Norwegian policy in the Caucasus and
Central Asia
NUPI seminar, Oslo, 10. June 2004
Central Asia and the Caucasus are
attracting increased international attention, and rightly so.
In the case of Central Asia, this
is first of all attributable to the region’s proximity to
Afghanistan and its strategic importance in the fight against
terrorism.
But secondly, there is a widely
shared concern that, in the absence of much-needed democratic
reforms and economic development, the countries of the region could
become breeding grounds for the kind of frustration and extremism
that nurtured the Taliban and Al Queda.
And thirdly, there is also a
growing concern as regards trafficking in drugs through the region.
The inflow of opium and heroin from Afghanistan has a debilitating
effect on Central Asian societies. But eventually most of these
drugs will of course end up on the streets of London, Paris, and
Oslo.
In many respects, then, the picture
is rather bleak as far as Central Asia is concerned. In the case of
the Caucasus, it seems to me, there are more shades and
nuances.
The good news is the “rose
revolution” in Georgia. A young, energetic president has taken
charge, with the support of more than 90% of the electorate. Still,
Georgia’s troubles are not over.
The economy is in ruins. And while
the crisis over Adjaria was peacefully resolved, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia remain significant challenges for the new government.
Although the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia have
improved, there appears to be little if any progress on the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia.
Yet a new beginning has been made.
President Saakashvili has obtained an exceptionally strong mandate
to push for political, economic, and social reforms long overdue.
It is crucial that he succeeds, for Georgia, for the region, and
for the broader international community. So far, the new Georgian
leaders seem to be getting the international support they clearly
need and richly deserve. We in Norway are committed to doing our
share.
But the case of Georgia
notwithstanding, from an overall point of view the
Caucasus continues to be a troubled region.
Nagorno Karabakh remains a
festering sore, causing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan and
abject misery to hundreds of thousands of IDPs. The peace process,
facilitiated by the OSCE Minsk Group, seemingly has ground to a
more or less complete stop.
And the countries of the region
continue to grapple with the legacy of the Communist past as well
as the after-effects of conflicts following the break-up of the
Soviet Union. This is true, of course, also with regard to the
countries of Central Asia. Economic development is sluggish at
best. Poverty is endemic. There are deep social strains and
divisions.
And although different in many
respects, the governments of the two regions have generally been
heavy-handed, not to say repressive, in their response to
opposition and dissidence.
Compliance with human rights and
rule of law commitments generally has been and remains deeply
unsatisfactory, particularly in countries such as Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. In Azerbaijan, too, there are serious human rights
problems. In some respects the situation in Azerbaijan has further
deteriorated in the aftermath of the presidential elections last
fall.
Yet all these countries have freely
undertaken to implement OSCE human rights and rule of law
commitments while the countries of the South Caucasus in addition
are bound by Council of Europe
standards.
This poses a dilemma for Western
governments which is further aggravated by the fact that the
countries of the two regions, and particularly those of Central
Asia, are significant contributors to the fight against terrorism
and the efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons and materials
of mass destruction.
It is understandable that some in
the NGO community are uneasy about this, particularly as regards
Central Asia. Concerns have been expressed that the international
community has turned a blind eye on repression and human
rights violations in order not to alienate important partners.
While some of these allegations
have been exaggerated, I think there is no denying that some
international reactions to human rights violations in Central Asia
have been somewhat muted in the post-9/11 period. The same has been
true as regards international reactions to events in the wake of
the presidential election in Azerbaijan.
To my mind, this kind of excessive
caution is regrettable, for it may convey the unintended message
that the international community does not feel strongly about the
observance of human rights, does not feel strongly about the rule
of law, and does not feel strongly about due process.
But having said this, I will
immediately add that speaking out is important, but it does not
make a policy in and of itself. Merely hitting your interlocutor
about the head is rarely conducive to building a constructive
relationship.
In my view we need a two-track
approach. In addition to pointing out human rights shortcomings and
infringements, we must also engage the countries concerned in
constructive dialogue and practical
cooperation.
And this kind of dialogue and
cooperation must include not only democratic reforms. In order to
be viable and constructive it has to encompass issues of primary
concern also to the other side.
In so far as Central Asia is
concerned, this is of course a familiar issue. The very decision to
invite the countries of the region, in the early nineties, to join
the OSCE was predicated on the idea that membership should mainly
be used to promote western values. Hence, the emphasis of the OSCE
in the beginning was almost exclusively on the human dimension.
But it soon became clear that this
approach did not work. Where the OSCE offered human rights and the
rule of law, the Central Asians asked for economic cooperation and
aid. As a result, the relationship was not going anywhere.
Gradually, the OSCE approach to
Central Asia has become more balanced. Not in the sense of
down-playing the human dimension. Human rights and the rule of law
remain at the core of the organization’s policy. Rather, the OSCE
approach has become more balanced in the sense that
security-related as well as economic and environmental issues have
become more important parts of the OSCE’s activities .
It was realized, in other words,
that it was essential to create incentives for the Central Asian
countries themselves to carry out much-needed reforms. And those
incentives were essentially to be found in economic development and
dealing with the daunting environmental problems that are part of
the Soviet legacy.
In my view the rationale for the
reorientation of the OSCE’s approach to Central Asia remains as
valid today as it was in the late nineties. We still need a
balanced aproach, to Central Asia and to the Caucasus, in the sense
I have just outlined.
As already noted, conditions in
individual countries differ widely. Generalization is dangerous, of
course. But in terms of promoting a positive development in both
regions, I see five particularly urgent priorities.
First, we in the international
community must step up our efforts to facilitate and promote the
emergence of sustainable, solid civil societies.
Grass-roots organizations and truly
independent media are of course desperately needed if democracy is
to take hold in these countries. The OSCE and the Council of Europe
have been doing some excellent work in these areas, but much more
could and should be done. And let there be no mistake about it:
This will be a long-term effort.
Second, we need to do more to
facilitate and promote security-sector reform.
No democracy will be safe and
sustainable in the absence of democratic control of armed forces.
There will be no rule of law unless the police respects basic
rights, and there will be no equality under the law unless judges
and prosecutors are incorruptible. This, too, will of course be a
long-term
effort.
Third, we need to do more to
facilitate and support efforts to roll back organized crime,
which is a major problem in the countries of the two regions.
Trafficking in drugs, arms, and –
most abhorrent of all – women and children – are of course
multi-million dollars industries. As a rule, the crime networks are
much better organized than the police. And they are usually capable
of much more efficient cross-border cooperation than the law
enforcement agencies trying to curb their activities.
Since much of the trafficked drugs
and many trafficking victims end up in Western countries, including
Norway, this is an area in which we have a very obvious
self-interest in supporting the countries of Central Asia and the
Caucasus.
Fourth, the international community
needs to be more active and forceful in promoting regional
cooperation.
Many of the most intractable
problems facing the region – be they related to the
environment, water rights or the fight against organized crime -
are trans-boundary in character. Trade and economic development
will obviously be very difficult in a situation where borders are
essentially closed and scheduled air-links are missing.
An obvious reponse to cross-border
challenges should logically be regional cooperation. Yet many of
the countries of the two regions are resisting this. Political
rivalries and suspicions have mitigated against regional
cooperation in the past, and still do.
And fifth, more needs to be done to
alleviate the suffering of IDPs and refugees.
The primary responsibility for this
rests squarely with the governments concerned. The plight of the
IDPs must not be used for propaganda purposes. But the
international community is not paying enough attention, either.
One million men,women, and children
have been forced to flee their homes and relocate as a result of
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict alone. I have seen for myself their
misery and suffering. International humanitarian organizations,
including some Norwegian ones represented here today, are doing a
tremendous job. Let me pay tribute to their untiring efforts. The
Norwegian government is committed to continuing its economic
support to the relief efforts.
But the best way of helping the
IDPs and refugees would of course be the resolution of the
conflicts that caused their uprooting in the first place. That,
too, of course is primarily up to the parties themselves.
As for Nagorno Karabakh, we hope
that the present impasse will be broken and that the parties will
soon resume the kind of direct contacts at the highest political
level that led to progress a few years ago. The international
community, through the co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group will of
course continue to support the process.
Ladies and
gentlemen,
Clearly, the international
community is facing significant challenges in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. The Norwegian response is essentially three-tiered:
First, we will maintain our support to enhancing the ties between
international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU and
the countries of the two regions. Second, we are strengthening our
bilateral relations with the countries of the Caucasus and Central
Asia. And third, we are increasing our economic support and project
cooperation, largely through co-operation with international
organizations and NGOs.
Against this backdrop, we are
gratified that both NATO and the European Union are committed to
engaging the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia in
structured, concrete, and ever closer cooperation.
Nato’s partnerships contribute
significantly to democratic reform and security cooperation across
the euro-atlantic area. At the upcoming NATO summit in Istanbul,
there will be a particular focus on the alliance’s partners in
central Asia and the Caucasus, with special emphasis on security
sector reform and other security-related issues.
Strengthening nato’s security
partnerships with the countries of the two regions is important in
the context of our response to the most pressing threats to
international security. As noted, these countries are in a position
to make significant contributions to the fight against
international terrorism and the efforts to prevent the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
We applaud furthermore the
commitment of the eu to bring the countries on its new external
borders closer to it. The new neighbourhood policy programmes will
be important instruments to foster and promote democratic reform
and economic development.
Later this month
european council is likely to
endorse inclusion of the countries of the south caucasus in the new
neighbours policy. This clearly will provide new impetus to
democratic and economic reforms in the three countries. We for our
part are committed to close cooperation with the eu on the
achievement of the objectives of the new neighbours
policy.
On 12
th> May Norway took over the Chairmanship of the
Ministerial Committee of the
Council of Europe for the next
six months. One of the priorities of the Norwegian chairmanship
will be to strengthen the Council’s role in promoting democracy and
human rights, good governance and conflict prevention, in the
countries of the Caucasus as well as in other member states.
And in Central Asia the UN and the OSCE are of course key players
with whom we cooperate closely.
We have allocated about 10 million
euro for projects in the South Caucasus. The money is spent mainly
on projects in the humanitarian area. In most cases the projects
are managed by the Norwegian refugee council, which is doing a
superb job in all the three countries of the region. Other main
areas of project co-operation are energy efficiency, health,
trafficking, free press and minority issues.
This year we have increase our
funding for projects in Georgia substantially, in order to support
the reforms undertaken by the new government. In Georgia we want to
increase in particular our funding of projects for judiciary
reform.
A word also on the situation in
Chechnya, which continues to be cause for
concern. There can be no justification for terrorist attacks such
as the one in the Grozny stadium last month. Russia has a
legitimate right to defend itself against terrorism. But security
needs must be addressed within international law and in
scrupulous compliance with human rights. Russia must hold
accountable any member of its military forces guilty of human
rights violations. This tragic conflict can only be resolved on the
basis of a political settlement in the context of Russia’s
territorial integrity. We hope the presidential elections this fall
will be free and fair.
In cooperation primarily with the
UN and Norwegian NGOs we will continue our humanitarian efforts,
mostly in support of IDPs in neighbouring Ingushetia. In addition
we will support a UNESCO project aiming to rebuild schools in
Chechnya. The security situation and the lack of a permanent
international presence in Chechnya are obstacles to the
humanitarian effort, but we hope that will change with time.
And through our Chairmanship of the
Council of Europe, we will follow up actively on the bilateral
co-operation programme with Russia on reforms in Chechnya. We look
forward to the report of the PACE Human Rights rapporteurs after
their recent visit in the region.
In
Central Asia, we will be
focussing mostly on security and the environment. The increase in
illegal trade and trafficking of human beings, weapons, drugs and a
weakened police and border control represent challenges to all of
us. Joint efforts to deal with the combination of poverty and
authoritarianism in the region are sorely needed.
Norway contributes substantially to
the OSCE police training program in Kyrgyzstan. This program has
been quite successful, and I think we need to widen the scope here.
We are also among the main contributors, through the UNODC, to the
efforts to curb drug trafficking, primarily in Tajikistan. To that
end we are also supporting an upgrading of border controls between
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Norway is also financing the first
comprehensive regional mapping project on trafficking in humans in
Central Asia.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
My aim this morning has been to
provide you with an overview of the situation in the Caucasus and
Central Asia and the Norwegian response to it. The situation is
rife with challenges and dilemmas. In the face of those challenges
and dilemmas there is no alternative to a balanced approach,
combining broad engagement and ever closer cooperation with
dialogue that at times will necessarily have to be direct and
critical.
But let us harbour no illusions.
The countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia are young nations
with a troubled past and a challenging future. The road to stable
democracy will be long and rocky.
Thank you.
