NATO/EAPC Conference on Guidelines and
Minimum Standards for the Protection of the Civilian Population
against CBRN Risks
Trondheim, 29 January 2004
Check against delivery
Ladies and Gentlemen,
We all have vivid memories of
September 11, 2001. The images that flickered across our television
screens on that terrible day have become ineradicably imbedded in
our minds. The attacks on the Twin Towers forced upon each and
everyone of us the realization that all nations, even the most
powerful among them, are vulnerable to the scourge of
terrorism.
Clearly, the world changed on that
day. International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction have become the defining security challenges of
the 21
st> century.
We know that some states are
actively seeking to obtain chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear weapons. We know that rogue and failed states are providing
safe havens for terrorists and those who traffic in illicit
substances, including chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear agents.
And we know that terrorist groups,
too, are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. No pains
must be spared to prevent this from happening. Recent attacks on
civilian targets in various parts of the world – in Bali, in
Casablanca, in Jerusalem, in Istanbul, and in Baghdad - have shown
that the terrorists are prepared to go to extreme lengths to
inflict maximum damage and suffering.
Even so, we must refrain from
dramatization and scare-mongering. While the threat of terrorism is
a real one, and while no nation is immune to it, the likelihood of
anybody in this room ever becoming a victim of a terrorist attack
is remote, at least in statistical terms. The same applies to major
accidents involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
agents or substances.
Yet we must be vigilant and as well
prepared for CBRN-related emergencies as we possibly can. When and
if they occur, such emergencies can, as everybody in this room
knows, be exceptionally destructive and create wide-spread
suffering and fatalities.
Hence, making civilian populations
less vulnerable and less exposed, and upgrading our ability to deal
with emergencies whenever and wherever they arise, is a high
priority of all the governments represented here today, and rightly
so. And that is why the present conference is an important one.
The involvement of NATO in
counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of course dates back to
well before 9.11. The Alliance identified terrorism as a key threat
as early as in the strategic concept which was adopted at the 1999
Washington Summit. And preventing the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction was defined as a principal goal of the Alliance a
decade ago.
But the New York and Washington
attacks of course added a new urgency to this work. They raised the
specter of extremist groups unleashing weapons of mass destruction
as the ultimate terror. As a result, the fight against terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction moved to the
top of NATO’s agenda.
In order to deal effectively with
these challenges, the Alliance has embarked upon a pervasive
process of adaptation. The clearest reflection of this is the
military transformation decided upon at Prague in late 2002: A new
command structure; a new rapid reaction force, the NATO Response
Force; new or upgraded capabilities in key areas such as sea and
air transport; and a new CBRN Battalion.
All of these are major ingredients
of NATO’s efforts to become more relevant in a changed and changing
security environment.
Since NATO is primarily a military
organisation, it should come as no surprise that much of its work
has concentrated on the protection of deployed troops. These
efforts are very important, and they have the full support of my
government.
But if there is one single thing
that recent terrorist outrages have taught us, it surely is that
military personnel are not the primary targets of terrorists.
Civilian populations often are. It is by putting innocent
bystanders in harm’s way that terrorists hope to achieve their
murky political objectives, or simply make their enemies
suffer.
Even the means of the terrorists
are some times civilian, the civilian airliners used on 9/11 being
a case in point. These were not advanced weapons of mass
destruction, but civilian assets, necessary for the working of
modern, open societies. Even more unberable prospects open up if
the terrorists should gain hold of weapons of mass destruction.
And they could. The UN Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, last week pointed to disturbing evidence of
increased trafficking in weapons and materials of mass destruction.
Mr. Annan expressed particular concern about indications of
enhanced cooperation and an emerging division of labor between
those involved.
And the extremists could create
chaos, panic and suffering without having access to advanced or
sophisticated weapons or agents. Simple devices such as the
rudimentary radiological weapons known as "dirty bombs" could
suffice.
We were starkly reminded of this
hazard last fall, when thieves tampered with and tried to steal
precious metal from two nuclear-powered lighthouse on the coast of
the Kola Peninsula in Northestern Russia.
There are about a thousand such
lighthouses scattered along the Russian coastline. They are powered
by highly radioactive strontium 90 batteries that could be used to
manufacture "dirty bombs". The lighthouses are very accessible and
hence represent a very real proliferation hazard.
For this reason, removing the
strontium 90 batteries and replacing them with environment-friendly
solar batteries have become a top priority in Norway’s
comprehensive nuclear safety cooperation with Russia, which dates
back to the mid-nineties, and which also aims to clean up
contaminated storage sites and dismantle nuclear-driven
submarines.
Nuclear safety in our view is a
crucial part of the efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and thus prevent the ultimate act of terror. We are
encouraged to see the increased international recognition of the
urgency attached to this work. This is clearly reflected in the
mobilisation, under the G8 Global Partnership, of some 20 billion
dollars, to be spent between 2002 and 2012 on efforts to prevent
the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Significant funds have been set
aside also in the context of the EU Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership. We for our part have actively associated
ourselves with the efforts of the G8 as well as the EU.
Nuclear safety is a perfect
illustration of the composite nature of the challenges facing us in
our efforts to upgrade preparedness and provide protection for
civilian populations. Unsafe storage of spent nuclear fuel and
various kinds of radioactive waste represent on the one hand a
formidable threat to the environment.
But equally it represents a
proliferation risk of the highest order, as seen in last fall’s
episode involving the Russian lighthouses. Hence, it is vitally
important to push forward energetically in the area of nuclear
safety, with a view to lessening the risks to civilian populations,
protecting the environment, and preventing fissile and radioactive
materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other
criminals.
And the Chernobyl catastrophe
showed us the devastation that could ensue at nuclear power plants
if sub-standard technology is combined with lax safety. Several
nuclear power plants of essentially the same type as the on in
Chernoby still are on line.
We will of course never be able to
protect ourselves one hundred percent against these or other
CBRN-related risks. Apart from the risk of a terrorist attack,
there is the risk of natural disasters, new viruses such as the
Asian bird flu come to mind, or human error causing emergencies.
That is why it is so important that we, while hoping for the best,
prepare ourselves for the worst.
Civil emergency planning is a
national responsibility. And it should continue to be so. But we do
also have an obligation to our populations to work together. We
have an obligation to ensure that best practices are shared within
the Alliance and with partners. We have an obligation to ensure
that if the worst were to happen, our police, our firefighters and
our health services – our first line of defence, - have recourse to
the the best procedures, the best training, and the best equipment
we can possibly provide.
And it is in our common interest
that the first responders are capable of receiving or giving
assistance across national borders, quickly and without loss of
efficiency.
It was against this background that
the joint initiative by Finland, Sweden and Norway was born. We
recognised that guidelines and voluntary minimum standards for the
protection against CBRN risks would be of value to all countries,
Alliance members and EAPC partners alike.
I find it particularly important
that partner countries are playing a crucial role in this
initiative. This conference and its follow-up would not have been
possible were it not for the efforts of Finland and Sweden. And
most other partner countries is to have enthusiastically embraced
the cause of civil emergency protection against CBRN-related risks.
Hence this is a very concrete way of bringing substance to the
EAPC, while at the same time enhancing the value of this work to
NATO. This, it seems to me, is what this partnership is all
about.
With the interest and commitment
shown by all the governments represented here today, I am confident
that this Conference will result in concrete and constructive
recommendations for how this important work should be taken forward
both in NATO and in all member and partner countries.
And I would be particularly
interested to see specific recommendations for closer co-operation
between NATO and other international organisations, particularly
the EU. This work should also be taken forward within the
NATO-Russia Council. Russia is an important partner, in this as in
so many other areas.
In conclusion, I would encourage
you to keep in sharp focus the need for increased interoperability.
There is no other word more popular on the military side of the
house. But our colleagues in uniform have a point. From experience,
I know and understand the value of interoperability when we act
together. Guidelines and voluntary minimum standards are an
important step on the way towards a greater degree of
interoperability also when it comes to protecting our civilian
populations.
Thank you for your attention.
