Common Security Concerns of Norway and China

First of all, a warm welcome to our guests from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI – and to all of you who have come to this seminar.

As all of you probably know, SIPRI is one of the world’s leading think tanks on foreign and security policy issues.

-And I and my staff at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been fortunate to benefit from close cooperation with you for many years now.

Let me also add that with the appointment of Bates Gill as the new director of SIPRI in 2007, our neighbours in Sweden became host to one of the most prominent US experts on Asian security affairs.

Today Bates Gill is accompanied by Senior Researcher Linda Jakobson from your Beijing office, who has also been an invaluable source of insight and food for thought. We are very glad that you are both here.

Today’s seminar is being held at a very timely moment. During the final weeks of 2009, we saw China performing its role as a key player on the world stage.

-Both at the Copenhagen climate summit and during the meetings in Beijing between the world’s two most influential leaders: Presidents Hu and Obama.

China’s rise has been too fast for many of us to adjust our mindset.

Let me stress here at the outset that the important thing is not so much to ask what the new world order will look like in the future, as to absorb and accept what is already a fact.

After many years of anticipating a multipolar world, many are rightly wondering if we haven’t already witnessed the birth of a new bipolar world order.

A few years back, most of us would have said this was not the most likely scenario.

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Here in Norway there has been, and still is, a growing interest in China.

Our bilateral contacts cover a range of fields from language and culture to development cooperation, from dialogue on Arctic affairs and environmental issues to human rights.

Trade and investment have also increased at a remarkable pace. And we are now in talks about a free trade agreement

The Norwegian Government have emphasised the importance of engaging China in all these different political issues. There are many reasons for that, but the fact that China in 2008 overtook Germany as the world’s third largest economy is of course one important element.  

In spite of the global economic crisis, China is on course to take the second spot from Japan in a few months from now.

But what is next?

China already exerts considerable global influence, and this development continues to accelerate.

Many here in the so-called West find the rapidity of it all puzzling and don’t quite know how to respond.

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These days there is naturally a great deal of focus on China’s economic role.

 It is the largest foreign investor in many parts of the world, and holds about half of the world’s currency reserves. It is a growing investor also in the Norwegian economy.

But as we all know –it is not only when it comes to the ecenomy we see the importance of China.

China’s level of greenhouse gas emissions brings it into the spotlight in the climate debate.

The human rights dimension also gets a lot of worldwide attention, including from the Norwegian Government.

And then also on security, which is what we are going to focus in today.

Virtually every day, there is a report or an editorial in the world’s leading media about the security situation in China or in its immediate neighbourhood and – importantly – about areas where China exerts global influence.

The issues range from China’s role as the world’s fifth largest nuclear power – with a modernised arsenal of mid- and long-range nuclear missiles – to its role in peacekeeping efforts.

We know about Chinas direct involvement in Sudan, its approach to Afghanistan and its position as a major energy consumer.

It is also playing an increasingly active part in the UN Security Council with a crucial say on Iran, and is taking an active interest in the Arctic with an evolving relationship to our common neighbour, Russia.

Only a few years ago, this picture was very different. China’s influence was less evident.

China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping famously maintained that China should “hide its capabilities and bide its time” – at least until the country was able to assert its international position more forcefully.

Today, the picture is clearer. We see signs of ambition in all the areas I have just mentioned, and China is also developing a more modern military, as those who watched the display on 1 October last year – the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic – can testify to.

The key question is what kind of nation China will be in a few years from now, and how it will impact on the multilateral system and other nations.

I am a strong believer in the multilateral system that was established after the second World War with the UN at its core.

-But this system was created while China still was undergoing a period of recovery.

-And the economic reforms that Deng Xiaoping introduced in 1978 didn’t unleash the kind of political power and influence we are witnessing today, until about ten years ago.

For almost a decade now, we have seen a much stronger and more assertive China.

It has been a constructive – and some would say essential – partner in the efforts to stem North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. For this China is respected.

The world looks to China for advice on this and many, many other important challenges.

And that in itself leads me to the issue of today’s seminar: common security concerns.

Many would ask: What kind of concerns does Norway share with China? And could two such different countries develop an equally beneficial relationship?

From my perspective, these are not difficult questions to answer.

Our differences are less relevant than ever, and the world has never been smaller. With the age of globalisation, our common sphere of interest has expanded.

Yes, Norway is a small country at the very north of Europe, while China is an Asian country the size of a continent.

About every sixth person on our planet is Chinese, while Norwegians account for only 0.07 per cent of the world’s population.

Moreover, we do not have the same positions on all foreign and security policy issues. But that could be said for virtually any country.

The Norwegian Government attaches particular importance to promoting dialogue and seeking mutually beneficial cooperation despite differences that may exist.

One of these areas of cooperation will be highlighted by Linda today, as she presents SIPRI’s report on China and the Arctic.

You may already be aware that Chinese scientists established a research station in Ny Ålesund in Svalbard back in 2004 and its activities have increased ever since.

This is something the Norwegian Government values and will continue to encourage. China’s scientific presence on Svalbard is a big asset.

While the melting of the Arctic ice is in no way desirable, it will provide opportunities for Arctic transport. In the near future it will become possible to sail from Norway to China along the Russian coast.

The polar explorers dreamed of using the Northeast Passage, and a hundred years later their dream may come true.

Taking a route from Europe to Asia directly over the Arctic will reduce the distance between Rotterdam and Shanghai by 35% compared to sailing through the Suez Canal.

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Let me conclude by mentioning that exactly a year ago, the Norwegian Government presented a white paper on the main features of Norwegian foreign policy.

Political developments in Asia in general, and China in particular, are one of the main themes, and a whole section is devoted to Asia’s impact on our security policy.

In our work abroad, at our embassies in New Delhi, Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo, we are now devoting more time and resources to security policy than ever before.

And we are also increasing the staff at our embassies and consulates in China.

In January last year, our colleagues at the Ministry of Defence posted their first Norwegian defence attaché to Beijing. He is already working closely with the rest of the team at our embassy to strengthen our dialogue with China.

Here in Oslo, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we are assigning more personnel to develop dialogue and seek cooperation with China and other Asian counterparts.

A major part of this strengthening of our work is also cooperation with think tanks at home and abroad.

In this regard SIPRI’s role as adviser and sparring partner for new ideas and concepts has been invaluable. It is therefore with great pleasure that I give the floor to Bates and Linda.

Bates, Linda, the floor is yours.