Opening statement at the Contact Expert
Group Seminar on RTGs
Oslo, 16 February 2005
(
Forklarende tekst på
norsk)
Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen.
I take great pleasure in welcoming
all of you to Oslo and this workshop on the challenges related to
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, or RTGs, that serve as
power generators in hundreds of lighthouses along the Russian
coastline.
We are extremely pleased to host
this gathering of prominent experts, all the more so since it is
held under the auspices of the Contact Expert Group of the
IAEA.
As we see it, the CEG has become
the most important forum for developing priorities and
co-ordinating international projects aimed at assisting the Russian
Federation in the field of nuclear safety and security.
The issue before us is an important
one. RTGs are powered by highly radioactive strontium batteries. By
and large they are unsecured and accessible. Hence, they represent
a very real proliferation hazard.
Recently, the UN Secretary General,
Kofi Annan, as well as the high level panel on UN reform, have
pointed to disturbing evidence of increased efforts on the part of
terrorist networks to acquire weapons or materials of mass
destruction.
Extremists could create chaos,
panic, and suffering without having access to advanced or
sophisticated weapons or agents. Rudimentary radiological weapons
of the type known as “dirty bombs” would suffice.
If RTG batteries were to fall into
the hands of terrorists, they could be used to put together such
devices. And this is not a purely theoretical
threat.
In the recent past, lighthouses
have been tampered with and parts stolen on several occasions. To
be sure, the purpose of the perpetrators appears to have been
gaining access to valuable scrap metal. But the motive could
equally have been linked to more sinister designs, including
terrorism. Hence, these are ominous events about which there is
every reason to be concerned.
Let me note in passing,
furthermore, that there have also been other incidents
involving RTGs. I understand this will be a topic for discussion
later during this workshop.
Against this backdrop, the task
before us is clearly urgent. And the way we deal with it is
important, too. Co-ordination among donors and avoidance of overlap
will be crucial if we are to produce optimal results in as limited
a timeframe as possible.
Norway has been actively engaged in
dealing with nuclear safety and security issues in Northwestern
Russia for the past ten years. Over this period, we have spent more
than 1 billion NOK (approximately 150 million USD).
In the beginning, there was hardly
any experience to learn from, little knowledge about the volume and
complexity of the challenges, and limited openness on the Russian
side in many areas. Much has changed since then.
Step by step we have built an
exceptionally close and productive cooperation with our Russian
partners. Let me pay particular tribute in
this regard to my friend Sergey
Antipov, who is with us this morning.
Along with the United States,
Norway was the first of Russia’s international partners to become
involved in nuclear safety cooperation. At the time, nuclear safety
was perceived as primarily a regional environmental issue.
11 September 2001 shattered that
perception, of course. Nuclear safety has become an integral part
of our joint efforts to counter new security threats such as
terrorism and the spread of weapons and materials of mass
destruction.
Much has been accomplished since
that tragic day. The formation almost four years ago of the G-8
Global Partnership was a watershed event. If we follow through on
the commitments we have made, there is a realistic hope that major
parts of the job will be done by the end of the present decade or
the beginning of the next.
If that is to happen, however,
broad and concerted international action and sustained involvement
on the part of individual donors will be required. We for our part
are committed to continuing and further developing our nuclear
safety cooperation with Russia
There is broad consensus in this
country as to the importance of this work. Our guiding principles
will continue to be the achievement of tangible results, value for
money, and close cooperation with Russian authorities.
Our priority areas of cooperation
are firstly rehabilitation of the Andreyev Bay storage site for
nuclear waste, secondly, dismantling of multi-purpose
nuclear-powered submarines, and thirdly removal of RTGs in
Northwest Russia.
Norwegian-Russian cooperation on
securing RTGs in Northwest Russia goes back to 1997. So far, we
have provided funding for the removal of 60 RTGs, and the
installation of environmentally friendly solar-cell panels in 37
lighthouses.
Norway very much appreciates the
interest shown by a number of donor countries in the RTG project.
As noted, the RTGs are threats to the environment and a real
proliferation hazard.
But removing and replacing them is
a very concrete and manageable task, which could be accomplished in
the foreseeable future,
provided efforts are well co-ordinated and labour
efficiently divided.
Norway’s is ready to take the lead
and a primary responsibility for ensuring the removal and
replacement of all the 110 remaining RTGs along the
northern coast of the Russian part of the Barents region, i.e. the
regions of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Nenets, by the year 2008.
To this end, we are currently
exploring the possibility of signing an agreement of intention with
Rosatom, identifying this as a Norwegian responsibility.
However, there are
one thousand RTGs mounted in lighthouses and navigation
beacons along the northern and eastern coast of the Russian
Federation – from Murmansk to Vladivostok.
My hope is that other donors will
follow Norway’s example, and co-operate with Russia in removing
RTGs from
all parts of the Russian territory – in the Baltic Sea,
along the northern sea route in Siberia and in the Russian Far
East.
The United States and the IAEA are
already involved and active in this work. Recovering RTGs and other
orphan sources in the former Soviet Union was an important part of
the “Trilateral Initiative” between the US, Russia, and the
IAEA.
Last year’s US-led Global Threat
Reduction Initiative also focused on the need to reduce the global
radiological threat posed by vulnerable radioactive sources. We
look forward to hearing more about these efforts later in the
course of the workshop.
The responsibility for the
co-ordination of international efforts lies, of course, with the
government of Russia. My understanding is that some work still
remains in order to have a full overview of all RTGs belonging to
various Russian organisations, and their exact location and
condition.
The objectives of this workshop are
to increase awareness of the proliferation and environmental risks
posed by RTGs, and to exchange information and experience from
completed and ongoing projects. As a result of the workshop, we
hope that donors may be able to define specific activities and
co-ordinate their efforts.
This workshop is timely and highly
valuable. Hence, in conclusion I would like to thank the Contact
Expert Group for the initiative. I hope and trust the workshop will
be a productive one, and that it will generate constructive
recommendations leading to practical results.
Thank you for your attention.
