Perspectives on Trans-Atlantic values for future generations

The 47th Annual Security Conference, Den norske Atlanterhavskomite (DNAK). Theme: Trans-Atlantic values and interests in a multipolar world. Session III: Trans-Atlantic values for future generations.

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Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, good morning to you all,

• Thank you for the invitation to speak at this conference. Initially, I was invited to the first day. However, I have spent the last two days in (“the Free and Hanseatic city of”) Hamburg, meeting Nordic and Baltic colleagues, German politicians and representatives of the dynamic Norwegian–German business communities there.
• I would also like to thank the Norwegian Atlantic Committee for holding these conferences every year. I have attended quite a few. The conference has become a platform – a valuable arena – for discussing security policy here in Northern Europe as well as global security and other broad foreign policy issues.
• My topic today is “transatlantic values for future generations”. I don’t know too much about the future, but I’m glad to have the opportunity to address “a future audience” – that includes you, young people from all over the transatlantic alliance. A hearty welcome to you all. The speakers following me represent not only the geographical breadth but also the future of the alliance.
• Now, about the concepts: values – common views and destiny. Practising common values.
• My address has three parts:

First, a brief historical perspective and look at the role of values and interests when the transatlantic alliance was founded.

Second, I want to see whether we are now approaching “the end of a defining decade” in international relations.

And third, a few words on the times we are living in, turbulent – with economic crises and geopolitical changes – what are the threats today? (Technological and economic imbalances).

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• Now, first, a historical perspective. What are “transatlantic values”? (To what extent do we share a platform of common values?)
• Shaped an alliance. On 4 April 1949, after over a year of negotiations, 12 countries gathered in Washington DC to formally establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In his speech on the occasion, President Harry Truman said that NATO should be “a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression – a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens”. A shield against aggression. A bulwark. A “fuller and happier life”. “Get on with the real business of government and society”.
• By stating this, Truman stressed from the very beginning a fundamental value for NATO: security. Shield. Protection.
• For we should remember that security or safety itself is a value – in fact, I believe that it is the most fundamental value that NATO should protect. (However, isn’t “security” also a foreign policy “interest”? You will, no doubt, discuss this later today.)
• Today, many of us in Europe take security for granted. Historically, this has often not been the case, in fact it never is! Quite to the contrary – through most of our history, achieving protection, security, safety, and certainty about the future has been one of the central aims of foreign policy, in fact – of any foreign policy. The very reason for foreign policy.
• This is a fact – an important historical lesson to remember – as it is also true for us today.
• Collective defence as expressed by NATO – that an attack against one member is an attack against us all – is our strongest safeguard. It is our most potent deterrent. This is and will remain our primary “shield from aggression”, to use President Truman’s words.
• The idea of an Atlantic alliance was already debated during the Second World War:
• After World War Two, Trygve Lie from Furuset/Grorud in Oslo (the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government in exile in England, later the UN’s first Secretary General), lectured at universities and wrote articles about the need to establish a formal alliance between the democracies bordering the North Atlantic. Lie called the Norwegians “a people of the Atlantic” and argued in favour of an alliance formed by the “Atlantic powers”: Great Britain and the United States. – Quite a contrast to the situation after World War I – and the result of certain lessons learned.
• Now, the democracies that gathered in April 1949 in Washington DC were different – but well united in many different ways. They were united by

  a strong mutual strategic interest in a military alliance,

  a common history of standing together against Nazism and totalitarianism,

  and a common geographical position in the North Atlantic.

• In sum:

  common geography,

  shared history, and

  the need to stand together.

• On a more fundamental level, the countries were, of course, also united by common values – about how our societies should be organised, namely:

  a commitment to democracy,

  free institutions,

  human rights,

  open economies,

  o the rule of law,

  o and the freedom to choose your own life.

• The driving force behind creating a military alliance was of course not only the fact that they – that we – shared some common values, but rather our mutual interests in gaining security by standing together. (Our interests – protect our shared values – go hand in hand).
• This is illustrated by the fact that while Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is well-known, few are familiar with Article 2. Article 2 deals with our common values – and it was these shared ideals that held us together during fifty years of Cold War, I believe.
• Part of Article 2 reads: “the Parties will contribute toward the further development of  peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions … by promoting conditions of stability and well-being … they will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies …” etc.
• So, one of my points is this: the solidity of Article 5 was based on the strength of common values and shared ideals.
• Now: moving 40 years on from 1949 to 1989: Our values were also important when the Cold War came to an end. And we remember how the role, purpose and future of NATO were very much debated in the 1990s: (This was or is underreported in the media, in my view). What is NATO’s purpose? We remember the whole discussion – how the phrase “out of area or out of business” was coined by those in favour of NATO expansion to maintain the relevance of the Alliance, while for many others, the concept of “out of area” was almost taboo at that time. (Apropos the 1990s, yesterday in Hamburg I met Helmut Schmidt, and we celebrated 20 years of the Baltic Sea States’ cooperation (Østersjørådet), 1992–2012).
• Our ideals were part of our appeal to our friends in Central and Eastern Europe as they began to throw off the shackles of Communism. I still believe that the Alliance, to these prospective new members, was essential in providing peace and stability for Europe.
• And even after the existential threat from the Warsaw Pact disappeared, the core values that helped forge the Alliance at the beginning are still at the heart of our cooperation.
• We should ask ourselves: What did these countries from Central and Eastern Europe seek? A road out of communism – out of external dominance – into a family and community of shared values.
• This is my first message to you. The core, the transatlantic values are still there. Times have changed but a solid platform stands. The Alliance has stood the test.
• The new Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon (2010) defines three core tasks for NATO:

collective defence,

crisis management,

and cooperative security.

• The 2010 Strategic Concept also sums up the purpose of NATO in a single sentence, which is not very different from the ambition articulated in Truman’s 1949 speech, namely that “NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means”. Freedom, security.

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• Now, security threatened. The events of 9/11 2001 had dramatic consequences in the United States and around the world.
• In fact, 9/11 and its consequences have been a defining factor in international relations in the last decade. The events of 9/11 led to NATO invoking Article 5 for the first time in our history. Attacked by a group, not by a state.
• Based on a broad mandate from the UN Security Council, the Alliance gradually became engaged in the conflict in Afghanistan, far outside its area of responsibility, leading up to the formal takeover of the ISAF-operation in 2003.
• This operation was – and still is – carried out at the request of and on behalf of the United Nations, based on a unanimous resolution in the Security Council. The Alliance has subsequently been joined by a number of other countries – there are around 50 countries contributing to ISAF (about a fourth of all the countries in the world).
• While we have achieved several important milestones in Afghanistan, the road has been difficult and the operation has also proven to be more challenging than originally anticipated.
• In 2003, another military operation was started, in Iraq, also in the wake of 9/11. There is no doubt that the run-up to this war was a difficult time for the transatlantic alliance and it drove a “wedge” into transatlantic relations.
• While the Afghanistan operation expressed our determination to defend our security, our common set of values, many allies believed this was not the case with Iraq, as there was no UN Security Council mandate. NATO played no role in the decision to invade or in the running of the military campaign in Iraq.
• The debate surrounding Iraq, the methods used by some allies in the so-called “war on terrorism”, the rhetoric – “evil” states, “us” and “them”, “with us or against us”, “coalition of the willing” etc. – proved to be divisive. While many of the anti-terrorism efforts were necessary in order to prevent another terrorist attack and the proliferation of Al-Qaida (and their affiliates and organisations inspired by them), some of the measures taken at this time were clearly at odds with our ideals and core values. There are rules that need to be followed also in wars.
• This is the challenge for our democracies. To protect our deepest values and safeguard our security.

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• Another point I would like to make here is this: Who do we talk to in international politics?
• Who do we have to talk to – in order to meet the challenges of finding a shared road to peace? And who are our counterparts? (And: Isn’t the ability to talk, to create a room for dialogue, in itself also a “value”, an “ideal”, or even an “interest”? What do you think? Think about it? Is the last decade a “lost decade”? Reflect on diplomacy: States versus groups. The problem today is that our counterparts are not traditional states, but groups inside countries.)
• In the immediate years after 9/11 there was a tendency for every armed opposition group to be labelled as terrorists. You were – you are – not supposed to talk to terrorists. This created little room to manoeuvre when it came to peace and reconciliation efforts.
• As I have emphasised many times, I am a strong defender of the importance of dialogue. (I have written an article in the New York Review of Books on the subject that you’ll find on the web, and I have also posted “a TED talk” – see YouTube or Ted.com).
• Norway has a history of working for reconciliation – and this is still given high priority in our foreign policy – both as an interest and a value. But in the geopolitical climate at the beginning of last decade, this was not always easy. Now times have changed, and I hope – and I see signs that – there will be more room for dialogue in international politics in the years ahead.
• For instance: I believe it was a mistake for us not to talk to the Taliban for several years. I am glad that we now see greater willingness from other countries to talk to them, as we try to find a political solution in Afghanistan. (Because: there is no purely military solution).
• Now that we are in 2012, more than ten years have passed since 9/11. The military operation in Iraq is over. In Afghanistan, we are gradually scaling down our military engagement. We have started the process of transition towards handing over responsibility for security to the Afghan security forces. More than half the Afghan population now lives in provinces that are controlled by Afghan government forces. In 2014, this process of transition will be completed and NATO combat forces will have left the country.
• (Then – a dilemma – and some may ask: Do we/did we try to “export” our (“transatlantic”) values to the Afghans? To what extent can we accept that there are certain values – or traditions, ways of life – in Afghan society that we will not be able to change or have an impact on? What about women’s rights, their freedoms?) 

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Dear friends,

• We see new, important developments on the international scene:

On both sides of the Atlantic, countries are struggling with major economic challenges, large debts, high unemployment, social and political unrest etc.,

whereas countries to the east and south of us are growing rapidly.

• This pattern could potentially accelerate the ongoing shift in the balance of power in the world today. (But: Should we worry about this? Now that the balance of power is shifting, will the predominant values “change”?) 
• US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently wrote an article in Foreign Policy – America’s Asian Century – where she argued that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan or Iraq”.
• The Obama administration recently announced in its revised defence strategy that it would focus more on the Asia-Pacific region.
• (Apropos Asia: I met with Robert D. Kaplan the other day. We discussed the rise of India, and the Indian Ocean as a new focus area in global politics).
• So, on the one hand,
  • the direct consequences of 9/11 are gradually decreasing, while at the same time
  • changes in the geopolitical balance of power are leading to a stronger focus on emerging powers and regions.
• My point is this: The sum of these two trends is that we are entering a decade that will be very different from the previous one.
• The years ahead will be shaped by these new geopolitical trends and emerging powers (economically, politically and culturally) on the international scene. We have already started to see this in multilateral organisations. (For example WTO, G20).
• In certain areas of international politics, this could potentially be challenging for us in the transatlantic alliance – or it could at least create dilemmas – as some of the rising powers have different values from ours. (But then we can ask: to what extent are “the universal values” perceived as universal? How do people all over the world define “security” and “safety” today? And remember that Article 2 (NATO) talks about “conditions of stability and well-being”. Now, this is food for thought...)
• Of course, the global shift does not mean that we will abandon Afghanistan, or that Al-Qaida is no longer a threat. We will not weaken our resolve to prevent another terrorist attack. We will continue our fight against terrorism. We will continue to fight extremist terrorist organisations, while at the same time we will also adjust our efforts so that we are ready to meet other potential security challenges. The point is that the security challenges cannot be fought by military means alone.

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• Now, when we describe the threats or risks of our times, uncertainty and unpredictability are the words that sum them up best. (In the same way as zero-polarity or multi-polarity can describe today’s geopolitics, versus the more stable unipolarity and then bipolar power balance some years ago).
• I attended a briefing at Reitan, Bodø, a few years ago: What are we threatened by? Started thinking: Is risks a better concept than threats? --- the environment, pollution, climate change, LNG ships (HSE issues), accidents in the Northern Sea Route, overfishing, human trafficking, viruses, terrorism, sabotage of oil platforms ---
• Several NATO countries are in the midst of their worst economic crisis since the 1930s. The EU is being tested in ways it has not been tested before. Not a military threat to security, but threats to values – amounting to a threat to security?
• Youth unemployment is now reaching 50% in Spain and Greece. I worry about the many unemployed young men and women on both sides of the Atlantic and how this will affect their belief in the future. Opinion polls have shown that today’s optimists, regarding their future lives and opportunities, live in the East and not in the West. More specifically, I worry about their belief in the justice and fairness of the foundations of our societies. Will Europe get another “lost generation”? This is extremely worrying.

• From a traditional security perspective, we need to pay close attention to the consequences of the crisis. The social costs of the economic crisis are very high.  State budgets, including defence budgets, will continue be under pressure on both sides of the Atlantic.

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• Now, to conclude, when we discuss transatlantic values, can we draw lessons from history? Can we compare the world in 1949 to the world in 2012? For one thing, back then there were just over 50 countries in the world, large parts of the world were still colonies, and the world was beginning to be divided by a sharp global ideological conflict, the Cold War.
• Today there are 193 member states of the UN, the number of democracies has grown, the Soviet Union no longer exists, the economic rise of the BRICs is gradually giving these countries more political say, and the world – as a whole – is slowly recovering from the worst economic crisis in several decades. NATO has also changed a great deal: it has gone from having 12 to 28 members, from being a defence alliance focused largely on a single threat to the East, to becoming a political and security organisation that deals with a much wider range of security challenges.
• I believe that the shared values within NATO are the same today as in 1949. Both the world and NATO itself have changed dramatically, but our values have stayed the same. So, yes, there are “transatlantic values” both for present and future generations. Different settings, same values. I also believe that – even though the world has changed – transatlantic cooperation and the security guarantee in NATO remains a stable anchor, at least for Norway. In the face of, for example, uncertainties due to the economic crises and geopolitical changes, the stability NATO gives us is especially important. It has high priority in Norwegian foreign policy.
• The transatlantic relationship has been and will continue to be at the core of NATO. Our values have stood the test of turbulent times before. They are a compass that guides us as we walk into an uncertain future. We do not know what we will have to confront in the future. Who predicted  the fall of the Berlin Wall, the events of 1989, the renewed independence of the three Baltic states in1991, 9/11, or the Arab Spring? NATO itself has also several times shown an ability to adapt in response to new and emerging threats.

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