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Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment

Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: A Strategic Evaluation

FEBRUARY 2014





About this Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a high-level strategic review of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), highlighting strengths and weaknesses in the past, key elements of its current status, and possible threats and opportunities in the future. It is separate from, but complementary to, the real-time evaluation program conducted through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The primary intended audience is members of the Government of Norway, including Parliamentarians, Ministers, permanent secretaries, and bureaucrats. It will also be available to the general public and the broader intended audience includes anyone engaged with, or interested in, topics related to REDD+, climate, forests, international development, and environmental protection.

The methodology consisted of a literature review regarding the history of REDD+ and NICFI, and a series of off-the-record interviews with a variety of key leaders and practitioners engaged in REDD+ efforts. It included a site visit to Jakarta, Indonesia to conduct in-person interviews with representatives from government, industry, civil society, and research organizations engaged in various aspects of REDD+ efforts. More details can be found in Appendix 1.

Acknowledgements

We are deeply grateful for the time and insights of those we interviewed for this evaluation. While comments and opinions are not attributed to specific individuals in order to maintain confidentiality and enable them to speak freely, the interview subjects are listed in Appendix 2. The information from these individuals was central to this evaluation. It would not have been possible without them.

The logistical support and guidance from the Meridian Institute, the NICFI team, and the Norwegian embassy in Indonesia were invaluable to the process of this evaluation. Their commitment to ensuring the evaluation was independent while also being responsive and supportive to the evaluators made the process as efficient and effective as possible.

We thank the people and Government of Norway for their commitment and leadership in efforts to mitigate climate change, conserve the world's great tropical forests upon which we all depend, and protect the rights and livelihoods of those people who rely directly on the forests day-to-day.



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Executive Summary

Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) was launched in 2007 by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg with a pledge to provide more than US\$500 million a year to REDD+.

This bold commitment was made in the context of substantial skepticism about the feasibility of the REDD+ mechanism and significant concerns from indigenous groups and civil society around several issues, including the rights of local and indigenous peoples, land tenure, benefits sharing, measurement issues, governance, and enforcement. NICFI was conceptualized as a bridge to a comprehensive climate agreement expected to be reached in 2009, but which did not materialize.

NICFI's strategy consisted of (among other things) using a pay-for-performance approach, emphasizing national ownership for REDD+ efforts, and fostering an atmosphere of cooperation and broad engagement. Norway entered into a series of bilateral agreements, most notably committing \$1 billion each to Brazil and Indonesia and \$250 million to Guyana. NICFI also provided hundreds of millions of dollars through multilateral channels, helping to establish the UN-REDD Programme, and supporting the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Norway is also providing over \$230 million in grants to civil society organizations working on various aspects of REDD+ readiness and implementation.

Our evaluation included a literature review and background research, but is based primarily on off-the-record interviews with high-level actors and stakeholders and experts in the REDD+ space. We spent a week in Jakarta, Indonesia meeting with key representatives, which gave us a deeper look at the core issues. The trip reinforced and helped us refine the findings and recommendations that resulted from our global interviews.

Overall we found that NICFI's basic premise – that a large investment in REDD+ was necessary and could be effective in advancing global forest carbon efforts – has proven to be sound. Interviewees largely agreed that NICFI has been a game changer in forest protection, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development efforts. Key elements for this finding included the top-level engagement by the Prime Minister, the size of the financial commitments (in the billions), the work done at the national level (as opposed to project level), and the fact that Norway encouraged forest-country ownership of REDD+ through its results-based approach, allowing Norway to be relatively hands off in terms of implementation. The fact that Norway's new ruling party was instrumental in creating NICFI and continues to champion it is critical to ongoing success.

As a result, our main recommendation is that NICFI stay the course and continue to invest at least at current levels, and ideally at increased levels, to support growing momentum in REDD+. We suggest that NICFI continue to expand at its current pace and continue to be responsive to feedback and adapt as circumstances evolve. We emphasize the importance of continued active engagement from the highest levels of the Norwegian government, particularly in terms of connecting quickly with new governments following the upcoming elections in Indonesia and Brazil.

We found that NICFI created the political space needed to improve forest governance. The sufficiently large financial incentives combined with top-level political engagement and a respectful, collaborative approach to partnership opened doors for many in forest countries to pursue their goals of protecting and sustainably managing their nation's natural resources in ways that supported strong economic development. At the same time, it became clear that in some cases the fundamental reform needed to achieve emission-reduction results can take considerable time and effort and may require



upfront outside funding to sustain progress. NICFI has worked to address this by providing support via multilateral channels and releasing payments early in certain cases. We recommend NICFI consider explicitly expanding its definition of “performance” to provide clear and transparent mechanisms for making such payments in a way that does not compromise the benefits of the current hands-off approach. We also found that while NICFI’s small team size in Oslo and on the ground has many advantages, marginal increases should be considered at this point to ensure there is capacity to follow country-specific development sufficiently and respond to requests for information and assistance appropriately.

Norway’s support has created high expectations in many countries around REDD+. In a sense Norway has brought upon itself a responsibility for ensuring those expectations are sufficiently met, even if a comprehensive international climate agreement does not bring significant additional funding to the effort, as originally hoped. We recommend NICFI endeavor to build a shared vision of future success among REDD+ actors and create plans for a variety of possible future scenarios that may or may not include a global climate agreement. These scenarios should include building coalitions of the willing among donor and forest countries to maintain momentum in REDD+ implementation.

All but absent from our conversations with high-level representatives was the notion that forest protection is necessarily to the detriment of economic development. The idea that these types of efforts prioritize trees over people would have been common five years ago. While that kind of rhetoric is certainly still prevalent in certain circles, it appears that a profound evolution in

thinking about the relationship of natural systems and economic development is taking place as a result of advances in REDD+. Despite NICFI now residing solely in the Ministry of Climate and Environment, continued collaborative participation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is important to ensuring the growth of such positive trends. We also recommend continuing to build the business case for REDD+ – both at the individual firm level and economy-wide – by commissioning studies and engaging more deeply with the private sector (internationally and nationally).

NICFI’s support is widely acknowledged as critical to advancing technical and conceptual issues related to monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV). Mapping efforts are improving in forest countries, which are critical not only for REDD+ but also for forest governance generally. Interviewees also praised Norway’s broad, collaborative approach for its effectiveness in fostering constructive dialogue leading to breakthroughs on longstanding, seemingly intractable issues related to rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, land tenure, and benefit sharing. The CSO funding strategy was largely credited for these successes. Virtually all interviewees hoped that this strategy would continue and some noted that expanding funding to national and local CSOs would be beneficial to NICFI’s goals.

While awareness and understanding of REDD+ has grown tremendously over the past seven years, it has largely been limited to the specialized groups of direct stakeholders. We recommend NICFI develop proactive, professional communication strategies for both REDD+ generally and NICFI itself, to meet core strategic goals of ensuring political support in donor nations for REDD+ funding and in forest nations for integrating REDD+ into development strategies.



Introduction

REDD+ and the International Climate Negotiations

Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg launched Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) at the 2007 UN climate change conference in Bali. He announced that Norway was prepared to commit significant funding – more than US\$500 million per year – to prevent deforestation in developing countries.

REDD+ (*reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks*) was a relatively new concept. At that time there were strong objections from indigenous groups and civil society organizations (CSOs) based on concerns around the reliability of measuring and setting baselines for emissions; monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV); the rights of local and indigenous peoples; benefit sharing; land tenure; governance; and enforcement.

How could stakeholders be sure protected forests really would not be impacted now or in the future? Would protecting forests lead to perverse, unintended consequences such as removing people from traditional lands and destroying livelihoods? Would large sums of money invested in areas with weak governance just amplify corruption without protecting forests?

Many believed REDD+ was too risky and too complicated to be worth pursuing.

It was in this context that Norway made a bold leadership commitment to tackle the complex challenges related to climate and forests. The Bali conference focused largely on establishing a road map that would lead to a comprehensive climate agreement at the Copenhagen conference in 2009. Norway's commitment ensured a prominent place for REDD+ on the map.

The goal in Copenhagen was to reach an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (set to expire in 2012). No such agreement was reached and the conference was widely regarded as a failure and a major setback to the UN process. By extension, it undermined an important component of NICFI – namely, that an international climate regime that included REDD+ would bring a flood of investment from the world's wealthy countries to cover the opportunity costs of not destroying forests. Despite the uncertainty in the wake of Copenhagen, Norway continued its support for REDD+ efforts. At the most recent UN climate conference in Warsaw in 2013, REDD+ was one of the few areas in the negotiations yielding demonstrable progress. The "Warsaw Framework for REDD Plus Action" represented progress on results-based financing, MRV, safeguards, and drivers of deforestation.

About NICFI

NICFI was a major commitment for a small country and the fact that it was launched with broad support across the political spectrum in Norway's Parliament, with most of the major political parties making important contributions to its creation, was essential to its success. Responsibility for developing the initiative rested with Erik Solheim, who at the time led both the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Development. Minister Solheim assembled a team including Ambassador Hans Brattskar, with whom he



had worked on Sri Lankan peace negotiations, and Per Pharo, who came from the Ministry of Defense. The team was selected based on their global experience and the ability to get things done within the government bureaucracy.

NICFI was given three specific objectives by the government and Parliament:

1. Include emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime
2. Take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
3. Promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity

These objectives were placed within the context of Norway's overarching climate policy goals (establishing a global, binding climate regime) and development policy goals (sustainable development and poverty reduction).

To achieve these objectives, NICFI has employed a comprehensive strategy, which includes the following core elements:

- Establishing robust systems for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV)
- Establishing an international architecture for REDD+
- Using a results-based, pay-for-performance approach
- Emphasizing national ownership of REDD+ strategies by forest countries that protect the rights of local people
- Engaging civil society organizations (CSOs) and fostering collaboration
- Seeking to serve as a catalyst for other donor countries to contribute to REDD+ efforts

NICFI is not intended to generate carbon offsets for Norway. Performance payments are not made in exchange for credits that Norway would apply to its own carbon footprint.

NICFI's Approach to Bilateral Partnerships

In 2008, Norway signed a memorandum of understanding with Brazil, which led to a commitment of \$1 billion and a bilateral agreement through a partnership with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) for performance-based payments to the Amazon Fund. An interim carbon price of \$5 per ton was established for calculating the rate of payments for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Similar agreements followed with Guyana (committing up to \$250 million), Indonesia (committing \$1 billion), and other smaller pledges.

These partnerships put the results-based, pay-for-performance model of REDD+ into practice. Forest countries were incentivized to create strategies and policies, address culture change, and create institutional structures necessary to reduce emissions from deforestation in whatever ways fit their circumstances.

In the case of Brazil, emissions rates were already decreasing and Norway was able to make payments. In the other cases, significant reforms were needed to work toward lower emissions. It became clear that some pre-performance funding was necessary to support these readiness efforts.

Overall Norway has taken a hands-off approach with limited intervention in forest countries' processes. It has largely deferred to its partners' decisions about how to achieve emissions reductions with the intention of establishing true partnerships among equals.



Two of NICFI's most notable characteristics – the national-level focus and the pay-for-performance approach – represent a significant departure from traditional development aid models, which are often project based and aim to change policies and institutions through successful project outcomes. The results-based approach, in contrast, rests on the idea that incentivizing performance will drive reform of policies, institutions, and culture. Intervening at the national level aims to ensure such reform is systemic.

NICFI's Broad Approach

In addition to establishing bilateral partnerships, NICFI recognized the need for REDD+ support and capacity building at multiple levels. It became the dominant funder of multilateral institutions and CSOs. It also provided strong support and active participation in developing technical, policy, and intellectual underpinnings of the REDD+ concept. For example, Norway supported the Meridian Institute in convening the REDD Options Assessment Report (REDD-OAR) processes, which brought together experts and key stakeholders to assess options for how to effectively put REDD+ into practice.

The UN-REDD Programme was established in 2008 with the objective of establishing effective national REDD+ frameworks. It is a collaborative effort between The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Norway has been by far the largest donor to UN-REDD, with commitments totaling over \$215 million (of its \$246 million in total commitments). As of early 2014, the UN-REDD Programme supported 49 partner countries – 18 of which receive financial support for national programs – to build capacity around REDD+.

The World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) also became operational in 2008, and as of late 2013 had 44 country participants. It supports readiness for REDD+ and aims to demonstrate how it can be applied at the country level. The Readiness Fund (\$360 million committed or pledged) supports countries in developing national REDD+ strategies and addressing technical and implementation issues. The Carbon Fund (\$390 committed or pledged) will provide payments for verified emissions reductions from REDD+ programs. Norway's support for REDD+ has included major investments in CSOs, with approximately 650.5 million NOK (US\$108 million) supporting 46 projects between 2009 and 2012¹ and 820 million NOK (US\$136 million) supporting 42 projects budgeted for the 2013–15 period.^{2,3} Funding for this most recent period is focused on four categories: (1) sustainable landscapes; (2) REDD+ relevant commodity supply chains; (3) analysis, concept, and methodology development that contribute to REDD+; and (4) creating global consensus on REDD+.

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¹ "Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations." Norad. Report 5/2012 Evaluation.

² "Overview and Analysis of the 2013– 2015 Portfolio." Norad. <http://www.norad.no/en/support/climate-and-forest-initiative-support-scheme/overview-and-analysis-of-the-2013-2015-portfolio>

³ Conversions from NOK to US\$ assume an exchange rate of 6 Norwegian Kronor per US dollar and are intended only to give a general sense of scale in US dollars.



Key Findings

The Basic Premise

The basic premise of NICFI – that a significant investment in REDD+ was necessary and could be effective in laying the groundwork for a global forest carbon scheme – has proven to be sound. Virtually all the experts and stakeholders we interviewed believe that NICFI has catalyzed significant advances for forest protection, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development efforts.

The size of the Norwegian forest carbon commitment and the fact that the initiative was launched by the Prime Minister in a high-profile speech to the Conference of Parties in Bali set the tone for the initiative, signaling to forest countries, other donors, and all other stakeholder groups that this was a serious strategic endeavor. Norway engaged in REDD+ discussions at multiple levels – with major forest countries, key multilateral institutions, and other donor nations. While the dollar amount of \$1 billion each committed to Brazil and Indonesia was more or less arbitrary, the fact that it was large enough (in the billions) was important in putting REDD+ on the political agenda for forested countries and keeping it high on the international agenda. Although \$1 billion is not a particularly large amount in the context of international trade and development flows for countries like Brazil and Indonesia, it was enough to ensure serious consideration throughout relevant government agencies, and to engage top-level political leadership.

The results-based, pay-for-performance approach taken by NICFI has allowed for national ownership of REDD+ efforts by forest countries – it is up to them to reduce emissions in whatever ways are most suitable to their unique contexts. Several long-time participants in international forest conservation efforts observed that the resulting policy changes may be more lasting and effective because they are “owned” by the host country. Many observed that the pay-for-

performance approach provides inherent safeguards for NICFI’s goals, ensuring funds are not spent without demonstrated results.

However, reducing deforestation in most cases requires changing longstanding patterns of governance through the amendment of key laws, the modification of policies and practices, and the development of new institutions of forest governance. A major challenge for the results-based approach is how to support the significant upfront institutional change necessary to produce results. The promise of future funding may not be sufficient to drive and sustain the process over the course of many years, and in some cases the partner country may not have the capacity to implement the required changes.

Finally, taking a national approach, rather than a project approach, was significant. In the case of forestry, a national approach helps avoid “leakage” (when forests are protected in one area and deforestation simply moves to another area). More fundamentally, projects are necessarily anecdotal, and do not always result in systemic change. A national approach promotes institutional reform, which is challenging but necessary for lasting change and long-term protection of forests.

Progress on International Policy

The intention behind launching NICFI was to maximize emission reductions in the most cost-effective way possible, while also supporting development benefits in poorer tropical nations. Driving the international climate policy agenda forward was necessary for this to be effective and has proven to be a positive side-effect of NICFI.

Interviewees consistently noted that if Norway had not made this commitment, progress on REDD+ would likely be moving at the same slow pace as other components of the international climate negotiations,



and fewer of the technical and conceptual challenges would be resolved. Instead, REDD+ is lauded as one area in which meaningful progress is being made within the UNFCCC process.

The REDD+ development process has played a significant role in bringing a diversity of perspectives to the conversation to make meaningful progress on policy. Issues related to the rights of indigenous peoples, the interplay of livelihoods and climate protection, the role of the private sector, and other complex topics are central to REDD+. As such, they have been brought into the broader climate negotiations in more meaningful ways through the REDD+ negotiating track. This has benefited the credibility and effectiveness of the overall process.

Progress in Forest Countries

While the circumstances of each partnership have been unique, our evaluation found that overall significant progress has been made in each case, and important lessons have been learned.

Most interviewees noted that Brazil's progress on reducing the rate of deforestation began before, and could not be attributed directly to, its partnership with Norway. However, they emphasized that Norway's support validated the efforts of Brazil and those advocating for policies to reduce deforestation, and could prove vital in keeping those efforts on track in the face of political and economic counter pressures.

Indonesia has shown significant outcomes, more directly attributable to Norway's partnership, in addressing deforestation (though not yet reductions in deforestation rates). The visible commitment of the Indonesian President, the creation of a REDD+ Task Force, and consequently a national REDD+ Agency, and the implementation (and extension) of a moratorium on new forest concessions have been significant in institutionalizing REDD+ as a societal goal and an element not of environmental, but of development policy. Reforms now seem possible that would have seemed farfetched a decade ago. Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty about which national agency

has authority and responsibility for the institution of policies to reduce deforestation, and how such policies will be implemented in a decentralized forest management structure. In addition many officials expressed confusion about what type of performance would be paid for, when, and how the proceeds would be allocated.

Interviewees had mixed opinions about the case of Guyana. Many acknowledged that there had been political challenges and questioned the rationale for the choice. However, others concurred with NICFI's stated reasoning that it was important to partner with a high-forest-cover country with low deforestation rates to reward strong historical performance and learn what unique issues such circumstances would present.⁴

Creating Political Space

Forests are large-scale ecosystems, homes and sources of livelihood, and national economic resources. Protecting forests is complex and effective forest governance is essential to success. Strong, clear regulation and enforcement are necessary to ensure forests are protected permanently. Enacting such measures requires fundamental political, economic, and institutional changes that affect vested interests. In both Indonesia and Brazil, large commercial enterprises and numerous smallholders benefit from conversion of forests to other uses. In many cases ambiguous laws and confused lines of ownership have encouraged corrupt practices.

While progress has been made over the past 30 years in protecting forests, it has been far from sufficient, despite billions of dollars invested. Many forest countries have been skeptical of outside calls for change in their management of key national resources, and that skepticism has deepened as countries have seen earlier forest carbon schemes (such as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects) collapse

⁴ We did not focus on other partnerships – some smaller, some more recent, and some supported primarily via multilateral channels – such as those with Mexico, Tanzania, Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia, each of which is in various stages of development. Detailed evaluations of each can be found in the forthcoming Real-Time Evaluation commissioned by Norad.



without providing promised benefits. Nevertheless, in a relatively short time, REDD+, predicated in no small part on Norway's leadership, has had success in consolidating (e.g., in Brazil) and catalyzing (e.g., in Indonesia) shifts in governance models needed for long-term protection. Most of those we interviewed agreed that Norway's emphasis on collaboration and national ownership of REDD+ activities in forest countries has created the political space needed for such shifts.

The NICFI program has provided support for a broad range of civil society organizations both in partner countries and working internationally (indeed, it was difficult for interviewers to find a civil society organization actively engaged in forest issues that had not received some support). This support has increased the capacity and the level of engagement of those organizations. In fact, it opened up the REDD+ process at every level leading to a more robust and inclusive policy dialogue that, in turn, has produced better decisions with greater legitimacy nationally and globally. It leveraged the ability of CSOs to ramp-up REDD+ efforts on the national and international levels, and to generate solutions (or at least progress) related to technical, cultural, and institutional barriers, such as MRV issues, engagement of local communities and indigenous peoples, land tenure, gender rights, biodiversity conservation, and governance and corruption issues. Important concerns remain in these areas: however, while these issues seemed almost insurmountable in 2007, there is wide agreement that significant progress has been made since then. There is a general sense of optimism that while important challenges remain, particularly in certain geographies, viable solutions to these concerns either exist or at least hold promising potential. Some interviewees noted that the majority of CSO funding has gone to western, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – and while much of their work has focused on national issues in forest countries, increasing the funding for local and national CSOs would be beneficial to NICFI's goals, given their more intimate knowledge of local issues and their ability to promote a sense of ownership for REDD+ processes.

NICFI has worked through, and heavily invested in, each of the multilateral organizations engaged in the REDD+ agenda. Many interviewees credited Norway's approach with improving collaboration among UN agencies and the World Bank, and noted that while the process has not been without challenges nor is the result perfect, it has created a uniquely effective cooperative environment. Fostering collaboration has been necessary given that REDD+ cuts across the traditional boundaries of development, conservation, and climate change mitigation.

The combination of substantial financial commitments on a pay-for-performance basis, active civil society engagement, and continued progress on an international framework for REDD+ appears to have changed the nature of the debate on forest protection in several countries. And, as noted, the symbolic size of the commitments in the billion-dollar range to Brazil and Indonesia ensured that internal champions within those governments were able to advance forest-protection agendas at the highest levels.

Long-Term View

NICFI's initial strategy was predicated on the idea that a global climate agreement would be reached in Copenhagen and that Norway's commitment would provide a proof of the concept, and a bridge to a global REDD+ agreement. Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg said in 2009, "One of the most important elements [in Copenhagen] is that we have to agree on how to save our forests and halt deforestation. We will allocate up to \$500 million yearly to reduce deforestation and forest degradation." In fact, seven years after the launch of NICFI, while there has been progress on the development of a REDD+ policy framework, a comprehensive global agreement of GHG reduction seems further away than it did at Bali.

Still, the UN climate process continues with a focus on reaching an agreement at COP21 in 2015 in Paris to go into effect in 2020. Thus NICFI's original objectives are still relevant. The opportunity remains to include emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime, while taking early



action on reducing such emissions and promoting conservation of natural forests. However, as there is still uncertainty around the outcomes of this process, NICFI needs a solid plan for defining and achieving success in absence of a global agreement.

There is a risk in the high expectations of potential funding for REDD+ results created by NICFI. If these expectations are not met – if for example, an international agreement is not reached in 2015, and if Norway were to ultimately wind down the NICFI program – it could create cynicism and obstacles to future agreement. In a sense, Norway has created a responsibility for itself to ensure that expectations are managed and met, one way or another.

Nearly all the experts we interviewed supported the concept of REDD+ and were optimistic about its potential positive impact. However, many played down the importance of an international climate agreement for the ultimate success of REDD+. The efficacy of REDD+ as a market mechanism was questioned repeatedly, given the complexities, and the supply-demand dynamics associated with emissions reductions from the forest sector. There is no doubt that funding for REDD+ results will need to be expanded significantly beyond what one country would be able to provide. However, an international climate regime may not be the only, or even the best, source of such funding. NICFI is testing a new way of financing sustainable forest management, which could work well within the context of a comprehensive global climate agreement, or in other scenarios, such as a series of North-South bilateral agreements that expand current official development assistance (ODA), networks of regional climate schemes, subnational agreements, or agreements among smaller groups of national governments.

National Ownership

NICFI operates with a very small staff and has pursued a deliberate strategy of minimal intervention in the choices made by partners in how to achieve

agreed-upon goals. This hands-off approach to the means used by forest countries to achieve emission reductions has encouraged national ownership of the process. It has produced a spirit in which bilateral agreements are seen as true partnerships of equals, and it has required forest countries to address barriers and enact reforms relevant to their unique circumstances. Interviewees across the spectrum, from government officials to civil society activists, agreed that the combination of a large incentive for performance with a commitment to let national institutions determine the means has earned trust and credibility for NICFI, and strengthened national commitment to the resulting programs and policies. However, most add a caveat: that the NICFI team should have the capacity and willingness to respond when partners ask for help in resolving difficult organizational and policy problems in implementing their commitment. Many noted that the extent to which the hands-off approach has manifested in NICFI maintaining very small teams in Oslo and forest countries may be too extreme.

As noted above, one of the strengths of the pay-for-performance approach is that by design it encourages national ownership of strategies for reducing emissions. As such, a pay-for-performance model focused solely on emission reductions would not provide financial support for the institutional reform, policymaking, strategic planning and technical preparations (i.e., policies and measures) required to achieve the emissions reductions. It would leave forest countries to fund this work. In some cases this is not realistic, and upfront external funding is needed. In addition to working through multilateral agencies to provide such support, NICFI's strategy for addressing this in Indonesia has been to make payments for policies and measures in the design phase. It has disbursed \$40 million of the \$1 billion to date. However, it is not clear that this strategy has been well understood by all stakeholders or sufficiently effective. There is a need to clarify and broaden the practice of paying to support policies and measures in early-phase activities.



Integrating Development and Environment

International climate debates have often been overshadowed by anger from less-developed countries stemming from the idea that the industrialized North, having created the climate problem, was looking to the South to solve it. The success of REDD+ in Brazil and Indonesia has emphasized sustainable forest management as a development policy – a means of assuring livelihoods – rather than an emissions-reduction strategy. The performance Norway is committed to pay for may be avoided tons of CO₂ emissions, but that is not what is most important to partners. The local goal is articulated in development terms. That seems an important achievement because it suggests that the REDD+ program can be seen as furthering national interests, rather than a distraction from core development issues pursued only because of third party payments. It appears that the NICFI mindset from its launch sought to appreciate and integrate development in what could have been framed as an environment-forests-and-climate-only initiative. As noted above, this mindset seems to have allowed NICFI to engage with its partners in a more holistic and effective manner. The fact that Norway's Ministries of Environment and Foreign Affairs have both been actively involved in the launch and development of NICFI was a structural actualization of this important mindset from the very beginning and important in helping NICFI achieve these results.

It is our view that sustainable forest management is a development benefit in and of itself. Protecting and wisely managing such a valuable resource is critical to the long-term economic prosperity of countries with significant forest cover. Still, forests must be protected and responsibly managed in a manner that does not harm other immediate development objectives – by violating people's rights, threatening their livelihoods, unfairly funneling resources to an elite few, or supporting abuses of power. We found that NICFI kept these key concerns at the forefront during its rollout and when it received feedback from stakeholders regarding shortcomings of its approach, it has been responsive in addressing those shortcomings.

All but absent from our conversations with high-level representatives was the notion that protecting forests is necessarily detrimental to economic development and business interests. This was a particularly striking result of our interviews. Five years ago this would have been a recurring theme; concerns that these types of efforts prioritize trees over people would have been common. While this type of rhetoric is certainly still prevalent in many circles, it was notably rare in our interviews. This shift reflects a profound evolution in thinking about economic development and the relationship of natural systems and economic success.

As to the question of how much other development criteria should be required in REDD+ initiatives, we heard two compelling lines of reasoning. Some felt a comprehensive approach with a broad range of safeguards and co-benefits was necessary to ensure the fairness and credibility of REDD+. Others felt that while such safeguards were important, the effectiveness of the pay-for-performance model was its simplicity, and REDD+ payments should only look at forest emissions, relying on other mechanisms to ensure the social and environmental integrity of the projects that yielded the reductions. We found that overall, Norway's emphasis on the importance of safeguards and fair benefit sharing has set a context for continuous improvement in these areas, and that performance payments need not be contingent on specific, predetermined policies or actions related to safeguards.

Global Approach

In taking a leadership role in the REDD+ space, Norway stepped into a dynamic and quickly changing environment. By necessity, its strategy was both proactive and reactive. This has raised questions as to whether NICFI has taken a portfolio approach or whether it has been too ad hoc in its activities. We found that NICFI's strategy and ability to adapt has led to a comprehensive portfolio of complementary activities.

The portfolio covers the major tropical forest countries of Brazil and Indonesia. While there has not been a major bilateral agreement in the Congo Basin region,



there is engagement through the Congo Basin Forest Fund, the FCPF, UN-REDD, and the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). While some interviewees felt strongly that doing more in this region should be a top priority, most felt that the current strategy was appropriate given the region's political and governance challenges. The work with Guyana aimed to bring a specific type of country – with high forest cover and historically low deforestation rates – into the portfolio. An additional engagement in Africa and Southeast Asia, both directly and through multilateral agencies and CSO partners, has given NICFI global reach without overextending the program.

Progress on Technical Aspects of REDD+

We found broad agreement in the field that NICFI's support for efforts to improve technical and conceptual issues related to MRV has had a significant impact. Such improvements are necessary for the success of REDD+, yet questions arose regarding the balance of spending on MRV versus direct efforts to reduce emissions. Expenditures on MRV are a reflection of concern from donor countries. Although continuing to improve the accuracy of MRV data is critical to the integrity of REDD+ programs, the perfect should not be the enemy of the good, and the best available data and techniques should be used to pursue reductions in deforestation and degradation rates in the immediate term. NICFI seems to have struck the appropriate balance in this regard.

Mapping efforts are underway in forest countries, and NICFI support has helped foster collaboration among governments, CSOs, and other actors to work toward more efficient and harmonized systems. Mapping efforts are essential not only to REDD+ initiatives, but also to the success and integrity of core development plans in forest countries. In this way, the impetus REDD+ has provided forest countries to improve their forest mapping systems could have profound impacts in terms of improving governance and management of national resources.

Overall it was clear that Norway has participated actively in efforts to improve the technical aspects of REDD+, and brought in multiple parties to drive progress. The sense of momentum this has brought to the field has been important in sustaining interest and support for REDD+.

General Awareness of REDD+

The REDD+ concept has become well known among experts and stakeholders directly involved with the processes, but in both donor countries and forest countries there is not a general awareness of REDD+ outside of these specialized groups. Interviewees, particularly from the United States, noted that REDD+ lacks visibility, despite being a rare example of a positive story related to climate change mitigation.

There are indications that this could be starting to change as well-known corporate brands begin to engage in REDD+ and through efforts like REDD+ Talks.⁵ In the past year, several signs suggest that commodity-driven tropical deforestation is becoming more of a focus for global consumer products companies. These include the launch of the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 (TFA 2020); the announcement of a deforestation policy by the world's largest palm oil trader, Wilmar International; and the inclusion of a session on "Creating Deforestation-Free Supply Chains by 2020" at the 2014 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting.

However, at the moment REDD+ is still a little-known concept to the general public. In donor countries, broad awareness and understanding of REDD+ is important for supporting both private and public funding. In forest countries, long-term acceptance of REDD+ and sustainable forest management as a core component of development strategies will require broad public understanding and support as political leadership turns over.

⁵ REDD+ Talks is an effort sponsored by the UN-REDD Programme, Wildlife Works, Wildlife Conservation Society, Code REDD, and CSR Wire that brings together corporate leaders and experts to speak about REDD+ to encourage more organizations incorporate REDD+ into their carbon-reduction programs, and posts videos of the talks online.



The Case of Indonesia

In May 2010, Norway and Indonesia signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) formalizing Norway's intention to contribute \$1 billion to Indonesia based on demonstrated REDD+ results. Shortly thereafter, President Yudhoyono created a REDD+ Task Force to implement the LOI. The task force published a REDD+ National Strategy in June 2012 establishing a framework around five pillars: (1) institutions and processes; (2) legal and regulatory frameworks; (3) strategic programs; (4) changes to work paradigm and culture; and (5) inclusion and involvement of stakeholders. In August 2013, a REDD+ Agency was established by Presidential decree, replacing the task force. In May 2011, Indonesia instituted a moratorium on new forest concessions for two years, which was subsequently extended for another two years to 2015.

Forests and Climate as a National Priority

To a remarkable degree, forest management and climate mitigation strategies have become an element of, rather than a threat to, Indonesia's national development agenda. We heard repeatedly that the scale and boldness of the Norwegian initiative, together with the President Yudhoyono's commitment, enabled the change in the nature of the discussion. The REDD+ program is being – and should be – characterized as much more than a dollars-for-tons initiative, and is seen as a means to improve forest management with broad development benefits. This is a very important win for NICFI.

Institutions, Governance, and Policy

Financial incentives alone will not lead to improved forest management, since the issues here, as in most REDD+ countries, are institutional and legal (particularly with respect to who has authority over the use of which land). A major question for NICFI is how to support the necessary changes, and whether and how to do so within the context of the pay-for-performance approach.

Skepticism and Confusion

A residue of skepticism remains about payments for forest and ecosystem services arising from unfulfilled promises in connection with CDM and other programs. There is also considerable confusion about what NICFI money will be spent for, when, and by whom. To many it remains unclear what performance will be paid for, and what the mechanism will be. Many stakeholders hope that Norway will use its leverage and credibility to accelerate decisions that clarify lines of authority and responsibility, and reassure key agencies of their inclusion. This will be important for the credibility of the program, and is likely to require a slightly expanded NICFI presence directly or through the World Bank.



Disbursing Funds

Related to the issue of skepticism, we saw a clear need to begin moving more funds that have an impact on the stakeholder agencies and district operations, and to answer the questions about how the money will be managed and what kind of performance it will reward. To achieve reduced emissions, it will be important to continue to pay for other kinds of success, such as policy change and institutional improvement. Communicating these steps and establishing clear, transparent mechanisms for showing people what funds are being used for what purposes is critical to ensuring momentum and support for these efforts.

Civil Society Organizations

There is widespread recognition that Norway's investment in strengthening the participation of CSOs has had a positive effect on the dialogue and decision processes. Their importance will be even greater as the program moves toward implementation.

Private Sector

At least some major private sector players are looking for a visible role in changing forest management. They have technical capacity, resources, and the ability to control not only their own practices, but also those of their suppliers. It would make sense to create a vehicle for their participation (or to incentivize the Indonesian government to do so).

The REDD+ Agency

We heard very divided opinions about Indonesia's REDD+ Agency. Its weakness is that it was established by Presidential decree and does not have statutory authority. Conversely, it is empowered to convene and coordinate important activities. The strong personalities of the individuals involved – Kuntoro Mangkusubroto the former head of the now disbanded REDD+ Task Force and Heru Prasetyo head of the new agency – will be critical to the success of the agency. Both are widely respected and seen as fair and credible leaders with the ability to promote cooperation across diverse groups. Both have experience managing complex, high-profile processes, including the multibillion dollar rebuilding effort following the 2004 tsunami in Aceh. Their ability to effectively wield their "soft power" to achieve the institutional change required for emissions reductions will be a significant factor in determining the success of REDD+ in Indonesia.

Presidential Transition

Much will depend on the willingness of the new President to take ownership of the REDD+ program and the LOI. Norway's credibility, as a result of its NICFI commitment and its role in the tsunami relief effort, is very strong in Indonesia. Early high-level discussions between Norway and the new government about REDD+ and the LOI will be very important



Recommendations

Expand NICFI's Scope Strategically and Deliberately

By and large, our findings were positive regarding NICFI's approach and strategy, including its willingness to be responsive and adapt to feedback. In a sense, our main recommendation is to stay the course. The current trajectory seems to represent an appropriate pace of expansion, both geographically and in addressing the interrelated issues of agriculture, land management, and restoration.

Geographically it is important to continue to focus on Brazil and Indonesia and demonstrate success in those partnerships. We recommend continuing to expand the scope geographically through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the UN-REDD Programme, and regional agencies. While we recognize the area's unique political and governance challenges, special efforts should be made to make progress in the Congo Basin region.

NICFI should consider expanding and clarifying its willingness to pay for performance necessary to achieve emissions reductions so that institution building, and governance reforms, policies and measures critical for success can be the basis for payments. While remaining true to the principle of results-based support, this enhancement could have the benefits of (1) distributing funds more quickly, (2) meeting expectations, (3) avoiding delays, and (4) ensuring genuine reform and institutionalization instead of expediency to get short-term emissions reductions, but not necessarily long-term permanent forest protection.

We recognize this recommendation creates a potential tension with the hands-off approach of paying only for emissions reduction results, which has been an important element of NICFI in establishing genuine partnerships of equals and encouraging national ownership. However, NICFI has already recognized the need for some upfront investment. Multilateral agency programs and CSO initiatives are helpful in supporting readiness activities, but the case of Indonesia suggests that more may be needed where major commitments are on the table. To address this, Norway has made \$40 million in payments to Indonesia. Some interviewees remained unclear about the basis for these payments and the possibility for future support. A more formal approach of paying for other types of performance could help clarify expectations.

A clear and transparent process to rewarding predetermined milestones in a way that is non-prescriptive could ensure that funds are distributed early enough to support upfront readiness activities and reforms. It could provide clarity to stakeholders about when and why funds are disbursed. Having a clear and mutually agreed-upon timeline for achieving milestones, as well as upper limits to payments for reform and readiness activities, would ensure that preparations do not drag on too long while deforestation continues. Bonuses for faster progress on upfront activities could be incorporated into such plans to incentivize a sense of urgency in achieving emission reductions.

This approach could provide a "both/and" solution, enabling NICFI to both continue with its high-level, hands-off, strategic, results-based approach, and integrate elements of more traditional implementation and even project-level support. Regardless of the exact approach taken, the issue of funding for major upfront governance reforms should be addressed clearly and explicitly.



Finally, we found a clear sense that the extent to which the hands-off approach has manifested in maintaining very small teams in Oslo and forest countries may be too extreme. While NICFI should not overcorrect and build a cumbersome bureaucracy and large oversight teams, there should be marginal increases in the size of the NICFI team in Oslo and in the number of staff dedicated to NICFI efforts in countries with bilateral agreements.

Take a Backcasting and Scenario-Planning Approach

We recommend NICFI take a backcasting and scenario-planning approach to help it influence international political processes toward its desired outcomes, while also preparing to make meaningful progress toward its goals in the absence of an international climate agreement.

Backcasting, which is essentially a complement to forecasting, involves imagining oneself in a successful desired future, then looking back to the present and asking the question: “What did we do then to arrive here?” There is an opportunity for NICFI to support and/or facilitate a process of co-creating a compelling shared vision for REDD+ within the broad community of stakeholders. This process would have the added benefit of building shared understanding of how various parties interpret and understand REDD+ concepts, and fostering trust and collaboration among stakeholder groups.

Scenario planning involves imaging and planning for various futures, and it enables groups to plan and create strategies for operating within different contexts in the future. In the case of NICFI, two scenarios with major implications are whether or not there is a global climate agreement by 2020 through the UNFCCC process. While Norway has demonstrated great leadership and made great efforts to support such an agreement, no one country can ensure the outcome. Developing strategies for each scenario (as well as two to three variations

of each) would provide NICFI and its partners and stakeholders with more clarity and certainty on how to implement in a rapidly evolving context.

Clearly communicating these scenarios would help to manage expectations and facilitate effective collaboration among stakeholders.

Ensure Continued Cooperation and Top-Level Political Support Within Norway

Deliberate efforts should be made to ensure that the appropriate individuals and teams within the relevant Ministries and departments (Foreign Affairs, Environment, Norad) are communicating and collaborating to advance the goals of NICFI. This may include processes for bringing groups together to foster dialogue, build relationships, and evaluate long-held beliefs and ideology regarding environmental protection and economic development.

The top-level political support from the Prime Minister during the launch and development of NICFI was critically important. As key partners (Brazil and Indonesia) move further in developing their REDD+ efforts, continued engagement from the Prime Minister remains key to success. Speaking publicly about the importance of REDD+ and engaging directly with heads of state in partner countries on a regular basis will have a powerful impact on sustaining momentum.

Strengthen Support for Local CSOs in Forest Countries

While Norad has provided funding for REDD+ efforts to national CSOs in forest countries, some interviewees suggested that it has not been sufficient. Continued support for large international CSOs is necessary, but strategic investments across a range of local CSOs would strengthen the process of institutionalizing REDD+ in forest countries.



Make the Business Case

A recurring theme in our interviews was about making the business case for REDD+. This related to firm-level business success, wherein countries with strong forest governance and clear regulations provide certainty for businesses, and enable them to manage forest resources and competing land-use activities responsibly. It also related to setting REDD+ strategies in the context of broader sustainable development programs (e.g., green growth, low-carbon development, climate-resilient development).

We recommend NICFI sponsor reports from highly credible individuals and organizations about how REDD+ serves the interests of key stakeholders. We also recommend convening various private sector actors to consider what it would take for them be effective and constructive participants (and/or supporting others in doing so). NICFI should develop a comprehensive private sector strategy and ensure it is shared widely among partners and other stakeholders.

Continuing to engage, support, build on, and strengthen existing efforts in this realm, such as TFA 2020, could provide a constructive approach to engaging businesses involved with, or relying on, activities that impact forests. NICFI should provide support to CSOs in forest countries to facilitate similar engagement processes with key business interests on the national level, and/or incentivize governments to do so.

Create Coalitions of the Willing

In the absence of a global climate agreement, a coalition working to advance REDD+ outside the UN processes will be necessary to bring sufficient funding to the process. Such a coalition would need a formal structure, beyond private negotiations. There are benefits for other countries to participate, both in terms of protecting the major global natural systems on which we all depend, and in terms of having the opportunity to design and shape the program.

Potential elements and examples of what such a coalition might look like could include: agreements between smaller groups of national governments; agreements with subnational governments; regional programs; integration with existing climate regimes; involvement of businesses and business groups; and collaboration of donors and different areas within a common framework to avoid duplication and competing programs.

Develop More Robust Communications Strategies

While much progress has been made regarding education and awareness around REDD+, there are still various understandings and interpretations of what REDD+ is. For some, it is strongly associated with a market mechanism, wherein REDD+ projects would generate carbon offsets. Others see it as a broad term that captures any activities that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Helping to build consensus on a clear definition of REDD+ for participants in the community and the general public could help avoid confusion and misunderstandings, which hinder progress.



Many interviewees noted that Norway could take better advantage of its experience and expertise by being more aggressive about sharing opinions, best practices, and lessons learned. There was a feeling that Norway may be hesitant to engage in public relations efforts for fear it would be viewed as self-promoting, which might limit its ability to achieve its goals.

Complementary, proactive communications strategies for both NICFI and the REDD+ concept generally should be pursued. Promotion of the REDD+ concept to a general audience would increase awareness, which can drive government and corporate support in industrialized countries and ensure broad public support in forest countries. Proactive communications strategies could help address preemptively unfounded and misleading criticisms (of both NICFI and REDD+ generally) that can be a distraction and require more resources to address after the fact. Components of these strategies should include a dedicated user-friendly website for NICFI; press relations at the international, national and local levels; and engagement with thought leaders to write and speak about key messages.

A communications strategy is not simply a matter of letting people know about the activities and results of the program. It is necessary for the success of NICFI's mission and should be seen as an integral piece of the overall strategy. Without broad awareness and understanding of the key issues – why climate action is important, why forest protection is a critical component, and how both need to be done in ways that enable the poor to enhance their quality of life – true cultural and institutional transformation will not be possible. Compelling and transparent communications are key to ensuring this, and should be prioritized.

A communications strategy is not simply a matter of letting people know about the activities and results of the program. It is necessary for the success of NICFI's mission and should be seen as an integral piece of the overall strategy.



Conclusions

Protecting Earth's great tropical forests is in the best interests of everyone on the planet. These forests are essential to avoiding climate catastrophe, maintaining biodiversity, and ensuring the long-term economic health of forest countries and regions. REDD+ currently represents one of the most promising mechanisms for protecting them.

REDD+ is also one of the most promising aspects of the international climate negotiations, serving as an area for cooperation and progress that is helping the rest of the process move forward. Further, it is opening new opportunities in the international development space, enabling cooperation and conversations where there has traditionally been deadlock among various groups (national governments and indigenous peoples in certain areas, for instance).

There is widespread agreement that these positive trends would not be nearly as strong if not for Norway's commitment, investment, and leadership.

One key metric of success for NICFI will be when Norway is no longer seen as "owning" the process of advancing REDD+. We see little room for improvement in terms of what the NICFI team has done to distribute

the engagement and ownership of the process, so we can only recommend that NICFI continue to do all it can to encourage other donors to engage at the scale necessary to meet the challenge. Part of this requires continuing to be adaptable, flexible, and open-minded regarding elements of the strategy, while at the same time being more forceful in sharing and disseminating what NICFI has learned through its experience. It also requires continued active engagement from the highest levels of government.

Norway's leadership has created the risk that the prospects for REDD+ could be dismissed altogether if NICFI's efforts are not successful. At the same time, Norway's investments have created very high expectations in forest countries regarding the prospects for funding to protect their forests.

Both of these realities lead us to conclude that Norway has brought upon itself the responsibility for continuing to play a major role in supporting REDD+ efforts on an ongoing basis. This support should continue at least at current levels of investment, and ideally increase to ensure continued and growing momentum in REDD+ readiness, implementation, and performance.



Appendix 1: Methodology

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a high-level analysis of NICFI’s strategic importance and approaches. It is distinct from, but complementary to, the real-time evaluation of NICFI that Norad has commissioned, which is designed to assess the results of NICFI’s support against its overall objectives.

This evaluation consisted of a literature review and background research on REDD+ and NICFI. However, it is based predominantly on in-person, phone, and videoconference meetings with leaders, experts, and key stakeholders engaged in the REDD+ space. It included a one-week site visit to Jakarta, Indonesia in early January 2014 to conduct in-person interviews with representatives from government, industry, civil society, and research organizations engaged in various aspects of REDD+ efforts.

The findings and conclusions are focused less on the success of the program, and more on the perceptions of key stakeholders.

The ability to have off-the-record, candid conversations with high-level, strategic actors involved with REDD+ was a key strength of the methodology.

Time constraints limited the number of interviews that were possible. Another potential limitation of the methodology was that NICFI’s support for REDD+ efforts is so broad, most of the leaders in the field receive or have received funding from Norway in one way or another. However, interviewees were transparent about this fact and cognizant of how it might impact their feedback. Further, many made it clear that they appreciated Norway’s effort to commission this type of evaluation, and were candid in offering criticisms to support continuous improvement.

The evaluation took place between July 2013 and February 2014. A complete list of those interviewed is included in Appendix 2.

Appendix 2: Interviewees

Category	First Name	Last Name	Organization	Title
REDD+ Country	Tasso	Azevedo	Brazilian Forest Service	Former Director General
Multilateral	Ellysar	Baroudy	World Bank	Lead Carbon Finance Specialist, Coordinator BioCarbon Fund and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Climate Change Policy and Finance Department
Civil Society Organization (CSO)	Hasbi	Berliani	Kemitraan Partnership	Program Manager, Sustainable Environment Governance
Multilateral	Benoit	Bosquet	World Bank	Sector Manager, Environment, Natural Resources, Water and Disaster Risk Management Unit (AFTN1), Sustainable Development Department, Africa Region; Former Lead Carbon Finance Specialist and Coordinator of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility



Category	First Name	Last Name	Organization	Title
Business Sector	Dewi	Bramono	Asia Pulp & Paper Co.	Deputy Director, Sustainability and Stakeholder Engagement
CSO	Bruce	Cabarle	World Wildlife Fund	Leader, Forest and Climate Initiative
Business Sector	William	Cahyadi	PT SMART Tbk	Sustainability Specialist
Indigenous Peoples	Joan	Carling	Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact	Secretary General
REDD+ Country	Hadi	Daryanto	Indonesian Ministry of Forestry	Secretary General
Multilateral	Leitizia	Fauzy	World Bank	Consultant, Green Development Specialist, Environment Unit
Business Sector	Aida	Greenbury	Asia Pulp & Paper Co.	Managing Director, Sustainability and Stakeholder Engagement
REDD+ Country	Basah	Hernowo	Republic of Indonesia National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas)	Director for Forestry and Water Resources Conservation
International Research Facility	Peter	Kanowski	Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)	Deputy Director General
Multilateral	Werner	Kornexl	World Bank	Sr. Climate Change Specialist
Donor Country	Donna	Lee	U.S. Department of State	Independent Consultant, formerly U.S. Department of State
CSO	Lars	Løvold	Rainforest Foundation Norway	Founder
REDD+ Country	Kuntoro	Mangkusubroto	Indonesian President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4)	Head of UKP4; Former Head of Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force
REDD+ Country	Nur	Masripatin	Indonesian Ministry of Forestry	Director, Centre for Standardization and Environment
Multilateral	Charles	McNeill	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Senior Policy Advisor, Environment and Energy Group
Business Sector	Rolf	McRae-Jensen	Asia Pulp & Paper Co.	Vice Managing Director, Sustainability and Stakeholder Engagement
CSO	Chris	Meyer	Environmental Defense Fund	Amazon Basin Project Coordinator
International Research Facility	Daniel	Murdiyarsa	CIFOR	Principal Scientist
Indigenous Peoples	Joseph	Ole Simel	Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development Organization (MPIDO)	Executive Director
Business Sector	Haskarlianus	Pasang	PT SMART Tbk	Sustainability Division Head
Donor Country	Jim	Penman	UK Department of Energy and Climate Change	Head of Response Strategies; International Forestry Team Leader; Head of Evidence (Ret. Jan. 2012)

Category	First Name	Last Name	Organization	Title
Norway	Tom	Rådahl	Government of Norway	Secretary General at Ministry of Environment
Foundation	Walt	Reid	Packard Foundation	Director of Conservation and Science Program
Multilateral	Stephen	Rodrigues	UNDP	Deputy Country Director, Indonesia
Multilateral	Budhi	Sayoko	UNDP	Assistant Country Director, Indonesia; Head of Environment Unit
CSO	Frances	Seymour	Center for Global Development	Senior Fellow; Former Director General of CIFOR
Indigenous Peoples	Adrien	Sinafasi	REPALEF ¹	Secrétaire Général
CSO	Nigel	Sizer	World Resources Institute	Director, Global Forest Initiative
Donor Country	Farah	Sofa	UK Climate Change Unit Indonesia	Partnership Advisor
Norway	Erik	Solheim	OECD Development Assistance Committee	Chair
Norway	Bård	Solhjell	Government of Norway	Minister of the Environment
CSO	Andrew	Steer	World Resources Institute	President
Multilateral	Achim	Steiner	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	Executive Director and Under-Secretary-General of the UN
Climate	Nicholas	Stern	London School of Economics	IG Patel Professor of Economics and Government; and Chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
CSO	Sita	Supomo	Kemitraan Partnership	Sustainable Development Governance
CSO	Laode	Syarif	Kemitraan Partnership	Senior Advisor, Justice and Environmental Governance
CSO	Mark	Tercek	The Nature Conservancy	President
Business Sector	Peter	van Dijk	Sinarmas	Advisor, International Relations, President's Office
International Research Facility	Louis	Verchot	CIFOR	Programme Director, Forests and Environment Programme
International Research Facility	Andrew	Wardell	CIFOR	Director of Research
REDD+ Country	Praveen	Wignarajah	Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) Ethiopia	Head of GGGI Ethiopia
CSO	Dan	Zarin	Climate and Land Use Alliance	Director of Programs
REDD+ Country	Medrilzam		Republic of Indonesia National Development Planning Agency Bappenas	Directorate for Forestry and Water Conservation Affairs

Note: 1. REPALEF (Réseau des Populations Autochtones et Locales pour la Gestion durable des écosystèmes forestiers en RDC).



Appendix 3: Glossary

BNDES	Brazilian Development Bank
CARPE	Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
COP	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP	Forest Investment Programme
GHG	greenhouse gas
GRIF	Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MRV	monitoring, reporting and verification
NGO	nongovernmental organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
ODA	official development assistance
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
REDD-OAR	REDD Options Assessment Report
TFA 2020	Tropical Forest Alliance 2020
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

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