

# **Real estate and infrastructure investments by Norwegian GPFG**

Comments by

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## GPFG already holds real estate and listed infrastructure

### The global market portfolio

- ▶ 6% real estate, of which 10% listed
- ▶ 3% infrastructure, of which 90% listed

### The GPFG portfolio

- ▶ 60% listed equities
  - ▶ Include listed real estate (REITs) and listed infrastructure
- ▶ 3% unlisted real estate, building up to 5%

### Finance theory implies that market-value weights are optimal

- ▶ Current portfolio weights are close to global market portfolio

**Thus, increasing the mandate is an overallocation**

## Empirical evidence on real estate (RE), continued

### Does adding RE raise risk-adjusted expected returns? No

- ▶ REITs do *not* outperform a portfolio of stocks and bonds
  - ▶ Zero excess returns (alpha) in two- and five-factor models

### Does adding RE bring diversification benefits? Not really

- ▶ Correlations between RE and stock/bond returns have risen substantially over the past decade
- ▶ In fact, RE returns look like small value stock returns
  - ▶ Small value stocks provide similar diversification as RE

### Is real estate a good buy right now? No

- ▶ Commercial RE has historically high valuations
  - ▶ Both in absolute terms and relative to net operating income
- ▶ In particular the trophy assets that GPFG invests in

## **Empirical evidence on real estate (RE) from the report**

**Does unlisted RE outperform listed RE? No**

- ▶ On the contrary, REITs tend to generate higher returns than direct investments in RE
  - ▶ No evidence of an illiquidity premium in private RE

**Is unlisted RE less risky than listed RE? No**

- ▶ The total volatility of unlisted RE is similar to that of REITs

**Do large pension funds outperform small pension funds? No**

- ▶ The evidence is too scarce and anecdotal to draw any robust conclusions

**Overall, no support for further expansion into real estate**

- ▶ Neither direct investments nor listed RE

## Empirical evidence on infrastructure (INFRA) returns

### Is there good infrastructure return data? **No**

- ▶ Short return series for listed INFRA (max 16 years)
- ▶ No reliable evidence on unlisted INFRA

### Does listed INFRA outperform stocks and bonds? **No**

- ▶ The longer INFRA indexes have zero abnormal returns
- ▶ Some evidence that Core INFRA performs *better*
  - ▶ Positive alpha over the past 12 years
- ▶ Some evidence that Clean Energy performs *worse*
  - ▶ Negative alpha over the past 8 years

### Does INFRA provide diversification benefits? **No**

- ▶ Listed INFRA is highly correlated with stocks, RE and bonds

**Overall, no strong support for expanding into INFRA**

## The RE recommendations are contradicting and lack support

### [1] Include unlisted RE in the mandate

- ▶ But there is no evidence that unlisted RE dominates REITs [1]

### [8] Increase maximum RE mandate to 10%

- ▶ Yet, report warns that elevated valuations warrant caution for new investments in real estate [3]

### [13] Explore RE investments in developing countries

- ▶ No evidence on RE in developing countries
- ▶ Also, expected growth  $\neq$  abnormal returns

### [14] Continue to build up the internal RE team

- ▶ Yet, the report concludes that rising correlations with stocks and bonds do not support further expansion into RE [2]

## The INFRA recommendations lack support in the data

### [8] Mandate for maximum 10% in INFRA

- ▶ But there is no reliable evidence that INFRA outperforms stocks/bonds [4]

### [11] Open up for unlisted Clean Energy investments

- ▶ But Clean Energy has underperformed stocks/bonds ( $\alpha < 0$ )
- ▶ Again, expected growth  $\neq$  abnormal returns

### [12] Open up for unlisted emerging-market INFRA

- ▶ Emerging market INFRA index has zero alpha.
- ▶ Also, there is no evidence in support of unlisted INFRA

### [14] Start build a team for INFRA investments

- ▶ Again, why overweight in INFRA without supporting evidence?

## The experts disagree on the mandate for unlisted INFRA

### [5] Open up mandate to include unlisted INFRA

- ▶ But there is *no* reliable evidence on unlisted INFRA
  - ▶ Unlisted INFRA could have huge costs (more later)

### [15-i] Do INFRA investments primarily in *listed* projects

- ▶ The two academics recommend the 90% listed INFRA

### [15-ii] Do INFRA investments primarily in *unlisted* projects

- ▶ The professional wants GPFG to enter unchartered territory

## Investment mandate should be based on empirical evidence

- ▶ Not because “other large funds do so”
- ▶ Or because someone looked in a crystal ball

## What matters is risk-adjusted expected returns after costs

### Direct investments in RE and INFRA carry substantial costs

- ▶ Require large, costly organization that is difficult to reverse
- ▶ Have higher transaction costs and are less liquid
- ▶ Subject to huge political risks (corruption, accidents, etc.)

### No market for lending unlisted assets

- ▶ Major source of GPFG's reported excess returns

### Difficult to evaluate performance of unlisted assets

- ▶ Unlisted assets have stale prices
- ▶ Appraisals are often biased

### Accounting for costs reduces the case for unlisted assets

## Performance evaluation: the Opportunity Cost (OC) model

**The OC model is a classical asset-pricing two-factor model**

- ▶ Requires a listed match (e.g. a REIT) for the private asset
- ▶ The expected return from a reference portfolio of stocks and bonds with the same systematic risk

**The proposed OC model also has issues**

- ▶ No Fama-French risk-factors
  - ▶ Rewards RE for its tilt to small value stocks
- ▶ Ex-post performance evaluation still relies on price estimates
  - ▶ How many years to judge a "long-term" investment?
- ▶ Conflict of interest in selecting a listed match
  - ▶ Must be done by someone outside the investment team

**OC model does not resolve the issues with RE and INFRA**

## Concluding remarks: let's take a step back

### **Passive management is the gold standard**

- ▶ Massive evidence that passive management generates higher returns *net of costs* than active management

### **An increase in the RE and INFRA mandates is also an increase in active management**

- ▶ Reason to be concerned

### **Highlights the need for an independent and objective performance evaluation of GPFG**

- ▶ You don't let students set their own grades

**Time to seriously consider establishing an NBIM Watch!**