Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disinformation (2025–2030)

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Content

Foreword

In a diverse and globalised society marked by growing inequalities and a concerning security situation, it is essential that we find common ground despite differences and conflicts.

We must be able to talk to one another. We must have discussions and debates that are fruitful and move us forward, even if we strongly disagree on issues. We must strive to maintain a healthy culture of disagreement.

The Internet and social media represent endless opportunities for this, but also countless ways to be confused and misled. Meaningful debate is impossible if those we engage with are fake profiles controlled by artificial intelligence and a hidden agenda, or if our understanding of reality diverges to the point that common discourse becomes impossible.

It is also evident in Norway that these developments could undermine public discourse, our sense of community, and the trust we place in one another and in public authorities. Ultimately, they pose a threat to the proper functioning of democracy.

The infrastructure requirement in Article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution requires authorities to facilitate open and enlightened public discourse to ensure that everyone can exercise their freedom of expression.

We therefore have a duty to ensure that disinformation does not undermine public debate in a way that hinders people from engaging with and staying informed about the world around them.

Social media must be held to account for their role in the propagation of disinformation. The public needs to be more discerning about sources, a diverse range of independent, editorial media must be maintained, and we must expand our knowledge to ensure that measures to counter disinformation are targeted and effective.

Maintaining and strengthening our resilience to disinformation is essential, which is why we are setting out this strategy now. The aim is not to censor or limit people's ability to speak publicly, nor to eliminate all false claims.

We *want* to maintain disagreement and debate. We still *want* criticism – both reasonable and unreasonable – from the broadest possible range of actors. But it must be a debate that is not influenced by disinformation, where claims are met with real counterarguments and facts.

Strengthening resilience to disinformation will be a top priority in the coming years. It is essential that we act now; we cannot afford not to.

Photo: Ilja C. Hendel/KUD

Lubna Jaffery
Minister of Culture and Equality

Purpose and background   01

1.1 Introduction

Norway is a liberal, open democracy characterised by an egalitarian society and robust welfare provisions. Citizens, authorities and other societal institutions enjoy a high level of mutual trust. The country has a good public education system and a highly educated population, robust protections for freedom of expression, and pluralistic editorial media.

These values and characteristics underpin a Norwegian society defined by security, stability and strong democratic institutions, and they make us resilient to disinformation.

However, authoritarian forces are on the rise in many countries around the world. There are fewer democracies now than 35 years ago. Among those that remain, several are introducing policies and laws that restrict freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in democracy.[1]

Authoritarian states also attempt to sway public opinion and policy decisions in other countries to serve their own interests, including through the propagation of disinformation.

This strategy provides an overview of the Norwegian Government's efforts to prevent disinformation by maintaining and strengthening resilience. The outlined policy instruments and measures aim to safeguard open and enlightened public discourse, not limit the right to speak publicly or eliminate all false claims from the public discourse.

1.2 Background for the strategy

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression examined the frameworks for freedom of expression in contemporary Norwegian society.[2] It concluded that conditions in Norway currently provide a favourable environment for public discourse. Over the past two decades, technological advances have increased opportunities for citizens to express themselves. The population now has access to an almost limitless array of information, and the barriers to participating in public discourse have been lowered. Freedom of the press and freedom of expression remain strong, but trust in institutions and politicians is declining.[3]

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression was also tasked with examining disinformation in a Norwegian context. It concluded that the extent of disinformation observed in several other countries gives cause for concern and requires vigilance,

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1   Democracy Report 2023, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
2   NOU 2022: 9
3   Innbyggerundersøkelsen 2024 [Norwegian citizen survey 2024], Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management (DFØ)

including in Norway, and highlighted the need to consider strengthening emergency preparedness and coordinated efforts.

The security situation is becoming more acute, compounded by the extensive technological change taking place. Even before the proliferation of generative artificial intelligence (AI) towards the end of 2022, Norway was undergoing a digital transformation.

Social media and other online platforms have simplified access to information, but they are also attractive channels for exerting influence. Hate speech, misinformation and disinformation generate engagement and spread rapidly on social media, not only because people comment on, like and share content, but also because platform algorithms further propagate it.[4] Recommendation algorithms can also reduce the distribution of editorial content and other forms of credible information.[5] Generative AI has made it even easier, cheaper and more effective to spread disinformation via social media and other online channels.

The infrastructure requirement in Article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution places a broad responsibility on the authorities to facilitate open and enlightened public discourse. This entails a duty to facilitate channels and institutions where people can express themselves and access relevant information. A key challenge is that social media – now central to public expression and information – are still subject to minimal regulation and limited democratic oversight.

In combination, the security situation, the use of disinformation by authoritarian states, technological advances and changing media habits among the population have dramatically altered the landscape of challenges. The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission concluded that this development requires Norway to prepare for a long-term situation of increasing exposure to influence attempts and the spread of disinformation.[6] The gravity of the situation makes it imperative to strengthen Norwegian resilience, including in the civilian sector.

Although disinformation and other forms of information influence present a societal challenge, it is neither possible nor desirable to prohibit falsehoods. Nor can resilience be legislated. Addressing this requires concerted efforts and cooperation between the public, the business sector, the third sector, local and county authorities, and national government bodies.

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[4] Skewed Perspectives: Examining the Influence of Engagement Maximization on Content Diversity in Social Media Feeds, Paul Bouchaud (2023)

[5] Digital News Report 2024, Reuters Institute

[6] NOU 2023: 17

1.3 The security situation

In May 2025, the Norwegian Government presented the National Security Strategy[7] aimed at the joint effort to keep Norway secure and safe.

Norway's fundamental security interests form the basis for this strategy:

1. A free and independent Norway
2. A robust democracy
3. A safe society with a high level of trust
4. An open and adaptable economy
5. Allied solidarity and cohesion in Europe
6. A world guided by international law in seeking solutions

All of these interests are vulnerable to disinformation and other information threats, either directly or indirectly.

The security strategy also provides a more detailed account of the security situation and describes how Norway is facing its most serious security situation since World War II. In a short period of time, the world has become more dangerous and less predictable. War is raging in Europe, superpower rivalries are intensifying, and transatlantic relations are marked by considerable uncertainty.

Intelligence activity is extensive, foreign actors are seeking to influence Norway, and the threat of sabotage is serious. Economic activity representing a threat to security has become more widespread, and state actors are deliberately using migration as a means of pressure. Norway must be prepared for these activities to escalate and become more aggressive in the future. These developments affect all areas of society.

Another worrying development is that state actors are funding radicalised groups and criminal networks and using them to carry out actions on their behalf. Serious acts of violence and disinformation are used to create fear and division. Finnmark, and particularly East Finnmark, is in a unique situation due to its geographic and strategic location at the border with Russia. Those living closest to the border are most directly affected by negative developments in Russia, and the region will remain a key focus in the ongoing monitoring of the strategy's priority areas.

1.3.1 Threat assessments

In its threat assessment, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) writes that Russian intelligence and security services use AI and the Internet to propagate anti-Western narratives and incite extremist actors, including in connection with controversial media reports.[8] The aim is to exert influence and create unrest in Western countries.

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) states in its threat assessment that it expects authoritarian states to conduct influence operations in Norway in 2025.[9] Amid rising geopolitical tensions, covert influence operations and disinformation have emerged as key tools for certain states seeking to sway decisions and change public attitudes in their favour.

The Norwegian population is a target for Russian influence attempts, including actions aimed at weakening our support for Ukraine. China is also increasingly demonstrating both the capability and will to carry out influence operations directly targeting citizens in Western states and our security interests. PST expects the quality of Chinese disinformation to improve and the scale of digital influence campaigns to grow in the coming years. In 2023, the first digital Chinese influence campaign directed at a Norwegian audience was uncovered. *Viking United News*, which

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[7]   Nasjonal sikkerhetsstrategi [national security strategy], Office of the Prime Minister of Norway (2025)
[8]   Fokus 2025 [Focus 2025], Norwegian Intelligence Service
[9]   Nasjonal trusselvurdering 2025 [National Threat Assessment 2025], Norwegian Police Security Service

presented itself as a Norwegian online newspaper, was part of a larger international campaign in which a commercial Chinese company created over a hundred fake websites, embedding Chinese propaganda within a stream of news articles stolen from legitimate news sources.

The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) notes that generative AI is increasingly being used to support influence operations.[10] It is employed to generate large volumes of false information, to create fake social media profiles and to orchestrate interactions between these profiles, thereby helping to spread disinformation or create the impression that a particular view is widely held.

1.4 What is disinformation?

Disinformation can take many forms and can originate from a variety of actors with differing motives. It could, for example, form part of a broader foreign-state influence operation, or be disseminated by authorities seeking to legitimise their own policies. It could also be propagated by groups or individuals for profit or other personal or political gain. In some countries, government authorities pay individuals to propagate disinformation.

Regardless of who spreads it, disinformation can displace other types of information and erode public trust in news media, politicians and institutions. It can undermine political debate and hinder opposition, threaten electoral processes, exacerbate polarisation and weaken alliance cohesion. Collectively, disinformation can erode many of the values and the resilience of Norwegian democracy.

In addition to disinformation, there are numerous other forms of information influence. These often share the aim of misleading, creating unrest, or shaping the views of the recipient. This information can then be propagated by individuals who believe the information they have received.

1.5 Scope and structure of the strategy

A comprehensive effort to counter disinformation can be divided into four phases: (1) prevention, (2) identification, (3) management and (4) evaluation.

1. Preventing disinformation involves strengthening resilience. We must reinforce the factors that hinder both the spread of disinformation and its effects on society. This includes pluralistic editorial media, an informed, discerning and critical public, and the regulation of algorithm-driven disinformation on social media.

2. Identifying disinformation requires authorities to assess individual cases in their broader context and determine whether they constitute a deliberate attempt to exert influence. This can be extremely challenging, as those seeking to propagate disinformation often attempt to conceal their motives.

3. Managing disinformation involves minimising its potential harmful effects, either proactively in anticipation of an attempted influence operation or once an attempt at dissemination has been identified. Measures can include informing the public about a specific influence operation, disseminating accurate information and, where appropriate, revealing those responsible. This requires a coordinated approach to public communication and can entail security assessments and responses.

4. Evaluating disinformation involves learning from previous instances of disinformation and from any countermeasures taken. The purpose is to improve our ability to prevent, identify and manage disinformation in the future.

This strategy is primarily focused on the first phase: prevention.

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[10]   Risiko 2025 [risk 2025], Norwegian National Security Authority

Definitions

Disinformation: false or misleading information deliberately spread to influence the recipient. Disinformation can displace other types of information, undermine public trust in news media, politicians and institutions, negatively affect political debate and opposition, threaten electoral processes, intensify polarisation and weaken alliance cohesion.

Misinformation: incorrect information spread by someone without the intent to mislead.

Fake news: misinformation or disinformation presented in a news format.

Conspiracy theory: a claim that the wrongs in the world are the result of secret conspiracies.

Polarisation: a state in which divisions between groups are so extreme that they hinder dialogue and the exchange of arguments and ideas.

Information integrity: when the information infrastructure promotes access to accurate, reliable, evidence-based and pluralistic sources, whereby individuals can be exposed to pluralistic and diverse ideas, make informed choices and better exercise their rights.

Influence operation: an operation in which a state uses overt and covert campaigns, operations or activities, often without military force, to change attitudes, decisions or outcomes. The aim is often to influence political processes or decisions in a particular direction, but it can also be to reinforce polarisation, spread distrust, or create general unrest among the population. Disinformation is one of several tools used to achieve this.

Hybrid threats: strategies for competition and confrontation below the threshold of direct armed conflict, which might combine diplomatic, informational, military, economic, intelligence and legal instruments to achieve strategic objectives. These strategies are generally extensive and sustained, combining overt, covert and clandestine methods.

However, the phases are interlinked, and the capacity of authorities to identify, manage and evaluate disinformation will also help strengthen resilience and prevention.

In practice, it is difficult to identify disinformation and distinguish it from other forms of information influence and misinformation. Preventive measures will largely aim to strengthen public discourse and counter polarisation, thereby tackling issues that go well beyond disinformation. The strategy therefore includes policy instruments and measures across a wide range of areas, which together, and in various ways, also help reinforce resilience to disinformation.

Disproportionate measures to counter disinformation or other information threats could inadvertently suppress freedom of expression, thereby undermining the values we seek to protect. All measures to counter disinformation must therefore be carefully weighed against their potential impact on freedom of expression. Up-to-date, evidence-based knowledge on the Norwegian context is crucial for identifying the most appropriate measures and striking the right balance between freedom of expression, freedom of information and civil protection.

Building resilience to disinformation requires focus, coordinated efforts and measures across a wide range of areas. To illustrate the breadth of the Government's work, the strategy includes both existing and new initiatives that support the objectives in different ways.

The landscape of challenges is changing rapidly, but strengthening resilience takes time. This strategy will remain in effect until 2030.

The strategy is divided into five priority areas, each of which starts with an overview of the background and the challenges involved, followed by a review of the relevant policy instruments and measures.

Priority area 1: Strengthen the public's critical media literacy
Help strengthen the public's critical media literacy, enabling them to assess for themselves the trustworthiness of information, images and videos.

Priority area 2: Hold social media to account
Ensure robust oversight of social media and other online platforms, as well as their impact on public discourse.

Priority area 3: Strengthen editorial media
Further develop media policy to help ensure that the media can continue to fulfil their societal mission in the future.

Priority area 4: Strengthen the knowledge base
*Help generate knowledge about how disinformation is propagated in Norway, and the potential implications for public discourse.*

Priority area 5: Strengthen government efforts and coordination between agencies
Strengthen the efforts to ensure a comprehensive approach to countering disinformation and an effective information flow.

Strengthen the public's critical media literacy   02

2.1 Introduction

Today's information society presents new challenges for media users. Identifying untrustworthy sources and information has become more difficult, and the risk of being exposed to disinformation is increasing. Over the past year alone, the rapid development of generative AI has created entirely new challenges.

Open and enlightened public discourse is a prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy. For meaningful societal debate to take place, people need to be able to access and use independent and reliable sources of information.

To navigate the vast flow of information and determine what is trustworthy, people need to critically assess content and be conscious of the sources they choose. This requires critical media literacy.

This chapter describes the challenges and presents the policy instruments and measures the Norwegian Government considers necessary to strengthen critical media literacy among the population in the face of an increasingly complex media landscape.

What is critical media literacy?[11]

Critical media literacy refers to the knowledge and skills needed to navigate and participate actively and safely in an increasingly complex media landscape. A critical approach makes it easier to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, challenge extreme claims and distinguish between commercial and editorial content, among other things.

Critical media literacy entails making informed choices about the media content we consume, produce, or share; understanding how different types of content producers operate; and being able to evaluate various forms of content. Robust critical media literacy also involves recognising that every message has a sender and being able to critically compare different information sources.

The definition of critical media literacy has traditionally been linked to media content. However, the use of AI in algorithms and the emergence of generative AI also make it important to understand how technology and system design work. Strengthening the public's critical media literacy therefore requires a holistic understanding of both content and design.

[11] Norwegian Media Authority (2021)

2.2 Challenges

2.2.1 Information overload and technological advances

The democratisation of information and freedom of expression via the Internet and social media is unprecedented.[12] The digital society is increasingly marked by information overload, where the challenge lies not in accessing information but in understanding and navigating it.

Information that previously reached the public via news media and government authorities is now increasingly published in global media platforms, where both the sources and the mechanisms of dissemination may be unknown. Consequently, it is now harder to distinguish between accurate and false information, which can lead to uncertainty and a sense of powerlessness among the public. It has also contributed to a general mistrust in which both credible and dubious sources are viewed with the same scepticism.[13]

Maintaining a critical approach to the constant stream of digital information can be a challenge. Even those who believe they can detect fake content online[14] can be influenced by the overall impression of an issue or debate. For instance, exposure to a disproportionate number of posts or comments from one side of an argument can create a misleading sense of public opinion. AI-generated images or videos can also evoke emotional responses, even when recipients know the content is not real.

Social media and search engines are typically used to find relevant information online. While useful, these platforms are not neutral. They are structured in a way that can amplify and filter content, potentially influencing the formation of opinions. Recommendation algorithms on social media determine the content that users see, which in turn shapes the basis for each individual's freedom to form opinions. Consequently, social media platforms have considerable power to influence users.

2.2.2 Social media as a news source

More than one in four Norwegians report that social media is among their main sources of news.[15] Children and young people receive news through social media to a greater extent than adults.[16]

Social media can increase exposure to news that people might not otherwise encounter, a development that is generally positive. However, using social media as a news source also presents certain challenges.

In editorial media, an editor is responsible for all published content, and the work is carried out in accordance with a common set of ethical guidelines and journalistic standards, making it a credible source of news and information.

In contrast, social media allows users to post content in real time, without any editorial oversight. These platforms are designed so that users can easily share information, but this also allows misinformation and disinformation to spread rapidly. A survey by the Norwegian Media Authority (NMA) on critical media literacy in Norway shows that the public considers editorial media a more credible source of information than social media, though this varies across demographic groups.[17]

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12   NOU 2022: 9
13   Tillit til mediene. Falske nyheter og partiske journalister? [Trust in the media. Fake news and biased journalists?], Moe et al. (2022)
14   Kritisk medieforståelse i den norske befolkningen 2024 [critical media literacy in Norway 2024], Norwegian Media Authority
15   Mediemangfaldsrekneskapen 2025: Mediemangfald i eit bruksperspektiv, [media diversity accounts 2025: media diversity from a user perspective], Norwegian Media Authority
16   Barn og medier 2024 [children and media 2024], Norwegian Media Authority
17   Kritisk medieforståelse i den norske befolkningen 2024, [critical media literacy in Norway 2024], Norwegian Media Authority

Certain groups in society are more susceptible to prejudice than others. Hate speech and abusive content, particularly when disseminated online and via social media, can include disinformation or be used in influence operations intended to create unrest and division.

Overall, individuals with a higher education and those who use editorial media tend to place greater trust in these sources. Younger age groups are more likely than older groups to trust social media content.

Recommendation algorithms can lead to users being exposed predominantly to content from a particular perspective, increasing the risk of missing alternative viewpoints or nuances on an issue. The algorithms also favour content that elicits strong reactions, making polarising material more visible. It can also be difficult to distinguish between content from credible sources and unreliable sources when all information is presented in the same feed. In recent years, platforms have also deprioritised news and political content,[18] which can lead to more random exposure to news. Research further suggests that using social media for news can weaken the process of acquiring knowledge about politics and current events.[19] Accordingly, the reliance on social media as a *replacement* for editorial media as a news source is a challenge.

2.2.3 Vulnerable groups in society

Certain groups in society are more susceptible to prejudice than others. Hate speech and abusive content, particularly when disseminated online and via social media, can include disinformation or be used in influence operations intended to create unrest and division.

The Norwegian Government has presented several action plans containing measures to prevent hate speech and harassment. These include the overarching Action Plan on Racism and Discrimination 2024–2027, the Action Plan against Antisemitism 2025–2030, the Action Plan to Combat Anti-Muslim Racism 2025–2030, the Action Plan to Combat Harassment and Discrimination of the Sámi 2025–2030, and the Action Plan on Gender and Sexual Diversity 2023–2026.

2.2.4 Differences in digital literacy across age groups and genders

In 2024, the NMA conducted its third survey of critical media literacy in the Norwegian population.[20] In 2024, the NMA conducted its third survey of critical

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18   Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024, Newman et al.

19   Learning Political News from Social Media: Network Media Logic and Current Affairs News Learning in a High-Choice Media Environment, Communication Research (2018)

20   Kritisk medieforståelse i den norske befolkningen 2024, [critical media literacy in Norway 2024], Norwegian Media Authority

Given their reliance on social media for news and information, it is crucial that young people maintain a sufficiently critical approach to the content they encounter.

media literacy in the Norwegian population. The survey highlights a correlation between age, digital literacy and critical media literacy. Older adults reported greater difficulty than younger people in, for example, checking the source of a website, assessing whether content is sponsored, notifying the publisher about content that may violate guidelines, and reporting illegal content to the relevant authorities.

Older adults also found it difficult to distinguish between different types of sources and content on social media, and faced more challenges in identifying AI-generated content. Developing these skills is essential for maintaining a critical approach to digital content in order to make sound judgements and informed choices.

Young people aged 16 to 24 score highly on digital user competence. However, several factors make them vulnerable. They tend to be more positive than older age groups about social media and its role in society. For example, they are more likely to believe that social media offers insight that helps them stay informed about current events. This can be problematic, as social media does not quality assure content to the same extent as editor-controlled journalistic media.

Younger people are also less concerned than older age groups that AI services make it harder to distinguish fact from fiction, or that the spread of false information can undermine trust in public authorities.

They report that it is relatively easy to judge whether information they encounter online is true or false. Given their reliance on social media for news and information, it is crucial that young people maintain a sufficiently critical approach to the content they encounter. A lack of critical engagement, combined with confidence in their own abilities, can make them particularly vulnerable.

Gender is another important factor. More men than women express confidence in their own judgements about whether online information is true or false. When combined with age, this may suggest that young men are more vulnerable to disinformation than women in the same age group. Further research is needed, however, before firm conclusions can be drawn.

2.2.5 Varying trust in public institutions

News consumption among the Norwegian population is generally characterised by consistently high trust in editorial media, but this trust is not evenly distributed. Younger people tend to have less trust in the news than older age groups, while individuals with a higher education tend to have greater trust than others.[21]

A small proportion of the population has very low trust in the media and other societal institutions and does not feel represented in the reality presented by the editorial media. This is particularly evident on

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[21]   Reuters Digital News Report Norway, Moe og Bjørgan (2024)

contentious issues such as the climate, religion and immigration, where one in four Norwegians question whether information from public authorities and editorial media is reliable.[22] Some feel that editorial media have moved away from their societal role as a public watchdog, actively contribute to maintaining dominant power structures, and fail to reflect the everyday lives and challenges of ordinary people.

These more marginalised groups seek information from alternative sources. They access news and information from websites that do not adhere to journalistic standards, online forums, social media, or chat services. While they are interested in political and societal issues, the information they encounter is not necessarily based on fact. They tend to dismiss corrective information when it does not align with their own political views.[23]

This dissatisfaction and sense of exclusion are often linked to perceptions of an unfair societal hierarchy, in which they see themselves as an 'inferior part' in social, economic and political contexts.[24] Disinformation campaigns can exploit these political divisions and have a particular impact on extremist groups and those sceptical of authorities. This makes these groups more vulnerable than the general population, including to Russian influence operations.[25]

An increasing proportion of those radicalised into various forms of extremism,[26] are minors; a development partly associated with the use of digital platforms. Many of these radicalised minors face challenges that increase their vulnerability, such as social exclusion and mental health issues, making them more receptive to extremist messaging.[27]

2.3 Policy instruments

2.3.1 Democratic preparedness in schools

The promotion of critical thinking and democratic values in schools is a key policy instrument for ensuring that Norway's younger generation is resilient to disinformation.

One of the strengths of Norwegian society is that pupils in the public education system meet peers from diverse backgrounds and learn and develop together. A positive and inclusive school environment is vital for preventing and addressing social exclusion. Pupils encounter a diverse range of peers with different experiences and perspectives, and learn through debate and the exchange of opinions. This diversity is a fundamental part of Norway's core values, and engaging with and accepting differences is essential for building trust and safeguarding democracy. These are important qualities of the Norwegian public education system that must be preserved and further developed.

In line with the general part of the National Curriculum for Knowledge Promotion in Primary and Secondary Education and Training, which details the values and principles of primary and secondary education, education shall promote support for democratic values and democracy as a form of government. It should help pupils develop an understanding of the rules of democracy and the importance of upholding them. Democratic values should be promoted via active participation throughout a pupil's education, helping them understand why democracy cannot be taken for granted and that it must be developed and upheld. Schools should also encourage pupils to be curious and ask questions, to engage in

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22   Informerte borgere [informed citizens], Moe et al. (2019)
23   All the News You Want to Hear: The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Political Participation, Public Opinion Quarterly (2011)
24   Toward a Sociologically Enriched Understanding of Anti-Media Populism: The Case of Enough is Enough! International Journal of Communication (2023)
25   Fokus 2024 [Focus 2024], Etterretningstenesta
26   Radicalisation is a process in which an individual increasingly comes to accept the use of violence to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives.
27   Nasjonal trusselvurdering 2025 [National Threat Assessment 2025], Norwegian Police Security Service

scientific and critical thinking, and to act with ethical awareness. The values and principles outlined in the general part of the National Curriculum form the basis for the syllabuses in the different subjects.

Critical thinking has been given more emphasis in all school syllabuses and is included in the competence framework underpinning the National Curriculum.[28] This means that pupils are expected to develop the ability to think critically in all subjects, evaluate different sources of information and reflect critically on how knowledge is produced.

The syllabus in each subject is designed to develop critical thinking in different ways and includes numerous competence objectives relating to critical thinking and source evaluation. For example, in Norwegian language lessons, pupils should be able to 'reflect critically on the influence and credibility of texts',[29] while in science they should 'learn how to distinguish between knowledge based on science and other knowledge'.[30]

According to the *International Computer and Information Literacy Study* (ICILS),[31] 86 per cent of Year 9 pupils in Norway reported that they had learned at school, to a large or moderate extent, how to evaluate the trustworthiness of information found online. This figure is considerably higher than the international average of 63 per cent.

However, it can be challenging for teachers to stay abreast of rapid developments, particularly in relation to generative AI. To help teachers and others stay up to date in the increasingly fragmented information landscape, and to strengthen pupils' source awareness and critical use of media, the Norwegian

Government allocates funding to Tenk, the educational division of the fact-checking organisation Faktisk.no. Tenk develops teaching resources for schools, parents and other professionals working with children. These resources are free, publicly accessible and regularly updated. Faktisk.no receives funding for Tenk through a government grant for organisations whose activities target primary and secondary schools.

2.3.2 Reading, literature and libraries

Reading provides the foundation for the acquisition of knowledge, self-expression, civic participation and critical thinking. Libraries encourage reading engagement, independent thinking and critical analysis of information, helping the population become better informed and more discerning. Many libraries offer training in basic skills and tools for evaluating information critically and effectively.

The Norwegian Government has presented the reading engagement strategy[32] and the library strategy,[33] which include measures to promote reading and support libraries in their role as independent community hubs.

2.3.3 Documentation and archives in public administration

The national archives are part of the infrastructure that underpins Norway as a constitutional state and a democracy. They are unique sources of knowledge about our present and past and serve as an important source for research and historical analysis. Properly preserved and accessible archives help to build our understanding of society, facilitate open and enlightened public discourse, and protect the rights of citizens. Readily accessible archives help

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28   Overordna del – verdiar og prinsipp for grunnopplæringa [General Part of the National Curriculum for Knowledge Promotion in Primary and Secondary Education and Training], Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training

29   Læreplan i norsk (NOR01 07) [Norwegian language syllabus], Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training

30   Læreplan i naturfag (NAT01 04) [science syllabus], Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training

31   International Computer and Information Literacy Study 2023, University of Oslo

32   Sammen om lesing – leselyststrategien 2024–2030 [reading together – the reading engagement strategy 2024-2030]

33   Rom for demokrati og dannelse – utvidet nasjonal bibliotekstrategi [A Space for Democracy and Self-cultivation] in effect until 2025

A well-functioning, healthy society provides the foundation for art, culture and cultural heritage as spaces for free expression, debate and the accumulation of knowledge.

illuminate the foundations and processes of governmental decision-making, and enable sources used in research to be checked and claims made in the public domain to be verified or challenged. National archives help to protect society from abuses of power and historical revisionism.

The Norwegian Government is facilitating the modernisation of records management through the proposed new Archives Act, as well as through secure long-term preservation of archives and digital access via the national Digital Archives service.

2.3.4 Art, culture and cultural heritage

A well-functioning, healthy society provides the foundation for art, culture and cultural heritage as spaces for free expression, debate and the accumulation of knowledge. Cultural heritage can be a target, a tool and a source of societal resilience, and experience shows that it is used actively in disinformation, fake news and conspiracy theories. Participating in cultural activities is valuable for all citizens, as it exposes them to a diversity of opinions and forms of expression, while also increasing understanding of a society's identity. Through such participation, art, culture and cultural heritage help to promote tolerance and understanding, while also fostering reflection on, and insight into, values, identity and society. Engagement with art and cultural activities helps build democratic resilience, enriches people's

lives and contributes to the meaningful development of society.

The infrastructure for the production and dissemination of art and culture, and for the preservation of cultural heritage, is underpinned by the Norwegian Government through institutions and public funding schemes.

2.3.5 Third sector

Participation in voluntary organisations helps individuals develop social skills, friendships and networks, and gives them a sense of achievement. These organisations provide informal spaces where children and adults can exercise their freedom of expression and encounter recognition, acceptance and the necessary challenge to their views. They therefore play a key role in gaining support for core values such as democracy and open debate.

Children's and youth organisations are often participants' first experience of a democratic body, where they practise collective decision-making, voting on issues and advocating for their own ideas. Their proposals may not always succeed, but they gain insight into how democratic systems ensure that all voices are heard before decisions are made. These organisations therefore function as arenas for learning democratic principles.

Many voluntary organisations also strengthen critical media literacy through knowledge production and dissemination, training and other skills-building activities.

The Norwegian Government lays the foundation for a free, independent third sector with predictable framework conditions. Simplification, coordination and digitalisation are also key priorities in its third sector policies.

2.3.6 Ung.no and DigiUng collaboration
Children, young people and parents must have access to reliable and relevant information from public authorities. In 2022, ung.no was designated the Norwegian Government's primary channel for digital information and services for young people, as well as for youth engagement, across all levels of public service.

By providing relevant and reliable information, ung.no serves as a platform for children and young people to learn critical media literacy and how to verify information they encounter, for example, on social media.

The Government aims to further develop ung.no and the DigiUng collaboration.

2.3.7 Safe digitalisation in society
In order to safeguard trust in our democracy, digitalisation in Norway must take place within a safe framework. Digital literacy and critical media literacy are closely linked.

The Norwegian Government's digitalisation strategy, *The Digital Norway of the Future*,[34] aims to maintain a strong and inclusive democracy in which people have high levels of trust in one another, in public authorities and in democratic institutions. The strategy includes measures to strengthen efforts to increase digital literacy in groups facing digital barriers or exclusion.

Through the action plan for increased inclusion in a digital society,[35] the Government aims to ensure that all citizens have equal access to public services, regardless of background, language skills, or age.

2.3.8 NMA's efforts to strengthen the public's critical media literacy
The work of the NMA includes helping to strengthen critical media literacy among the population, particularly within vulnerable groups. This work includes research and analysis, as well as guidance and information initiatives targeted at different audiences.

Research and analysis
The NMA regularly conducts quantitative and qualitative studies on media use, media habits, trust in different media and critical media literacy, including the Media Diversity Accounts and the surveys 'Children and Media' and 'Parents and Media'. It also monitors critical media literacy across the population and collaborates with other Nordic media authorities.

Guidance and information
Findings from the NMA's research are disseminated in various channels and are used to inform guidance materials and public campaigns. The NMA works with other public bodies through DigiUng and ung.no to respond to questions from young people and to produce evidence-based articles for this audience. It also provides content for foreldrehverdag.no.

Children and young people are particularly vulnerable to harmful content and designs on digital platforms. The NMA serves as Norway's Safer Internet Centre and works with the Red Cross to improve online safety for this population group.

Coordination in critical media literacy efforts
The Norwegian Ministry of Children and Families coordinates initiatives promoting a safe digital childhood, while the NMA is responsible for coordination

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[34]   Fremtidens digitale Norge – nasjonal digitaliseringsstrategi 2024–2030 [The Digital Norway of the Future 2024–2030]
[35]   Handlingsplan for auka inkludering i eit digitalt samfunn 2023–2026 [action plan for increased inclusion in a digital society 2023–2026]

As centres for knowledge and public education, libraries must provide access to research and sources, facilitate debate and help to develop critical thinking and digital literacy among the population.

at the agency level. The Action Plan for a Safe Digital Childhood serves as a key framework for this work. The NMA chairs a collaborative body to coordinate the Government's efforts in this area and also operates a national network for critical media literacy.

2.3.9 International efforts
Norway contributes to social and economic cohesion in the European Economic Area (EEA) through the EEA and Norway Grants, which are allocated to 15 EU countries in Southern and Eastern Europe under negotiated agreements. Norway has funded projects to strengthen critical media literacy, freedom of expression, investigative journalism and independent media.

The Norwegian Government will continue its efforts to ensure broader access to communication technology and digital public goods. Digital divides remain a major global challenge. People require access to the Internet, digital platforms and social media to obtain information and participate fully in society. Nevertheless, one-third of the world's population does not use the Internet. In developed countries, approximately 93 per cent of the population are Internet users, compared with just 27 per cent in developing countries. Lack of access to the Internet and digital services reinforces social and economic inequalities and increases vulnerability to disinformation by limiting opportunities to evaluate different sources.

The Government also seeks to strengthen digital skills and critical media literacy through its development cooperation programmes on education, equality and digitalisation.

2.4 Measures
2.4.1 Potential funding for a new centre for source awareness
Faktisk.no has proposed establishing an independent education and training centre to improve the population's source awareness. The centre would primarily build on the existing Tenk initiative and extend its reach to additional target groups. Funding for Tenk is already provided through the government grant for organisations with activities targeting primary and secondary schools,[36] and the new centre would operate as an independent foundation, rather than as part of Faktisk.no.

The Norwegian Government welcomes this initiative and will consider financially supporting the establishment of a centre for source awareness, which could enhance critical media literacy, particularly among young people, older adults and other potentially vulnerable groups.

2.4.2 Strengthen the role of libraries
In recent years, increasing focus has been placed on threats to democracy, such as political polarisation,

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[36]   Government grant for organisations with activities targeting primary and secondary schools

digital exclusion and disinformation. Libraries are intended to serve as a counterweight to these developments. As centres for knowledge and public education, libraries must provide access to research and sources, facilitate debate and help to develop critical thinking and digital literacy among the population. Libraries constitute an important arena for strengthening critical media literacy, and this role should be reinforced and given greater prominence.

The National Library of Norway supports library development by managing and allocating project and development funding to libraries. Political directives in the library sector are set out in the extended library strategy,[37] in effect until 2025.

The National Library follows up the strategy in partnership with the library sector, and this joint effort will continue after the current strategy concludes.

The Norwegian Government will strengthen libraries' work in promoting reading and reading engagement, as well as their expertise in digital inclusion.

2.4.3 Prevent digital exclusion through an inclusive, safe and accessible gaming culture

Video gaming is Norway's most popular leisure activity, and the Norwegian Government seeks to promote an inclusive, safe and accessible gaming culture.[38] Beyond the games themselves, gaming can include gaming platforms, chats and servers where political topics are also discussed. Players can

be exposed to extremist propaganda, radicalisation and disinformation.[39] To counter disinformation, video games should, in some cases, be regarded as a media platform on a par with social media, making them subject to the new regulations outlined in Chapter 3: *Hold social media to account*.

The Government's work to promote an inclusive and safe gaming culture can help prevent vulnerability to disinformation. Parental involvement, along with enhancing adults' understanding of gaming environments and the children and youth sector, can help prevent digital exclusion and build resilience to disinformation.

2.4.4 Further develop ung.no and provide current information on source evaluation and disinformation

Ung.no is the Norwegian Government's primary channel for disseminating digital information to young people. The website can be used to fact-check information and to learn. A large proportion of children and youth access ung.no regularly.

It is important that ung.no provides sufficient information on topics such as disinformation, source evaluation and related issues. In collaboration with other relevant agencies, the NMA will ensure that information on these topics is continuously updated and further developed.

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[37]   Rom for demokrati og dannelse – utvidet nasjonal bibliotekstrategi [A Space for Democracy and Self-cultivation] in effect until 2025

[38]   Tid for spill – regjeringens dataspillstrategi 2024–2026 [time for games – the Norwegian Government's video gaming strategy 2024–2026]

[39]   Malign foreign interference and information influence on video game platforms: understanding the adversarial playbook, Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (2023)

2.4.5 Prevent radicalisation

Radicalised groups are particularly vulnerable to influence attempts.[40] The Norwegian Government undertakes to prevent all forms of radicalisation and extremism and will present a White Paper to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) in spring 2025 on the prevention of extremism. Preventing social exclusion is an integral part of efforts to prevent radicalisation, and the White Paper includes a range of measures aimed at achieving this.

2.4.6 Strengthen the NMA's work on critical media literacy

The Norwegian Government is continuing and strengthening the NMA's work on insights and initiatives to improve the public's critical media literacy. See Chapter 6, which outlines the expanded mandate for the NMA, and Chapter 5, which addresses the need for more knowledge.

The NMA will continue to serve as a key supplier of knowledge for both the public and government authorities, offering information and guidance to different groups. In this work, greater emphasis will be placed on digital source evaluation and raising awareness of how AI and language models work.

2.4.7 Guidance on users' rights on social media

New regulations strengthen Norwegian users' rights on foreign-based platforms (see Chapter 3: *Hold social media to account*). Users can now, for example, notify platforms about content that breaches platform rules and appeal decisions to remove a post or account. These rights apply to individuals and businesses.

As Norway's Safer Internet Centre, the NMA is responsible for informing children and young people about their rights online. To ensure the new rules have the intended effect, all social media users in Norway must be made aware of them.

The Norwegian Government will task the NMA with producing guidance for Norwegian users on their rights. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority will be consulted on matters relating to privacy rights.

2.4.8 Strengthen the Nordic cooperation

The Nordic countries share multiple common challenges in building resilience to influence operations and disinformation. Our populations and institutions have similarities, and the same applies to our security.

The Nordic media authorities are conducting a joint survey of critical media literacy in the population, supported by the Nordic Council of Ministers, to enable cross-country comparisons of the status and development of critical media literacy and provide an evidence base for considering potential measures.

The Norwegian Government will actively promote collaboration on these issues through the Nordic Council of Ministers and the follow-up of recommendations from the Nordic Think Tank for Tech and Democracy.[41]

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[40]   Fokus 2024 [Focus 2024], Norwegian Intelligence Service

[41]   *A Nordic approach to democratic debate in the age of Big Tech, Nordic Council of Ministers (2023)*

2.4.9 Support measures to strengthen resilience to disinformation through the EEA and Norway Grants
In the upcoming period for the EEA and Norway Grants, Norway will work to ensure that measures aimed at increasing resilience to disinformation are integrated into various programmes in many of the 15 relevant EU countries. These countries could receive support through programmes in sectors such as culture, education, local community exchanges, emergency preparedness and justice, as well as through one of Europe's largest civil society funds.

Norwegian organisations can participate in this co-operation through sharing experiences and learning at the European level. It will also be important to strengthen efforts to counter disinformation on climate and the environment, and to generate new knowledge and develop policies through research and collaboration with international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OECD.

Through the EEA and Norway Grants, measures will be undertaken at three levels: 1) Resilience in the population will be strengthened by improving critical media literacy, partly through education and training; 2) Efforts will focus on reducing mistrust and the conditions that enable the propagation of disinformation, particularly at the local level and through the inclusion of marginalised groups; 3) The framework conditions for addressing disinformation will be improved, for example by strengthening police action against cybercrime, tackling digital violence against women, and promoting responsible use of digital technology.

The individual country agreements will be drawn up in 2025, and most programmes are expected to be operational by 2026.

EEA and Norway Grants and efforts to counter disinformation in Poland

In the next EEA and Norway Grants period, efforts to counter disinformation in Poland will be strengthened. In the emergency preparedness programme, led by the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration, EUR 10 million has been allocated to measures aimed at countering disinformation and ensuring information integrity.

Other programme areas will also support building resilience to disinformation and extremism, including through civic education and improving critical media literacy. One measure under consideration is a collaboration between the national libraries of Norway, Iceland and Poland, in which libraries can serve as arenas for public debate, civic education and learning about critical media literacy.

The Norwegian Government will

- ✧ consider providing funding for the establishment of Tenk, a centre for source awareness

- ✧ strengthen libraries' efforts to promote reading and reading engagement, and enhance their digital inclusion expertise

- ✧ prevent digital exclusion by fostering a more inclusive, safe and accessible gaming culture

- ✧ ensure more, regularly up-dated information on source evaluation and disinformation is published on ung.no

- ✧ reinforce efforts to prevent radicalisation

- ✧ strengthen the NMA's work on critical media literacy

- ✧ produce guidance for consumers on their rights on social media

- ✧ strengthen Nordic cooperation on critical media literacy

- ✧ support measures to strengthen resilience to disinformation through the EEA and Norway Grants

Hold social media to account

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
3.1 Introduction

The Internet, search engines, messaging services, social media and other online platforms have made it easier to access information and engage in public discourse. This is fundamentally positive for freedom of expression. Nine out of ten Norwegians use social media,[42] making it an important platform for public debate in Norway. Accordingly, this chapter focuses primarily on social media.

Over the past 20 years, the Internet has become increasingly *platformised*, evolving from an open, universally accessible network into social media and other online platforms restricted to registered users, creating new challenges that require appropriate responses. Any measures must be balanced against freedom of expression and freedom of information, which includes the right to share false or misleading content.

Social media has both strengthened and challenged open and enlightened public discourse in Norway. This chapter outlines these challenges and sets out the policy instruments and measures the Norwegian Government considers necessary to address them.

3.2 Challenges

3.2.1 Lack of regulation and effective enforcement

Content moderation, algorithmic amplification and restrictions on different types of content are the result of deliberate choices by social media providers. Nevertheless, social media have rarely been held to account for the dissemination and amplification of illegal content, disinformation, election interference and restrictions on content from editorial media.

Regulation of social media platforms is limited, and ensuring effective compliance is challenging. The largest platforms are owned by US or Chinese companies, with European headquarters in countries such as Ireland and the Netherlands. Because the largest social media platforms are based outside Norwegian jurisdiction, holding them to account for regulatory violations in Norway is challenging.

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[43] sets requirements for how social media platforms collect and use personal data, including the need for a legal basis for using personal data for profiling and targeted advertising. However, the GDPR alone is not sufficient to address the challenges posed by the spread of disinformation on these platforms. Pan-European cooperation is therefore needed.

The EU has adopted a new set of digital regulations designed to ensure greater democratic oversight of social media platforms. These regulations will form part of Norway's legislative framework if they are incorporated into the EEA Agreement and transposed into national law.

Meta has indicated that, together with the current US administration, it will challenge European laws that it believes compromise freedom of expression.[44] Freedom of expression was a key consideration when drafting these new digital regulations and will remain important in their enforcement.

3.2.2 Social media are effective channels for propagating disinformation

Social media, messaging services and online platforms have become attractive channels for spreading disinformation, interfering in electoral processes and conducting influence operations. This is partly because social media posts are published in real time without prior review and can, in addition, be targeted at specific user groups for a fee.

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42   Bruk av IKT i husholdningene [households' use of ICT], Statistics Norway (2023)

43   General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679

44   Transcript: Mark Zuckerberg Announces Major Changes to Meta's Content Moderation Policies and Operations, Techpolicy.Press (2025)

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AI-generated content can be an effective instrument for influencing democratic elections and political opinions, by stirring up and reinforcing existing attitudes or appealing to emotions.

The business model of social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, X, TikTok and Snapchat is based on the sale of targeted advertising. This means that platform providers may have a financial interest in users spending as much time as possible on their platforms. The providers have access to large volumes of personal data and can track user patterns over time and categorise users into different interest profiles. By linking this data to algorithms, platforms can send targeted content and advertising to individual users. While this increases access to content of interest, it also heightens the risk of spreading misinformation and disinformation.

Misinformation or misleading information, tailored to individual preferences, can be highly influential. The collection and use of personal data can thus facilitate the propagation and amplification of disinformation.

Hate speech, misinformation and disinformation generate engagement and spread rapidly on social media, both through user interactions (such as likes, shares and comments) and through platform recommendation algorithms.[45] These algorithms can also limit the distribution of editorial content and other credible content.[46] AI, machine learning models and algorithms play a key role in content ranking.

3.2.3 Generative AI can be misused

Generative AI is advancing at a rapid pace. It offers substantial opportunities while also posing considerable challenges.

Generative AI makes it more difficult to distinguish between genuine and synthetic text, audio, images and video. Setting up an online news site with AI-generated fake news requires little time and few resources.[47] AI-generated content can be an effective instrument for influencing democratic elections and political opinions, by stirring up and reinforcing existing attitudes or appealing to emotions.

Generative AI has been used by disinformation actors in connection with several elections, for example in the United States[48] and Slovakia,[49] but it is difficult to measure the impact on election outcomes. A report on last year's EU elections found that inauthentic

45   Skewed Perspectives: Examining the Influence of Engagement Maximization on Content Diversity in Social Media Feeds, Paul Bouchaud (2023)
46   Reuters Digital News Report, Newman et al. (2024)
47   How I Built an AI-Powered, Self-Running Propaganda Machine for $105, Wall Street Journal (2024)
48   Fake Joe Biden robocall urges New Hampshire voters not to vote in Tuesday's Democratic primary, CNN (2024)
49   A fake recording of a candidate saying he'd rigged the election went viral. Experts say it's only the beginning, CNN (2024)

behaviour, such as bots and fake profiles, as well as generative AI, were employed in disinformation campaigns prior to the election, though to a lesser extent than feared. European regulations and risk mitigation measures implemented by platforms were identified as possible explanations.[50] Norway's Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence and Elections also found that generative AI had less impact than feared in the elections they examined in 2024. However, both the technology and the trends are evolving rapidly, and with this, the threat landscape and the need to build resilience among the population and within society are also changing.[51]

Inauthentic content and profiles are a central part of the disinformation ecosystem. In autumn 2024, the Romanian election was annulled due to foreign influence operations on TikTok. Inauthentic accounts, AI-generated content and the use of influencers were key factors.[52] Automated programmes (bots) are used to publish, like and share posts. The European Commission has opened an investigation into TikTok to assess whether the platform's measures to counter election interference have been adequate under European regulations.[53]

Generative AI can also spread misinformation through so-called 'hallucinations', where language models produce false content that appears credible. Many social media platforms now offer AI assistance and chatbots as part of the service, and there is a tendency for users – particularly younger media

consumers – to use chatbots such as ChatGPT and TikTok in place of traditional search engines.[54, 55]

Language models can exhibit both intended and unintended political biases that users may not be aware of.[56] For example, one study documented how the large volume of Russian online propaganda, including AI-generated news sites, has influenced large language models, causing them to reproduce the propaganda, often citing it as a credible source.[57]

3.2.4 Platform power can be misused

Internet platforms are owned by a small number of global technology companies, which have considerable power over and influence on public discourse. These companies occupy dominant positions in the digital advertising market and in app stores, giving them significant competitive advantages. Many are also located in low-tax jurisdictions, further reinforcing the disparities in competitive conditions between global and national actors. This creates challenges for the financing of editorial media, which compete for the same advertising revenue, potentially undermining media diversity and reducing access to fact-checked, verified information.

Changes to system design and recommendation algorithms can have major implications for society. For example, when Facebook adjusted its algorithms in 2018 to promote engaging content,[58] it also led to a rise in the propagation of hate speech and harmful material. Restrictions on editorial content imposed

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50   European Board for Digital Services publishes post-election report on the EU elections, European Commission (2024)
51   Kunstig intelligens og demokratiske valg – internasjonale erfaringer og nasjonale anbefalinger [artificial intelligence and democratic elections – international experiences and national recommendations] (2025)
52   Romania's security chiefs confirm election cyberattacks, request TikTok probe, Politico (2024)
53   Commission opens formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks under the Digital Services Act, European Commission (2024)
54   Why do people use ChatGPT? Exploring user motivations for generative conversational AI, Sintef (2024)
55   Medietrender Ung 2024 [media trends among young people 2024], Kantar
56   Kunstig intelligens og demokratiske valg – internasjonale erfaringer og nasjonale anbefalinger [artificial intelligence and democratic elections – international experiences and national recommendations] (2025)
57   The Infection of Western AI Chatbots by a Russian Propaganda network, NewsGuard (2025)
58   The Facebook Files, The Wall Street Journal

by companies such as Meta have also affected traffic to editorial media.[59]

Heightened geopolitical tensions can increase both interest in using algorithms to achieve political objectives and the likelihood of their use. The capability to target content brings with it a risk of covert attempts to influence public opinion and political attitudes, as well as the risk of platforms abusing their power. This highlights the need for transparency and oversight in the use of algorithms on social media.

3.2.5 Limited insight and access to platform data

Some social media platforms give researchers access to data, but this access is often limited and there is considerable uncertainty regarding quality and continued availability. Many platforms have recently tightened their procedures for sharing data.[60]

Without sufficient access to data, it is difficult to build a robust evidence base on how disinformation spreads across platforms, how recommendation algorithms increase its reach, and how effective platforms' countermeasures are. A solid evidence base is crucial for implementing targeted measures to mitigate societal risks associated with social media.

Access to data is also important for supervisory authorities to evaluate platforms' compliance with relevant regulations.

3.2.6 Lack of measures to protect children and young people

Children and young people are particularly vulnerable to harmful design features and content, including disinformation. Harmful design can take several forms, such as addictive algorithms,

recommendation systems that amplify damaging content, and manipulative design. Manipulative design can lead users to make choices that are not in their best interests. For instance, design features can make it harder to refuse than to consent to the collection of personal data, or can try to accelerate a purchase decision. They can also be used to influence opinions.

Report to the Storting no. 13 (2024–2025) *Prevention of Extremism – safety, trust, cooperation and democratic resilience* notes particular concern regarding minors participating in transnational digital networks. Much of the extremist propaganda is designed and distributed in ways that appeal to younger audiences. Social media can serve as a channel for radicalisation and recruitment. In this context, it is especially concerning that young people are exposed to extremist and violent ideologies, often accompanied by graphic video material.

Harmful design on social media platforms and its impact on children and young people are at the core of legal action that several US states have initiated against Meta.[61] Amnesty International has documented how TikTok amplifies harmful content in the feeds of children and adolescents.[62] Young girls are particularly vulnerable to developing an addiction to social media.[63] Report to the Storting no. 32 (2024–2025) *Safe Childhood in a Digital Society* highlights a range of challenges and opportunities related to children's use of social media and digital tools.

Seven out of ten children aged 9–12 years use social media, despite the minimum age being 13. Influence operations actively exploit gaming platforms and associated messaging services to target children and

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[59]   Reuters Digital News Report, Newman et al. (2024)
[60]   Commission sends request for information to Meta under the Digital Services Act, European Commission (2024)
[61]   Dozens of states sue Meta over addictive features harming kids, Politico (2023)
[62]   Global: TikTok's 'For You' feed risks pushing children and young people towards harmful mental health content, Amnesty International (2023)
[63]   NOU 2024: 20

Seven out of ten children aged 9–12 years use social media, despite the minimum age being 13. Influence operations actively exploit gaming platforms and associated messaging services to target children and young people.

young people.[64] Many of these services are regulated under new European regulations, which need to be applied in order to mitigate the risks of unwanted influence.

3.3 Policy instruments

In recent years, the EU has adopted a number of regulations designed to promote fairer competition and enhance the legal protection of users of digital services. The aim is to reduce societal risks and safeguard freedom of expression, freedom of information and media freedom. These regulations are also relevant to efforts to counter disinformation and election interference. They can only be enforced in Norway once they have been adopted as Norwegian law.

3.3.1 Digital Services Act

The Digital Services Act[65] (DSA) is designed to strengthen users' rights online and is a key policy instrument for mitigating the negative effects that social media can have on public discourse, including the spread of disinformation, attempts to influence elections and content that is potentially harmful to children and young people. The DSA also strengthens the accountability of social media platforms for the way content is delivered.

The DSA covers a range of digital services, including Internet service providers, cloud storage services, social media, search engines and other online platforms. The rules are most stringent for the largest online platforms and search engines, such as TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, Snapchat, YouTube and X, where the risks to individual users and to society are greatest.

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[64] Malign foreign interference and information influence on video game platforms: understanding the adversarial playbook, Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (2023)

[65] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)

Key provisions of the DSA

○ National authorities can issue orders directly to service providers for the removal of content that is illegal under national legislation.

○ Social media platforms and other online platforms must have a system for processing notifications from users regarding illegal content and content that breaches the platform's terms of service. Platforms must prioritise notifications from public authorities or organisations with trusted flagger status.

○ Users have the right to appeal if content or accounts are removed, and the right to have appeals handled by an independent appeals body.

○ The DSA prohibits manipulative design and behaviour-based advertising that targets minors.

○ The largest platforms and search engines must identify and mitigate systemic risks relating to, for example, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, consumer protection and privacy protection, as well as negative effects on public discourse and electoral processes. Examples of risk-mitigating measures include complying with the duty to remove illegal content, complying with terms of service and reducing risks associated with recommendation algorithms for user-generated posts and advertising. Children and young people must be given special protection, and one of the measures to ensure this is age verification.

○ Researchers and supervisory authorities have access to data that can provide a better evidence base for assessing the scope of disinformation and unwanted political influence, and how recommendation systems (algorithms) influence public discourse.

○ The European Commission has access to the algorithms and machine learning models used for content moderation and recommendation systems on platforms, and a European centre for aiding the oversight of algorithms has been established (European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT)).

The Code of Conduct on Disinformation[66] has been incorporated into the DSA as a risk-mitigation measure to address negative impacts on public discourse, particularly relating to misinformation and disinformation. Social media platforms that have signed up to the Code are required to report twice yearly on the effect of the measures they implement.

The Code encompasses measures to curb the propagation of misinformation and disinformation, reduce advertising revenue for disinformation actors, limit inauthentic behaviour and AI-generated posts and accounts, and label fact-checked content. The NMA publishes assessments on its website of platforms' compliance with the Code in Norway. These assessments include visual graphics that make it easy to track trends over time.[67]

Each country appoints a DSA coordinator to oversee compliance with the DSA in cooperation with other national supervisory authorities. The Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) is Norway's designated DSA coordinator and holds primary responsibility for compliance in the country. The NMA, the Norwegian Data Protection Authority and the Norwegian Consumer Authority are the designated competent authorities within their respective areas of responsibility.

The supervisory authorities also participate in the European Board for Digital Services, providing a unique opportunity to actively contribute to enforcement of the regulations and promote legal certainty for social media users in Norway. Services that breach the rules can be subject to fines of up to six per cent of their annual global turnover.

3.3.2 European Media Freedom Act

Freedom of the press and media diversity are under pressure in Europe. The European Media Freedom Act[68] (EMFA) is designed to protect editorial media from state and private interference and to promote a diverse media landscape.

EU Member States must not influence editorial decisions. They are required to protect the safety of journalists and respect source confidentiality. The EMFA will better protect press freedom on the largest social media platforms and search engines.

Platforms must notify news and current affairs media 24 hours in advance before removing or restricting editorial content, and media organisations have the right to appeal. The EMFA also provides for structured dialogue between editorial media and social media platforms, organised by the European Board for Media Services, with participation from the NMA.

3.3.3 Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising

The Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising[69] aims to ensure open and enlightened political debate, free and fair elections, and to counter disinformation and unlawful interference from third countries. It sets requirements for the transparency and targeting of advertising in connection with elections, referendums and legislative processes in the EU and Member States.

The regulation was introduced in response to concerns over the risk of election interference. It is intended to help the public recognise political advertising, identify who is behind it, and know whether it has been targeted, thereby better equipping them to make informed decisions. The regulation does

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66   Code of conduct on disinformation
67   Code of Conduct on Disinformation, Norwegian Media Authority
68   Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act)
69   Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising

New EU regulations impose a duty on social media platforms, search engines and other online services to protect public discourse, promote fairer competition and ensure access to data.

not govern the content of political advertising and does not cover editorial content or expressions of personal opinion.

The regulation sets requirements for labelling political advertising. The labelling must indicate, for example, who has paid for the advertising, the source of the funds and the purpose of the advertising. This is partly because what appears to be neutral information may be funded by another country attempting to influence an election.

The regulation also requires explicit consent to be obtained before using personal data to target political advertising online. Targeted advertising based on sensitive personal data (such as ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation) is not permitted, nor is the use of personal data from minors. This is intended to prevent the misuse of information for microtargeting, emotional manipulation, or the propagation of disinformation.

3.3.4 Artificial Intelligence Act

The Artificial Intelligence Act[70] aims to ensure responsible use of AI systems within the internal market. It covers product safety and liability and can help reduce the risk of potential negative consequences arising from the use of AI. The Act classifies AI systems into different risk categories: high risk, systemic risk, limited risk and minimal risk. It prohibits harmful AI practices, including social scoring, certain forms

of real-time biometric recognition, and the use of AI to manipulate vulnerable groups. The Act does not apply to AI systems intended for military use. The use of AI to generate realistic audio, images, or video (deep fakes) must be labelled, with certain exceptions for criminal proceedings and, among other things, satirical content. Nkom has been designated the national coordinating supervisory authority for the Act by the Norwegian Government, and is responsible for uniform compliance with the rules throughout Norway.

3.4 Measures

3.4.1 Rapid implementation and effective enforcement of EU regulations

New EU regulations impose a duty on social media platforms, search engines and other online services to protect public discourse, promote fairer competition and ensure access to data. These regulations are important instruments for addressing the risks associated with disinformation, election interference, infringements on press freedom in Norway and the misuse of AI. They can only be enforced in Norway once they have been incorporated into Norwegian law.

The vast majority of platforms used in Norway are located abroad, outside Norwegian jurisdiction. National laws alone are therefore often insufficient to address breaches of these regulations, making it essential to utilise the opportunities provided by the EU regulatory framework. In terms of enforcing

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[70] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act)

rules related to the spread of disinformation and the strengthening of public discourse, the NMA has relevant expertise.

The Norwegian Government is working to ensure that relevant EU regulations are incorporated into the EEA Agreement and transposed into Norwegian law as swiftly as possible, and that the relevant supervisory authorities have the necessary resources to enforce them effectively.

3.4.2 Improve understanding of the role of social media in the propagation of disinformation

New regulations and improved access to data can help provide a clearer understanding of how social media influences public discourse in Norway and the Nordic region, both in terms of the propagation of disinformation and the filtering of editorial and other credible content.

• **Methodology for analysing social media's compliance with relevant regulations**

Effective enforcement of the DSA requires Norwegian supervisory authorities to map, document and report suspected breaches in Norway to the European Commission or the national DSA coordinator.

The NMA has been tasked with developing a methodology to assess how social media influence public discourse in Norway, and whether the measures aimed at countering disinformation and protecting editorial content are sufficient. This includes evaluating whether platform algorithms actively increase the spread of disinformation or limit the dissemination of credible content, and examining the steps taken by platforms to limit the scope of fake accounts and AI-generated content.

The Norwegian Government will ensure that the relevant supervisory authorities have adequate resources to document how social media manage systemic risks related to disinformation and comply with regulations in the Norwegian context. This will help inform the public and ensure that the conditions are in place for regulatory breaches to be addressed.

• **Sharing insights from social media platforms' self-reporting**

Most social media platforms undertake to counter disinformation and report on the effect of the measures they implement, in line with the Code of Conduct on Disinformation discussed in Section 3.3.1.[71] This includes reporting the number of posts and advertisements removed for violating the platforms' terms of service, as well as the number of inauthentic accounts and posts that are deleted. Platforms are also required to publish transparency reports and record data on all posts that are removed or restricted in an open database.

The NMA will analyse and compile relevant data from social media and present it to the public in a clear and accessible manner.

• **Strengthened Nordic cooperation on the analysis and oversight of social media**

Analysing and monitoring compliance with regulations requires substantial resources. Nordic cooperation can facilitate more effective enforcement. Increased Nordic cooperation on the enforcement of the DSA was also one of the recommendations from the Nordic Think Tank for Tech and Democracy.[72]

The Norwegian Government will support effective cooperation between relevant Nordic supervisory authorities on analyses of how social media, search engines and major online platforms influence public discourse in the Nordic countries.

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[71]   Code of conduct on disinformation
[72]   A Nordic approach to democratic debate in the age of BigTech, Nordic Council of Ministers (2023)

- Improved access for researchers to social media data

The DSA requires platforms to give researchers access to data. Researchers can apply to their country's national DSA coordinator for access, who will then assess the request according to the criteria in the regulations. This can generate insight into the propagation of disinformation in Norway and provide a stronger evidence base for understanding risks to public discourse, as well as for considering potential measures to mitigate such risks. The Norwegian Government will facilitate further research into the spread of misinformation and disinformation via social media in Norway.

3.4.3 Dialogue with and oversight of social media prior to elections

During democratic elections and major national events, the risk of unwanted influence increases. Prior to the 2024 EU elections, the European Commission held a close dialogue with the largest social media platforms and performed a stress test to assess their election readiness.[73] The aim was to ensure sufficient measures were in place to counter any influence attempts and to maintain established communication channels in the event of heightened activity, such as the use of bot networks.

The Norwegian Government will consider whether a closer dialogue with platforms is necessary prior to elections in Norway. The DSA also includes specific procedures that will be applicable to future elections.

3.4.4 Clarify age verification and age limits for social media

Children and young people are particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation and have the right to be protected from harmful content. Misleading health information, for example, can have serious consequences. It is important to ensure that children and young people are well protected from harmful content on social media.

Currently, 13-year-olds can consent to social media platforms processing their personal data. The Norwegian Government proposes raising this age limit to 15 years. Work is underway on a legislative proposal establishing an age limit for children's use of social media, with 15 years as the starting point. The aim is to protect children and young people from potential harm associated with social media use, including exposure to misinformation and disinformation. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority has also been tasked with strengthening efforts to protect children and enforce age limits on social media.

3.4.5 Development of Norwegian and Sámi language models at the National Library of Norway

In 2024, the Norwegian Government presented its digitalisation strategy, *The Digital Norway of the Future 2024–2030*,[74] in which one of the initiatives is to establish a national infrastructure for AI. As a follow-up to this, the National Library of Norway will, from 2025, train, update and provide access to Norwegian and Sámi language models that the Norwegian business sector and public sector can use to develop AI-based tools and services. The rationale for developing dedicated Norwegian models is to create tools that are reliable and of high quality both linguistically and in terms of content, while also reducing some of the risks associated with AI discussed in this chapter. It is particularly important to provide language models that reflect Norwegian public discourse and democratic values, and to build robust alternatives to models from China and the United States.

The National Library will have full insight into how the language models are trained and the data on which they are trained, and will be fully transparent about this. This will facilitate safer and better-documented AI.

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[73]   Commission stress tests platforms' election readiness under the Digital Services Act, European Commission (2024)

[74]   Fremtidens digitale Norge – nasjonal digitaliseringsstrategi 2024–2030 [The Digital Norway of the Future 2024–2030]

The Norwegian Government will

✧ ensure that the DSA and other EEA-relevant regulations governing social media are transposed into Norwegian law as soon as possible

✧ ensure that relevant supervisory authorities have the necessary resources to enforce the regulations effectively

✧ improve understanding of the role of social media in the propagation of disinformation

  › develop a methodology for analysing social media platforms' compliance with the DSA and the extent to which they counter negative effects on public discourse and election interference, including disinformation

  › compile and provide access to relevant information from the social media platforms' self-reporting on measures to safeguard public discourse in Norway

  › strengthen Nordic cooperation to understand how social media influences public discourse

✧ ensure dialogue with social media platforms prior to elections

✧ raise the age at which children can consent to the processing of their personal data by social media platforms from 13 to 15 years

✧ submit a proposal for consultation for the introduction of an age limit for social media use

✧ ensure the development of Norwegian and Sámi language models

Strengthen editorial media

04

4.1 Introduction

Editorial media are responsible for informing the public on issues of societal importance and ensuring that diverse voices are represented in public debate. They also serve as a public watchdog, exposing matters of public concern and protecting individuals from abuse or neglect. A democratic society with free, editorial media that fulfil this societal mission is well positioned to counter the propagation of disinformation. Access to verified, balanced and timely information reduces the public's vulnerability to influence, making editorial media more important than ever.

In order for editorial media to provide balanced and trustworthy information to the entire population, a diverse media ecosystem is needed that promotes different perspectives and conveys a variety of stories and analyses in different ways. Public service broadcasters, national and local media, and niche outlets all help ensure a wide range of voices is represented in public discourse.

In order to fulfil their societal mission, editorial media depend on the public's trust in their independence and their ability to deliver high-quality, credible content. In Norway, trust in editorial media is consistently high.[75,76] Media independence is safeguarded through the Media Liability Act and the self-regulation system. Norway has top ranking on the Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index for the ninth consecutive year.[77]

Editorial media also depend on public engagement with their content. Just over seven in ten Norwegians receive news daily via newspapers, online services, or live radio and television,[78] and Norway ranks among the world leaders in terms of willingness to pay for online news services.[79] However, many Norwegians access news from sources other than editorial media, with more than one in four citing social media as one of their primary news sources.[80]

The media sector is facing financial challenges. Editorial media are undergoing a major digital transformation while losing advertising revenue to global technology companies.

This chapter examines these challenges and sets out the measures the Norwegian Government will take to strengthen media diversity and better equip editorial media to fulfil their societal mission.

4.2 Challenges

4.2.1 Media habits are changing

In 1991, 84 per cent of Norwegians read newspapers on a typical day. By 2024, this had fallen to 65 per cent for print or online news. The percentage with access to paid news services increases with age, education and income.[81]

Many Norwegians also obtain information and news from sources other than editorial media, with more than one in four citing social media as a main news source.[82]

While accessing news from a variety of sources contributes to healthy public debate, it is important to distinguish between individual opinions and information produced according to journalistic principles and methods. Social media algorithms, which prioritise content that engages users, can also contribute to a skewed perception of the news.

75   Tillitsbarometeret [trust barometer], Respons (2024)
76   Reuters Digital News Report Norway, Moe og Bjørgan (2024)
77   2025 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders
78   Mediemangfaldsrekneskapen 2025 [media diversity accounts 2025], Norwegian Media Authority
79   Reuters Digital News Report Norway, Moe og Bjørgan (2024)
80   Mediemangfaldsrekneskapen 2025 [media diversity accounts 2025], Norwegian Media Authority
81   Norsk mediebarometer 2024 [Norwegian Media Barometer 2024], Statistics Norway
82   Mediemangfaldsrekneskapen 2025 [media diversity accounts 2025], Norwegian Media Authority

4.2.2 Young people are less frequent users of editorial media

Young people today are more likely than previous generations to turn away from editorial media in favour of other platforms and content. They are able to navigate the increasingly more complex media landscape, combining multiple platforms, screens and content. Determining whether young people consume less news than before is complex, but studies point in that direction.[83]

The proportion of people citing social media as their main source of news rises as the age of users decreases. TikTok, Snapchat and YouTube are the main platforms through which most 9–18-year-olds access news.[84] Thirty-seven per cent of the under 30s report social media as one of their main news sources,[85] and nearly half of 16–24-year-olds do not use traditional news media, such as radio, television, or newspapers, to access news.

The fact that young people follow the news less than older generations is not a new phenomenon. However, the shift from print to digital newspapers may mean that children and young people are even less exposed to editorial media. On social media, they may encounter content from these outlets without necessarily recognising the source. While the consequences of this trend are difficult to predict, one concern is that editorial media may find it harder to attract younger audiences. Meanwhile, a growing number of young adults report having access to newspaper subscriptions.[86]

4.2.3 The media economy is under pressure

In the traditional business model of editorial media, advertising revenue has historically outweighed income from users. These outlets previously held a strong position as key gatekeepers of public discourse while controlling central distribution channels for advertising. Digitalisation has transformed this landscape, affecting the production, distribution and consumption of services and content.

This has also transformed the media economy. User revenues are increasingly challenged by competition from free content and expectations that content should be freely accessible. Advertising revenue is also under pressure, with companies such as Meta (Facebook, Instagram) and Alphabet (Google) dominating the advertising market. Consequently, media outlets have experienced a substantial decline in advertising revenue. In 2023, global actors earned roughly three times the advertising revenue of Norwegian newspapers in the domestic market.

Nowadays, media depend on user revenues to fund journalism. While Norwegian outlets have largely succeeded in encouraging payment for digital news services, this has only partly offset the loss of advertising revenue. Commissioned by the NMA, Oslo Economics has analysed the economic conditions of editorial media and the challenges they will face in the years ahead.[87] Their findings indicate that user revenues will need to fund a greater share of journalism, and that media must invest heavily in digital infrastructure to compete with other sources of information and entertainment. The current generation of young people will be the future funders of editorial media, and they tend to consume news via videos or podcasts. Oslo Economics therefore expects demand for news in audio and visual formats to increase.

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83   Nordmenns digitale nyhetsbruk [Norwegians' digital news consumption], Reuters Digital News Report Norway (2024)
84   Barn og medier 2024 [children and media 2024], Norwegian Media Authority
85   Mediemangfaldsrekneskapen 2025 [media diversity accounts 2025], Norwegian Media Authority
86   Betaling for nyheter 2024 [paying for news 2024], Norwegian Media Businesses' Association
87   Redaktørstyrte mediers økonomiske forutsetninger – i dag og fremover [editorial media's economic conditions – today and in the future], Oslo Economics (2025)

Editorial media must constantly balance accuracy with the need to report rapidly on unfolding events. This challenge is exacerbated by competition with social media, with many platforms publishing unverified content far more rapidly than editorial outlets can manage.

4.2.4 AI a challenge to current working methods

Rapid advances in generative AI will have major implications for how media operate. AI can streamline workflows and uncover stories that were previously inaccessible; however, it has made verification and fact-checking more complex, often requiring additional resources to determine whether a story, image, video or audio clip is authentic. Media are also vulnerable to misuse by actors seeking to spread disinformation.

Editorial media must constantly balance accuracy with the need to report rapidly on unfolding events. This challenge is exacerbated by competition with social media, with many platforms publishing unverified content far more rapidly than editorial outlets can manage.

Exploiting this technology requires both reorganisation and skills enhancement, and a strained media economy can make it difficult for editorial teams to leverage technological opportunities while minimising risks.

Editorial media in many countries, including Norway, have agreements with AI companies that use their content in information comparison services. If readers increasingly turn to such services rather than accessing editorial media directly, this could have implications for both the media economy and how audiences consume news. While there is concern that these services could reduce traffic to editorial media, they could also drive more traffic to the sites they reference. It is too early to determine the overall impact.

4.2.5 Freedom of the press and media diversity under pressure on platforms

Editorial content on social media plays an important role in giving the public access to reliable information that meets journalistic standards for quality, source evaluation and fact-checking. If popular social media platforms become digital news deserts, this could create vulnerabilities due to reduced access to local and national news and current affairs, and could also have negative implications for emergency preparedness if it becomes harder to disseminate important information. There are also a number of challenges associated with distributing this type of information via social media.

Social media platforms can limit the reach of editorial content or intervene in the content itself.[88] Posts may be removed for breaching a platform's terms of service, regardless of news value or the media's critical role in society. Several major platforms have introduced algorithmic restrictions on editorial articles because they generate less engagement than

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88   Reuters Digital News Report, Newman et al. (2024)

Several major platforms have introduced
algorithmic restrictions on editorial articles
because they generate less engagement
than entertainment or posts from friends.

entertainment or posts from friends.[89] This challenges freedom of the press and the diversity of news content on platforms and could weaken public resilience to disinformation.

4.2.6 Editorial media under international pressure

Press freedom is declining globally, and states and other political actors are playing an increasingly smaller role in safeguarding it. Political actors in an increasing number of countries are reported to be directly involved in propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the media.[90]

In countries that challenge our security interests, such as Russia, China and Iran, there is no such thing as genuine press freedom. Russian authorities, for example, use state-controlled media to conduct disinformation campaigns about Western countries, targeting both domestic and international audiences. One of the aims of these campaigns is to undermine support for NATO and Ukraine.

The framework conditions for editorial media in other countries can also have negative implications for Norway. Many Norwegians follow international news and can be exposed to disinformation if coverage does not meet journalistic standards. Disinformation about Norway abroad can influence domestic public debate, reduce Norwegians' trust in authorities, influence Norwegian international business interests and harm Norway's international reputation. Many Norwegian editorial media rely in part on coverage from international outlets for their foreign news. They are therefore, to some extent, dependent on a credible and independent foreign press to be able to report accurately and impartially themselves.

The global situation also impacts on the safety of Norwegian journalists reporting from abroad, which has implications for press freedom. Conflicts such as those in Ukraine and the Middle East have heightened risks for journalists in these regions, and in countries with authoritarian regimes, journalists reporting on political opposition face harassment.[91] Reduced journalist protection can limit coverage from such countries, potentially making editorial media appear less relevant and allowing unverified news on social media to play a greater role in shaping the public agenda.

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89   Reuters Digital News Report, Newman et al. (2024)
90   2024 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders
91   Strategi for ytringsfrihet i utenriks- og utviklingspolitikken [Strategy for Promoting Freedom of Expression in Norwegian Foreign and Development Policy]

Legislation regulating Norwegian media

Act relating to the editorial independence and liability of editor-controlled journalistic media (Media Liability Act)
The Media Liability Act aims to facilitate open and enlightened public discourse by safeguarding editorial independence and establishing clear lines of responsibility for content published in editor-controlled journalistic media. Under the Act, media outlets engaged in regular journalistic production, including news, current affairs, coverage of public debate, or other content of general interest, must appoint an editor to lead operations and make decisions on editorial matters. The publisher, owner, or company management cannot instruct or overrule the editor in editorial decisions. The editor is legally accountable, both in criminal and civil law, for the publication of editorial content and its associated promotion.

Act relating to financial support for the media (Media Support Act)
This law is intended to safeguard the independence of editor-controlled journalistic media and promote a diverse range of media across the country. The objectives of the various direct media support schemes are incorporated into the Media Support Act. Any establishment or discontinuation of direct grant schemes, or any change to the objectives of existing schemes, requires an amendment to the law.

Act relating to broadcasting and audiovisual on-demand services (Broadcasting Act)
The Act includes provisions on the right to operate broadcasting services, transmission via cable networks, a duty to transmit and overarching regulations governing the organisation of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK).

4.3 Policy instruments
The Norwegian Government's media policy aims to ensure that all segments of society have access to high-quality media and enlightened public discourse.

Both regulatory and economic instruments support the objectives of diversity and quality within Norwegian editorial media.

4.3.1 Regulatory instruments
Norway has multiple laws designed to safeguard editorial freedom and ensure a diverse media landscape.

Direct media support schemes

Production grants for news and current affairs media
Production grants aim to promote independent, high-quality journalism, particularly in news and current affairs media operating in markets that are too small to be sustainable, or as an alternative to the leading news outlets.

Grants for local audio and visual media
This grant scheme is intended to support media diversity and freedom of expression, and to strengthen the democratic role of local audio and visual media in society, including through the digitalisation of local radio.

Innovation and development grants
Innovation grants aim to promote media diversity and enlightened public discourse by stimulating editorial and content-driven innovation and development in news and current affairs media. The scheme particularly supports editorial, content-driven innovation and development in small, local news and current affairs media.

Grants for Sámi newspapers
Support for Sámi newspapers and Sámi-language newspaper pages is intended to facilitate democratic debate, formation of opinions and language development within the Sámi community.

4.3.2 Direct media support schemes
The four direct media support schemes are designed to ensure both geographic and thematic media diversity. A variety of additional media support measures are also in place.

4.3.3 Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation
International comparisons indicate that a strong public service broadcaster contributes to a more informed, and thereby more resilient, population.[92]

The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) promotes public discourse and helps ensure that the entire population receives adequate information to participate actively in democratic processes. Furthermore, NRK has an independent responsibility to support media diversity in Norway, both at a regional and national level.

Surveys show that the public has a high level of trust in NRK and actively uses its news services.[93]

NRK also performs a central role in emergency preparedness, with a statutory duty to ensure that information from the Norwegian Government reaches the population during crises and wartime.[94]

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92   Resilience to Online Disinformation: A Framework for Cross-National Comparative Research, Humprecht et al. (2020)
93   Reuters Digital News Report Norway 2024, Moe og Bjørgan
94   Forskrift om virksomheten i Norsk rikskringkasting under beredskap og i krig [regulation on the operations of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation during crises and wartime]

4.3.4 Grants to TV2 as a commercial public broadcaster

Since 2018, TV2 has operated under an agreement to provide commercial public broadcasting services. The purpose of the agreement is to help maintain media diversity, ensure genuine competition to NRK and provide nationwide news broadcasts produced and transmitted outside Oslo.

The agreement strengthens media diversity, in part by ensuring the presence of a commercial public broadcaster outside the Oslo region. It also requires TV2 to employ editorial staff for its news broadcasts in at least six different locations across the country.

4.3.5 VAT exemption for newspapers

When value added tax (VAT) was introduced in Norway in 1970, it was decided that printed media, including newspapers, would be exempt. The justification for the exemption for editorial media was that they are important for public discourse and that a pluralistic daily press provides the foundation for a free and diverse formation of opinion.[95] The exemption applies to newspapers, including electronic newspapers that consist predominantly of text and still images.

4.3.6 International work

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has devised a strategy for promoting freedom of expression in Norwegian foreign and development policy.[96] The strategy describes key priorities in Norway's international work to promote freedom of expression and the diversity of free and independent media. These objectives are pursued through multilateral cooperation, political dialogue and support for partner organisations such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the EEA, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other multilateral organisations, as well as NGOs and industry organisations. Support includes measures to strengthen journalist protection, provide education and training for journalists, facilitate knowledge exchange and develop national legislation and institutions.

In Report to the Storting no. 20 (2024–2025) *Promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights in Europe*,[97] the Norwegian Government outlines how Norway will work internationally to counter the spread of disinformation by protecting freedom of expression, ensuring an independent and critical press, and strengthening critical media literacy. Norway will help strengthen global fact-checking

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95   Meirverdiavgiftslova – Ot.prp. nr. 17 (1968–69) [The VAT Act – Proposition to the Storting No. 17 (1968–69]

96   Strategi for ytringsfrihet i utenriks- og utviklingspolitikken [Strategy for Promoting Freedom of Expression in Norwegian Foreign and Development Policy]

97   Meld. St. 20 (2024–2025)

solutions, reinforce and complement national regulatory frameworks and highlight the responsibility of technology companies to uphold human rights.

Creative Europe is the European Commission's programme for culture and media. It counters disinformation by promoting media diversity, media freedom and media literacy. Creative Europe provides support to journalists and to initiatives promoting independent media in Europe, and Norway has participated in the programme since its inception.

Cultural cooperation within the framework of the Nordic Council of Ministers also includes cooperation in the media sector. The Nordic Cooperation Programme for Culture 2025–2030 aims to strengthen freedom of expression and artistic freedom in the Nordic countries, including by emphasising the free and independent role of the media. The programme will also focus on countering disinformation through increased Nordic cooperation and specific measures.

4.4 Measures

4.4.1 Determine the appropriate level, design and distribution of media support schemes

The media economy is under pressure due to declining advertising revenues and tough competition from global platforms. Reduced financial resources limit editorial media's capacity to fact-check, verify and balance claims, thereby diminishing their role as a counterweight to the propagation of disinformation.

A weakened media economy can also have implications for media diversity.

The direct media support schemes are part of the four-year policy frameworks approved by the Storting, with the next period covering 2027–2030. In this context, the Norwegian Government will consider the appropriate level, design and distribution of the direct media support schemes.

4.4.2 Explore potential measures to boost the use of editorial media by young people

A high level of news consumption is an important element of a society's resilience to disinformation. It is therefore concerning that children and young people appear to consume less news from editorial media than before.

The Norwegian Government recognises the need for measures to promote good media habits among young people – habits that will remain with them. Norway's Ministry of Culture and Equality has therefore commissioned the NMA to examine how such measures could be structured, for instance through subsidised access to journalism, new grant schemes, or by expanding existing schemes.

The Government will consider how to follow up the recommendations of the NMA.

4.4.3 Support investigative journalism

Local journalism plays an important role in local communities. However, the current financial pressures make it difficult for many small newsrooms to prioritise investigative reporting. The Norwegian Government therefore seeks to support collaborative initiatives that make it easier for smaller newspapers to undertake investigative journalism, adopt new technology and enhance journalists' skills.

In 2025, the Government strengthened its support for investigative journalism, use of technology and skills development in smaller newsrooms by increasing funding for the Center for Investigative Journalism (SUJO) and for *Samarbeidsdesken*, a joint project between the Association of Norwegian local newspapers, SUJO and NRK. This project provides access to research material on key social issues in order to facilitate investigative and in-depth journalism.

The Government will consider whether there is a need to further strengthen investigative journalism.

4.4.4 Support skills enhancement for journalists

Fact-checking and verification have become increasingly complex due to technological advances and developments in the security situation. These changes have created a greater need for newsrooms to enhance skills and adopt new tools.

Newsrooms have an independent responsibility for securing the skills they consider necessary.

In addition, the Norwegian Government provides grant funding for the Norwegian Institute of Journalism, which is a national centre of expertise for media. The combination of rapid technological change and the challenging media economy makes this support more important than ever.

The Government will consider whether to provide further support for skills enhancement for journalists.

4.4.5 Strengthen press freedom in social media

Press freedom is under pressure on social media, where platforms can delete or down-rank editorial content without regard to its news value or editorial media's critical role in society. This creates vulnerabilities that can weaken society's resilience to disinformation.

The DSA requires social media platforms to include the protection of press freedom in their terms of service. Platforms must also identify and mitigate systemic risks to press freedom, including through the design of recommendation algorithms and content moderation. The EMFA requires platforms to notify editorial media 24 hours before deleting or restricting editorial content. It also provides for structured dialogue at the European level.

The Norwegian Government will help ensure effective enforcement of the DSA and EMFA to maximise protection of press freedom for Norwegian media on social media platforms.

Despite the turbulent global context, Norway remains a safe country for most editorial staff, as reflected in the annual Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, which Norway topped for the ninth consecutive year in 2025.

4.4.6 Promote safer conditions for journalists

Despite the turbulent global context, Norway remains a safe country for most editorial staff, as reflected in the annual Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index, which Norway topped for the ninth consecutive year in 2025. However, not all journalists in Norway have a safe working environment free from threats and harassment. Such conditions can lead to self-censorship, reducing media diversity and undermining public discourse.

It is therefore important to closely monitor journalists' safety, in line with the Council of Europe's recommendations and its campaign for journalist protection. The Norwegian Government has invited the press organisations to explore how government authorities and the media can work together to ensure safe conditions for all journalists in Norway. This initiative will be followed up through the forthcoming national strategy for open and enlightened public discourse.

4.4.7 Strengthen editorial media internationally

In Report to the Storting no. 20 (2024–2025) *Promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights in Europe*,[98] the Norwegian Government sets out its international work to counter the propagation of disinformation by protecting freedom of expression, supporting an independent and critical press and promoting critical media literacy. Norway will help strengthen global fact-checking solutions, reinforce and complement national regulatory frameworks and highlight the responsibility of technology companies to uphold human rights.

The Strategy for Promoting Freedom of Expression in Norwegian Foreign and Development Policy[99] outlines key priorities for Norway's international efforts to promote freedom of expression and a diverse, independent media landscape. These objectives are pursued through multilateral cooperation, political dialogue and support for partner organisations such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the EEA, the OSCE and other multilateral organisations, as well as NGOs and industry organisations. Support includes measures to strengthen journalist protection, provide education and training for journalists, facilitate knowledge exchange and develop national legislation and institutions.

The Government will continue to act as an international advocate for initiatives that build resilience to disinformation

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[98]   Meld. St. 20 (2024–2025)
[99]   Strategi for ytringsfrihet i utenriks- og utviklingspolitikken [Strategy for Promoting Freedom of Expression in Norwegian Foreign and Development Policy]

The Norwegian Government will

✧ determine the appropriate level, design and distribution of the direct media support schemes for the upcoming four-year policy framework period, 2027–2030

✧ consider potential measures to boost the use of editorial media by young people

✧ support investigative journalism, with a particular focus on strengthening local reporting

✧ support skills enhancement for journalists

✧ promote press freedom and media diversity in social media, search engines and other online platforms

✧ explore measures to enhance journalist protection

✧ act as an international advocate for initiatives that build resilience to disinformation by protecting freedom of expression, ensuring an independent and critical press and promoting critical media literacy

Strengthen the knowledge base

05

5.1 Introduction

Paradoxically, while the accumulated body of knowledge has never been greater, access to fake news and disinformation has also increased. Distinguishing between disinformation and difference of opinion is a challenging but increasingly important exercise. Resilience to disinformation does not entail being critical of everything; it is about drawing on available knowledge, supporting claims with evidence and giving due consideration to opposing views and counterarguments.

The importance of knowledge and research in the fight against disinformation is twofold.

First, the scientific method itself acts as a vaccine against disinformation. Scientific methodology is based on continuously testing theories and hypotheses to determine whether they hold, enabling us to develop and expand our understanding of the world. Knowledge should and must be challenged; however, those who challenge it must also be able to substantiate their claims. Critical thinking, source evaluation and a fundamental understanding of scientific theory are skills everyone needs when engaging with the ever-growing flow of information from the increasing number of platforms and sources.

Second, knowledge of and research on disinformation and how it spreads are crucial for strengthening processes and institutions in the face of growing access to false information.

In a liberal democracy, there must be ample room for disagreement and debate. However, some measures to counter disinformation, such as extensive surveillance or censorship of opinion content, can risk undermining fundamental democratic principles, including freedom of expression, privacy and democratic freedom. A lack of knowledge about the propagation of disinformation can lead to countermeasures that are either excessive or ineffective.

Over the past decade, the volume of research on disinformation has steadily increased. Much of this research focuses on the democratic and security implications of changes in the digital information environment. Although the majority of disinformation research originates from, or focuses on, the United States, there is also substantial research activity in Norway and at other European universities.

An up-to-date, evidence-based knowledge base within a Norwegian context is important for identifying appropriate measures and achieving the right balance between freedom of expression, freedom of information and civil protection.

This chapter outlines the challenges and sets out the policy instruments and measures the Norwegian Government deems necessary to support further research and strengthen the knowledge base on disinformation in Norway.

5.2 Challenges

5.2.1 Rapid developments in technology and research

The rapid pace of technological change presents challenges for research on disinformation. The field is continually evolving, and the need for up-to-date

Identifying targeted and effective measures to enhance resilience to disinformation requires knowledge on how different segments of the population are exposed to and influenced by disinformation.

knowledge is also growing at a rapid pace. AI has made it possible to generate and disseminate disinformation on a larger scale and in more sophisticated ways than before, and it can help identify and analyse the propagation of disinformation more effectively than before.

5.2.2 Fragmented research and knowledge on disinformation

Many strong research communities in Norway are examining different aspects of disinformation and other information threats. The interdisciplinary nature of this research is both a strength and a challenge. Multiple perspectives can provide broader insight and capture different aspects of change. However, studies from different disciplines often use varying terms and definitions,[100] making it difficult to compare findings. Consequently, it is challenging to establish a clear overview of the available knowledge in the field, draw conclusions about the scale of the problem, identify vulnerabilities and consider how best to develop targeted and effective measures.

5.2.3 Strengthen knowledge on how disinformation spreads over time

Studies have been conducted on how disinformation spreads in Norway. The Norwegian Defence

Research Establishment (FFI), commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, has analysed influence attempts in connection with recent elections in Norway. These studies, along with similar research, provide valuable insight into how disinformation spreads in the country.

However, influence operations and the spread of disinformation can occur covertly and over extended periods, making them difficult to capture in studies with a limited timeframe. Longer time series may therefore be better suited for showing developments over time.

5.2.4 Improve understanding of which measures help build resilience to disinformation

Which measures are effective in strengthening resilience to disinformation varies between countries, across different contexts, and among different segments of the population.

Research has highlighted links between critical media literacy, patterns of media use and an individual's vulnerability to information influence. However, identifying the most effective measures requires further knowledge of what works within a Norwegian context.

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100   Misinformation, disinformation, and fake news: lessons from an interdisciplinary, systematic literature review, Broda and Strömbäck (2024)

5.2.5 Improve understanding of vulnerabilities in Norway

Identifying targeted and effective measures to enhance resilience to disinformation requires knowledge on how different segments of the population are exposed to and influenced by disinformation.

The chapter on critical media literacy describes various groups in society that, for different reasons, may be particularly vulnerable to disinformation. To strengthen critical media literacy across the entire population, further knowledge is needed on the factors that make these and potentially other groups vulnerable.

5.2.6 Improve understanding of the propagation and impact of disinformation in online subcultures and gaming environments

More knowledge is needed on how disinformation spreads online beyond the major social media platforms, particularly within online subcultures and via gaming environments.

Online communities formed around, for example, video gaming, provide a valuable escape from loneliness and isolation for many members.[101] Despite these positive aspects and the wider social benefits of gaming culture, gaming platforms (like Discord, Twitch and Steam) and smaller social media platforms (such as Parler and BitChute) have also emerged as arenas for information influence and the propagation of disinformation.[102]

The report from the Commission for Countering Extremism highlighted how extremists have exploited the broad reach of gaming platforms and gaming culture for recruitment, propaganda dissemination, mobilisation and acts of violence.

More knowledge is needed about the phenomenon in order to explore potential measures.

5.2.7 Trust in research

Trust in research and knowledge is essential for society to make evidence-based decisions. In Norway, the population generally has a high level of trust in research and knowledge. Nevertheless, there are notable variations and exceptions. For instance, trust in research on climate change and renewable energy is consistently lower and appears to be declining, and certain population groups exhibit lower levels of trust than others.[103]

It is therefore important to understand how trust in research varies and changes over time, as well as the factors that influence it. These questions are the focus of a current research project at Norway's Institute for Social Research.[104]

5.3 Policy instruments

5.3.1 Current research in Norway

Information influence and disinformation has been identified as a priority research area in the long-term plan for research and higher education 2023–2032.

Major universities and several research institutes already have extensive activity in this field. Research is interdisciplinary and aligned with the expertise of different academic environments.

The topics of disinformation and information influence are relevant across several portfolios in the Research Council of Norway (particularly Welfare and Education, and Democracy and Global Development), but there are no dedicated initiatives specifically targeting them. Nevertheless, the Research Council funds ongoing research projects on disinformation,

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101   NOU 2024: 3
102   Disinformation studies: perspectives from an emerging field, Correia et al. (2022); Malign foreign interference and information influence on video game platforms: Understanding the adversarial playbook, Swedish Psychological Defence Agency (2023)
103   Befolkningens tillit til og syn på forskning [public trust in and attitudes to research], Research Council of Norway (2024)
104   Tillit og holdninger til forskning: årsaker og endring over tid [trust and attitudes to research: causes and changes over time], Institute for Social Research

with over NOK 150 million allocated to date. The majority of this funding is directed to MediaFutures, the Research Centre for Responsible Media Technology and Innovation, affiliated with the University of Bergen. Norwegian research communities also have close connections with European and international research initiatives, and extensive cross-border collaboration is underway.

5.3.2 Public-oriented research communication

Public-oriented research communication serves an important democratic function as it improves understanding of research findings and their potential practical applications. Disseminating, sharing and applying research strengthens society's resilience to disinformation.

Communication is a core activity for higher education institutions and a key objective for publicly funded research institutes.[105] However, research and education are generally valued more highly and better rewarded than public-oriented research communication. Academic staff tend to prioritise activities that carry most weight in recruitment and promotion decisions. A 2021 time-use survey found

that researchers spend around 5 per cent of their working hours on research dissemination.[106] Historically, recognition of public-oriented research communication has been inconsistently weighted in recruitment and promotion processes in the sector.

In 2025, the Norwegian Government removed scientific publishing as a research indicator in the funding system for higher education institutions. Consequently, published research output no longer carries weight in core funding allocations for the higher education sector.[107] The publishing indicator is still used for research funding in the institute sector (independent research institutes that receive both public funding and private contracts) and health authorities.

Internationally, efforts are underway to reform the system for evaluating research, researchers and research organisations, including through the Coalition for Advancing Research Assessment (CoARA). In line with this, Universities Norway (UHR) has developed a framework for tailored academic career assessments, in which research dissemination is one of six competence areas recognised for merit. Several

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[105] Retningslinjer for statlig grunnbevilgning til forskningsinstitutter og forskningskonsern [guidelines for core government funding for research institutes and research consortia]

[106] Når timene telles: Tidsbruksundersøkelsen 2021. En kartlegging av tidsbruk blant vitenskapelig og faglig tilsatte ved norske universiteter og høgskoler [counting the hours: the 2021 time-use survey – a study of how academic and teaching staff at Norwegian universities and colleges spend their time], NIFO (2021)

[107] Meld. St. 14 (2022–2023)

Reducing vulnerability to disinformation requires individuals to feel connected to the broader public sphere and that their voice is heard.

Norwegian institutions are currently implementing this framework.

An amendment to the regulations of the Universities and Colleges Act now allows institutions to place emphasis on a broader range of competencies in recruitment, whereby research dissemination and other public engagement activities carry more weight than previously.

5.3.3 Media research and continuing education
The Norwegian Government operates a dedicated grant scheme for media research and continuing education, aimed at enhancing understanding of the role of media in the development of society. The scheme is administered by the NMA. Funded research is intended to strengthen the knowledge base for media policy and support efforts to address major societal challenges, including resilience to disinformation. Critical media literacy is a priority area in the scheme.

5.3.4 Reports and surveys by government agencies
Several government agencies produce reports and data on the challenges related to information influence in different areas of society.

The NMA regularly monitors the public's media use and critical media literacy and publishes biannual assessments of major online platforms' compliance with industry standards to counter disinformation.

Annual public threat assessments by the NIS, PST and NSM provide information on the risks that disinformation and other forms of information influence may pose to Norwegian society.

5.4 Measures
5.4.1 Explore the potential for establishing a research centre for long-term research on public discourse
There is a pressing need for research on disinformation in a Norwegian context, including how it spreads, who it targets, who is vulnerable, its impact on public discourse and which countermeasures are effective. Long-term studies are needed to track developments over time, as also noted by the Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression.

Research on disinformation and resilience to this should be closely linked to studies on public engagement, freedom of expression and the climate of expression, in line with OECD recommendations on safeguarding information integrity.[108] Reducing vulnerability to disinformation requires individuals to feel connected to the broader public sphere and that their voice is heard. However, open and enlightened public discourse requires resilience to

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[108] Recommendation of the Council on Information Integrity, OECD Legal Instruments

disinformation and a space for expression that is both broad and perceived as such.

The Norwegian Government will consider supporting the establishment of a research centre to monitor the framework conditions for freedom of expression over time. A key focus of the centre will be to track developments in public discourse, including polarisation and the spread of disinformation. The centre will also actively disseminate findings to keep the public informed about the status of public discourse.

This measure forms part of the broader strategy to promote open and enlightened public discourse.

5.4.2 Increase the reach of evidence-based research by expanding the national support scheme for Norwegian language open-access journals in the humanities and social sciences

Open access to and availability of peer-reviewed research is crucial for open and enlightened public discourse and facilitates the use of research in society and public administration. In Norway, the national support scheme for Norwegian language open-access journals in the humanities and social sciences helps ensure that research published in Norwegian is freely available to all, thereby increasing the reach of evidence-based research in public discourse. In Report to the Storting no. 14 (2024–2025) *Reliable Knowledge in an Uncertain World*, the Norwegian Government announced plans to expand the scheme to additional disciplines, ensuring broader public access to high-quality research in Norwegian.

5.4.3 Establish one or more centres for research on the societal impacts of AI

There is a need to strengthen research on the societal risks associated with AI and on strategies for managing these risks.

The Research Council of Norway has announced a call for proposals to establish four to six research centres for AI. The centres will have an interdisciplinary approach and facilitate collaboration across sectors and institutions. Collectively, they will focus on three main areas: societal impacts, technology and innovation.

The centre(s) focusing on the societal impacts of AI will seek to identify and address key challenges and dilemmas, while also exploring the potential opportunities of AI technology for individuals and society. Examples include the ways in which AI influences democracy, civic participation, trust, social cohesion and the welfare state.

5.4.4 Improve understanding of the spread of disinformation through video gaming and other online subcultures

The Norwegian Government's video gaming strategy for 2024–2026 examines the challenges of the propagation of extremist propaganda on gaming platforms. The strategy's measures aim to promote an inclusive, safe and accessible gaming culture. A national centre of expertise on video gaming and the gaming culture has been established at the Norwegian Film Institute. The centre seeks to bring together expertise on challenges within the gaming culture, advance knowledge and expertise in the field, and highlight the positive aspects and opportunities that the gaming culture offers.

In light of the challenges, however, there is still a need for more knowledge on the propagation of disinformation through video gaming and other online subcultures.

The Norwegian Government will

✧ explore the potential for establishing a research centre for long-term research on public discourse

✧ increase the reach of evidence-based research by expanding the national support scheme for Norwegian language open-access journals in the humanities and social sciences

✧ establish one or more research centres to investigate the societal impacts of AI

✧ improve understanding of the spread of disinformation through video gaming and other online subcultures

Strengthen government efforts and coordination between agencies 06

6.1 Introduction

Effective prevention requires shared situational awareness, risk assessment, information sharing and coordination. Preventing disinformation and other forms of information influence is challenging, as it can be hard to identify. It can also be difficult to distinguish it from legitimate expression, and it could unfold over long periods with widespread impact.

Numerous public actors are working to strengthen resilience to disinformation in different ways. The Norwegian Government's total preparedness report outlines' authorities efforts to strengthen the overall preparedness, clarify roles and responsibilities, and coordinate efforts to counter influence operations.[109]

A key strength is that many different actors are working towards a common goal from different perspectives and using various approaches and policy instruments. Addressing such a complex challenge requires multifaceted solutions, underpinned by clear responsibilities and effective knowledge sharing and collaboration where appropriate.

The principle of responsibility in public administration means that managing disinformation and influence operations primarily rests with each individual agency and sector. Certain ministries and agencies, however, have specific responsibilities that are central to the efforts to counter disinformation and influence operations.

Local and county authorities are responsible at the local level for protecting the population and preventing unwanted incidents.[110] Local authorities' remit in terms of preparedness is set out in the Civil Protection Act. In addition, local and county authorities play key roles in civil protection and emergency preparedness, covering areas such as elections, transport, business development, transport preparedness and upper secondary education. Although local and county authorities do not have specific responsibilities for countering influence operations or disinformation, they play a crucial role in ensuring that the public receive accurate information and in maintaining effective local preparedness.

In addition to public authorities, numerous actors in the business sector and third sector contribute, directly or indirectly, to strengthening resilience to disinformation. Private companies can, for example, be targets of disinformation as well as unwitting channels for its dissemination. They can also play important roles as employers or as owners and operators of platforms where disinformation circulates. The business sector can enhance resilience through measures such as information sharing, proprietary algorithms, ethical guidelines, responsible marketing and skills development. Both the business sector and the third sector can help build public trust and disseminate reliable information.

This chapter outlines the challenges and presents measures to strengthen and coordinate preventive efforts, as well as proposals for how authorities can further support open and enlightened public discourse.

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[109]   Meld. St. 9 (2024–2025)
[110]   Samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap [civil protection and emergency preparedness], Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities

Responsibility for disinformation and influence operations in some authorities

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has specific responsibility for overseeing and coordinating efforts to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, as well as overall responsibility for preventive national security under the Security Act, on the civilian side. The Ministry is also responsible for the general coordination of measures to counter influence operations in the civilian domain and has operational responsibility for coordination and crisis management when required.

The Ministry of Culture and Equality is responsible for strengthening resilience to disinformation. This includes improving preventive measures and contributing to improved coordination among actors that support resilience efforts in various ways. This responsibility does not extend to areas covered by the mandate of Norwegian intelligence, surveillance and security services (EOS services) with regard to illegal activities.

The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development has national responsibility for the administration of elections in Norway. This includes overarching responsibility for coordinating security measures during elections, including actions to counter election interference.

The Ministry of Defence is responsible for devising and implementing Norwegian security and defence policy, including matters related to information threats, in times of peace, crisis and war. It also coordinates strategic communication within the sector and in international defence cooperation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the diplomatic, foreign policy and international security aspects of disinformation and influence operations. Norwegian diplomatic missions protect and promote Norway's interests abroad and report on conditions in host countries and regions that could impact on these interests.

The Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance is responsible for national digitalisation policy, including the implementation of Norway's Digital Future strategy and measures to prevent digital exclusion. It also oversees the Government's communication policy and promotes openness and transparency in public administration. In addition, the Ministry is responsible for several EU regulations in the digital domain, including the AI Regulation and the DSA.

The Ministry of Children and Families is responsible for coordinating policy to ensure a safe digital childhood.

The Ministry of Education and Research oversees kindergartens as well as primary and secondary education, where the National Curriculum Regulations and the National Curriculum for Knowledge Promotion in Primary and Secondary Education and Training promote democratic values, critical thinking and source evaluation. The Ministry is also responsible for research and higher education, ensuring that society has access to current, high-quality knowledge and that research ethics are upheld.

The Norwegian Armed Forces are responsible for defending Norway, its allies, military forces and operations from information threats in times of peace, crisis and war. They contribute to the national decision-making process and co-ordinate strategic communication with NATO, allied states and partners.

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) is Norway's national domestic intelligence and security agency. Its role is to prevent and investigate serious crimes that threaten national security. As part of this mandate, PST identifies, assesses and manages threats stemming from the activities of foreign states in Norway. It also issues warnings regarding security threats in Norway and provides decision-making support on matters that could compromise Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic governance and other national security interests.

The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) is responsible for communicating risk and crisis-related information, as well as providing guidance to the public on self-preparedness.

The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is responsible, within the framework of the Security Act and its main directives, for providing information, advice and guidance on preventive security measures and requirements for protective measures. This includes providing information and guidance on influence operations targeting entities subject to the Security Act. NSM is also the national centre of expertise for digital security and is responsible for preventing cyberattacks.

The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) is responsible for foreign intelligence and for detecting and alerting the authorities to information threats to national security from foreign states, non-state actors or their representatives.

The Norwegian Media Authority (NMA) is the government supervisory and regulatory body for the media sector. It is responsible for facilitating a diverse range of editor-controlled journalistic media across the country and for promoting critical media literacy among the population. The NMA's mandate will be expanded to include building resilience to disinformation.

No single measure alone can strengthen resilience to disinformation. A range of actors across multiple disciplines possess complementary tools and capabilities that, collectively, can have a preventive effect.

6.2 Challenges

6.2.1 Need to strengthen preventive efforts

No single measure alone can strengthen resilience to disinformation. A range of actors across multiple disciplines possess complementary tools and capabilities that, collectively, can have a preventive effect. There is a need to reinforce these preventive efforts and to facilitate a shared understanding of the situation and the risks posed by disinformation targeting Norway and Norwegian interests.

6.2.2 Need to share information between relevant public actors and the business sector

The Norwegian Defence Commission highlighted a need to improve shared situational awareness and to better equip authorities to translate threat and risk assessments into specific policy measures.[111]

The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission stressed the need for information to be shared across sectors and at local, regional and national levels. This includes general information on the intentions of foreign states in Norway and information on disinformation methods and specific events that require scrutiny.[112]

Using coordinated measures has society-wide effects, making it essential to facilitate effective information sharing, coordination and shared situational awareness across sectors and all levels of government, as well as the business sector.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security follows up and coordinates the Government's work on hybrid threats, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Inter-ministerial coordination forums have also been established to strengthen situational and threat awareness, including with respect to disinformation.

However, developments in the threat landscape indicate that more sectors and levels of government need to take a more proactive approach and establish channels for sharing information and experience.

To improve shared situational awareness, greater information sharing may be needed between civilian actors and the Norwegian intelligence, surveillance and security services (EOS services). While EOS services have extensive insight into various information threats against Norway, civilian actors could provide valuable expertise in their own domains, such as how information propagates on social media.

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[111] NOU 2023: 14
[112] NOU 2023: 17

International cooperation with neighbouring countries and multilateral organisations is also essential to learn from the experiences of other countries and international organisations.

6.3 Policy instruments

Several of the policy instruments available to authorities to strengthen resilience to disinformation are discussed in earlier chapters. These include measures to safeguard public debate, pluralistic editorial media, teaching source evaluation in schools, and robust monitoring of social media. Below, we outline measures that directly target the specific challenges related to disinformation.

6.3.1 Intelligence and security services

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) (EOS services) contribute in various ways to resilience to disinformation, including by providing decision-making support to the authorities and through annual threat and risk assessments, which enhance public situational awareness. PST is responsible for identifying, assessing and managing threats from foreign influence operations. Since 2024, it has been a criminal offence to participate in such operations on behalf of foreign intelligence services where this may harm major societal interests. PST also has the authority to collect, systematise and analyse publicly available information for intelligence purposes, enabling it to produce analyses and assessments to support decision-making in situations where influence operations could pose a threat to Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic governance or other national security interests.

The EOS services, together with the wider police force, work together to strengthen Norway's capacity to detect and understand hybrid threats, assess vulnerabilities and provide effective decision-making support to the authorities, including through the National Intelligence and Security Centre (NESS) for hybrid threats.

6.3.2 Guidance on self-preparedness

During a crisis, misinformation and disinformation can spread quickly, either because the crisis itself causes confusion and misunderstandings or because actors seek to destabilise society. It is therefore essential to verify information sources and consider carefully what information should be shared. In 2024, DSB revised the guidance on self-preparedness among the public, following consultations with the NMA. The updated guidelines now include advice on source evaluation and how to identify disinformation.

6.3.3 Special measures to counter election interference

Prior to the last parliamentary, Sámi, local and county council elections, the Norwegian Government appointed a working group to strengthen resilience to election interference. Headed by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, the group has included representatives from relevant ministries and agencies, including the intelligence and security services and the Norwegian Electoral Directorate. Since 2019, it has prepared an action plan for each election, detailing measures to strengthen Norway's resilience to influence attempts.

These measures have targeted political parties and candidates, government authorities, the media and the general public, among others. They have included information campaigns relating to fake news and disinformation, research projects on foreign electoral interference, and brochures for candidates on personal security. The group has also served as an important network linking actors involved in elections, which has helped improve the coordination of efforts.

In June 2024, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development appointed a rapid-response expert group to examine the implications of generative AI for secure and democratic elections. The group reviewed experiences from elections held in other countries in 2024 and submitted its report in February 2025.[113]

The report emphasises that Norwegian society is well placed to withstand democratic threats, and highlights the importance of building on and reinforcing these strengths. It also notes that the information landscape has been transformed by algorithm-driven systems and that AI primarily amplifies existing threats. The expert group proposed a series of recommendations to reduce the risk of AI negatively affecting elections and democracy. These recommendations are aimed at multiple sectors, with the aforementioned inter-ministerial working group playing a key role in their implementation.

6.3.4 Hybrid network

In 2024, the Norwegian Government established a hybrid network comprising representatives from all ministries. Its purpose is to strengthen the coordination and understanding of hybrid policy instruments and threats, including disinformation, within the ministries and across the broader public administration.

6.3.5 International sanctions

Norway has endorsed the EU's sanctions against Russia, with certain national adaptations. Norway has agreed to place individuals and entities involved in propaganda on sanctions lists, subjecting them to financial restrictions, including a prohibition on providing them with funds or other resources. Travel restrictions also apply to these individuals.

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[113]   Kunstig intelligens og demokratiske valg – internasjonale erfaringer og nasjonale anbefalinger [artificial intelligence and democratic elections – international experiences and national recommendations] (2025)

Examples of international initiatives and cooperation

Disinformation is a global issue. Cooperation with neighbouring countries and international organisations is essential to benefit from their experience in addressing disinformation and influence operations.

NATO
In recent years, NATO, together with allies and partners, has developed tools to make it easier to understand, analyse and manage information threats, including disinformation. NATO is frequently targeted by information campaigns seeking to manipulate perceptions of the organisation and its role, and to undermine public trust and alliance cohesion.

NATO has also built capacity to map and analyse such activities with a view to establishing robust situational awareness that supports responses to information threats. This work is guided by NATO's strategy for strategic communication 2025–2027, prepared in consultation with allies, and NATO's *Approach to Counter Information Threats*.[114]

Allies play a key role in supporting NATO's strategic communication by, for example, coordinating messages on issues of importance to the alliance – such as support for Ukraine – and by using their embassy networks in NATO's partner countries.

An informal network for strategic communication at the senior official level (the NATO Rapid Response Group) has also been established, where all allies can share information on current information threats, exchange best practices for managing them, and coordinate measures and potential responses. Norway is an active participant in the group. Additionally, an informal Senior Communicators Network at the senior official level, with representation from several Norwegian ministries, meets regularly to discuss strategic communication within the alliance.

Norway also participates in NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga,[115] which specialises in areas such as analysing

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114   NATO's approach to counter information threats, NATO (2024)
115   StratCom, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

disinformation campaigns and actors, influence operations and challenges related to AI. The centre aims to strengthen strategic communication capacity within NATO, its Member States and partner countries. The Norwegian Government will send a secondee to the centre to strengthen the exchange of information with a leading international expert network in the field, thereby contributing to national capacity building.

EU

The EU has been actively working to counter disinformation for several years and, in 2016, published its first action plan on hybrid threats, which also covers disinformation.

EUvsDisinfo[116] is a task force that identifies foreign disinformation, points out factual inaccuracies and maintains a database of its findings. The task force has a particular, though not exclusive, focus on Russian and Chinese disinformation. Its work is publicly accessible, and the database is easy to search.

In 2023, the EU adopted a package of measures to counter disinformation, known as the FIMI toolbox.[117] The toolbox is a collection of countermeasures that Member States – and, to some extent, EU institutions – can use to counter foreign information and influence operations. Responsibility for implementing these measures lies primarily with the Member States, with the EU providing support and coordination. One example of a countermeasure is

attribution, i.e. where a state publicly identifies the source of FIMI. Through the FIMI toolbox, states who opt to attribute a source can receive coordinated statements of solidarity from the EU to reinforce the effect of the measure.

Protecting democracy and our shared values is one of seven overarching priorities of the current European Commission. During the present mandate period, the Commission will establish a 'democracy shield' to counter FIMI.

Cooperation within the EU on disinformation has so far been primarily political and intergovernmental rather than institutional. This has made it relatively easy for Norway to sign up to European initiatives on a case-by-case basis where desirable. It remains to be seen whether the EU will move towards more binding common solutions during this period: this is typically the Commission's starting point when it puts forward proposals.

UNESCO

UNESCO is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, which also includes media and communication. It has primary responsibility for safeguarding freedom of expression, countering disinformation and ensuring access to fact-based information. UNESCO's work in communication and information supports key actors in protecting fundamental human rights – both online and otherwise – by focusing on areas such as freedom of expression and the safety of journalists, media

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116   Detecting, analysing, and raising awareness about disinformation, EUvsDisinfo
117   FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference.

development and media in crises, media and information literacy, digital literacy, universal access to information, digital inclusion, digital guidelines and digital transformation.

UNESCO is also developing its role in countering disinformation, misinformation and hate speech, with particular emphasis on more effectively promoting and protecting freedom of expression and ensuring access to fact-based information.

OECD Hub on Information Integrity
The OECD Hub on Information Integrity is part of the OECD's broader initiative to strengthen democracy and ensure public access to reliable and diverse information. Norway was one of the first OECD countries to support the development of the hub, which was launched in 2022. The hub functions as a learning platform where Member States can exchange data and best practices. Through the initiative, countries share information on measures and strategies to address information challenges. The OECD conducts analyses of public governance measures and publishes reports offering insights on how to enhance information integrity. It also provides Member States with resources and tools to tackle global information challenges, and develops guidelines and recommendations to support the implementation of policies that promote information integrity.

Open Government Partnership
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is an international initiative that Norway helped establish in 2010. Originally eight countries participated, and today OGP has around 70 member countries. The partnership is founded on the principle that the most effective way to ensure open, well-functioning and user-friendly public administration is through close collaboration between the public sector and civil society. Through OGP, Norway undertakes to increase transparency in its administration by developing action plans and reporting on progress. Norway's participation is coordinated by the Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance, which presented the country's fifth OGP action plan in 2024.

Freedom Online Coalition
The Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) is an intergovernmental coalition that promotes an open and free Internet in line with human rights, with particular emphasis on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and privacy rights. The FOC currently has 42 member countries, which meet informally in various forums to share information, develop joint strategies and coordinate efforts to promote an open and free Internet. Notable examples include coordination during the negotiations on the Global Digital Compact in 2024, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Oslo in 2025 and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+20) in 2025.

6.4 Measures

6.4.1 Expand the mandate of the NMA

The Norwegian Government intends to expand the mandate of the NMA in order to strengthen resilience to disinformation. The NMA currently contributes to the efforts to achieve societal objectives related to freedom of expression, legal certainty and a vibrant democracy. Its key priorities include facilitating a diverse media landscape and critical media literacy among the population.

The NMA is well positioned to assess the impact of disinformation in relation to potential countermeasures, both due to its expertise in freedom of expression and its responsibility for safeguarding media diversity.

Under the expanded mandate, the NMA will serve as a competent authority in accordance with the DSA, with responsibility for provisions relating to content and expression, as outlined in Chapter 3, *Hold Social Media to Account*. A central part of this role will be to analyse and document compliance by social media and other content platforms, and to ensure that any breaches are addressed, in coordination with the European Commission and other EU regulatory bodies.

In 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Equality commissioned the NMA to explore a methodology for assessing how online platforms influence public discourse in Norway. The aim is to establish a knowledge base on the scope and propagation of disinformation on these platforms and on how the platforms moderate such content.

The NMA will initially develop a methodology for analysing how platform algorithms impact on the reach of editorial content as well as misinformation or disinformation, and the extent to which platforms enforce their own terms of service regarding misinformation, disinformation and inauthentic behaviour.

With an expanded mandate and increased resources, the NMA will be equipped to carry out this task alongside other responsibilities related to strengthening resilience to disinformation. This will involve producing, gathering and disseminating knowledge about the propagation of disinformation and its impact on society, with particular emphasis on social media. The mandate should be viewed in conjunction with the NMA's existing work on media diversity and freedom of expression.

The following sections provide further details of several of the new tasks the Government proposes for the NMA.

6.4.2 Establish a new council structure for preparedness planning and status assessments

In its total preparedness report,[118] the Norwegian Government announced the establishment of a new council structure at the ministerial level for preparedness planning and status assessments. This represents an important step in countering hybrid threats, including disinformation. Systematic reporting on status and vulnerabilities across sectors will provide a more robust and comprehensive foundation for improved situational awareness within the Government. The new council structure will also facilitate more comprehensive and coordinated input to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in its role as the lead and coordinating ministry for the prevention and management of hybrid threats.

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[118]   Meld. St. 9 (2024–2025)

6.4.3 Make the inter-ministerial working group for resilience to election interference permanent

The work of the inter-ministerial group for resilience to election interference has yielded positive results.

The Norwegian Government aims to make the group a permanent body, eliminating the need to re-establish it before each election. This will help ensure that efforts in election security and building resilience to election interference are coordinated across sectors. Maintaining continuous activity within the group will also allow for a more long-term approach than was previously possible.

6.4.4 Strengthen public discourse

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression, the Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission and the Norwegian Defence Commission have all emphasised that the most important measure against hybrid threats, influence operations and disinformation is a resilient society. Trust and open and enlightened public discourse are central to achieving this.

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression concluded that the current status of public discourse and freedom of expression in Norway is good. Against this backdrop, and given current security challenges, the authorities' priority should be to monitor developments and continue supporting and strengthening measures that have proven successful.

To guide this effort, which must be carried out across all sectors, the Norwegian Government will present a strategy for ensuring open and enlightened public discourse.

6.4.5 Update the Government's communication policy

Part of the aim of the Norwegian Government's communication policy is to ensure that it effectively communicates accurate and relevant information about rights, duties and opportunities to the entire population. While the policy does not directly address disinformation, its objectives, underlying assumptions and policy instruments are crucial for enabling the Government to provide timely information.

The current policy, adopted in 2009, needs to be reviewed and updated to align with today's population and media landscape.

6.4.6 Raise public awareness of the threat posed by disinformation in Norway

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) have a large body of knowledge on specific instances of disinformation and the threats such activities can pose to society.

Every year, these services publish their unclassified risk and threat assessments, which form an important basis for shared situational awareness among the authorities, the private sector and the public. Sharing this information more widely helps the public better understand the threats posed by disinformation. Enhanced situational awareness can lead to a more resilient society, where the public is better equipped to recognise disinformation and other influence attempts.

The authorities need to clearly convey the threats we face in order to strengthen awareness throughout society.

The most important measure against hybrid threats, influence operations and disinformation is a resilient society.

6.4.7 Promote transparency in public administration

An open and transparent system of public administration is an important tool for preventing and countering the spread of conspiracy theories and disinformation. Clear communication from the authorities about their decision-making processes helps to reduce uncertainty and mistrust, conditions in which misinformation and speculation can be rife.

Norway aims to be a driving force and take a leading role in promoting transparency in public administration. To achieve this, and to ensure credibility and legitimacy, the Norwegian Government is working continuously to identify and address the challenges associated with maintaining transparency.

Since 2010, Norway has been an active participant in the international Open Government Partnership (OGP). Through the OGP, Norway undertakes to strengthen transparency in public administration through extensive cooperation between the administration and civil society. Norway's engagement in the OGP reflects the Government's ambition to promote transparency as a core principle of Norwegian public governance. Norway also plays an active role in the OECD Working Party on Open Government.

A study commissioned by the Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance gathered insight into transparency in Norwegian public administration. The work drew on contributions from public administration, research communities, civil society and other key actors in the area. Its purpose is to build a clearer picture of the current situation, identify challenges and knowledge gaps, and provide recommendations for the Government's further work within the framework of the OGP.

The work provides a starting point for further discussion on the Government's efforts to enhance transparency in Norwegian public administration, and the recommendations will be given consideration in Norway's engagement with the OGP and in the development of future action plans.

6.4.8 Protect national security interests in the information environment

The use of disinformation and other forms of misleading information is a key feature of today's threat landscape. Such subversive activity can destabilise liberal democracies, the rules-based international order and the fundamental security interests on which our freedom and prosperity depend. Our national security interests in the information environment must, within the framework of democratic values, international law and individual rights, be protected from systematic interference and attacks.

Strategic communication entails coordinating objectives and resources to protect and promote fundamental national security interests. The Norwegian Government will strengthen the framework for more coordinated communication in order to protect national security interests within the information environment.

6.4.9 Initiate efforts to ensure a more comprehensive approach to managing disinformation and other information threats

The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission recommended establishing a national function to monitor and analyse influence attempts, independent of the intelligence and security services. The Norwegian Government does not consider it appropriate to create a new agency dedicated to countering disinformation, but acknowledges the need for more comprehensive efforts to manage disinformation and other information threats.

These efforts must protect the interests of the public, the business sector and public authorities across sectors, and strengthen resilience, situational awareness, evaluation and international cooperation. This includes devising more systematic methods for identifying concerning developments, understanding

individual incidents as part of a broader campaign, and ensuring that this information is shared with other relevant actors and the public.

This work must be carried out with full regard for freedom of expression and other rights. The objective cannot be to limit lawful expression, but it may include measures to inform the public about coordinated attempts at information influence that obstruct the free formation of opinion.

The Government will initiate cross-sectoral efforts to ensure a comprehensive approach that balances security policy considerations with the protection of individual rights.

6.4.10   Host the Internet Governance Forum in Norway

The Internet is now one of the world's most critical infrastructures and a fundamental resource for the free flow of information in society. Protecting freedom of expression and countering disinformation therefore depend on the responsible governance of the Internet. The UN's Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is the leading global platform for broad and inclusive dialogue among all relevant actors on Internet governance and global digital development. As the host country and organiser of IGF 2025, Norway will help safeguard the existing model for governing the resources and structure of the global Internet.

Norway will also work to ensure that this *multistakeholder* governance model will be continued in the future. The model is founded on the principle that governance is carried out collectively, with government authorities, the business sector, civil society, academia and technical communities jointly

establishing the framework. The aim is to secure a sustainable global Internet that strikes the right balance between transparency, security, robustness and freedom. Achieving this requires active engagement from liberal democracies in the work of the IGF.

IGF 2025 will be the largest UN meeting ever held in Norway, with 4000–5000 participants attending in person each day and a comparable number participating via digital platforms.

6.4.11   Strengthen Norwegian representation in internation cooperation

There are numerous regional and international initiatives aimed at coordinating and sharing knowledge and experience on the propagation of disinformation, as well as on how countries can strengthen their resilience. Although countries have different starting points and cultural approaches to these challenges, sharing experience and knowledge and identifying common solutions is of considerable value.

The Norwegian Government recognises that such initiatives are becoming increasingly important and will therefore strengthen Norway's engagement in relevant international forums and initiatives. This will include increasing support for cooperation with international organisations such as the Council of Europe to identify and counter online hate speech, and strengthening the cooperation with the OECD to promote robust governance at all levels, including with respect to information integrity.

The Government will also actively support NATO's efforts to prevent and manage information threats, and will seek dialogue and cooperation with the EU on relevant measures and initiatives in this area.

The Norwegian Government will

- ✧ expand the NMA's mandate in order to strengthen resilience to disinformation

- ✧ establish a new council structure for preparedness planning and status assessments

- ✧ continue the inter-ministerial working group on resilience to election interference and make it a permanent body

- ✧ consider the expert group's recommendations on the implications of AI for elections

- ✧ present a strategy to promote open and enlightened public discourse

- ✧ raise public awareness of the threat posed by disinformation in Norway

- ✧ update the Government's communication policy

- ✧ strengthen efforts to promote transparency in public administration nationally, in cooperation with civil society, the business sector and academia

- ✧ serve as a driving force for transparency internationally, through active engagement in forums such as the OGP and the OECD

- ✧ protect national security interests relating to the information environment

- ✧ initiate efforts to ensure a more comprehensive approach to managing disinformation and other information threats

- ✧ host the Internet Governance Forum in Norway in 2025

- ✧ strengthen Norwegian representation in relevant internation forums in order to share knowledge and experiences

- ✧ actively support NATO's work to counter disinformation and information threats

- ✧ seek dialogue and cooperation with the EU on relevant measures and initiatives to counter disinformation