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Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership - Second Verification of Deliverables

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SUMMARY

The second evaluation of deliverables of the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership found that there has been significant progress in establishing arrangements needed for beneficial reforms to governance of the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in Indonesia. With the support of civil society, national institutions, sub-national (provincial and district) stakeholders and the office of the Presidency, and in direct collaboration with UNDP and indirectly with other development partners, the Partnership has been able:

- to seamlessly extend for a further two years an increasingly, though still imperfectly, effective moratorium on new forest concessions for logging and plantations in primary forests;
- to develop national and sub-national REDD+ strategies;
- to facilitate the creation and updating of a publicly accessible digital map of all forests, peatlands and concessions affecting them; and
- to obtain a legal mandate (through Presidential Regulation 62/2013, signed 31 Aug 2013) to create a national REDD+ Management Agency with broad responsibilities and powers to coordinate, synchronise, plan, facilitate, manage, monitor, supervise and control REDD+ in Indonesia, including to develop with other stakeholders the necessary systems for managing financial and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) aspects.

Thus, all deliverables foreseen under the first Joint Concept Note (JCN1) of the Partnership have either been accomplished or are in the process of being accomplished and are plausibly likely to be so during the current Interim Phase. But with an election year in 2014, between now and the end of 2013 there is the urgent need, and a real window of opportunity, to embed irreversibly the new low-carbon institutions and systems within national and sub-national government and society. This will require dynamic and effective leadership from the head of the new REDD+ Agency, and continued and, especially, better-coordinated support from those governmental and non-governmental development partners that have an interest in avoided deforestation and peatland degradation. International actors are particularly encouraged to endorse Indonesia's REDD+ process and progress, and to continue conversing with the Government of Indonesia and with each other around ways to consolidate and build upon the progress to date.



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMAN	Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago
Bakosurtanal	National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping (<i>Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional</i>)
Bappenas	National Development Planning Agency (<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i>)
BIG	Geospatial Information Agency (<i>Badan Informasi Geospasial</i>)
BKPRN	Spatial Planning Coordination Agency (<i>Badan Koordinasi Penataan Ruang Nasional</i>)
CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research
CLUA	Climate and Land Use Alliance
DNPI	National Council on Climate Change (<i>Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim</i>)
FORDA	Forestry Research & Development Agency
FPIC	Free prior informed consent
FREDDI	Indonesian REDD+ financing institution
GHG	Greenhouse gas
ICCC	Indonesia Climate Change Centre
IFI	International financial institution
INCAS	Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System
JCN	Joint Concept Note
Komda	<i>Komisi Daerah</i> (sub-national REDD+ commission)
LCD	Low-carbon development
LoI	Letter of Intent
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
PRISAI	Principles, Criteria and Indicators for REDD+ Safeguards in Indonesia
REDD+	REDD with aims and safeguards specified by the Cancún UNFCCC 16 th CoP
REL	Reference Emission Level
SekBer	<i>Sekretaris Bersama</i> (joint secretariat)
ST	REDD+ Special Team (of UKP4)
STRADA	<i>Strategi Daerah</i> (sub-national REDD+ strategy)
SVLK	Timber Legality Assurance System (<i>Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu</i>)
TF	REDD+ Task Force (of UKP4)
UKP4	President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (<i>Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan</i>)
UNORCID	UN Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia
VER	Verified Emissions Reduction



VCS	Verified Carbon Standard
WALHI	Indonesian Forum for the Environment (<i>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia</i>)
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature



1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the mission

This is the final report of the second evaluation of deliverables of the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership, the first such evaluation having been done in early 2011. The terms of reference (ToR) called for the mission team to update the assessment of progress made on the deliverables of the first phase in the first Joint Concept Note (JCN1), comprising the creation of a national REDD+ agency, a moratorium on new forest and peatland concessions, an independent institution to monitor/measure, report and verify emission reductions, a REDD+ financing mechanism, and a national REDD+ strategy, as well as activities within pilot provinces. The ToR also required the team to provide a qualitative assessment of progress on other relevant deliverables and developments, to form a judgment on whether Phase I has been completed as per the JCN1, and to make suggestions as appropriate. In addition, a review of reasons for delays in establishing the necessary REDD+ institutions was requested, as well as an assessment of the perceptions of stakeholders in the first pilot province of Central Kalimantan.

1.2 Progress of the mission

The team comprised Dr Julian Caldecott (Team Leader) and Ms Dewi Rizki (Forest Management Specialist), and was joined by Mr Pasi Rinne (Chair of Gaia Consulting) for 2-4 September, with Mr Mikko Halonen (Economics Specialist) advising remotely throughout. From 19 August to 4 September, the team interviewed 50 knowledge holders at 24 institutions in Jakarta, Bogor and Palangkaraya, based on lists provided by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta and the REDD+ Special Team (formerly the REDD+ Task Force) at the President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4). A focus was on central and local government entities involved with REDD+ processes, including in particular the past and present leadership and staff of UKP4/REDD+, official and non-governmental development partners with an interest in low-carbon development and REDD+, and civil society organisations active in Central Kalimantan, plus three international observers interviewed remotely (see Annex 1).

All interviewees were cooperative and communicative, and the team is extremely grateful to all concerned for their time and valuable insights. No significant difficulties were encountered, beyond the fact that a number of potential informants were not available in Indonesia at the time of the mission. Interview data were supplemented by a review of documents provided to the team by various stakeholders, and these are listed in Annex 2. An *End of Mission Aide Mémoire* was submitted on 2 September to the relevant team at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta, for discussion at the debriefing on the next day. A *Preliminary Report* based on the *Aide Mémoire* was circulated for peer review and comment prior to drafting this final report (see Annex 1), and we are grateful to those who helped in this way. Additional comments on the draft final report were received from stakeholders in Oslo and elsewhere, and are incorporated in the present version. Section 2 of this report summarises the progress made relative to the stipulations of JCN1, and discusses the current



status and issues arising in relation to the outputs required of Phase 1 of the Partnership. Section 3 presents a brief discussion of strategic issues, conclusions, and some suggestions for the future development of the Partnership.

2 Progress of the Partnership

2.1 Origins of the Partnership

The Partnership was founded on the concept that Indonesia's high rates of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were largely the result of deforestation and peatland degradation, and that to reduce these would require changes to the way in which decisions were made and implemented within the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector. Given that this sector had for some decades been managed with a view to maximising revenues from logging and plantation development rather than a balanced development path that maximizes the welfare of local populations while minimising unnecessary GHG emissions through low-carbon ecosystem management, a fundamental change in approach was considered to be necessary.

At the G-20 summit at Pittsburgh on 25 September 2009, President Yudhoyono committed Indonesia to reduce its GHG emissions by 26% compared with the 'business as usual' scenario by 2020 (this is known as the 'Pittsburgh commitment'); the announcement also foresaw further reduction of up to 41% in the same terms, if international help was forthcoming. This attracted considerable interest and support from Indonesia's development partners, including Norway which agreed to enter into a billion-dollar, grant-based (rather than offset-based) REDD+ partnership through which to establish the capacity to reduce LULUCF emissions and to incentivise such emission reductions. This led to the signing in May 2010 of a Letter of Intent (LoI) and subsequently a first Joint Concept Note (JCN1), which laid out the agreed process by which these aims would be achieved through three phases: Phase 1 for 'establishment' of necessary institutions and capacity, Phase 2 for 'transformation' of managerial systems in the LULUCF sector, and Phase 3 for 'delivery' of verified emission reductions.

The existence of entrenched high-emission interests in the LULUCF sector, and the distinctive and new cross-sectoral demands that would need to be met in creating a REDD+ capacity, led the partners to conclude that wholly new institutions would be needed in addition to changes in the way that existing institutions functioned and related to each other and to other stakeholders. These were no small tasks, and President Yudhoyono decided to give them to a REDD+ Task Force to be established within UKP4, building on a model and with the same leadership as previously used to address the urgent and complex delivery challenges involved in reconstruction following the great tsunami of 2004 in Aceh and Nias (in northern Sumatra).



2.2 Implementation modalities

The first REDD+ Task Force at UKP4 (TF1) had six working groups¹ and a secretary, and its mandate ended on 30 June 2011. The second Task Force (TF2) had ten Working Groups but no secretary, and continued in operation to the end of 2012. The third Task Force (TF3) was then mandated up to 30 June 2013, being succeeded thereafter by the UKP4 REDD+ Special Team (ST) which was tasked to conclude all preparatory work using residual funds from Norway's advance of US\$30 million (of which some US\$188,000 then remained uncommitted). The UKP4 mechanism was backed by presidential authority which during the periods of the TF and ST mandates gave them considerable influence and freedom of action. Much of the progress since 2010 can be traced to the vigour and technical competence of the UKP4 appointees.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was tasked with managing the US\$30 million advance to support Phase 1 of the Partnership, and particularly to allow the successive Task Forces to work effectively. This also reflected Norway's intention at all stages to involve and where appropriate operate through internationally reputable institutions, especially where the management of funds was involved. In any case, as originally posited by the Task Force, UNDP was to be the fiduciary agent in the interim phase until a dedicated new fund became operational, with roles as a financial channel, contract manager and financial overseer, while the Task Force would decide on the substance and approaches; there would be no UN consultants as such, and UNDP would merely assist in the implementation of a nationally-owned process. On this basis, in late 2010 UNDP was awarded the contract for a six-month activity known as '*Support to the Indonesia REDD+ Task Force*', which would deliver outputs against budget components based on the JCN1 deliverables noted in Section 1.1.

Although the time frame envisioned in the LoI had already been amended by the time of JCN1 and the UNDP contract in late 2010, at that time the planned schedule for achieving key milestones remained extremely demanding and progress was subsequently much slower than expected (see Caldecott *et al.*, 2011 and Section 3.2). This led to successive renewals of the Task Force mandates and extensions of the UNDP involvement, and eventually the formulation of an Interim Phase designed as a 'bridge' between the first and second phases of the Partnership. An additional US\$10.9 million advance was committed by Norway for management by UNDP² to support the continuation and completion of activities under the Partnership, pending the establishment of the REDD+ Agency and its full capacitation.

The Interim Phase UNDP project document was signed in August 2013 (UNDP, 2013e), for an operation lasting from 15 August 2013 to 30 June 2014 under the title '*Support to the Establishment of Indonesia REDD+ Infrastructure and Capacity*', the purpose of which is to speed up completion of deliverables and achieve a seamless transition to Phase 2, now in support of the UKP4 REDD+ Special

¹ Focused on: (a) the National REDD+ Strategy; (b) the National REDD+ Agency and LoI governance; (c) the funding instrument; (d) the MRV institution and the moratorium; (e) communications and multi-stakeholder engagement; and (f) the pilot province.

² With an advisory board including Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo of Bappenas, Agus Purnomo of DNPI, Willy Sabandar of the UKP4 REDD+ Special Team, Abdon Nababan of AMAN, and Daniel Murdiyarto of CIFOR.



Team and the National REDD+ Agency as it becomes established. Its priorities, like those of the partners, are:

- to build REDD+ capacity in the forested provinces and districts;
- to support follow-up work on MRV, baselines and spatial data;
- to develop and establish the REDD+ financing mechanism known as FREDDI;
- to facilitate the registration and safeguarding of all REDD activities;
- to continue with legal work surrounding the enforcement of the moratorium and legality of forest conversion licencing; and
- to support the further improvement of the moratorium map.

Details are given in following sections, where it should be remembered that the Indonesian stakeholders (i.e. the UKP4 Special Team and REDD+ Agency) are driving all processes, with UNDP in a shadowing and supporting role. Meanwhile, it should also be mentioned that others among Indonesia's development partners have provided moral³, financial and technical support to the Partnership and its aims. These include direct contributions, such a Swiss grant via the World Bank in 2011-2012, which supported the UKP4 Task Force's Strategy and Financing Instrument working groups and consulting inputs from the World Bank on the design of FREDDI, and a Danish contribution to the newly-established REDD+ Support Facility, which will focus on capacity development of FREDDI, the REDD+ Agency and sub-national bodies. They have also included indirect contributions, such as US State Department support to the Indonesia Climate Change Centre (ICCC) and the 'One Map' process, AusAID's to the Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System (INCAS), and the Climate and Land Use Alliance's to formulation of the Interim Phase itself. Moreover, other Indonesian actors have had major beneficial impacts in LULUCF sector reform, including the Geospatial Information Agency through the unprecedented 'One Map' movement, and the Constitutional Court through rulings supportive of REDD+ aims on the legality of plantation concessions (e.g. Rawa Tripa in Aceh) and on the land rights of peoples living by customary law (*Masyarakat Adat*)⁴.

2.3 The National REDD+ Agency

A key part of TF3's job was to create a draft presidential decree to establish the REDD+ Agency with five main features: (a) its head should report directly to the president; (b) it should be cross-sectoral; (c) it should have ministerial-level leadership; (d) it should be the Designated National Authority (in UNFCCC terms); and (e) it should have the authority and power to influence events, rather than just coordinate actors. As had happened with both the National REDD+ Strategy and the moratorium decree, however, competing drafts were drawn up by different institutions. As in the other cases, there was a complex and time-consuming process of debate and consensus-building, complicated here by the need to reconcile MRV responsibilities with the Ministry of Environment, financial arrangements with the Ministry of Finance, and the creation of a new institution with the Ministry of State Apparatus.

³ Development partners at interview often expressed admiration for the Partnership and Norway's role in it.

⁴ Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) No.35/PUU-X/2012.



The draft decree was eventually approved by the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environment, and lastly by the Ministry of Forestry, and Presidential Regulation 62/2013 was signed by the President on 31 Aug 2013. This created the REDD+ Management Agency (*Badan Pengelola REDD+*) with a mandate to help the President coordinate, synchronise, plan, facilitate, manage, monitor, supervise and control REDD+ in Indonesia (Article 4), and specifically:

- to prepare and develop the national REDD+ strategy and the framework of REDD+ safeguards in the social, environmental and financial fields;
- to coordinate the development and implementation of REDD+ policy and its mainstreaming in national development;
- to manage REDD+ funds;
- to establish standards and methodologies for GHG emission measurement and absorption in the context of REDD+ programmes, projects and activities;
- to improve the capacity of ministries and agencies, implementing partners and communities in relation to the quality of tools used in REDD+ implementation;
- to prepare recommendations for Indonesia's position in international forums related to REDD+; and
- to coordinate with law enforcement actors regarding the implementation of REDD+ policies.

Importantly, the definition of REDD+ programmes, projects and activities is broad enough to allow the Agency to engage in the substance of all activities related to land and forest-based emissions. The Head of the Agency will report directly to the President, and will be supported by four deputies, technical staff and an administrative secretariat. There will also be an advisory council comprising representatives of various sectors and interests (environment, communities including *Masyarakat Adat*, women, the private sector, science and technology, and good governance), which is expected to have an important function in enhancing the governance of REDD+ under the Agency's leadership. On the other hand, because the 2014 budgeting deadline has now past, unless special measures are taken (which it is assumed they will be) the Agency will have to operate without a government budget until at least 2015.

Under Presidential Regulation 62/2013, the Agency is assigned to create an effective and independent MRV system (with the Ministry of Environment) and FREDDI (with the Ministry of Finance), and must cooperate with the Ministry of Forestry (which has a dominant legal mandate) on the review of forest licences and the implementation of the moratorium. Our conclusion is that the mandate of the Agency is sufficient to its purpose provided that an effective leader is appointed, one who possesses the vision and drive to motivate key staff and steer the Agency towards a set of transformational outcomes by taking up and continuing the Special Team's work, driving it down to the sub-national level, creating the MRV and FREDDI systems, and extending and improving the moratorium. In short, the Agency needs to build upon its mandates and claim space as a necessary institution, taking advantage of the increasing tendency towards multi-stakeholder approaches to governance in Indonesia, and it needs to do so speedily, with December 2013 as a key deadline before the political turbulence of an election year becomes excessive.



2.4 The moratorium on new forest and peatland concessions

The presidential moratorium decrees 10/2011 and 6/2013 are complex documents and give rise to nine distinct mandates that have been dissected out by the Moratorium Working Group and formulated as programmes of work:

- to postpone new forestry permits in primary forest and peatland areas;
- to postpone other major changes in primary forest, peatland and other areas;
- to assist and supervise local governments;
- to improve governance policy for the use of forest products;
- to improve the management of critical lands;
- to improve governance of business activities involving forests and peatlands through environmental permitting;
- to consolidate an indicative map for the moratorium;
- to update that map every six months; and
- to update a thematic map of forests and peatlands every six months.

These nine programmes gave rise to 30 specific action plans that were allocated to various agencies and ministries for delivery against specified criteria and indicators; 21 of these action plans have been delivered as outputs, and have created, stimulated or fed into further outcomes (e.g. the One Map movement and various follow-on Presidential Instructions), and many other initiatives have been inspired (e.g. MoUs between the KPK anticorruption agency and 12 agencies on forest crime issues).

On the other hand, nine of the action plans have not been fully delivered, including: (a) the completion of a 1:50,000 scale moratorium map (as opposed to 1:250,000), which is vital for REDD+ architecture; (b) integrated environmental permits regulations (a responsibility of the Ministry of Environment); (c) monitoring & evaluation including licence inventory by local government (a responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs); (d) suspension of new licences (a responsibility of the Spatial Planning Coordination Agency, BKPRN); and (e) 1:50,000 forest/peat map (a responsibility of the Geospatial Information Agency, BIG). A continuing important challenge lies in poor, although improving, inter-agency coordination.

The moratorium has not yet been as effective as many had hoped, especially in terms of halting forest clearances, for the following reasons: (a) that it only applies to new concessions (allowing land under older permits to be cleared); (b) that there is a lack of clarity in what is meant by older permits (with possession of the first stage location licence sometimes being interpreted to allow clearance licences to be issued); (c) that there have been changes to the definition of peatland (according to peat depth, which is of special interest to the Ministry of Agriculture); and (d) due to illegal and/or corrupt practices. Thus, a 2011-2013 UNDP participatory assessment of forest and REDD+ governance gave ten forested provinces a composite score of only 2.35 out of 5.00⁵, and NGOs in provinces such as Central Kalimantan report that licences are still being issued in the moratorium area. This was confirmed by the Governor of Central Kalimantan in September 2013, along with the observa-

⁵ Based on separate assessments for transparency (2.67), participation (2.45), equity (2.34), capacity (2.32), accountability (2.26) and effectivity (1.98).



tion that licences for degraded/deforested lands are not being revoked, apparently to allow companies to retain a presence on the ground which they can use to buy logs illegally from local people. It is envisioned that the REDD+ Agency will lobby the Ministry of Forestry to close these loopholes⁶, that the Ministry of Agriculture will put into practice its commitment to review all palm oil concessions by 2014, and that One Map can identify licence areas and degraded land to support the whole process.

Meanwhile, the Legal Review & Enforcement Working Group has co-signed with eight security agencies an agreement to address forest crime through a 'multidoor' approach (meaning cooperation to find the people behind the illegal loggers and use multiple means - anti-corruption, tax, forestry and other laws - to prosecute them). This work has been of a piloting nature, and to be more systematic will require collaboration with the Ministry of Forestry. On the other hand, there are six major prosecutions now underway, plus the case of Rawa Tripa in Aceh. The latter was particularly significant, in that the Ministry of Forestry had evidence that a licence had already been issued by the provincial governor, so Rawa Tripa was taken out the moratorium area. NGOs reported that the licence was illegal, however, and there was a massive email campaign and a series of court hearings, culminating in the licence being overturned by the Constitutional Court.

Rawa Tripa was an important case in improving peatland governance, based on: (a) participation (the 'moratorium watch' by NGOs such as WALHI, public verification of the moratorium map, and participatory mapping to agreed technical standards⁷); (b) innovations (computer analysis, and real-time IT-based public grievance); and (c) transparency (public scrutiny of live data, and shared spatial data). Thus far the emphasis within the Partnership has lain on transparency, public involvement and enforcement, but it is possible to imagine additional ways to solve problems, based on rational spatial planning, for example the re-zoning of disputed and neglected concessions which may then be protected, or the amendment of Government Regulation 11/2010 on Administration of Abandoned Land to allow companies to conserve forests on their concessions.

2.5 The independent MRV institution

The *REDD+ National Strategy* (REDD+ Task Force, 2012) is explicit in its Section 2.2.1.3 on the arrangements to be established for the periodic measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of GHG emission reductions achieved through REDD+ activities, and the amount of carbon stocks preserved or increased, with the results to be used as the basis for determining appropriate remuneration by the REDD+ Funding Instrument. The idea in the *Strategy* is that the formation of the MRV Institution will be facilitated by the REDD+ Agency, that it will develop policies, standards, and work mechanisms for MRV that are compliant with UNFCCC decisions and approved by the REDD+

⁶ While also strictly implementing the national timber legality assurance system SVLK, which is based on independent auditing against a multi-stakeholder legality standard with the engagement of civil society, thus helping to stop illegal logging.

⁷ Participatory carbon measurements using simple techniques in tropical forests have been shown to be just as accurate as estimates based on more complex models and satellite imagery, a finding that could have important implications for costs and levels of public involvement in REDD+ systems (see: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-24713215>).



Agency, and that it will thereafter operate independently but “under the coordination of the REDD+ Agency” (*Strategy*, page 14). The aim is for both national and sub-national emission reductions to be verified, ultimately by independent third-party inspectors, to allow Verified Emissions Reduction (VER) and Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) documents to be issued, which will then constitute grounds for performance-based disbursement.

On pages 14-15 the *Strategy* confirms a number of key design and operating principles for the MRV Institution that are intended to secure its integrity, these being:

- **methodological consistency** to allow credible measurements against a Reference Emissions Level (REL) baseline;
- **completeness of information coverage** on carbon stocks in all ecosystem components, including above-ground biomass, below-ground biomass, and necromass elements;
- **accuracy** of all data;
- **transparency** of all methods and findings;
- **comparability** of all measurement over time; and
- **independence** and the use of specific criteria and requirements for verifying emission reductions.

On pages 15-16 the *Strategy* further articulates the national mandate of the MRV Institution in the following terms:

- to formulate policies, standards and mechanisms related to MRV activities with the approval of the REDD+ Agency;
- to compile GHG inventories for forests and peatlands over all domains of REDD+ activities at the national level;
- to function as a registry and clearing-house for the management and processing of related geographic and other data for access by stakeholders;
- to develop mechanisms for reporting to relevant national and international institutions and market players;
- to integrate the measurement framework into a safeguard for evaluation of social and environmental performance;
- to integrate and seek synergies between the MRV and REDD+ safeguard information systems;
- to integrate a Forest Resource Monitoring System into the MRV System, to ensure data accuracy on the changes of forest land use and its impact on carbon stocks and other ecosystem functions;
- to provide information, on the results of verification of emissions reduction for any given phase of REDD+ activities, to funding institutions responsible for disbursing performance-based payments;
- to develop capacity in measurement and reporting among the implementers of REDD+ activities; and
- to build capacity for coordination among those responsible for MRV within sub-national REDD+ agencies.

On the relationships between the three key institutional players, namely the REDD+ Agency, the REDD+ Funding Instrument and the MRV Institution, the *Strategy* observes in Section 2.2.1.4:

- that the REDD+ Agency will have the authority to control the Funding Instrument and the MRV Institution effectively, transparently and accountably;
- that the REDD+ Agency will determine the priorities, strategies and policies for fund management;



- that the REDD+ Agency will establish policies, regulations and standards for measurement and reporting, as well as setting policies concerning independent third-party verification;
- that the MRV Institution will provide verification results for emissions reduction from any given REDD+ activity to the Funding Instrument for performance-based payment; and
- that the Funding Instrument will cooperate with the MRV Institution to develop evaluation protocols for social and environmental safeguards.

Thus, since the first evaluation of the Partnership in 2011, a highly-articulated plan for the establishment of the three key elements in the REDD+ system has been achieved. The *Strategy* was even explicit on the pathway and milestones to be accomplished during the MRV System Development Phase (page 16):

- by the end of 2013, Indonesia will be ready and able to implement IPCC Tier 2 MRV (project sites and landscape areas) to meet sub-national needs in pilot and priority provinces;
- by the end of 2014, a country-wide system will have been set in place to achieve Tier 3 MRV realization of VER at all project sites and IPCC Tier 2 at all landscape areas to fulfil all sub-national level needs; and
- by the end of 2014, a national level MRV system will deliver results confirming to IPCC Tier 2 or better.

Progress on developing the MRV framework was reported to be 'on track' throughout 2012 (UNDP, 2013a) and into the second quarter of 2013 (UNDP, 2013d), meaning in practice:

- that the conceptual design of MRV had been endorsed by key line ministries and agencies (i.e. the Ministry of Forestry, Bakosurtanal, the Ministry of Agriculture and LAPAN) in a joint memorandum of understanding;
- that the final draft of the conceptual design of MRV at national level had been developed by line ministries;
- that the MRV design had been incorporated into the draft REDD+ Agency Presidential Regulation;
- that pilot MRV activities were producing lessons learned and feeding into the MRV design and technical guidelines;
- that the final draft of the conceptual design of MRV at provincial level had been developed and submitted to the Central Kalimantan Government;
- that Reference Emission Levels based on historical data from 2000-2009 had been endorsed by the Central Kalimantan Government;
- that lessons learned were being incorporated in non-carbon performance based-MRV guidelines; and
- that further development of the REDD+ Registry and Safeguard Information System was underway.

Thus there was abundant evidence of qualitative and quantitative progress on MRV preparation at a technical and policy level in the 18 months before Presidential Regulation 62/2013, which then consolidated matters by authorising the REDD+ Agency to implement the *National REDD+ Strategy*, and specifically in relation to MRV to prepare standards and measurement methodologies of GHG emission from projects, programmes or other REDD+ activities, as well as the consolidation and reporting of GHG emissions data resulting from them (CLUA, 2013). Broadly, all agencies are called on to support the measurement of REDD-relevant changes, coordinated by the REDD+ Agency. Particularly close collaboration will be needed with the Ministry of Environment, which is responsi-



ble for reporting on all national GHG emissions to the UNFCCC. It is understood that the REDD+ Agency will establish its own MRV unit to support verification capacity building at the Ministry of Environment, so as to ensure complementarity and synergy in this regard.

In any case, there has been substantial progress in developing both the REDD+ and MRV concepts through the adoption of a jurisdictional approach based on the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) devised by a coalition of international actors (see: <http://www.v-c-s.org>). This approach strongly emphasises disabling the drivers of deforestation (weak planning, participation, transparency, tenure, etc.) by funding district-level public-sector processes, community activities and institutional strengthening projects so as to implement local REDD+ action plans and thereby achieve emission reductions by the district as a whole against a measured and monitored district baseline. The jurisdictional approach simplifies the matter of verification in principle since, provided all maps and other data are accurate and transparent, and assumptions plausible and clearly stated, verification will become an exercise in public science in which conflicts of interest and corrupt practices cannot be concealed.

Despite steady progress at national and sub-national level, however, it is unlikely that purely quantitative MRV systems will be fully operational in the near future, allowing actual reduction in emissions to be demonstrated relative to defined baselines and 'business as usual' scenarios. Thus proxies will be needed in the intermediate phases, including the processes, activities and projects that disable the drivers of deforestation and peatland degradation, and the estimated effects of policy change on GHG emissions. These may well allow valid and defensible decisions to be made on payment by results much earlier than would be the case if a fully quantitative system were to be awaited.

During 2013 there was however an acceleration in the development of the Indonesian National Carbon Accounting System (INCAS), which is now hosted by the Ministry of Forestry's Forestry Research & Development Agency (FORDA). INCAS is designed to measure emissions and sequestration of carbon across the whole Indonesian forest estate, with the following emerging capabilities: (a) to provide annual emissions estimates; (b) to identify key geographic sources of actual or potential emissions, and thus where REDD+ interventions could be most effective; (c) to provide emissions MRV at national and sub-national level; and (d) to encourage and enable government to make informed decisions on land use, taking into account the emission-related consequences of land-use decisions. Although REDD+ is explicitly conceived as a national-level process in UNFCCC and LoI terms, in a decentralised country there is a need for sub-nationally nested emissions accounts. However, as one interviewee observed on the subject of leakage, "at a national level, emission reductions by ten districts in Kalimantan and Sumatra could be offset by one road in Papua". Thus the full potential of REDD+ needs a national system to be realised, but this national system needs to be consistent with what happens at sub-national level. The INCAS approach offers a way forward, in that an identical system of carbon accounting is being applied nationally and sub-nationally, and trialled in Central Kalimantan where Tier 3 results are expected based on local data, with the rest of the country being Tier 2 based on national data. The idea is that the quality of the national account will increase steadily as more provinces become involved. Although the precise fit between the institutional actors is not yet clear, it does seem that INCAS is in the process of creating the crucial information architecture needed for MRV in Indonesia. With INCAS due to close in mid-2014, however, arrangements for its sustainability and continuity are likely to be essential.



2.6 The REDD+ financing mechanism

Presidential Regulation 62/2013 authorises the Agency to constitute a permanent funding mechanism for REDD+ in Indonesia, known as FREDDI, with a view to financing the Pittsburgh commitment on reducing GHG emissions. Although the market price of conserved carbon is depressed at present, international commitments anticipated in 2015 may make REDD+ (and other low-carbon and carbon-negative) investments attractive enough to allow leverage of funds beyond those available through the Partnership⁸. In any case, the aim is to establish an effective and trusted mechanism that will be ready to take advantage of such opportunities. After much debate and the accommodation of both Indonesian and Norwegian conditions, the design of FREDDI has been accepted along the lines described below, alongside a safeguards protocol (PRISAI) that has been accepted by the National Forestry Council and mutually recognised by key IFIs.

FREDDI will be governed by a Board of Trustees (BoT) comprising at least the REDD+ Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and Bappenas, and a cash account management service known as the Trustee will act on the instructions of the BoT. Three basic modalities are envisioned, in which FREDDI will act:

- initially as a granting entity with four main windows of disbursement: (a) to address emergencies and national initiatives that are too big, too complex or too urgent for local action alone; (b) to pay sub-national entities for emission reductions and/or to finance sub-national actions based on priorities and capabilities at the district and provincial level; (c) to support competitively-selected initiatives based on a call for proposals for medium-sized initiatives; and (d) to make small grants in support of REDD-relevant initiatives devised by communities, NGOs, universities, etc.;
- potentially as a trade intermediary, involving the purchase of performance units, aggregation, risk reduction, etc.; and
- potentially as an investor, in which FREDDI would take positions to finance projects directly or indirectly.

Thus, once the REDD+ Agency has been created, the constitution of FREDDI would be an essential precondition of JCN2 and will require urgent review of Presidential Regulation 80/2011 on grant agreements. An important design element is that FREDDI must manage funds off-treasury if it is to be able to exercise flexibility in making payments to NGOs, government, communities, etc., and receiving, holding and managing MVR payments, other REDD+ monies (if not managed by FREDDI, they would have to be registered with the REDD+ Agency) and other carbon conservation investments. One risk visible at this time is that there may be a considerable delay before FREDDI can

⁸ A Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism between Japan and Indonesia was recently signed to prepare the way for Japan to meet its future emission reduction commitments by generating carbon credits in Indonesia (through REDD+, renewable energy, green buildings, etc.) far more cheaply than would be the case in Japan. It is possible that such arrangements will multiply after 2015, with profound implications for the financing of LCD in Indonesia. Although the Indonesia-Norway Partnership does not include an off-setting component, it could create the capacity for others to employ REDD+ off-setting in future.



become operational. Developing a pipeline of bankable projects, programmes and activities is a slow process, and managing a financial institution of this nature requires an intricate mix of expertise, experience, time and supportive legislation. On the other hand, there are many necessary and ‘no-regrets’ actions (i.e. those that are unlikely to be harmful and will almost certainly be helpful) that can be funded relatively quickly, including the implementation of sub-national REDD+ action plans, support to ‘champion’ institutions, and small grants. Three years’ engagement with the ‘Norway Process’ at sub-national level has created many expectations, districts have budgeted REDD+ agencies and contact points, and there is generally substantial buy in, but all this would be at risk in the absence of early and appropriate disbursements.

A Fund like FREDDI cannot be operated with uncertainty, so it must have known assets that are available within itself, and as their deployment is necessarily linked to performance, the definition of performance is key. Here it is relevant that sub-national REDD+ action plans are in fact a species of LCD plan, so performance could be interpreted as accommodating all the capacity and institutional building processes involved in LCD, as well as later emission reductions. Thus, we envision that FREDDI would be capitalised early on (at or before the start of Phase 2, possibly in a series of tranches to recognise a phased establishment process), and would pay out against performance both on the jurisdictional-level LCD process and on jurisdictional-level emission reductions. Thus, the initial beneficiaries would be: (a) the sub-national public sector; (b) communities, NGOs, etc. receiving small grants; and (c) projects (i.e. helping to build capacity by investing in institutions). Criteria for performance-based payments for avoided carbon emissions during Phase 3 would be developed as other parts of the REDD+ system are clarified, but regional incentives should be seen as the key priority, both to facilitate disbursement and action on the ground, and to encourage and enable a sub-national focus on the fundamental reforms and high impact projects that are needed to make REDD+ real at the local jurisdictional level. In this respect, lessons should be learned from other arrangements for financing climate-friendly investment processes, including the Amazon Fund in Brazil, where a recent evaluation concluded that “disbursement has been slow, in part as a result of the funds’ operational processes, but also because of the difficulties of developing a portfolio of programs to be supported” (Forstater *et al.*, 2013).

2.7 The National REDD+ strategy

The National REDD+ Strategy was published by TF2 in June 2012, after earlier drafts by Bappenas and the Ministry of Forestry had been integrated to focus on the foundations of REDD+ and its five pillars of: (a) **capacity** (i.e. creating the capacity of all essential institutions); (b) **law** (i.e. developing the necessary legal, enforcement and regulatory frameworks); (c) **strategic projects** (starting with the ‘One Map’ operation); (d) **multi-stakeholder participation** (i.e. creating transparency and involvement for all); and (e) **paradigm shift** (i.e. changing the assumptions, objectives, reference points and techniques applied to the LULUCF sector, with a view to achieving low-emission and socially-inclusive land use governance). Thereafter the emphasis has switched to the development of sub-national REDD+ strategies (*Strategi Daerah*, STRADA) in 11 provinces (starting with Central Kalimantan) and several districts (starting with Barito Selatan in Central Kalimantan). Some observers note that the National Strategy has not been fully implemented in areas such as the reform of land use planning, legislation and law enforcement, stakeholder involvement, transparent governance and the reform of key sectors related to REDD+ such as forestry, agriculture, and mining (including de-



veloping a credible database of degraded lands, revising land use and spatial planning methods, developing and implementing environmental laws on independent auditing of environmental impact assessments for concessions and on putting peatlands off limits for development, and reviewing and revising legislation to build a permanent legacy from the 2011-2015 moratorium). In short there is much still to do, but the relevant deliverable from the point of view of this evaluation is the strategy itself, rather than the implementation of it which is being addressed in other programmes of work described in other sections of this report.

2.8 The pilot provinces

2.8.1 STRADAs and Action Plans

Sub-national STRADAs and action plans are prepared by local REDD+ groups, teams or task forces comprising academics, officials, NGOs and others as appointed by local government, with the role of the central team in Jakarta being to facilitate and inform the process through a REDD+ coordinator in each province. Of the 11 provinces involved, seven have completed STRADAs and action plans: West Papua, Jambi, East Kalimantan, Riau, West Sumatra, South Sumatra and Papua. Central Kalimantan's STRADA was issued by governor's decree 10/2012 dated 15 May 2012, but its action plan needs revision, while in Aceh and West Kalimantan the process was delayed by elections but drafts have been submitted which need another round of public consultation before finalisation. Central Sulawesi has a STRADA but not an action plan, and there is some debate about its continued role even though it had been very well prepared by the previous UNREDD programme and had established legislation on REDD+ strategy, Reference Emission Level, guidelines on FPIC and the selection of districts. In any case, a basic risk mitigation strategy for the Partnership would logically involve prioritisation of work in multiple provinces.

2.8.2 Central Kalimantan

Central Kalimantan was described in the first evaluation report as containing "an abundance of issues typical of the country as a whole, including boundary disputes between sub-districts, competition over tenure, overlapping tenure systems and concession licenses, mining in Forest Estate areas, etc.". More recent data from the National Land Agency show that there are no fewer than 234 oil palm plantation companies occupying nearly three million hectares of the province. To address such challenges, Governor Teras Narang has actively supported the REDD+ process, including the moratorium extension and a commitment against further conversion of forest and peatland to oil palm. He first established a REDD+ *Komisi Daerah* (provincial REDD+ commission, or Komda) and then agreed to set up a joint REDD+ secretariat (*Sekretaris Bersama*, or SekBer) between Komda and the REDD+ Task Force, the latter being responsible for implementing the Partnership's plan of work within Central Kalimantan, beginning with the development of a STRADA. The SekBer will now continue as a joint initiative of the REDD+ Agency and the Governor's Komda, and this is the preferred option of the REDD+ Special Team. An alternative would be to pass authority back to the Governor, with the Agency providing technical support, and in this case there would be an immediate need to strengthen the capacity of provincial institutions. Decisions on such provincial arrangements are awaited in all 11 of the forested provinces with which the Partnership is engaged. In Central Kalimantan the



aim is to support the Governor's staff by 'twinning' them with Agency experts, to focus on MRV, STRADA, communication, etc., while the Governor will appoint other participants at district level.

The STRADA was prepared despite many conflicts of interest (and misunderstandings over the preparation of accounts to UN standards that were required for the payment of consultants), and it is expected that the action plan will be finished in 2013. The STRADA's objectives include: (a) in the short term (2012-2014), to prioritise operationalisation of the REDD+ Agency, reduce the rate of forest conversion, strengthen the recognition and mapping of *adat* land, and activate the MRV system; (b) in the medium term (2014-2020), to promote environmentally-friendly investment and improve the status of land ownership and quality of governance; and (c) in the long term (2020-2030), to promote community-based forest management and peatland sustainability. The baseline data and map for the province were completed in July 2013, using 35 data themes (including peat depths, carbon stock, deforestation 2000-2011, licences for logging and plantations, mining, etc.), and a process is underway to prepare a 1:50,000 scale map while clarifying and correcting and checking the legality of all licences. A particular issue in Central Kalimantan is the enormous extent of land degradation caused by the 'Mega Rice' project, a failed attempt to cultivate and settle a large area of deep peatland, where a variety of small, pilot livelihood-oriented initiatives have been supported by the programme. Other activities have also been supported, more as a symbol of the Partnership's commitment than directly to do with emissions reduction, focused on such issues as community-based forest fire management, schools-based work on sustainable development, and community training and training centre rehabilitation.

Meanwhile, several other partners have been involved in Central Kalimantan (e.g. the US, Australia and WWF), FORDA has contributed the MRV methodology, the national carbon accounting system INCAS is being trialled in the province (see Section 2.5), and a UN-connected Climate Communication Centre was opened at Buntuy on 3 Sep 2013. All this activity in such a complex context, however, has prompted a diversity of local opinion about the actors, including the Partnership. There is widespread appreciation of the Partnership, but serious concerns are still expressed in relation to it over a perceived lack of communication (e.g. on what is going on and why), transparency (e.g. how contractors are chosen), dialogue (e.g. between institutions and groups), coherence between REDD+ and the five-yearly provincial development strategy, equitable flow of benefits to communities, inclusiveness of stakeholder involvement and ownership, and training and other forms of capacity building, as well as an over-emphasis on deliverables rather than good governance, the involvement of UNDP rather than Indonesian institutions (despite UNDP's acknowledged effectiveness), a focus on peatlands rather than forests on mineral soils and uplands, and a failure to fully enforce the moratorium and to end forest clearance.

In conclusion, for Central Kalimantan there is the need to prepare more systematically for the jurisdictional approach, to revise and further develop and finalise the STRADA and action plan, and to communicate far more effectively with far more stakeholders than has so far been the case. Such lessons will no doubt be applicable to other provinces as well.



3 Conclusions, issues and opportunities

3.1 Overview of progress and impact

It is clear that much has been achieved since the first evaluation, either directly by the investments deployed by the partners (i.e. by the REDD+ Task Force until the expiry of its mandate in June 2013 and thereafter the REDD+ Special Team, with funding mainly from Norway in a commitment widely admired on value-for-money and strategic-impact grounds by Indonesia's other development partners, and generally appreciated by Indonesian stakeholders), or else through governmental, non-governmental and development partner actions and decisions inspired or facilitated by those investments. Highlights include:

- Presidential Decree 10/2011 which established a moratorium on the issuing of new logging, mining or palm oil licences in the forest estate, was replaced and in effect seamlessly extended to May 2015 by Presidential Decree 6/2013.
- The pledge by the Governor of Central Kalimantan to achieve zero deforestation from palm oil conversion by 2020, and the initiation of comprehensive concession review and law enforcement in a number of districts;
- An Indicative Map for the Moratorium at a scale of 1:250,000 was prepared as the first ever public map of all forests and concessions, and is coming up to its fourth revision in light of public comment
- The unprecedented 'One Map' managed by the Geospatial Information Agency on behalf of and for use by all ministries and agencies has been established and developed in parallel with the development of a satellite ground station to receive ultra-high-resolution imagery, the moratorium map, and efforts to prepare 1:50,000 scale maps for pilot districts and forest/peatland themes.
- The Constitutional Court ruled in May 2013 that the land rights of peoples living by customary law (*Masyarakat Adat*) must henceforth be recognised fully by government, and the President has stated that this will be fully implemented, prompting a sudden prioritisation of the participatory mapping of *adat* lands (which comprise up to 40 million hectares).
- Presidential Regulation 62/2013 establishes a legal basis for creation of a national REDD+ Agency with a broad mandate to facilitate REDD+ processes and coordinate REDD+ actors, while working with partners to develop MRV systems and REDD+ financing systems, and to improve implementation of the moratorium.

3.2 Constraints on progress

There is no denying that the timeline that was originally envisioned in the Lol and JCN1 has slipped badly. Many reasons for this were offered by interviewees, including in general terms that the original timeline was profoundly naïve given the scale of reform that was to be attempted, that the scale of reform itself was too ambitious, that the introduction of new ideas and new systems was bound to challenge the absorptive capacities of some of Indonesia's key institutions, that the scale of entrenched vested (notably corporate palm oil) interests that REDD+ would have to confront had



been underestimated, and that the Ministry of Forestry's perception that it would lose many powers to a new REDD+ Agency (as well as suffering many redundancies) would lead to resistance.

More specific reasons for delay are given as including the loss of momentum due to discontinuities in the mandate of the UKP4 REDD+ Task Force (between TF1 and TF2, and between TF2 and TF3), presidential unwillingness to make decisions without inter-ministerial consensus, and the permissions that had to be obtained from both the French and Indonesian governments before military-grade (4 cm resolution) satellite imagery could be acquired. It should also be remembered that the international conversation on REDD+ and related matters has hardly been spritely or decisive, and that no off-the-shelf model for a REDD+ system suitable for Indonesia exists that could have been copied. Rather the Partnership has been pioneering a complex enterprise against turbulent political headwinds, locally and globally, and to us the wonder is not that there have been delays but that so much has been achieved so quickly. This can no doubt be attributed to presidential leadership, the technical competence of the participants, the patience of the Norwegians, the sustained interest of civil society and hence the media, and the fact that the escalating threat of climate change will not go away.

3.3 Transition processes

Only two of the six key deliverables foreseen in Phase 1 can unambiguously be said to be complete, these being the National REDD+ Strategy and the selection of the pilot province (where, however, various Phase 2 activities are already underway, and the pilot province approach has ramified considerably). Another deliverable, the moratorium, is in place and has been extended, but has generated many necessary tasks (which were not, however, specified in the LoI), some of which are not yet complete but are expected to become so in the course of 2013. The remaining three deliverables, the creation of a REDD+ Agency, MRV institution and financing mechanism, all became tied to the fate of a single decree which was promulgated during the mission in the form of Presidential Regulation 62/2013. Now this has become law, a pathway to completion of all the JCN1 deliverables has been established, but there will still need to be a transitional process and completion of outstanding tasks before the end of Phase 1 and the beginning of Phase 2.

The evolving nature of the Phase 1 to Phase 2 transition is summarised in Table 1. Although on paper this transition seems clear enough, and no signs of uncertainty were detected amongst informants, there are in fact some uncertainties, for example on the question of whether and how staff will be recruited or seconded to the new agency. Some argue that experienced UKP4 Special Team personnel would be the most logical recruits, others that full secondments from the Ministry of Forestry would be more reasonable, and others that the entire recruitment process should be fully open and competitive. We tend to take a view in favour of open recruitment but with the proviso that experience with the Partnership and a good reputation for performance in that role should be seen as a desirable (though not mandatory) attribute of an applicant.

Table 1: The Phase I to Phase II transition			
	Phase I	Interim phase	Phase II
Authority	REDD+ Task Force	UNDP	REDD+ Agency



Budget system	on-budget/off-treasury	off-budget/off-treasury	on-budget/off-treasury
Budget	US\$30 million	US\$10.9 million	US\$160 million (tentatively)

3.4 Strategic issues and suggestions

There are some interesting conceptual and practical tensions within the REDD+ process emerging in Indonesia, notably concerning the powers and expectations of national and sub-national jurisdictions, with the elected district and provincial governments wielding great influence over land-use and therefore emission outcomes. This means that the full value of conserved carbon must be fully perceived and understood at the sub-national level if low-emission land-use decisions are to be politically feasible. As one interviewee observed, “people are only willing to talk about strategy for two months; in the third month they ask about their livelihoods”. Thus, to engage with sub-national stakeholders there must be an early flow of livelihood-relevant benefits to the grass roots. This can be achieved through various governmental and non-governmental granting mechanisms and projects aimed at communities, hence the priority given by the Partnership to livelihood projects in the ex-Mega Rice area in Central Kalimantan, and the small grants window of FREDDI, and by taking an affirmative attitude to paying for the way-stations of REDD+ preparedness, such as the STRADAs and action plans and the implementation thereof. Yet there will be a need very soon to go beyond doing ‘no regret’ things, such as enforcing the moratorium, improving the moratorium map and ‘One Map’, STRADAs, base-lining emission levels, clarifying and checking the legality of forest licences, in favour of doing specific things with clear rules in order to achieve a set of specific objectives in the context of a coherent vision. Such clarity is expected to emerge rapidly as the new REDD+ Agency and its partners engage with all the issues concerned.

Meanwhile, we have drawn attention to a number of issues, for example in Section 2.7.2 on the need in the pilot province(s) to address stakeholder perceptions on communication, transparency, dialogue, coherence and equity, and Section 2.3 on improving moratorium effectiveness. We have also noted a general need for better communication and coordination amongst government agencies at all levels, and between government and civil society at all levels, including the private sector which includes actors and investors that will be crucial in the development of a low-carbon economy. We also observe at least three areas of opportunity:

- **for a continued focus on building capacity for implementation in the districts and provinces**, where diverse learning and experimentation can be done, where peer pressure between bupatis and governors will likely be effective in motivating replication, and where innovations in spatial planning, legal challenges to licences for forest and peat land conversions and recognition of customary rights can all lead to lower GHG emissions;
- **for supporting key relevant activities among connected institutions**, for example the re-mapping of Indonesia’s peat and peatlands based on ecology and hydrology (at ICCG), the development of standards and guidelines for software applications needed at the sub-national level to support MRV and the aggregation of REDD+ services at all levels (at BIG), increased participation in developing REDD+ financing arrangements by the Ministry of Finance, and the continued development of INCAS (currently at FORDA); and



- **for increased donor coordination on REDD+**, both in the area of financing and on the meaning of REDD+ at different levels of society in Indonesia (particularly involving Germany, Australia, the US, Norway, Finland and the UK).

These measures would further facilitate what is already a transformational process in Indonesia's LULUCF sector, and one that promises to be an important pilot and clarifier of issues around the development of REDD+ as part of the global solution to climate change.



Annex 1: People and institutions consulted

Institution	Individuals
a) Central Government	
Presidential Delivery Unit (UKP4), REDD+ Special Team	Heru Prasetyo (former National Project Director, REDD+ Task Force), Agus Sari (Funding Instrument Working Group), Mubariq Ahmad (Strategy Working Group), Heracles Lang (Pilot Province Working Group), Kuntoro Mangkusubroto (former head, UKP4 REDD+ Task Force), Mas Achmad Santosa (Legal Review & Enforcement Working Group), Willy Sabandar (Director, UKP4 REDD+ Special Team), Nirarta Samadi (Moratorium Working Group), Arief Darmawan (MRV Working Group), John Paterson (Knowledge Management Working Group), Fika Fawzia (Asisten Kepala UKP4)
National Council on Climate Change (DNPI)	Agus Purnomo (Presidential Adviser on Climate Change, Head of DNPI Secretariat), Farhan Helmy (Secretary of DNPI Mitigation Working Group)
Ministry of Forestry	Iman Santoso (Director General, Forestry Research & Development Agency FORDA, and Head, UKP4 REDD+ Special Team Pilot Province Working Group), Isye Banowati (former coordinator, UNREDD Central Sulawesi)
National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas)	Endah Murniningtyas (Deputy for Natural Resources and Environment Unit, and UKP4 REDD+ Special Team Mainstreaming REDD+ Working Group)
Indonesia Climate Change Centre	Dr Eli Nur Nirmala Sari (Peatland & Peatland Mapping Cluster Coordinator), Dadang Hilman (MRV Cluster Coordinator), Artissa Panjaitan (Low Emission Development Strategy Cluster Coordinator)
b) Local government	
Provincial Secretariat, Central Kalimantan, Palangkaraya	Dr Siun Jarias (Provincial Secretary)
Sekretaris Bersama (SekBer), Palangkaraya	Mursid Mursono (Head of SekBer), Bambang Irawan Wibisono (UNDP contractor)
c) Development partners	
Royal Norwegian Embassy, Jakarta	Joar L. Strand (Counsellor), Per Kristian Roer (Counsellor), Marthe Hotvedt (Counsellor), Nita Irawati Murjani (Forestry & Climate Change Adviser)



British Embassy, Jakarta	Jenny Yates (Head of UK Climate Change Unit), Lizzy Whitehead (UKCCU Forestry Adviser), Farah Sofa (Governance Programme Manager)
UN Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia (UNORCID)	Satya S. Tripathi (Director)
World Bank, Jakarta	Werner Kornexl (Senior Climate Change Specialist), Leitizia Fauzy (Green Development Specialist)
Multistakeholder Forestry Project	Andy Roby (DFID Forestry Adviser, MFP co-director).
United States Embassy, Jakarta	Bill Rush (Senior Forest Advisor to Indonesia, US Forest Service)
Australian Embassy, Jakarta	Annemarie Watt (Climate Change Counsellor), Dr Tristan Armstrong
UNDP Support to the Establishment of Indonesia REDD+ Infrastructure and Capacity	Stephen Rodrigues (Deputy Country Director, UNDP), Dr Budhi Sayoko (Head of Environment Unit, UNDP), Tomoyuki Uno (Climate Change Programme Office, UNDP)
Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership	Thomas Harvey (INCAS Programme Manager), Michael Parsons (INCAS technical adviser)
d) Civil society and others	
Independent consultant	Mochamad Indrawan (Institutions, Laws and Decentralisation Specialist, First Evaluation of Deliverables of the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership)
Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI), Palangkaraya	Ari Rompas
Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), Palangkaraya	Simpun Sampurna (Pak Dadut)
Forum Komunikasi Komunitas (FOKKER)	Edy Subhani (Oeban)
Partnership on Governance Reform in Indonesia (Kemitraan)	Andy Kiki
Save our Borneo, Palangkaraya	Pak Nordin
Universitas Palangkaraya	Dr Suwido Limin (Head, CIMTROP)
WWF Indonesia	Dr Thomas Maddox (Leader, WWF Heart of Borneo Global Initiative), Klaas J. Teule (Director Programmes), Nyoman Iswarayoga (Director Climate & Energy), Zulfira Warta
e) International commentators	
Bloomberg New Energy Finance	Benjamin L. Caldecott (Head of Government Advisory)
Rainforest Foundation Norway	Hege Karsti Ragnhildstveit (Head of Southeast Asia



	and Oceania Department)
Independent consultant	Adam Tomasek (former Leader, WWF Heart of Borneo Global Initiative)
f) Peer reviewers	
Greenpeace Southeast Asia, Indonesia	Teguh Surya (Forest Political Campaigner)
WWF Indonesia	Klaas J. Teule (Director Programmes)
Climate and Land Use Alliance	Chip Fay (Indonesia Programme Coordinator)
Independent consultant	Mochamad Indrawan (Institutions, Laws and Decentralisation Specialist, First Evaluation of Deliverables of the Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership)
Centre for Tropical Environmental and Sustainability Science, James Cook University, Cairns, Australia	Sean Sloan (Postdoctoral Researcher)
Climate Advisers, Washington D.C	Andreas Dahl-Jørgensen (Policy Director)
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo	Ivar T. Jørgensen (Policy Director, Forests)
Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, Oslo	Andreas Tveteraas (Deputy Head)



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


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