

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Norway

2. Date of the notification:

15 October 2025

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

12 November 2025 – 11 May 2026

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Ferry arrivals from Schengen Member States

5. Notification for a:

☐ first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event):

Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event): Article 25a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

☐ first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event):

Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

☒ prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event): Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

12 November 2024 – 11 May 2025 and 12 May 2025 – 11 November 2025.

☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- ☐ prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- ☐ reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- ☐ terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- ☐ large-scale public health emergencies

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- ☐ an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

Please include information as to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control, and the available evidence from information analysis and all available data, including from relevant Union agencies.

☐ Large scale or high-profile international event

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

☒ Other

Norway has as a producer and supplier of energy to European Allies an important role in ensuring European security. As such, Norway must both nationally and in cooperation with Allies apply measures to secure this supply. In this respect, the threat of sabotage is of great concern.

The Norwegian Police Security Service assess that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West continue to characterize the threat situation in Norway.

In addition to extensive, continuous intelligence and influence operations, there is an increased likelihood that Russian intelligence services will try to carry out sabotage operations in Norway. It is further underlined that the Police Security Service finds it **likely** that Russian intelligence will try to carry out such actions against targets in Norway in 2025.

In accordance with the Commission recommendation on proportionate police checks and police cooperation in the Schengen area of 12 May 2017, Norway has been carrying out intensified police checks in the areas of Østfold bordering on Sweden. Norwegian and Swedish police authorities have a very good bilateral cooperation. To further this, a shared police station has been opened at the actual border between Norway and Sweden. However, such measures cannot fully substitute internal border controls in Norwegian ports.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Ports with ferry arrivals from Schengen. At the present the harbours in Oslo, Sandefjord, Larvik, Kristiansand, Stavanger and Bergen.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, the UK and Denmark agreed in 2024 on a Joint Declaration on cooperation regarding protection of critical infrastructure in the

North Sea. They cooperate on security measures, share information and knowledge and report relevant information at operational level.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1. Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

The Norwegian Police has emphasized the value the intelligence gathered in connection with the controls have in order to mitigate the threats. There are no other means that can substitute this information. It is therefore the recommendation of the Police that the controls are prolonged. The Norwegian Police also underlines the effect the controls have in countering attempts of foreign malign actors to travel to Norway.

10.2. Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:

—Introducing controls at limited parts of the internal border allows for the collection and control of advance data on crew and passengers on the ferries arriving to Norway from other Schengen Member States. There are no alternative measures with the same effect.

10.3. Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions

The controls are targeted, and based on screening of passenger and crew information. The controls have a minimal impact on traffic flow

Affected cross-border regions as notified under article 42b of Regulation (EU) 2016/399; The municipality of Strömstad.

10.4. If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please provide a risk assessment and information on the sudden large-scale unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from Union Agencies and data analysis from relevant information systems.

Please include quantitative and qualitative data, including for example the number of applications for international protection and unauthorised movements, as well as information on to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control.

10.5. Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)

Please specify:

—*what action has been taken in response to opinion(s) of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 27a(2) or 27a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;*

—*what action has been taken in response to the outcome of a consultation process established in accordance with Article 27a(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.*

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)**11.1. Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399**

Please fill in point 10, taking into account the previous assessment of necessity and proportionality and the evolution of the serious threat since the reintroduction of border control at internal borders.

11.2. Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat

It is the assessment of the Norwegian Police Security Service that it is likely that that Russian intelligence will try to carry out sabotage operations against targets in Norway in 2025.

The scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat is closely linked to the development of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and developments in the hybrid threats against Norway and other European countries. Recent incidents, such as the unregulated drone flights over Danish and Norwegian airports, underscores the dynamic development of the threat picture. The affected border sections going forward will have to be assessed in light of this. For the time being, it is not planned to increase the controlled sections of our internal borders beyond the ports with ferry arrivals from Schengen

Concerning coordination measures, Norwegian and Swedish police authorities have a very good bilateral cooperation. To further this, a shared police station has been opened at the actual border between Norway and Sweden. The impact on the public of the controls in ferry ports are negligible. As such no specific coordination measures have been considered necessary.

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1. Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399	
<i>Please fill in point 11.</i>	
12.2. Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)	
12.3. Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)	
12.4. Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security	
12.5. Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective	
12.6. Presentation of mitigating measures	
12.7. Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders	

13. Any further information (optional)

<p><i>For example:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — details of strategic and operational cooperation with other Member States — details on to the use of alternative measures (Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399) — whether the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 is applied at the time of reintroduction of border control at internal borders — bilateral or regional cooperation initiatives, including with third countries
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14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

<p><i>Please indicate, to the extent that grounds of public security allow, whether any information has been withheld justified on public security grounds, taking into account the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.</i></p>
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Please indicate whether any of the notified information, in whole or in part has been classified under national law.

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Please indicate and specify if any of the notified information is to remain confidential.