

Notification of a temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders

1. Notification submitted by:

Norway

2. Date of the notification:

14 April 2026

3. Date and duration of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 27(1), point (d), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

12 May 2026 - 11 November 2026

4. Scope of the proposed reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders, specifying at which part or parts of the internal borders border control will be reintroduced or prolonged (Article 27(1), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Internal ferry connections

5. Notification for a:

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event):
Article 25a(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (unforeseeable event):
Article 25a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

first reintroduction of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event):
Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

prolongation of border control at internal borders (foreseeable event):
Article 25a(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

12 November 2024 – 11 May 2025, 12 May 2025 – 11 November 2025 and 12 November 2025 – 11 May 2026

prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years and 6 months, for major exceptional situation: Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Period(s) of previous reintroduction(s) of border control at internal borders:

Please indicate the dates of previous reintroductions of border control at internal borders.

- reintroduction of border control at internal borders in accordance with a Council Implementing Decision: Article 28(1) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

NB: A continuation of a reintroduction of border control at the internal borders does not have to be considered a prolongation if the serious threat to public policy or internal security upon which it is based is different from the serious threat that motivated the preceding reintroduction of border control at the internal border. If this is the case, please notify for a first reintroduction and specify the new and distinct nature of the serious threat to public policy or internal security under 7.

6. If the notification for a foreseeable event is made less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders (Article 25a(4), (5) and (6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please indicate when the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders became known.

7. Serious threat to public policy or internal security, consisting of:

- terrorist incidents or threats, and threats posed by serious organised crime

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- large-scale public health emergencies

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- an exceptional situation characterised by sudden large-scale unauthorised movements of third country nationals, within the meaning of Article 25(1), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

Please include information as to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to

the overall functioning of the area without internal border control, and the available evidence from information analysis and all available data, including from relevant Union agencies.

- Large scale or high-profile international event

Please specify and include all relevant data detailing the events that constitute a serious threat.

- Other

Norway, as a producer and supplier of energy to Europe, has an important role in ensuring European security. As such, Norway must both nationally and in cooperation with the European Union apply measures to secure this supply. In this respect, the threat of sabotage is of great concern. This concern is amplified by Norway's role in supporting Ukraine.

In the annual threat assessment for 2026, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) underlines that the tense geopolitical situation in Europe means that Russian intelligence have several areas of interest in relation to Norway and other NATO countries. Given the increase in military targets on Norwegian soil, the stronger allied presence, and additional military exercises, PST anticipate heightened activity from Russian intelligence services.

PST also underlines that Russian intelligence may see benefit in carrying out sabotage operations on targets in Norway in 2026. The most likely targets are property and

logistics infrastructure associated with support for Ukraine, but civilian infrastructure may also be affected. The aim would be to create social unrest and reduce the capability and willingness to support Ukraine. Sabotage may also be used as a tool of influence.

The geopolitical situation and the need to expand the range of operational methods have increased Russian intelligence services' risk appetite. In recent years, we have observed several instances of sabotage and disruptive activity in Europe, with a slight decline in 2025. Such activity is often carried out by proxy actors and involves attempts to destroy or severely disrupt targets of societal importance. It may also include less severe incidents, such as damage to property or spreading propaganda, aimed at creating social unrest.

8. Names of authorised border crossing points

Ports with ferry arrivals from Schengen. At the present the harbours in Oslo, Sandefjord, Larvik, Kristiansand, Stavanger and Bergen.

9. Measures taken by other Member States (if applicable)

Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark and the UK agreed in 2024 on a Joint Declaration on cooperation regarding protection of critical infrastructure in the North Sea. They cooperate on security measures, share information and knowledge and report relevant information at operational level.

10. Assessment of necessity and proportionality under Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

10.1. Appropriateness: explanation how the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is likely to adequately remedy the threat

The Norwegian Police emphasize the need for controls at internal borders, as they are necessary for the mitigation of the current security situation.

Access to crew- and passenger lists is deemed to be proportional as it significantly reduces the need for physical checks of persons and vehicles at ferry- arrivals. The controls can therefore focus on persons that may pose a threat to critical infrastructure, illegal migration and organized crime, which may pose serious threats to public order and internal security.

In addition to address the threat to public order and internal security, the Norwegian Police use crew- and passenger lists with subsequent controls to counter organized crime and criminal networks. The Police emphasize that this also improves cooperation with the Police in Germany and Denmark, as it improves the exchange of information.

The controls also have a preventive effect, as malign actors are aware that controls take place at ferry-arrivals.

10.2. Explanation why the objectives pursued by the reintroduction cannot be obtained by:

—Introducing controls at limited parts of the internal border allows for the collection and control of advance data on crew and passengers on the ferries arriving to Norway from other Schengen Member States. There are no alternative measures with the same effect.

10.3. Likely impact on the movement of persons within the area without internal border control and the functioning of cross-border regions

The controls are targeted, and based on screening of passenger and crew information. The controls have a minimal impact on traffic flow.

Affected cross-border regions as notified under article 42b of Regulation Regulation (EU) 2016/399; The municipality of Strömstad. Due to the nature of the controls, the impact on the cross-border regions is insignificant.

10.4. If the serious threat consists of sudden large-scale unauthorised movements (Article 25(1), point (c), and 27(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399):

Please provide a risk assessment and information on the sudden large-scale unauthorised movements, including any information obtained from Union Agencies and data analysis from relevant information systems.

Please include quantitative and qualitative data, including for example the number of applications for international protection and unauthorised movements, as well as information on to the sudden nature of the large-scale unauthorised movement, the strain put on the resources and capacities of the competent authorities, the level of preparedness of the competent authorities, the likely risk to the overall functioning of the area without internal border control.

10.5. Opinion of the Commission and consultation process (if applicable)

Please specify:

—what action has been taken in response to opinion(s) of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 27a(2) or 27a(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399;

—what action has been taken in response to the outcome of a consultation process established in accordance with Article 27a(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.

11. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 6 months in accordance with Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

11.1. Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Please fill in point 10, taking into account the previous assessment of necessity and proportionality and the evolution of the serious threat since the reintroduction of border control at internal borders.

11.2. Scale and anticipated evolution of the serious threat

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) assess that the geopolitical situation and the need to expand the range of operational methods have increased Russian intelligence services' risk appetite. In recent years, several instances of sabotage and disruptive activity in Europe has taken place since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Such activity is often carried out by proxy actors and involves attempts to destroy or severely disrupt targets of

societal importance. It may also include less severe incidents, such as damage to property or spreading propaganda, aimed at creating social unrest.

12. If the notification concerns a prolongation of border control at internal borders after 2 years, for a major exceptional situation (Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399).

12.1. Assessment of the necessity and proportionality based on the criteria laid down in Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399

Please fill in point 11.

12.2. Action taken in response to an opinion of the Commission issued in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)

12.3. Action taken in response to a consultation process initiated in accordance with Article 25a(6) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (if applicable)

12.4. Substantiation of the continued threat to public policy or internal security

12.5. Explanation why alternative measures are ineffective

12.6. Presentation of mitigating measures

12.7. Where appropriate: presentation of the means, actions, conditions and timeline with a view to lifting border control at internal borders

13. Any further information (optional)

For example:

- details of strategic and operational cooperation with other Member States*
- details on to the use of alternative measures (Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)*
- whether the procedure laid down in Article 23a of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 is applied at the time of reintroduction of border control at internal borders*
- bilateral or regional cooperation initiatives, including with third countries*

14. Withholding of information on grounds of public security (Article 27(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Please indicate, to the extent that grounds of public security allow, whether any information has been withheld justified on public security grounds, taking into account the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.

Please indicate whether any of the notified information, in whole or in part has been classified under national law.

15. Confidentiality of information (Article 35 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399)

Please indicate and specify if any of the notified information is to remain confidential.