Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Traavik

Responses to Today’s Proliferation Challenges

Roundtable seminar on proliferation and disarmament,
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, 23. March 2004

Ladies and gentlemen,

The uncovering of Dr Khan’s network has reaffirmed that proliferation is a real and present danger. This has truly been a wake-up call to anyone who may have doubted the magnitude and scale of this threat.

Iran, Libya and North Korea are the Khan network recipients we know of. Whether non-state actors have also benefited from Khan’s network is unclear. But there are strong indications that Osama bin Laden has attempted to obtain nuclear weapons, and he has stated that he would not hesitate to use such weapons if he had them.

The despicable terrorist attacks in Madrid reaffirmed once again that terrorists will spare no effort in inflicting the maximum amount of death, suffering and destruction. We must ensure that weapons of mass destruction never fall into the hands of terrorists.

Hence we appreciate the new initiatives proposed by President Bush in his speech last month. American leadership is needed if we are to curb the spread of these deadly weapons.

• Firstly we agree that the UN should adopt a new resolution addressing the most pressing proliferation challenges.
• Secondly we agree secondly that national export controls must be tightened.
• Thirdly we agree that thirdly any country wishing to obtain nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes must become bound by the IAEA additional protocol.
• And fourthly we agree forthly that loopholes allowing nations to pursue clandestine nuclear weapon programmes must be closed.

It is essential that the UN is able to fulfil its mandate to uphold international peace and security. To that end we must strengthen the global non-proliferation treaties. These treaties must be made binding for all parties, and there must be no loopholes.

Hence, ensuring the authority and integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must be a primary objective. The NPT has been a cornerstone of the international arms control edifice for more than three decades. We must not allow it to be weakened. But the global treaties could and should be complemented by ad hoc initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The PSI fills a gap in our tool-box of non-proliferation measures. We support the strong operational focus of the PSI.

Norway is prepared to shoulder its responsibility as a partner in the initiative.

• We plan to take an active part in operational activities and to intensify existing intelligence co-operation with other countries.
• We will make every effort to ensure that our law enforcement and military personnel have the skills required to participate in interdiction exercises and activities.
• As an important shipping nation we aim to prevent Norwegian registered ships from being misused for proliferation purposes.
• We have just completed a review of Norway’s internal legislation relevant to interdiction activities, including export control legislation.
• Finally, we will actively support outreach initiatives to promote the PSI among states adjacent to major maritime transit routes.

It is essential that support for the PSI is solicited on a global scale, particularly among flag states, overflight states, transit states and coastal states.

Norway would welcome a further strengthening of the PSI framework, with the obvious proviso that any adjustments must be consistent with international law. We see a need to expand the PSI beyond interdiction to include disruption of the proliferation networks and a strong law enforcement component. US ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention would strengthen the maritime legal order and – we think – shore up international support for the PSI.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Operation "Active Endeavour" in the Eastern Mediterranean is an important part of the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. The importance of the operation will further increase as a result of the decision to expand its area of operation to the entire Mediterranean, and to enlist the support of our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

But NATO’s number one priority is Afghanistan. The task of the international stabilisation force, ISAF, is a daunting one. Failure is not an option. The Alliance must stay the course in Afghanistan and ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a free haven and training ground for terrorists bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

NATO must therefore continue to take the lead in efforts to extend security throughout the country, and to provide the stability necessary for democracy to take hold. This is not only about the future of Afghanistan and the fight against international terrorism and the spread of WMD. It is equally about the future credibility of the Alliance.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We applaud President Bush’s announcement of increased support for the Nunn-Lugar Nuclear Threat Reduction Programme, the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated. It has clearly been instrumental in raising international awareness of the dangers posed by vast stock of weapons and materials of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, which two years ago led to the formation of the G8 Global Partnership.

Norway was the first country outside the G8 to join the Global Partnership. The Kola Peninsula, just across our border with Russia in the north, has the world’s largest concentration of nuclear installations, as well as vast amounts of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Many of these materials represent a significant proliferation risk.

For example, there have already been attempted thefts of the highly radioactive strontium batteries used to power lighthouses scattered along the Russian coastline. We must prevent installations and materials such as these from falling into the hands of terrorists. For one thing, they could be used to manufacture dirty bombs.

Since 1995 Norway has spent USD 130 million on nuclear safety projects in Northwestern Russia. Current priorities include dismantling non-strategic nuclear submarines, clean-up of the Northern Fleet’s storage site at Andreyev Bay, one of the most contaminated spots in Europe, and safe removal of strontium batteries from lighthouses along the Russian coastline.

In the area of nuclear safety a window of opportunity has been opened. The G8 Global Partnership will make substantial amounts of money available for these efforts. We appreciate the strong US role in the clean-up activities in Northwestern Russia. The European Union, too, is becoming more involved. There is now a real hope that the nuclear safety and proliferation problems in Northwestern Russian can be solved during the next decade.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international security, and thus should be seen as a responsibility of the UN Security Council. Norway has consistently worked to strengthen the role and authority of the Security Council in our effort to halt the spread of these weapons.

We support President Bush’ call for a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalise proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.

The UN and the Security Council should play a prominent role in issues related to both compliance and verification. We should look for ways to retain the unique verification expertise built up by UNMOVIC within the UN system.

Reinvigorating the multilateral frameworks for disarmament and non-proliferation is of vital importance. Hence, we have taken the lead in efforts to reform the General Assembly’s work on disarmament and non-proliferation.

We must also find a way to get the Geneva Conference on Disarmament back on track. The only permanent multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament and non-proliferation cannot be allowed to remain dormant. As long as the present deadlock prevails, a treaty banning the production of fissile material cannot be negotiated. This is why it is so urgent to break the deadlock in Geneva.

We are concerned that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is under pressure. The spectre of nuclear terrorism adds to our concern in this regard. Next year’s review conference will be decisive for the future of the Treaty.

North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the NPT could set a dangerous precedent. We consider North Korea to be still bound by its NPT obligations. Iran must co-operate fully and unconditionally with the IAEA. On the other hand, the case of Libya shows that diplomacy and dialogue can work.

The 2005 Review Conference will provide an opportunity to consolidate and strengthen the NPT Treaty. For us, it is essential that the 2005 conference results in a strengthened non-proliferation regime. There must also be further progress on the NPT’s disarmament obligations. Additional cuts in tactical nuclear arms are called for, above all on the Russian side. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles are the best guarantee that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is essential for the promotion of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In our view, it is essential that the Treaty should enter into force as soon as possible. Thus, although we appreciate the US moratorium on testing, it is no substitute for the legally binding commitment that comes with accession to the Treaty. We are concerned that the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as low yield devices, may blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, and that it may also lead to pressure for renewed testing and hence to a lowering of the nuclear threshold. This would, of course, seriously weaken the non-proliferation regime.

IAEA safeguards, and in particular the Additional Protocol on Safeguards, give us a tool for verifying that nuclear activities remain in accordance with the NPT. Only states that have signed and implemented the Additional Protocol should be allowed to import equipment for civilian nuclear programmes. Agreement on an international commitment to that end should be a key objective at the NPT Review Conference.

Moreover, a system should be devised whereby countries are assured access to nuclear reactor fuel at affordable prices, provided they refrain from developing the capacity to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. For this to work properly, a multilateral framework would be required.

In our view it is crucial that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is strengthened. But efforts to ensure full compliance with the obligations set out in the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions should also be intensified. The scientific community and the private sector must become more sensitive to the dangers posed by the misuse of biotechnology.

Considerable progress has been made in strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention. Now we must strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. The cause of non-proliferation would be well served by the development of credible verification instruments for the convention.

To conclude, we need a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation. Multilateral regimes and emerging security initiatives and partnerships must be mutually supportive. We must combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by all available means. Absolute security may be impossible to achieve – but it must not be for lack of effort.