Historical archive

Norway’s conflict resolution efforts – are they of any avail?

Historical archive

Published under: Stoltenberg's 2nd Government

Publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

House of Literature, Oslo, 11 June 2010

Reconciliation and peace efforts are a key area of Norwegian foreign policy.(...) It is here that our policy of engagement meets our security policy. Here that Norway’s interests are played out in this age of globalisation, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre said in his speech.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

Few people would have felt more at home in this forum for social debate – the House of Literature – than Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. For here he would have found that very crossroads he sought to stand in the middle of – a crossroads between literature, culture and politics.

In a 1907 edition of Samtiden – the renowned Norwegian periodical on political, literary and social issues – Bjørnson, a member of the first Norwegian Nobel Committee, wrote that all efforts to promote peace must begin by combating not so much war itself as the warmongering that lies behind it. And, he went on, we must create a global brotherhood of peace.

In the same periodical 100 years later – in 2007 – Sten Inge Jørgensen claimed in a strongly worded article entitled “Norway’s global decline” that we have cultivated a kind of global calling, and that overall, Norway’s efforts to improve the world may in reality have had a more negative than positive effect. No less!

Norway’s role in the world has been debated for at least 100 years, and not just in Samtiden. This is good. Without a lively exchange of views, we will get nowhere. This is no less true for our policy on peace, reconciliation and conflict resolution – a fairly new field in terms of both content and policy, but – as we have seen – not without roots in Norwegian history.

In other words, people are engaged in Norway’s policy of engagement. I welcome this engagement, we need to be examined in a critical light, and it is against this backdrop that I would like to present our conflict resolution efforts and kick off a debate on the reasoning behind our policy of engagement, the form it takes, and how it is implemented.

First of all I would like to share with you an image taken by Harald Henden, photographer for the Norwegian daily newspaper VG, in Sudan during my visit a week ago. It was published in the newspaper on Monday. I am not going to show it here, but I will describe it to you. Mr Henden has caught me in the rear view mirror of a car driving through the village Akobo, in the east of Sudan. Through the windscreen I am looking, as we all are, at a motley crowd of people – men of all ages in uniform on the back of two trucks, young people and children. We assume that this is just what they do all day – hang around – that they are there quite simply because they don’t have anywhere else to be.

Mr Henden has caught me as I look out on this. At the same time, I am looking into a political rear view mirror. There I see the peace agreement between northern and southern Sudan from 2005 that marked the end of several decades of brutal, deadly and destructive civil war. I see a peace that Norway – together with several other actors – helped to bring about. Not lasting, stable peace, but at least to begin with a fragile absence of war.

I see people struggling to survive close to the limits of endurance. The highest child and maternal mortality rate in the world. But I also see a will, an almost desperate determination to avoid ending up at war again.

And, taking a step further, I see Sudan as a whole – the largest country in Africa with nine neighbouring countries around it. With Darfur – home to humanitarian disaster – in the west. With its tensions between north and south. With the Nile – representing huge resources – running through its land. With its oil deposits – some in the north, but most in the south. We can imagine the consequences not only for Africa but also for the world if this all goes wrong.

At this point in my visit, I have had talks with leaders from the north, and I am on my way to meet key players in the south. I can feel the tension, the antagonism; I can sense how much is at stake. Everywhere I hear that the parties want Norway to be involved – not that Norway has the key, but that Norway should be engaged. That they welcome Norway’s support of the NCP in the north and of the SPLM in the south. Our cooperation with the UN and the AU. Our close cooperation with the other members of the troika – the US and the UK. Our willingness to share our thoroughly developed expertise in the oil sector. Our support for the UN’s efforts.

Perhaps people looking at that photograph in VG might wonder whether I am asking myself – there and then in that car – a question that is often raised in Norway: Is it worth getting involved? Should Norway say yes to all these requests? What qualifications do we really have for this work? Is this where we should be focusing our attention and our resources? Can we make a difference?

These are questions I invite the panel to debate today. For me, my impressions from Sudan together with the lessons learned over the last few years add up to a resounding “yes” to that question.

Because, knowing what suffering war causes, we should play a part where we can to prevent new wars from breaking out.

Because the parties have clearly indicated that our contribution is welcome.

Because it gives Norway a platform that makes it relevant in its dealings with other countries.

And because I can’t find any convincing argument for saying “no”, that this is something we should turn our backs on, that this is an area where we cannot make a difference.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Against the backdrop of this introduction, this picture, let me lift my gaze from the mirror in the car driving through Sudan and present the general status of our efforts, the point of departure.

Reconciliation and peace efforts are a key area of Norwegian foreign policy. Not the main issue, as I was asked on the radio today, but a key area.

It is here that our policy of engagement meets our security policy. Here that Norway’s interests are played out in this age of globalisation. Here that factors relevant to our neighbouring area interface with our efforts to help resolve conflicts far away – to the extent that “far away” has any meaning in today’s interconnected world.

At the same time, this is a policy area that is full of contradictions; it is sensitive and complex, and it challenges the integrity and sovereignty of vulnerable states – going right to the quick.

Therefore we don’t become engaged unless the parties ask us to. Norway has virtually no leverage to demand a role for itself. I don’t see that as a disadvantage. It underlines the responsibility of the parties, and highlights the essential basis for our engagement. And we don’t “buy” ourselves a role either, in case anyone was wondering about that.

This is why it is so important to promote open communication and an incisive debate on Norwegian and international conflict resolution efforts. And this is why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Refleks project, has provided input to this debate in the form of discussion forums, various articles and publications, and finally the white paper on the main features of Norwegian foreign policy (Report No.15 (2008–2009) to the Storting). And we have seen several examples of such debate here at the House of Literature.

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So let me now go directly to the question posed in the title, and it is a question that is important to ask: Are the Norwegian and global conflict reconciliation efforts of any avail?

First a familiar proviso. Let’s beware of all simple solutions and easy answers when we examine the results achieved. For there are no easy answers. These are extremely complex questions. It is not possible to measure achievement on an index, on a barometer or in a column of a budget.

But my answer is – yes, they do help, they are on the right track. And in this address I will try to explain why.

Once again, I would like to underline that our efforts span many different types of work in this field. We help to prevent conflict through humanitarian action, disarmament, negotiations, facilitation, brokering, military intervention, contributions to peacekeeping forces and various phases of reconstruction, and these efforts have an impact on one another.

There is much to indicate that more conflicts are becoming the object of peace negotiations and are resolved through talks and subsequent peace agreements than are “resolved” through a military victory on the part of one of the parties. This is a positive trend. And it behoves all who have the will and capacity to contribute to do so, so that efforts to resolve conflicts, negotiate peace agreements and maintain peace can become better and more effective. It is not a matter of winning a conflict, but of resolving it. In recent years, brokering has helped to resolve conflicts in settings as different as Aceh, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. However, it is a cause for concern – and there is much debate on this – that many peace agreements are fragile with a risk of hostilities being resumed. As many fear will be the case in Sudan.

Norway’s results have varied, but it is questionable whether it is meaningful to highlight a single conflict and measure Norway’s individual role. For in most cases it is limited, and is part of a larger, broader effort together with others.

Let me give a few brief examples.

First – the Middle East. For Norway’s part, the story didn’t end with the Oslo Accords. I have said it before, and I am happy to say it again: there’s a kind of nostalgia – not least in the media – surrounding what is referred to as Norway’s “role in the Middle East”. But a role of this kind is not static. It is formed and develops in a historical context, and there are many parties and actors involved.

Work leading up to the Oslo Accords entailed facilitating talks. That is not our role today. Our responsibility today – which is just as important – is to coordinate measures to promote development in the Palestinian Territory in our role as chair of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) of donors to the Palestinians. And we make this clear. This work is vital for maintaining confidence in the vision that political solutions can be found for a future peace agreement. Both the Israelis and the Palestinian authorities take part in the AHLC together with the major donors. This gives us continual insight that is valuable in the efforts to create peace.

Second – Sri Lanka. Here we are reminded of a fundamental truth – that it is the parties that bear the main responsibility. Our main message when Norwegian facilitators helped to bring about a ceasefire agreement in 2002 was that the parties had to take responsibility for a political process that would culminate in a political solution. They did not do so. But we again made it clear when the parties chose to revert to war that this too was their responsibility. We did not have the power to prevent it, and they must bear the responsibility also for the negative consequences.

There are many lessons to be learned from our engagement in Sri Lanka. And I would like to emphasise this. Erik Solheim and I have announced an invitation to tender for an extensive evaluation of Norway’s engagement in the peace process, which continued over many years and under different governments. We want to know more, to gain new perspectives and see what lessons can be applied to other conflict areas.

Moving on to Haiti, Belgian consultants have evaluated our peacebuilding efforts in Haiti over ten years, from 1998 onwards. The report is entirely positive. It concludes that we made a contribution to peace and stability, that we made effective use of informal actors and organisations, and that we coordinated our efforts well with other aid actors. Indeed, flexibility and the willingness to take risks are generally factors that are highlighted as positive characteristics of Norway’s general aid efforts as well as in our peace work.

*****

So back to the question I said I would answer: How exactly do we contribute – directly – to conflict resolution and peace?

Our overriding objective is to help the parties to find peaceful solutions to conflicts so as to prevent them from developing into armed combat, or at least to help to reduce the level of violence, and move from violence towards political solutions.

Our main tool is contact – dialogue – based on confidence. We may facilitate a process that the parties themselves take responsibility for, and in some cases administer. Or we may administer the process ourselves, act as brokers and seek to influence the parties directly. We take different approaches, use different means.

Here are some examples.

Firstly, we act as facilitator in certain peace processes.

In Sri Lanka and the Philippines, Norway has had or still has a formal facilitator role in a peace process on behalf of the parties. These have been extensive engagements where we have spent a great deal of time with each of the parties to help them develop their positions and thus take important steps towards resolution of the conflict. In several other countries, Norway is working in a more informal way – and in some cases right out of the public eye – to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Secondly, we contribute to other actors’ conflict resolution efforts. Since the early 1990s, the number of actors in the field of conflict resolution and peace-brokering has increased considerably. Due to the continuity, expertise and strategic and financial resources associated with us, we are an attractive partner in a number of processes where other actors are playing the main role. The long-term nature of Norway’s policy inspires trust; we shoulder our responsibility through good times and bad and regardless of changes of government at home.

Norway funded Kofi Annan’s brokering initiative in an acute situation that arose during the conflict in Kenya after the 2007 election. His efforts helped to curb the violence and establish a unity government. Mr Annan underlined the importance of our cooperation when I met him in Kampala last week.

Thirdly, we have been systematically investing in knowledge development and network-building that can we can draw on in Norwegian or Norwegian-supported conflict resolution initiatives. Early in the 2000s, we set up the Section for Peace and Reconciliation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate our efforts, ensure systematic competence development and provide an interface with organisations in Norway and abroad that have expertise on and are engaged in peace processes. By providing support for and cooperating with institutions working with conflict resolution all over the world, we have increased our knowledge and improved our data and understanding of the key factors for achieving peaceful resolutions to conflicts. During my years at the Ministry, I have seen how strong networks of expertise on peace and reconciliation have been developing, and this has been very valuable for us.

Fourthly, our embassies are extensively involved in these activities. They play a key role in all conflict areas where Norway is engaged. The embassies represent the Ministry’s comparative edge. They are our ears and eyes – and our voice – in the countries concerned. They are building up local expertise and local networks, and they continually provide information and analyses that are essential for Norway’s efforts. And in addition, the major contribution Norway makes through civil society in conflict areas would be impossible without the embassies’ contacts and ability to follow up activities in the field.

Fifthly, there are “silent processes”.

Norway is directly or indirectly involved in a number of silent processes where the aim is to provide channels for parties who do not want any publicity in connection with the talks. This is difficult work, and exciting enough for anyone. Particular challenges arise in connection with risk. And it is a dilemma – and we acknowledge this – that much of this work, which can sometimes be of great importance, cannot be made visible, and that we therefore have to consciously undercommunicate both what we are doing and what has been achieved.

Sixthly, there is dialogue.

A much maligned word, and perhaps a favourite of the caricaturist?

I may as well repeat myself. For me, dialogue is a fine word. Because it has two antonyms: silence and monologue. These are rarely preferable. Dialogue will always be at the heart of our contribution to conflict resolution. Informal dialogue that leads to formal negotiations. Structured dialogue in negotiations between the parties.

Dialogue can be problematic and demanding. It raises difficult questions. Why reward armed groups with the opportunity to take part in talks? Won’t ceasefires and endless diplomacy just buy time for insurgents and undemocratic regimes? We must acknowledge these dilemmas.

The arguments against dialogue are valid, but they don’t take you very far. If we want extremists and insurgents to choose a political path – i.e. politics and not violence – then we have to give that message and keep the political channels open. We have to stake out a clear path out of violence and into politics.

However, this doesn’t mean that we can’t exert pressure. This is an appropriate line to take in relation to Iran: sanctions – yes, but also willingness to enter into dialogue. Open doors and sanctions.

That is why I believe it is important to have envoys who maintain contact with Hamas in the Palestinian Territory and Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is why there is increasing support for talking to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not in a way that suggests political recognition or legitimises unacceptable actions, but in a way that makes it clear what is required to achieve a political solution.

And I would like to add that dialogue is not a sign of weakness, acquiescence or compliance. On the contrary, it entails setting a clear framework that has been carefully thought out and is based on fundamental values. And not least, we must remember that the alternative in most cases – as I often say – is worse.

Seventhly, Norway is not neutral. In my eyes, it is only really the Red Cross that can aspire to that aim. We take positions. For example in the UN through addresses, votes and resolutions. But in certain processes where we are assisting two parties, we may be cautious about taking sides. This is a question of timing, credibility and circumstances.

*****

In a few days time we will be gathering close to 100 peace and conflict resolution practitioners from all parts of the world for the annual Oslo Forum Mediators’ Retreat, which has been held every year since 2003. This will in other words be the eighth such retreat. The purpose is always the same: to exchange knowledge and experience gained in various conflict areas by engaging politicians, experts from research institutions and NGOs, and diplomats in discussions in this stimulating forum. For example, this year the Turkish Foreign Minister will be coming.

What have we learned about what works in conflict resolution – and what does not?

Are there elements in peace agreements that make them more likely than others to be undermined or to lead to a rekindling of the conflicts themselves?

How should the need to prosecute perpetrators of abuses be weighed against the desire to make progress in a peace process?

What are necessary conditions for reconciliation?

An interesting development in recent years has been the emergence of new actors that are deeply engaged in peace processes. Several of these will be coming Oslo next week. There will be discussions about the Middle East, Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan. The Iran agreement recently negotiated by Turkey and Brazil showed the impact of these actors’ increasing importance in international diplomacy – and in other arenas.

In other words, we are gaining insight and engaging with a broader network through our peace and reconciliation efforts – as a side effect. This reflects the breakneck pace of globalisation, and the challenges this entails as regards the balance of power, the facts on the ground and the ongoing processes in conflict areas.

Some see problems here. I prefer to focus more on the positive aspect, namely that emerging major powers are choosing to engage. The opposite – if they chose to opt out and isolate themselves – would, in my view, be truly worrying.

*****

What are the particular areas where Norway is an attractive partner? What has become our trademark? Our defining traits? I would like to share a few reflections with you.

First, Norway’s policy of engagement enjoys broad political support. This ensures vital continuity and predictability. The government in power at any time has so far been able to presume that the next government would follow the same main policy lines. Had this not been the case, we would very soon have become marginalised in a number of peace processes. Norway has the financial flexibility to quickly provide funds as needed. Our foreign and development policies are closely coordinated, as regards both aims and measures.

Second, we have built up expertise through systematic efforts in the field over nearly 20 years. We have an extensive presence in conflict areas through our network of embassies, our aid activities and our humanitarian action, as I mentioned earlier. We are a part of important network and cooperation structures, both at home and abroad, not least through the UN, and we also have long-established channels to large, powerful countries that in most cases have been engaged from the very start or will become involved in the course of these processes.

Third, there is close cooperation in Norway between the authorities, research institutions and NGOs. I am aware of the pitfalls here and of the criticism of what some call the Norwegian “rule of benevolence”, and I am most willing to discuss this issue.

Fourth, we are willing to take risk. We are willing to take a long-term approach and engage in important projects and processes where there is a considerable risk that we may fail. Choosing to engage generally entails taking risk.

Fifth, there is our perceived impartiality and low degree of self-interest. This is because we do not have a past as a colonial power, or political and economic interests that could cast doubts on our political engagement. Of course Norway has certain interests, for example in the energy sector, but these must not be mixed up with our political engagement in conflict resolution. We need to find a balance here. In general, the parties have a clear idea of who we are and what we stand for.

Sixth, we have shown an ability and willingness to handle low-key, confidential and secret processes when required, allowing the parties to build confidence – for example by avoiding media attention.

You might say that these elements combine to make up what I call Norway’s list of merits.

*****

Ladies and gentlemen,

Back to the greater picture. Many different aspects of Norway’s foreign policy help to prevent war, relieve suffering during conflicts, resolve conflicts and, not least, rebuild war-torn, post-conflict societies. It is possible that the cumulative effect of these – mainly indirect – approaches is greater than that of any direct conflict resolution effort. They are a part of the picture.

Take security policy: Norway’s engagement in conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation efforts is becoming increasingly relevant to our security policy. This was one of the key themes of the white paper on the main features of Norwegian foreign policy and of the subsequent debate in the Storting. The threats caused by external instability were highlighted as one of the main security challenges for Norway in the time ahead, that is to say for its security policy for the 21st century, the age of globalisation.

One security policy perspective is the following: Norway does not pursue a pacifist policy for conflict resolution. And, as I have already mentioned, Norway is not neutral. We have armed forces whose purpose it is to safeguard our own physical security, and Norway is a member of a political military alliance for the same reason.

Conflict is an inherent aspect of any society’s development. Our focus is on destructive, violent conflicts with innocent victims. Our policy builds on the legitimate right of states to defend themselves by military means.

Together with a number of other countries we have clearly expressed our misgivings about Sri Lanka’s military strategy for what it calls resolving the problem of the Tamils. However, we are not questioning the Government’s sovereign right to employ any force it has at its disposal to maintain security, law and order within the limits set by the country’s constitution and the universal human rights. Nevertheless, we support the UN Secretary-General’s call for an independent investigation of the last phase of the war.

In Afghanistan we – the international community – have been invited by the country’s legitimate authorities to fight the rebel groups by military means. Training national military forces and police forces is a key element of the NATO/ISAF-led operation, in which the US plays a leading role. This is a question of security.

At the same time, Afghanistan is to my mind a good illustration of a conflict that cannot be won by military means alone. The solution must be political. Extensive civilian efforts are if anything more important. The point is that we cannot consider these two aspects independently of each other. A broad range of civilian efforts is necessary in order to demonstrate to the people of Afghanistan, who are tired of war, that security, peace and development are achievable. And that a legitimate government, supported by the international community, can deliver.

We are not alone, it would seem, in interpreting the situation in this way. President Obama’s new security policy strategy demonstrates renewed US willingness to employ a broad range of measures to maintain security, and to accord a key place to a policy of engagement – in the broader sense. The strategy also acknowledges that the US, like other countries, can only reach its security policy goals through joint efforts with its allies and the global community as a whole.

To me, this illustrates a fundamental point, and here I will once more refer to the white paper on the main features of Norwegian foreign policy. A policy of engagement is not incompatible with realpolitik or with an interest-based security policy. As I see it, they are becoming increasingly interlinked.

For me, the following is therefore a key point: our policy of engagement provides a framework and method for pursuing an integrated foreign and development policy.

The concept “policy of engagement” is meant to encompass those measures in which we make full use of our foreign policy apparatus, aid funding, networks and willingness to take political risk in order to bring about change at the international level – change that is in line with universal values such as protection of humanitarian principles, promoting human rights, disarmament and conflict resolution. Norway’s development cooperation and humanitarian efforts are part of such a policy of engagement.

Let me sum up using a few examples.

Instead of just providing emergency relief to people affected by war – or rather in addition to doing so – we can strive to put an end to hostilities through peace and reconciliation efforts.

Instead of just providing prosthetics and alleviating suffering, we can work to mobilise international support for a ban on anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions – and here we have been very successful.

Instead of just accepting that natural resources lead to corruption and conflict, we can draw on our own experience and help to find solutions to energy-related conflicts through our Oil-for-Development initiative. Sudan is one example here.

We can also support international capacity-building efforts in organisations ranging from the UN to the African Union, which I visited last week. Norway was instrumental in establishing the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which it also helps to finance. Kofi Annan created the Commission in 2006 to address the “black hole” in the international community’s ability to assist countries emerging from conflict. The fact that many post-conflict countries slide back into armed conflict in the course of a few years was an important reason for setting up the Commission. It is just one of many areas where we support UN peace efforts.

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To conclude, I would like to present a few more dilemmas and challenges. They also reflect our political thinking on these matters, and they should be addressed in a critical debate on the lessons we have learned and the opportunities open to us. These dilemmas keep us alert and force us to check our bearings.

First of all, is our extensive engagement in conflict resolution taking place at the cost of other Norwegian interests? For example at the cost of Norway’s security? I hear this claim being made from some quarters.

In my view, the answer is “no”. I believe that our global engagement in conflict resolution is a cost-effective and forward-looking approach to security policy. What resources we should be allocating to the Norwegian armed forces is an important but entirely different discussion.

In a changing world, in which new centres of power and constellations of interests are emerging, we need to hone our foreign policy analysis. We need to understand the new drivers. I would be so bold as to claim that few things have done more to develop our understanding of the real global power constellations than our active engagement in conflict resolution. It is vital that we understand the regional and global interests that are at play in these conflicts and what effect they have.

Then there is the dilemma between justice and the need to make progress in peace processes.

It is a well known fact that criminal prosecution of those involved in violent conflicts poses challenges in processes aimed at achieving peace and reconciliation between the warring parties. There are those who question whether it is wise to prosecute a head of state or a commander of armed forces for genocide if they are sitting with a possible key to peace. That is indeed a good question.

Here is a second dilemma. Amnesty International recently expressed its deep concern to me about negotiating with the Taliban, and what this really means. Can we find an inclusive solution without including warlords who have hundreds of innocent lives on their conscience?

There is no easy answer. But I would maintain that we don’t have to choose between justice and peace. We must work to achieve both.

It is, in any case, the international community’s duty to maintain the rights perspective and the justice perspective. Particularly important here are the rights of women and girls. And we must help societies that have been almost completely torn apart – like Afghanistan – to build up, stone by stone, the set of norms essential to any society, the foundations both for the rule of law and for reconciliation between former enemies.

Thirdly, there are questions such as these: Are we prolonging the war? Are we encouraging ever more groups to take up arms? Are we creating unrealistic expectations that are unlikely to result in the establishment of stable states? Are we creating fragile forms of peace that will soon be drowned by the language of war?

One answer to some of these dilemmas is that our role in peace processes must always be supported both by the authorities in power and the group or groups that are in conflict with them. Again, Norway will very rarely have the power or the means to prolong anything. It is the parties to the conflict that are in charge of the process.

One advantage of Norway, as a state actor, being involved in a peace process, as opposed to private actors, is that we do not create unrealistic expectations about the likelihood of a particular group winning by violent means. Through our support to civil society, and for democracy- and state-building, we are strengthening societies’ own ability to address conflicts.

A fourth question is: Are we giving legitimacy to undemocratic forces? 

This question is particularly relevant in the current debate on whether or not we should negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. The predominant view, until recently, has been: No, the Taliban is the Government’s and NATO’s/ISAF’s main enemy, and showing willingness to negotiate would be giving them an inch at the risk of them taking a mile. Therefore, first the surge – in order to weaken them significantly in military terms – and then perhaps talks, once they realise that they have lost.

But then again, the understanding we have gained of the complex political–strategic landscape of Afghanistan, the dynamics within the Taliban and between the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as the military situation on the ground – all this and more – has altered the picture. Many people are now beginning to think the unthinkable: Is it possible to get the Taliban to take responsibility by entering into negotiations? To persuade them to break all contact with Al-Qaeda? Is it possible to involve those forces that primarily have a national, Afghan agenda?

All these questions are on the agenda for the Oslo Forum next week.

Many of the most dangerous conflicts today are taking place in Muslim countries, and religion – or at least the interpretation of religion – is an ingredient. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Sudan are the most acute examples. In many of the most dangerous conflicts today, religious language is used to legitimise violence. That does not mean that religion is at the core of these conflicts, nor that it is the cause, but we do see that religious language is exacerbating the conflicts. And this makes it vital that we – who have sought to wash religion right out of politics over the last few centuries – must do our homework and seek to understand what a driving force religion can be.

The trend of polarisation between the West and the Muslim world must be countered. But if we are to succeed, we must take a broad approach. We must increase our knowledge about Islam. We must strengthen our contact with influential Muslim actors. Political forms of Islam have broad popular support in large parts of the world. In some countries, Islamist groups form a strong and peaceful opposition to authoritarian regimes. In others, they use violent means. 

We must prevent extremist groups from setting the agenda. We must not relinquish UN podiums to authoritarian leaders who can then proceed unchallenged because we ourselves choose to stay away. Islamist groups and parties that choose peaceful approaches must be taken seriously as political actors. Even though in many cases we may not share their points of view. Or perhaps for that very reason.

Finally, just to dispel the myth – if there should be such a myth: we are not engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts because Norwegians are particularly “peaceful” or “good” people. We become engaged because Norway has the opportunity, the position, and the economic and political resources to take a share of the responsibility for bringing about peace.

In my view, we have made good use of this window of opportunity over the last 10–20 years. And we can do so even better in the years to come. That is why I welcome this debate.