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Can Democratisation Prevent Conflicts?

The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001:
Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa



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The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001:
Can Democratisation Prevent Conflicts?
Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa

Solstrand 18–20 June 2001

Seminar Report

Prepared by Chr. Michelsen Institute

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Executive Summary

1. About the seminar

The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 focused on Africa's democratic experiences in the last decade, and asked to what extent the development of democratic institutions had contributed to conflict prevention. Through plenary and parallel sessions, the participants and invited speakers discussed to what extent these democratic institutions were actually working, and to what extent democracy as it has been practised in sub-Saharan Africa so far had served to prevent internal conflicts. The countries chosen for particular focus and scrutiny this year were Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania. Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) hosted the seminar, which took place at Solstrand Fjord Hotel on June 18–20, 2001. This report seeks to highlight the main seminar findings and discussions.

2. Experiences with democracy in sub-Saharan Africa

The following findings were set out: since the late 1980s democratic ideals have become widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, and all but a handful of the 48 countries in the region now officially practice democratic politics. But neither donor assistance nor domestic constituencies have been able to stem the continued executive dominance over political processes in sub-Saharan Africa. The challenge to further the democratic process in the new democracies should therefore be to ensure that the established institutions gain capacity, independence and authority in order to ensure an impact on policy-making by their decisions. The keynote speaker noted that it is difficult to demonstrate that multiparty competition has improved political accountability. Instead elections are regarded as one of many instruments of factional mobilisation responsible for sharpened instability. According to this view, rule of law, elections or policies of decentralisation will not prevent conflict. This

perspective was challenged in the general discussion.

3. Elections: politics of polarisation or inclusion?

The findings from this section were that most of the new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa share one common political feature: a political system dominated by one party. The main speaker emphasised how both choice of electoral system and quality of electoral management impacted on overriding concerns such as inclusion and polarisation. He reiterated the warning against the twin fallacies of “electoralism” - that holding elections is synonymous with democracy - and “anti-electoralism” - that elections do not matter in the democratisation process. Stressing that there are many forms of electoral systems, donors were encouraged to consider technical assistance to running simulations of potential outcomes under different electoral systems, with a view to selecting the least polarising options. The discussion in this section raised the costs of elections as an issue. The case of South Africa was illustrative as it was reported that the country in direct outlays spent R 52 million solely on political party support in the last elections.

4. The role of courts in promoting democracy

The following findings were set out: effective mechanisms of horizontal accountability - institutions of restraint limiting the powers of political office-holders, and in particular that of the executive - are seen as a precondition for democratic stability and peaceful conflict resolution. Constitution has been the main vehicle by which to establish institutions to counteract excessive concentration of power and remove contentious issues from the political domain. The third session of the seminar reflected upon the role of the international

community in enhancing the role of the judiciary in processes of democratic institutionalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. The main speaker noted that many jurists in Africa now were becoming activists, to the extent that more jurists are able – and willing – to confront national laws and practices with international human rights standards. One discussant also indicated the problems with such reforms. Courts and other institutions of restraint are vulnerable, particularly in contexts where their legitimacy is limited. And being perceived as “external agents” aggravates this vulnerability. The question of whether the courts were properly equipped to promote Human Rights was also addressed. The fact that judges and courts did not have autonomous separate budgets was raised as a major concern.

5. Can a democratic state decentralise more effectively?

The discussion emphasised that contrary to support for elections and judicial reform, decentralisation is not a new theme in development planning in Africa. Decentralisation is intended to strengthen both accountability and governance capacity: The focus on local government has a legitimacy aspect, because local government is seen as a prerequisite to rebuild the legitimacy of the state in many African countries. Furthermore, it is assumed that greater autonomy of locally elected councillors will improve *service delivery*. Based on Tanzania’s experiences with decentralisation reforms, the speaker emphasised that decentralisation is bound to be a long process that will entail changing deeply rooted practices and traditions. It calls for an enlightened citizenry and implementation of good governance principles. The outright reluctance by central government departments to devolve powers, responsibilities and resources to local government authorities was raised as an inhibiting factor in efforts to accelerate reforms. The commonly cited excuses are lack of resources and inadequate capacities at the local level.

6. The cases of Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa

The substantial issues raised during the first day of the seminar were brought up in country-groups on the second day of the seminar. Thus, in the parallel sessions the issues of democracy, conflict and the role of development aid were discussed as they related to political developments in Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa. All three countries in various ways illustrate key issues of democratic development, conflict and aid.

7. Aid, policy and peace

The last session of the seminar addressed the questions of conflict, democracy, economic development and international development assistance from a macro-perspective based on cross-national analyses carried out by the World Bank’s Research Department. On the basis of a comprehensive cross-country study, it was found that democracy does not matter for economic performance in societies that are ethnically homogeneous (e.g., China). However, in ethnically diversified societies, the introduction of democracy makes a big difference to economic growth. Thus, according to Collier, the reason why Africa has performed so badly the last 30 years is the lack of democracy. According to this perspective, the ethnically diversified African societies with no democracy constitute a major impediment to development. Based on cross-country data sets and regression analysis, Collier found that level of income mattered, as the incidence of violence is higher in the poorest countries. The structure of the economy was also found to be significant: according to the World Bank, there are more conflicts in countries that are primary commodity producers (e.g., mineral and oil rich countries). The policy implications drawn from the World Bank study were that Africa needs economic success. But, to achieve success, Africa needs democracy as democracy adds to economic performance. The World Bank found that development aid helps in this process and Collier stressed the need for more foreign aid.

About the Seminar

As the fourth conference arranged jointly by the Chr. Michelsen Institute and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 focused on Africa's democratic experiences in the last decade, and asked to what extent the development of democratic institutions had contributed to conflict prevention. With substantial international financial aid many African governments in the past decade have implemented reforms in the form of multiparty elections, decentralisation of government functions, and the establishment of institutions of restraint such as human rights commissions and electoral commissions. Through plenary and parallel sessions, the participants and invited speakers at the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 discussed to what extent these democratic institutions were actually working, and to what extent democracy as it has been practised in sub-Saharan Africa so far had served to prevent internal conflicts. As at previous seminar, the main objective of the 2001 Bergen Seminar on Development was to distil lessons and debate recent findings from evaluations of development aid. Building on last year's seminar,¹ which dealt with the immediate transition from war to reconciliation, the 2001 seminar looked at the "second phase" - involving the long-term process of building stable and enduring democratic institutions in Africa's many divided societies and nation-states. The countries chosen for particular focus and scrutiny this year were Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania.

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) hosted the seminar, which took place at Solstrand Fjord Hotel on June 18–20, 2001. Approximately 50 participants were invited to the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001, ranging from government officials and representatives from international organisations and non-governmental organisations, and researchers with an academic interest in the topics of the seminar.

This report seeks to highlight the main findings of, and discussions taking place at the seminar. The seminar was divided into five thematic sessions and one parallel session discussing the three country cases. The seminar report will mainly follow the structure adopted at the seminar. Following this introduction, the first section discusses the relationship between democratic development and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (1). Section two addresses the role of elections in Africa's new democracies (2). Section three focuses on the role of the judiciary and courts to promote democracy and prevent conflict (3). The fourth section addresses the role of local government and decentralisation (4). In section five the main findings from the three parallel sessions on Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania are presented (5). The sixth section focuses on the relationship between conflict, development and aid (6). By way of conclusion, the final section of this seminar report summarises the debates at the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 by posing the question: "What lessons for development aid?" (7).

1) Bergen Seminar on Development 2000: After War: Reconciliation and Democratisation in Divided Societies.

1 Democracy and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

The first session of the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 focused on the questions:

- Have the democratic transitions in the last decade produced more accountable governments in sub-Saharan Africa?
- Has foreign assistance been conducive to reducing violence in the context of multiparty democracy on the continent?

Africa south of Sahara is not only the poorest among the world's regions, but also today the most conflict-ridden, and there are no signs of the level of instability and violence subsiding. The post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of national-level conflicts, often rooted in ethnically based hostilities and scrambles for natural riches and state privileges. At the same time, this has been a period when democratic ideals and aspirations gained a foothold and all but a handful of the 48 countries in the region now officially practice democratic politics.

Based on the democratic literature and studies that have evaluated international assistance to democratic processes in sub-Saharan Africa, *Lise Rakner* (Chr. Michelsen Institute) in her presentation emphasised that to date neither donor assistance nor domestic constituencies have been able to stem the continued executive dominance over political processes in sub-Saharan Africa.² From the perspective of conflict resolution and human rights excessive executive dominance is potentially devastating. It turns politics into a zero-sum game where winning the presidency becomes everything, which again is likely to exacerbate conflict. It also endangers the effective operation of institutional mechanisms introduced to prevent the abuse of power and safeguard the rights of citizens and the integrity of the democratic process. According to Rakner, the challenge to further the democratic process in the new

democracies is to ensure that the established institutions gain capacity, independence and authority in order to make their decisions impact on policy-making. Despite the conduct of multiparty elections, democracy has not yet been *institutionalised* - to the extent that core state institutions (such as the executive, legislative, judiciary, political parties, media, and civil society) are well organised and operate efficiently. When constitutional limitations are respected, regardless of who stands to gain or lose from these limitations, a democratic process has become institutionalised. Rakner further emphasised that in order to understand African politics today, earlier notions must be redefined. African politics should be seen as a triangular relationship between states, civil society and external actors.

Rule of law, elections or policies of decentralisation will not prevent conflict

In his presentation, Professor *Patrick Chabal* (Kings College) argued that with the exception of some countries - Botswana and most notably the island states (Cape Verde, Mauritius) - it is difficult to demonstrate that multiparty competition has improved political accountability. According to Professor Chabal, elections in sub-Saharan Africa are one of many instruments of factional mobilisation that have produced instability. Nor did he find any evidence that pluralist politics have led to more sustained economic development on the continent. He also doubted that the democratic transitions had reduced the number or the intensity of conflicts in Africa. According to Chabal, rule of law, elections or policies of decentralisation will not prevent conflict. Rather, he argued, the form of political competition introduced in sub-Saharan Africa has led to more acute rivalry among the elites for control of the state. Within this perspective, contemporary politics in Africa is best

2) The papers presented at the main sessions of the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 are posted in Pdf-format and can be downloaded from the Chr. Michelsen Institute's homepages (<http://www.cmi.no>).

understood as the exercise of neo-patrimonial power. In other words, despite the formal political structures in place, power transits essentially through the informal sector. Power, Chabal argued, is the main reason for conflict, and the present political systems can be expected to produce more violent conflicts. He called for more realism both from the international donor community and the academic community as most African leaders currently instrumentalise disorder rather than accountability.

Are African states neo-patrimonial?

Most participants agreed that the majority of African states do not meet the classical criteria of a modern rational-legal state, displaying a functional separation of the public and private spheres and a notion of citizenship binding individuals directly to the state. However, many participants questioned the usefulness of the term neo-patrimonialism when discussing the development of democracy in Africa. The term refers to the informal aspects of African politics, and scholars denouncing African states as neo-patrimonial argue that the state is merely a façade that masks the realities of deeply personalised political relations. In this perspective, African politics are assumed to be radically different from politics elsewhere, and it is deemed futile to analyse them by means of general theories of political development, democratisation, and formal institutions.

In the general discussion several participants challenged Chabal's hypotheses and objected that the neo-patrimonial perspective did not provide a new analysis of African politics. That African politics are largely based on neo-patrimonialism was, by some participants, regarded as self-evident. Other interventions argued that this perspective was un conducive for understanding change, as well as to account for the exceptions, such as Botswana and Mauritius. It was also argued that neo-patrimonialism is not particularly helpful in

explaining how one country evolves from "politics of disorder" to more institutionalised forms of democratic rule, the recent democratic developments in Ghana being one example. Several participants questioned whether it was possible to empirically confirm that there are more wars in Africa today than there was twenty years ago.

In the discussion it was generally agreed that there is a great demand for democratic accountability in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the question turned to *how* Africa's new democracies could develop accountable political institutions considered vital for the furthering of democracy, economic development and stability. Acknowledging the need for appropriate institutional mechanisms, the participants also emphasised other vital aspects of democratisation relating to the role of norms, values and attitudes. Many participants also pointed to the importance of economic development. Several participants from the south questioned the implicit interconnection between political and economic reform and argued that maybe African countries should wait for economic growth before they democratised. Others dismissed this point and argued that while donors had pressed for political reform, democratisation had also been driven by significant domestic demands. The option of stalling democratic reform was therefore not regarded as either desirable or realistic. Underscoring the importance of ownership, a substantial part of the discussion nevertheless concerned the role of the international donor community in Africa's democratisation processes. Some questioned the usefulness of "the borrowed" models and standards employed when donors were referring to human rights and democratisation. Other interventions pointed out that all democratic systems were based on "borrowed" models. Lack of donor co-ordination on democratisation was emphasised as a major problem in terms of furthering the democratisation processes.

2 Elections: Politics of polarisation or inclusion?

The discussions in the first session raised serious questions about the nature of multiparty politics and the ability of the electoral institutions to actually produce accountable governments on the continent. In the second session, the electoral processes became the focal point of discussions and two questions in particular were emphasised:

- Have democracy and multiparty politics in sub-Saharan Africa provided mechanisms for solving conflicts based on ethnicity, identity, and nationhood?
- What are the lessons for policy-makers and donors on the basis of the experiences with multiparty democracy so far?

Professor *Jørgen Elklit* (Århus University, Denmark) introduced this session. He presented a paper that drew on experiences from South Africa, Lesotho and Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar). These countries are diverse in terms of size, social structure, constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as developmental factors. Yet, they share one common political feature: a political system dominated by one party. Elklit emphasised how both the choice of electoral system and the quality of electoral management impacted on overriding concerns such as inclusion or polarisation. Acknowledging the methodological complexity of measuring democratisation, Elklit reiterated the warning against the twin fallacies of “electoralism” - that holding elections is synonymous with democracy - and “anti-electoralism” - that elections do not matter in the democratisation process.

High quality elections reduces the level of conflict

Elklit made the basic assertion that there is an inverse correlation between an electoral governance system of high quality and the level

of polarisation and conflict in society. According to Elklit, if democratic legitimacy is to prevail and democracy to consolidate, the goal should be to establish an electoral governance system that guarantees certainty as to its institutional make-up (rules of the game), yet promises uncertainty or unpredictability as to electoral outcome (number of parliamentary seats). He also said that only when the electoral rules are stable and considered legitimate – and the inherent unpredictability of electoral outcomes is accepted by the political actors *ex ante* – will elections serve as a conflict-regulating mechanism. If the parties do not accept in advance the electoral procedures and the attendant uncertainty of electoral outcome, elections may fuel conflict. Elklit argued that the building of trust and legitimacy is a time-consuming process, which is not always well understood by the donor community. Pushing for an early election without having gone through a prior process of rule-making could be tantamount to doing nascent democracies a disservice.

“Good elections” may be too costly

Stressing that there are many options between these two standard electoral models, First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) majority systems and Proportional Representation (PR) systems, Elklit argued that donors might want to consider technical assistance to running simulations of potential outcomes under different electoral systems, with a view to selecting the least polarising options. Discussant *Brigalia Bam* (chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa) agreed with Elklit’s view on the merits of the PR system as an inclusive one, and added that in South Africa it had worked to the advantage of women. She dwelled, however, on the cost and time-consuming nature of elections. Relating to 109 registered parties - as was the case in South Africa - is extremely time-consuming for an electoral commission, even if the number of contesting parties is ultimately

reduced to 79. In direct outlays South Africa spent R 52 mill. on political party support, indicating that quality elections are expensive!

Bam conceded that South Africa cannot be considered an established democracy yet: there is still a certain amount of distrust in the system; some party leaderships manipulate the electoral lists; traditional authorities have not been fully integrated into the system and given an appropriate role; the urban–rural divide is still working to the disadvantage of the rural areas; unemployed people enter politics in the hope of attracting donor support as a source of income, not because they take a keen interest in political issues; the costly electoral system is difficult to sustain in the face of widespread poverty. Adding to Bam’s observation, the second discussant Professor *Lars Svåsand* (University of Bergen) warned against excessive regulation of elections as such practices could be counter-productive, even if well intended, because it may encourage bureaucratisation. Svåsand stressed that conflict over elections is likely and the degree of conflict is correlated with the significance of the issues at stake.

General discussion

The general discussion traced the need for wide consultations on issues of democratic governance throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, involving political parties, election management bodies and civil society organisations, in an effort of social or political engineering to avert unnecessary conflict. Focusing on the role of the international donor community, it was

generally agreed that election monitoring is more important in the early stages than on Election Day. It was further stressed that the quality of an election is not decided on Election Day or in the election campaign. The justification of external pressure was questioned and it was suggested that indirect election models might be more appropriate for Africa, in line with existing traditions. It was also mentioned that internal party democracy is equally important in majoritarian systems as in systems of proportional representation. Each country must develop its own election model, rather than seek role models elsewhere, and then accept responsibility for its own choice.

The point was made emphatically that the legitimacy and the rules of the electoral process must be established *before* the elections take place. However, the costs of elections impose constraints. The shoestring budgets of election management bodies tend to impede them in discharging their duties and, thus, generate controversy over election results. The participants agreed that the cost of elections per vote cast varies widely, and it is difficult to suggest an appropriate cost level. It was added that the election management bodies need to retain their competence and staff between general elections. A warning was issued in terms of donor involvement as the domestic politicisation of democratisation and election support issues may deter donors from getting involved in pre-election activities and rather lead them to support only conventional election monitoring.

3 The role of courts and special institutions of constraint in promoting democracy

Effective mechanisms of horizontal accountability - institutions of restraint limiting the powers of political office-holders, and, in particular, that of the executive - is seen as a precondition for democratic stability and peaceful conflict resolution. Constitution-making - whether in the form of negotiating new constitutions or amending old ones - has been the main vehicle to establish institutions to counteract excessive concentrations of power and remove contentious issues from the political domain. The background paper for the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001³ made the argument that in the past decade concerns for good governance, accountability and constitutionalism have been prominent in the international political community and strongly emphasised by donors in relation to democratisation processes in Africa. The international community has advocated strong constitutions with comprehensive bills of rights, division of power between organs and levels of government and provisions for judicial review to allow the judiciary to operate as an enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, the need for specialised institutions of restraint such as electoral commissions, human rights commissions, independent central banks, ombudsmen etc., has been emphasised. The third session of the seminar reflected upon the role of the international community in enhancing the role of the judiciary in processes of democratic institutionalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. The main questions raised by the speakers and participants were:

- To the extent that courts and special institutions of constraint are effective, do they defuse conflict? Or are they rather themselves politicised?
- Have the institutions of restraint advocated by international donors furthered democratic stability in Africa?

Rule of law in Zimbabwe

In his paper “The role of courts in promoting human rights, the case of Zimbabwe”, the Hon. Chief Justice *Anthony Roy Gubbay* (the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe) argued that a positive development could be observed within the judiciary in many African countries. Many jurists are becoming activists, to the extent that more jurists are able – and willing – to confront national laws and practices with international human rights standards. However, he also observed an increasing amount of obstacles in the way for courts to implement their decisions. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Hon. Gubbay observed that in the period 1991 to 2000 the ZANU-dominated parliament had on a number of occasions overruled Supreme Court rulings and amended the constitution in a manner not consistent with international human rights standards. The reintroduction of corporal punishment for juveniles, the reintroduction of capital punishment by way of hanging, and the recently amended land acquisition act were some examples given. The Hon. Gubbay also pointed to the increasing presidential powers as an impediment both to judicial independence and the defence of international human rights standards. The assault on citizens in the period prior to the 2000 elections, the abuses of courts and basic human rights over the past few years should be understood in light of the political power at stake, argued the Hon. Gubbay. After the 2000 elections, ZANU no longer holds a two-thirds majority in Parliament, and therefore no longer controls this important institution of constraint on executive power. This has led to a politicisation of the courts, and serious attacks on the institution.

Courts must be capacitated

Emphasising the dangers of executive power over political institutions, the first discussant Pius Langa (Deputy President of the South

3) Lise Rakner: “Democracy and Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa: What Role for Development Aid” (<http://www.cmi.no>).

African Constitutional Court) emphasised that the South African Constitution recognises the importance of separation of powers. However, he questioned whether the courts were properly equipped to promote Human Rights. The fact that judges and courts did not have autonomous, separate budgets was raised as a concern. Recognising the increasing institutionalisation of the South African democratic institutions, Pius Langa referred to an incident when the Constitutional Court disputed President Mandela. The President went public and acknowledged the decision, arguing that this was the role of the Constitutional Court. Pius Langa found that this decision had set a precedence for others to follow. However, he argued that this also pointed to the precarious need for both institutions and political will. Claiming that South Africa was too young a democracy to be able to rely solely on the structures that have been set up, Langa said that it was necessary for democracy to develop a leadership that valued the separation of powers and respected the rule of law.

Supporting the restraining capacity of the judiciary may lead to conflict

The second discussant *Siri Gloppen* (Chr. Michelsen Institute) pointed out that the ability of courts to constrain government agencies' in their exercise of power (to say "no" and "make it stick") depends on their jurisdiction and powers, their independence, and their capacity. Much of the resources and attention given by donors to judicial reform have gone into introducing institutional characteristics that, on the basis of evidence from other parts of the world are believed to be conducive in this regard. As a consequence, focus has been primarily on the formal legal system and the top echelons of the judiciary. The increasing signs of politicisation of the courts that we now see in many countries may indicate that the courts play a more active role. However, it also

indicates the problems with such reforms. Courts and other institutions of restraint are vulnerable, particularly in contexts where their legitimacy is limited. And being perceived as "external agents" exacerbates this vulnerability. The direct attacks on the rule of law in Zimbabwe were pointed to as obvious examples. A further example was the effective abdication by the Namibian Supreme Court of a significant part of its review powers.

The open discussion emphasised the importance of facilitating regional co-operation to strengthen the rule of law and democratic accountability in sub-Saharan Africa. Concern was also expressed that, even when successful from the point of view of government accountability, such reforms do not necessarily guarantee access to justice for the wider population. The Danish evaluation of human rights assistance to Mozambique (2000) indicates that there is a tendency for the formal legal system to be strengthened while other parts of the justice system - the police, prisons, lower courts (the magistracy), and traditional courts - are comparatively neglected. Representatives from the donor community raised this dilemma as an inconsistency - or even a contradiction - when considering the overall policy goal of poverty orientation.

The discussion showed that serious difficulties are involved in transplanting formal laws and institutions to societies and sectors where law has not played any major role in their organisation. Reform projects initiated by the international donor community have further often over-estimated the capacity of states to absorb new policies and institutions. Special agencies of constraint - like the ombudsman institution - require high levels of government support to function optimally, without which they have limited effect. In conclusion it was argued that the fact that the introduction of new Western formal legal systems often renders traditional systems dysfunctional, exacerbates the problems.

4 Local democracy: Can a democratic state decentralise more effectively?

Contrary to support for elections and judicial reform, decentralisation is not a new theme in development planning in Africa. However, in the past local institutions were mainly seen as implementing agencies or channels for the central government. With the introduction of multiparty elections and an increased emphasis on accountability, a renewed focus on decentralisation and local government structures has come to the fore. The focus on local democracy has a *legitimacy* aspect because local democracy is seen as a prerequisite to rebuilding the legitimacy of the state in many African countries. Furthermore it is assumed that greater autonomy of locally elected councillors will improve *service delivery*. Thus, it is hoped that decentralisation will strengthen both the accountability and governance of the African states. Two main questions of decentralisation and local government were debated during the fourth session of the 2001 Bergen Seminar on development:

- Have processes of political reform fostered local democracy and participation in Africa?
- Do bonds of loyalty and legitimacy point upward or downward in the political structure?

Alfred Kabagire (Programme Manager for Tanzania's Local Government Reform Programme) introduced the session on local democracy. Mr Kabagire gave a presentation and descriptive overview of the practical implementation in Tanzania of the Local Government Reform Programme. The Tanzanian Government's vision for a reformed local government system includes four main policy areas. One is political decentralisation, which includes the integration of the public service sectors into a local government system. The second is financial decentralisation giving local councils the powers to levy local taxes and pass their own budgets. Thirdly, an administrative decentralisation that involves de-linking local authority staff from their respective

ministries, and procedures for establishing a local payroll. And finally, the role of the central government *vis-à-vis* local councils will be changed into a system of inter-governmental relations with line ministries focusing on policy-making, provision of assistance to local councils, monitoring and quality assurance, as well as legal control and audit.

According to Mr Kabagire, the main lessons for effective decentralisation to be derived from the Tanzanian case include the need for clearly outlined government objectives and policies; strong political support at national and local level; the need for an appropriate legal framework; adequate financial and human resources; work plan, budget and dedicated team of implementers; and good governance strategies. Specifically, Mr Kabagire pointed out that decentralisation is bound to be a long process that will entail changing deeply rooted practices and traditions. It calls for an enlightened citizenry and implementation of good governance principles. The parallel introduction of multiparty politics has led to other challenges. If not properly addressed, Mr Kabagire claimed, multiparty politics might lead to irreversible divisions based on ethnic, tribal and religious lines. The experiences so far also indicate that over-extension of multiparty politics at the grass roots level may contribute to low turnout in the election process. There is also a need to address the issue of how to encourage representation of youth and disabled persons at the local government level.

Central governments are often reluctant to devolve powers

Mr Kabagire also identified another inhibiting factor to accelerated devolution in the form of the outright reluctance shown by central government departments to devolve powers, responsibilities and resources to the local government authorities. The commonly cited excuses are lack of resources and inadequate capacities at the local level. Further progress

depends on concerted efforts and resolve to address capacity building and a more equitable revenue distribution between central and local government. The first discussant, *Ole Therkildsen* (Danish Centre for Development Research) reiterated Kabagire's point about the conflict potential in the parallel introduction of decentralisation reform and multiparty politics based on his experiences in Tanzania. So far in Tanzania he found multipartyism to have strengthened divisions based on ethnic lines. It was also his experience that the local government candidates found it more pertinent to be accountable to the central leadership (upward) than to the local electorate (downward). Therkildsen warned the audience that there are many different forms and types of conflict and argued that a general discussion of conflict may not yield many results. Picking up on Kabagire's concern about participation at the local level, the second discussant *Liss Schancke* (Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, KS) found that local government institutions in Norway are grappling with the same challenges of participation of all citizens, to enhance the efficiency, and increase the level of service delivery. She therefore found that the challenges facing Tanzania are also relevant in a Norwegian context.

General discussion

In the discussion two issues dominated. One was the extent of the democratic

decentralisation in Tanzania. Many participants argued that local government representatives were essentially agents of the central government. It was further argued that political power still resided with the central authorities. While financial resources may have been transferred, so far, experience has indicated that too many conditions were attached, which has not allowed local authorities much space for making their priorities. A related question in the discussion was the role of multiparty politics at the local level. Some participants argued that it may not necessarily be a bad thing if people voted along ethnic identity lines. Following up on this point, the banning of private candidates from running for local elections was criticised. Concerns were also raised with regard to how NGOs and traditional leaders were affected by the shift to local government and demands for greater accountability.

The second main issue raised in the general discussion related to the role of local government in conflict resolution. Local government is considered to fulfil an important function in this respect. The actual and potential violent conflicts in Tanzania were considered limited, especially compared to neighbouring countries. But it was also claimed that the role of local government in the ominous conflicts witnessed so far was far from clear, and some argued that local authorities should be expected to take a more pro-active role to prevent conflict at the local level.

5 Democracy, conflict and the role of international assistance in Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa

The substantial issues raised during the first day of the seminar, were discussed in parallel sessions on the second day of the seminar. All three countries in various ways illustrate key issues of democratic development, conflict and aid.

In the discussions on the political transitions in *South Africa*, it was claimed that constitutional negotiations had been a main means of conflict resolution. In the process, the country's political elite took account of and incorporated the most current knowledge on democratic institutions and electoral systems. A state-of-the-art constitution was adopted, which established a range of specialised institutions of restraint. Both in terms of process and content, South Africa has been seen as a textbook case and has served as a model for other countries in the region. Despite the high ambitions and seemingly sound foundations, the country is experiencing controversies over its electoral system, severe problems at local government level are observed, and the country's new or strengthened institutions of restraint are experiencing politicisation. The parallel discussion indicated that in the post-apartheid period, ANC has become a very dominant force. The discussion also revealed that the close relationship between the donor community and the ANC government has meant that donors implicitly are contributing to strengthening ANC's dominance.⁴

Compared with most countries in the region *Tanzania* has experienced remarkable political stability. However, the recent political tensions and the political violence in the aftermath of the 2000 general election came to dominate the parallel discussions on Tanzania. In 1992 the new multiparty system was introduced in a peaceful manner. However, the 1995 elections

on Zanzibar were heavily criticised and international observers observed irregularities in the polling process. Many donors responded by freezing further development co-operation with Zanzibar. The sanctions apparently had little effect and the situation reached a deadlock, despite international mediation. Both the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) government and the international donor community hoped that the 2000 election would solve the conflict. It was argued that an aid-dependent country such as Tanzania illustrates well the double-edged role of aid in the process of democratisation. One of the paradoxes of the democratisation process in Tanzania has been that the gradual dismantling of the single-party state also served to loosen the bonds that hold the Tanzanian nation together. Increased political violence appears to be one of the consequences. Due to the traditionally close ties between the international donor community and the CCM government, it was argued that the donors so far seem unable to help mitigate the conflict.⁵

Ethiopia is now attempting to consolidate a fragile democracy. After the fall of the military dictatorship in 1991, a coalition of ethnic liberation movements, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power in Ethiopia. Arguably, a far-reaching decentralisation was the only chance to keep Ethiopia together. The unitary single-party state was transformed into an ethnic federal state, with ten ethnically defined regions. The objective of decentralisation was to prevent ethnic conflicts. The parallel discussion revealed that in several respects Ethiopia complies with democratic standards. A new democratic constitution was ratified in 1995 and scheduled elections are held. However, the elections are contested, and many questions remain concerning whether Ethiopia is truly on

4) In the parallel group on South Africa, Dr. Steven Friedman (Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg) presented the paper "A partial peace: Democracy and conflict resolution in post-apartheid South Africa". Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi, (Member of Parliament, Kenya) served as discussant.

5) Professor Haroub Othman (Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam) presented the paper: "Tanzania: Can democracy prevent conflict" in the parallel group on Tanzania. Hilde Selbervik (Chr. Michelsen Institute) served as discussant.

its way towards a broad-based, inclusive democracy. The parallel discussions questioned whether Ethiopian federalism empowers the people through influence on local governments. In most areas of the country, there are non-EPRDF political parties claiming that they are not allowed a level playing ground in the elections. The opposition is not at all satisfied with the current situation and conflict is latent, it was argued. After the 2000 elections the EPRDF has a large majority of the seats in the legislature, the Council of Peoples' Representatives.⁶

The virtues of multipartyism...

The plenary discussion focused on the comparative lessons to be drawn from the group debates in terms of conflict prevention. The discussion centred around two main questions: the virtues of multipartyism and the vices of ethnicity. One issue raised was whether *less* donor assistance might have been better for the process of democratisation and for respect of human rights. As an example, it was pointed out that Tanzania had done well for thirty years and the international donor community first accepted the one-party system. Then donors insisted on multiparty democracy. Maybe donors were too impatient, and their insistence created at least part of the problem of the observed polarisation. Participants from the south emphasised the external pressure and demand for democracy, but it was, nevertheless, acknowledged that there was a domestic demand for democracy across most sub-Saharan African nations.

... and the vices of ethnicity?

Another issue raised in the plenary debate was whether indeed African states are threatened by

multipartyism. Is there a dynamic force in multipartyism that allows ethnicity and religion to attract political interest? Participants questioned whether ethnicity came up in Tanzania as a political factor because of multiparty politics, or whether things unfolded so that the problem of ethnicity, a latent political issue, rose to the surface. Based on data from Tanzania, one participant claimed that only 20 per cent of the people wanted multipartyism. Speaking for Ethiopia, it was pointed out that the country was sitting on a time bomb, as long as 7 per cent of the population wanted to rule the rest of the population. This was the real danger inherent in ethnicity according to one participant, i.e., that it is used to keep minorities in power. Caution was therefore called for when discussing ethnicity in politics. Some people tend to distrust some of the institutions established along with democratisation, it was noted. Participants from South Africa, however, emphasised that South Africans in general have high expectations of elections. After a lively debate, most participants appeared to agree that the one-party system in, among other countries, Tanzania, had kept the many latent ethnic conflicts hidden. One speaker reminded the meeting that there are many ethnic or Christian parties in Europe. It was claimed that it might be more a question of leadership or how political engineering could hinder ethnicity or religion from turning intolerant and violent. As one participant argued, people demand a say in politics, and multipartyism is a consequence of their demand. Even if multipartyism allows for ethnic or religious parties, it still responds to a demand. It was further added that young nations needed to educate the citizenry: despite a wide range of democratic institutions, there was still a need to develop a democratic spirit and attitudes needed for peaceful debate and management of conflict.

6) Dr. Makonnen Bishaw (Secretary General, Ethiopia Human Rights Council) presented the paper: "Democratisation and the peace process in Ethiopia" in the parallel session on Ethiopia. Dr. Ebrima Sall, Nordic Africa Institute, served as discussant.

6 Reducing the risks of civil conflict and incidence of civil war in Africa

The last session of the seminar addressed the comprehensive questions of conflict, democracy, economic development and international development assistance from a macro-perspective based on cross-national analyses carried out by the World Bank's Research Department.

- Does democracy matter for economic development?
- Do economic development and democratic governance reduce the risk of conflict?
- Can aid contribute to conflict prevention?

Paul Collier (Head of World Bank Research Department) opened the session by presenting two papers concerning democracy and economic performance and violent conflicts in Africa. Collier argued that democracy is often identified with "harmony". However, it was argued that "democracy" is often characterised by noise and aggressive debates. Political disagreements are fine and Collier found that "hatred is perfectly acceptable". This should, however, be distinguished from violent conflicts. Within this perspective, it could be expected that democracy would deliver not peace, but good policies.

Turning to the question of whether democracy matters for economic development, on the basis of comprehensive cross-country studies, Collier found that democracy does not matter for economic performance in societies that are ethnically homogeneous (e.g., China). However, in ethnically diversified societies, introduction of democracy makes a big difference with respect to economic growth. Thus, according to Collier, the reason why Africa has performed so badly the last thirty years is the lack of democracy. The ethnically diversified societies of Africa with no democracy are the main problem for economic development. On the basis of this argument, Collier turned to explain violent conflicts in Africa. Based on cross-

country data sets and regression analysis, Collier's study found that economic issues matter. In particular, a country's level of income as the incidence of violence is higher in the poorest countries. The structure of the economy is also significant, as, according to the World Bank study, there are more conflicts in countries that are primary commodity producers (e.g., mineral and oil-rich countries). The study further suggested that foreign aid matters since aid flows indirectly reduce the level of conflict by increasing the level of growth and income levels. Surprisingly, the regression analysis conducted by Collier et al. found that inequality, the level of military expenditure, ethnic diversity, and religious diversity had no explanatory power. On the other hand, ethnic domination may lead to increased violence. Diasporas may cause conflicts since they often lay the foundation for extreme positions (e.g., the Tamil diaspora in Sri Lanka).

The policy implications drawn from the World Bank study were that Africa needs economic success. But, to achieve success, Africa needs democracy as democracy adds to economic performance. The World Bank has found that development aid helps in this process. Collier stressed, however, that democracy on its own is not enough to build peace because many guerrilla groups are financially viable. Therefore, it is important to make it difficult for such groups to stay alive by controlling the global arms trade and military expenditure. Lastly, Collier stressed the need for more foreign aid. Over the last decade – which was the fastest growing in history - aid fell by a third.

General discussion

Several interventions questioned Collier's finding that ethnicity did not explain violent conflicts. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi were put forward. Collier responded that he did not accept the argument that ethnic hatred caused the bloodshed in Rwanda. There is a lot of hatred between ethnic groups in Africa that

does not lead to bloodshed. In the case of Rwanda, Collier argued that domestic politics and the large diaspora explained the bloodshed. One commentator argued that “policy blueprints” like the ones usually prescribed by the World Bank and other international stakeholders rarely work. The experiences with structural adjustment programmes in Africa clearly show this. Thus, policy prescriptions need to be designed in a way that takes the particularities of each country into consideration. It was generally held that one

ought to be very careful in using the broad, general findings by Collier for policy-making. A number of participants questioned the methodology used by Collier and the World Bank. It was emphasised that due to the quality of African data it was necessary to apply caution when providing general conclusions on the causes of conflicts, and, in particular, when providing policy recommendations. This includes the quality and existence of newer data, and historical data for time series.

7 Lessons from the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001

The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 brought together politicians, academics and development aid officers from the north and the south. Over two days the participants discussed pertinent issues relating to the furthering of the democratic processes in sub-Saharan Africa and to the prospects of institutionalising - or deepening - the relatively novel processes of democratisation. Many lessons and policy implications can be drawn from the informed debates. Below, we try to summarise the main issues raised relating to the future role of aid in terms of strengthening the democratic process on the African continent.

A role for aid

Aid has a role to play in stimulating political processes by providing resources, training, opportunities, and exchange of ideas to a broad range of political players in a country. While donors should be less concerned with influencing the content of politics, in an open society, at both the national and international levels, donors have a legitimate role in providing new opportunities that stimulate the process of politics. But the preoccupation with getting policies “right” and the various types of “carrot and sticks” that are being applied by donors may work contrary to a process of deepening democracy. If decisions of vital development policies take place at donor meetings and are formulated and communicated as demands from the international donor community, many local political actors are at best reduced to spectators. In the long run, excessive donor involvement can be counterproductive to the processes of consolidating democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.

Building democracy is a process

There is an inherent contradiction between the long-term processes of democracy and need for quick results. The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001 recognises that elections

introduced at the wrong time have increased conflicts; that running elections has been too expensive; and that election observation has been carried out in isolation from the overall political processes. This should, however, not lead to the conclusion that donors should no longer support elections. To build democracy is essentially an internal and long-term process. This requires patience and willingness to accept setbacks. The building of trust and legitimacy is time-consuming, something that is not always well understood by the donor community.

“Too much aid” makes institutions vulnerable

Democratisation is a domestic process and donor assistance functions best when at the margins of the political processes. Both the evaluation studies consulted and the debates at the Bergen Seminar on Development 2001, indicate that there are serious difficulties involved in transplanting formal democratic institutions to societies and sectors where these institutions have no historical roots. Furthermore, too much aid and too much external involvement may affect the legitimacy of domestic actors and make them vulnerable to politicisation as “Western”, and foreign. The fact that the introduction of new Western formal legal systems often renders traditional systems dysfunctional exacerbates the problems. Special agencies of constraint - like the ombudsman institution - require high levels of government support to function optimally, without which they have limited effect.

Aid cannot buy democratisation

As with economic reforms, it has become painstakingly clear that international donors and organisations cannot force democratisation processes. Unless there is a political commitment to reform, donor assistance is unable to secure the development and functioning of the democratic institutions

intended to check on the potential abuses of the executive. However, it is still evident that continued aid is necessary for the democratisation processes in Africa. Africa

needs economic success to reduce its levels of conflict. In order to generate economic development, democratic development is necessary.

Programme

The Bergen Seminar on Development 2001

Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa

Hosted by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organised by the Chr. Michelsen Institute

Monday 18 June 2001

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Afternoon/evening | Arrival |
| 18:00 | Informal reception with introduction by Dr Gunnar M. Sørbo , Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute |
| 19:00 | DINNER |

Tuesday 19 June 2001

Chair: **Alf Morten Jerve**, Assistant Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 09:00 - 09:15 | Official opening Bjørn Skogmo , Director General, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| 09:15 - 09:45 | Introductory lecture: <i>Democracy and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa: What role for development aid?</i> Dr Lise Rakner , Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute |
| 09:45 - 10:15 | Keynote address: <i>Can democracy prevent conflicts in Africa?</i> Prof. Patrick Chabal , King's College London |
| 10:15 - 11:00 | Plenary discussion |
| 11:00 - 11:15 | COFFEE BREAK |
| 11:15 - 11:45 | <i>Elections: politics of polarisation or inclusion?</i> Prof. Jørgen Elklit , Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark |
| 11:45 - 11:55 | Discussant 1: Dr Brigalia Bam , Chairperson, Independent Electoral Commission, South Africa |
| 11:55 - 12:05 | Discussant 2: Prof. Lars Svåsand , Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway |
| 12:05 - 13:00 | Plenary discussion |

| | |
|---------------|--|
| 13:00 - 14:00 | LUNCH |
| 14:00 - 14:30 | <i>The role of courts in promoting human rights: the case of Zimbabwe</i> Hon. Chief Justice Anthony Roy Gubbay , The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe: |
| 14:30 - 14:40 | Discussant 1: Pius Langa , Deputy President of the South African Constitutional Court |
| 14:40 - 14:50 | Discussant 2: Dr Siri Gloppen , Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute |
| 14:50 - 15:45 | Plenary discussion |
| 15:45 - 16:00 | COFFEE BREAK |
| 16:00 - 16:30 | <i>Local democracy: Can a democratic state decentralise more effectively? The case of Tanzania</i> Alfred Kabagire , Programme Manager, Local Government Reform Programme, Tanzania: |
| 16:30 - 16:40 | Discussant 1: Dr Ole Therkildsen , Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen |
| 16:40 - 16:50 | Discussant 2: Liss Schanke , Adviser, The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS), Oslo |
| 16:50 - 17:30 | Plenary discussion |
| 17:30 - 18:00 | Questions and comments on all three themes |
| 19:00 | DINNER |
| 21:00 | Norwegian evening |

Wednesday 20 June 2001

Chair: **Dr Gunnar M. Sørbø**, Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute

09:00 - 11:00 Parallel working groups:

Group 1: SOUTH AFRICA

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 09:00 - 09:30 | <i>A partial peace: Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Post-Apartheid South Africa</i> Dr Steven Friedman , Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, South Africa |
| 09:30 - 09:40 | Discussant: Dr Mukhisa Kituyi , Member of Parliament, Kenya |
| 09:40 - 11:00 | Group discussion Moderator: Dr Siri Gloppen , Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute Rapporteur: Dr Dren Nupen , Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, South Africa |

Group 2: TANZANIA

- 09:00 - 09:30 *Tanzania: Can democratisation prevent conflicts*
Prof. Haroub Othman, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- 09:30 - 09:40 Discussant: **Hilde Selbervik**, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
- 09:40 - 11:00 Group discussion
Moderator: **Odd-Helge Fjeldstad**, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
Rapporteur: **Hon. Joseph S. Warioba**, Former Prime Minister of Tanzania

Group 3: ETHIOPIA

- 09:00 - 09:30 *Democratisation and the peace process in Ethiopia*
Dr Makonnen Bishaw, Secretary General, Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- 09:30 - 09:40 Discussant: **Dr Ebrima Sall**, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden
- 09:40 - 11:00 Group discussion
Moderator: **Dr Siegfried Pausewang**, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
Rapporteur: **Merera Gudina**, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

- 11:00 - 11:15 COFFEE BREAK
- 11:15 - 12:00 The rapporteurs present conclusions from the working group discussions.
- 12:00 - 13:00 Plenary discussion
- 13:00 - 14:00 LUNCH
- 14:00 - 14:30 *Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict and On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa*
Dr Paul Collier, Director, Development Research Group, World Bank
- 14:30 - 15:00 Plenary discussion
- 15:00 - 15:15 Closing address
Jan Dybfest, Deputy Director General, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 15:30 Departure of airport shuttle

List of participants

1. Dr Brigalia Bam, Chairperson Independent Electoral Commission, Pretoria 0001, South Africa
2. Rob D. van den Berg, Director, Policy and Operations, Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, Netherlands
3. Dr Makonnen Bishaw, Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
4. Dr David Bloomfield, Senior Executive, Democracy and Conflict Management, International IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden
5. Ellen Buch-Hansen, Advisor, Evaluation Secretariat, DANIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark
6. Prof. Patrick Chabal, King's College, London, United Kingdom
7. Dr Paul Collier, Director, Development Research Group, The World Bank
8. Jan Dybfest, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
9. Prof. Jørgen Elklit, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark
10. Sigurd Endresen, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
11. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
12. Steven Friedman, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa
13. Hans Jacob Frydenlund, Special Adviser for Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
14. Ilmas Futehally, International Centre for Peace Initiatives (ICPI), Mumbai 400 053, India
15. Thorbjørn Gaustadsæther, Director of Policy Planning Unit, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Norway
16. Dr Siri Gloppen, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
17. Hon. Anthony Roy Gubbay, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe
18. Merera Gudina, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
19. Kristin Høgdahl, Project Director, Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), Norwegian Institute of Human Rights
20. Almerindo Jaka Jamba, Angolan Parliament Vice-President, Luanda, Angola
21. Alf Morten Jerve, Assistant Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
22. Alfred Kabagire, Programme Manager, Local Government Reform Programme, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
23. Dr Mukhisa Kituyi, Member of Parliament, Nairobi, Kenya
24. Pius Langa, Deputy President, The South African Constitutional Court, South Africa
25. Bodil Maal, Adviser, Regional Department for Southern Africa, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Norway

26. Prof. Ted Luta Maliyamkono, Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
27. Hans Peter Melby, Adviser, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Norway
28. Lennart Nordström, Head, Division for Democratic Governance, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Sweden
29. Dren Nupen, Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, South Africa
30. Prof. Haroub Othman, Institute of Development Studies, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
31. Dr Siegfried Pausewang, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
32. Dr Lise Rakner, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
33. Nils A. Røhne, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Norway
34. Dr Ebrima Sall, Research Programme Coordinator, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden
35. Liss Schanke, Adviser, The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, Norway
36. Hilde Selbervik, Research Fellow, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
37. Bjørn Skogmo, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
38. Nils Gunnar Songstad, Seminar co-ordinator, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
39. Prof. Lars Svåsand, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway
40. Gunnar M. Sørnbø, Director, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
41. Atsedeweine Tekle, Ethiopian Women Lawyers' Association (EWLA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
42. Ole Therkildsen, Centre for Development Research, Denmark
43. Elling N. Tjønneland, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
44. Dr Dave Todd, Social Development Adviser, Evaluation Department, Department for International Development, Glasgow, United Kingdom
45. Arne Tostensen, Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
46. Stein Villumstad, Assistant General Secretary, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norway
47. Hon. Joseph S. Warioba, Nyalali, Warioba & Mahalu Law Associates, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
48. Aud Marit Wiig, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
49. David Wiking, Adviser – Conflict Management, Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management, Sida, Sweden

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