Timo Lochocki

Trends, Causes and Patterns of Young People’s Civic Engagement in Western Democracies

A Review of Literature
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Centre for Research on Civil Society and Voluntary Sector
Co/Institute for Social Research
Munthes gate 31
P.O. Box 3233 Elisenberg
0208 Oslo
Norway
www.sivilsamfunn.no
www.civilsociety.no

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This report is the result of a preliminary project geared towards gaining an overview of the existing international research on young people’s civic involvement. The situation in Norway is not the centre of attention in this report, but the report will provide a starting point for the centre’s research on youth and participation within the voluntary sector in Norway. It is important to hold in mind that results and findings reported here will not necessarily be transferable to the Norwegian context, and that further analysis based on Norwegian data is necessary in order to warrant any such transference.

I have a number of academic debts to pay: first to Klaus Eder, Martin Gross and Karin Lohr, all from Humboldt University in Berlin; their understanding and flexibility enabled me to work for the Stein Rokkan Centre in the first place. I further want to thank Arlyne Moi for her subtle proofreading. In addition, I have benefited greatly from the inspiring and encouraging mentoring of Tord Lindén, Kristin Strømsnes and Jacob Aars from Stein Rokkan Center in Bergen. By no means could this report have been published without their patience, guidance and constant support.

Berlin, September 2010
Timo Lochocki
Defining the subject

Subject of the review

This review is devoted to trends, patterns and explanations for civic engagement amongst younger generations. Their civic engagement is of key interest for students of contemporary democracies because it plays a salient role in sustaining strong civil societies, understood as pillars of vibrant democracies – especially the «Northern European model of democracy» (Amna 2005, Amna 2006, Bondeson 2007, Inglehart 2003, Krishna 2002, Stromsnes and Wollebaek 2006, Tranvik and Selle 2005, Wijkström 2006, Wollebaek and Selle 2007, Wollebaek and Selle 2008). Researchers wonder whether forecasts and predictions about the future shape of the political economy can be derived from young people’s engagement patterns (Wollebaek and Selle 2003). Those researchers particularly interested in the Norwegian model scrutinize to what extent younger Norwegians’ civic engagement patterns change, and whether implications and forecasts for Norway’s democracy can be deduced from these results (Odegard and Berglund 2008, Osterrud and Selle 2006, Tranvik and Selle 2007).

Since young people’s civic engagement is an important subject for Norwegian institutional analysis, this report aims to review the international body of literature on the theme. It does not discuss the Norwegian case in particular, but offers comparative theory and data that can complement ongoing debates and research.

The review consists of eight parts. Part 1 defines the subject and points out the exigencies and trade-offs made in order to incorporate a large body of international literature. Part 2 deals with general trends in young people’s civic involvement and the extent to which these trends can be mirrored in survey data. Part 3 presents the most prominent concepts for explaining these trends and dares to wrap up and evaluate discussions about them. In Part 4, young people’s individual motivations for becoming civically involved are discussed. This is followed up with discussions on environmental influences (Part 5) and socio-economic variables (Part 6). The role of organizations in
the civic engagement of youth is dealt with in Part 7. Part 8 briefly summarizes the findings and discusses possible directions for further research.

Defining the subject

Part 1 is devoted to defining and specifying the subject of the review and to introducing the field of research. It shows what compromises had to be made in order to incorporate a wide body of international literature and explains the key concepts researchers have used in recent years for studying civic engagement.

Who are «young people»?

Since this review aims to review an international body of literature, the way in which the focal group «young people» is defined may vary depending on which literature is presented. Studies done in the USA usually conceive of «young people» as persons ranging from 15 to 25 years old. European studies tend to define people ranging between 14 and 24 years old as «young». Certain studies, especially those only scrutinizing small N samples, might veer from these norms. Accordingly, in this review, «youth», «youths» or «young people» will refer to the age group between 14 and 25.

How is «civic engagement» to be understood?

Due to various definitions of «civic engagement» (or involvement), which are rooted in distinct institutional circumstances, unique research traditions and varying questions in national censuses, the present review eschews a narrow definition of «civic engagement». This is an unavoidable trade-off in order to widen the body of literature and be able to take into account various distinct studies with national foci. The review therefore discusses research devoted to understanding any form of engagement aimed at influencing government policy (political), as well as involvement aimed at facilitating collective action (civic action). Such a wide definition might seem unsatisfying, but recent studies do not enable us to assume clear distinctions between the outlined political and civic forms of engagement (Campbell 2004). The distinctions are valid though, and are supported by various theoretical approaches to younger generations (Dahl 1961, Verba and Schlozman and Brady 1995, Verba and Nie 1972). One example here is David E. Campbell’s summarization that «the increasingly common concern among many knowledgeable observers is that one-on-one volunteering has begun to supplant action directed at collective solutions to social problems, particularly among younger [people]’ (Campbell 2004: 5).
Defining the subject

Studies conducted in the USA primarily focus on «volunteering». European studies, by contrast, are more concerned with «social engagement» and «political engagement». Each community and institutional structure differs, thus offering distinct realms of participation for young people, so it should come as no surprise that research foci vary as well (Wyness 2006).

If comparing young people’s civic engagement cross-nationally is a meaningful undertaking, this does not mean solid and reasonable caveats cannot be made. Still, the conscious reader must not be too concerned. Volunteering, social and political participation – roughly stated – adhere to the same mechanisms and logics: firstly, the same character traits benefiting volunteering also benefit civic engagement (Snyder and Omoto 2008); secondly, all concepts of strong civil society are grounded in high rates of volunteering and civic engagement (Wilson and Musick 1999); thirdly, recent data on volunteering in the US show a strong correlation between volunteering and civic activities (Corporation for National and Community Service 2008). Nevertheless, when a discussed study has a certain focus, its peculiarities will be elaborated.

Why is it so difficult to properly measure young people’s civic engagement?

When measuring young people’s civic engagement comparatively, a problem with definitions emerges, and this is one of the prime reasons why there are so many passionate arguments and conundrums in the field. Scholars question whether the «classic» definitions of «citizenship» and «civic» are still fit for today’s purposes (Joppke 1999, Joppke 2010, Soysal 1994). Especially when dealing with young people’s civic engagement, it appears as though the given definitions neither fit with 21st century circumstances, nor with the real-life conditions of young people. Contemporary research takes these considerations into account. For example, Molly Andolina and her colleagues argued in 2002 that the terms «civic engagement» and «citizenship» do have meaning for young people, but that these meanings are barely congruent with the definitions used by scholars and adult laypersons (Andolina, Jenkins, Keeter and Zukin 2002).

The exigent character of evaluating young people’s civic engagement are hence twofold: in the political realm, the challenge might have less to do with changes in youth participation in general and more to do with institutions’ «shortcomings» in offering proper opportunity structures for young people in the 21st century (Bessant 2004, Camino and Zeldin 2002, Grundy and Jamieson 2004, O’Toole, Marsh and Jones 2003). In the realm of research, only in the last ten years have scholars begun taking into account these «new ways» in which young people involve themselves civically, so proper methods to fully grasp these phenomena are still being developed (Banaji 2008, Barber 2007). Both exigencies ought to be kept in mind when reading this review, especially when interpreting theories and data.
Why are patterns of civic engagement changing in general?

Before narrowing the focus to factors affecting young people’s civic engagement, attention ought to be paid to developments that can account for changes in patterns of civic engagement in general. It is an open question whether changes in young people’s civic engagement are grounded in social changes affecting the entire society, or youth in particular, or rather a mixture of both.

Several scholars have discussed social changes in late 20th and early 21st century societies and how they affect individuals as conscious political and civic actors. Ulrich Beck (Beck 1992) and his wife Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002) have coined the contemporary use of the terms «individualization» and «reflection» – best used in the German translation: *Freisetzung des Individuums*. Ronald Inglehart, meanwhile, heads up the contentious debate on post-material and post-modern values in a world freeing itself from modern/material structures (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Other important contributions are from Alain Ehrenberg (Ehrenberg 2008), Peter Gross (Gross 2005), Uwe Schimank (Schimank 2002) and Barry Schwartz (Schwartz 2004), who portray the dilemmas and impact of the endlessness of choices, in a world loosened from structural constraints. This «setting free» and «loosing» of ties emerges at a «liquid» time in a young person’s life, when he or she is full of uncertainties and deprived of definite responsibilities (Bauman 2007).

As for what it is it that restructures the motivational basis and patterns of civic engagement, scholars focus particularly on individualization, globalization and secularization (Hacket and Mutz 2002). Here the change of values, decreased salience of traditional social ties (family, neighbourhoods, etc.) and sensation-seeking are perceived as being the defining features of the contemporary changes (Notz 1999). These developments result in four major trends in civic engagement: firstly, scholars detect a shift from face-to-face interaction in long-lasting civic groups to mediated interaction within fluctuating networks; secondly, individuals seem to move from value-based to consumer-based relations within the civic sphere; thirdly, civic engagement is shifting from diffuse horizontal involvement to centrally coordinated activities; fourthly, there is a shift from a kind of civic engagement mediated by associations to a direct involvement, or an engagement mediated by structures that are usually not defined as «civic» (Lorentzen and Hustinx 2007).

The common denominators for changes in civic engagement are the transition from «traditional/classical/old» to «modern/new» (Hustinx 2001), from «collectivistic» to «individualistic» (Eckstein 2001), from «membership-based» to «program-based» (Meijs and Hoogstad 2001), from «regular» to «episodic» (Macduff 2005), and from «institutionalized» to «self-organized» (Beck 1997) types of engagement.
Trends in Young People’s Civic Engagement

Which social changes affect young people’s civic engagement in particular?

While the 21st century is marked by social changes that affect all age groups, the «disconnecting from structural ties» seems to affect young people in particular. Not only are their affiliations to institutions and structures loosened in general, but their transitions to adulthood (especially through changes in the educational structure) also favour this kind of «disconnecting» (Flanagan, Levine and Settersten 2008): «[The] increased complexity and heterogeneity in the passage to adulthood [makes] the adolescent period more challenging than ever in the past» (Zarret and Eccles 2006). This is mainly due to the blurring of formerly stratified and structured life-paths: family-school-(military)-job-family (Furstenberg, Settersten and Rumbaut 2005). Structural transformations on both the macro and micro levels might have a stronger impact on younger generations than on older generations, since young people experience these transformations in «the formative period of their lives» (Hooghe 2004). The structural transformations mainly result in a loosening of ties to authorities, structures, institutions and organizations, be it clearly in the political realm (Henn, Weinstein and Hodgkinson 2007) or within the broader, more general field of civic engagement (Lätteenmaa 1999). The lack of «definite political-moral rationales for social action» and «frameworks of larger collective movements» – like emotionally-loaded political ideologies – seems to be the prime reason for young people’s changing forms of civic participation in the 21st century (Metz, McLellan and Youniss 2003).

In brief: the unquestioned cause, the all-persuasive ideology or faith, the undoubted and desired organization or institution in a «disenchanted» (Weber), individualized, globalized, rationalized and secularized world, which would demand, inspire and sustain broad civic engagement, is simply lacking.
As James Youniss and Miranda Yates put it in their often-cited case study, «Not every generation has the opportunity to grow up during a time of dramatic social change that calls forth idealism and creative energy that reaches people’s bones» (Youniss and Yates 1997: 172).

New forms of civic engagement

As already elaborated, contemporary young people’s civic involvement seems to diverge significantly from «classic» forms such as organizing in groups, forming interest groups, becoming involved in a political party, etc (Campbell 2004: 5). What are youth up to then? A recent summary points to several forms of engagement, among others, voluntary work, informal political action, activities with political implications, awareness-raising, altruistic acts and general social participation. What today’s young people seem less interested in is engaging in «classic» civic participation forms like officially joining an organization or voting (Smith, Lister, Middleton and Cox 2005). When Karlo Marcelo and Mark Lopez (Marcelo and Lopez 2007), for instance, measured how young people express their political views; they found their informants did not use «classic channels» like joining political parties and voting. Rather, the youths were contacting officials, the mass media and talk shows, they were signing e-petitions, boycotting, canvassing, participating in protests and trying to persuade others.

While on this tack, it is worth noting the results of a cross-national analysis revealing that Norwegian youth (compared with youth in the USA, Chile and Portugal) are especially eager to enter into new forms of civic engagement (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2003).

Thus it seems like youth involvement in civic affairs is currently subject to an interesting paradox: on one hand, involvement is decreasing in terms of classic, regular forms, but on the other hand, young people’s interest in politics in general has not decreased – it is rather that their interest comes to expression in new ways.

Take for example voting statistics; these figures decrease for younger generations, but the reason is not a lack of knowledge or interest. On the contrary: young people today simply seem not to be convinced that voting is an effective means for civic engagement (Chareka and Sears 2006). Thus, despite the lower turn-out rate of young voters in 21st century democracies, young people’s absence from the polls must not be interpreted as a sign of political disinterest (McDonald and Popkin 2001). Recent surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center – an independent survey institute (Pew Research Center 2007) on young people’s political interest and turn-out at the polls seem to support the thesis of a political informed younger generation. Based on this, it
would seem warranted to infer that they are civically engaged. Although they may neglect classic forms of participation like voting, «the simultaneity of civic engagement and civic disengagement is not necessarily a contradiction, for both are possible» (Checkoway 2003).

The snag here is that the described new forms of participation are as yet rarely valued as legitimate acts of civic engagement (Weller 2006). This in turn might be a reason for social scientists’ findings of diminishing interest in civic engagement amongst youth in general: the ability of the citizen to actively participate in the civic process – even though not as a decisive player – emerges as one of the pivotal features of a «healthy» democracy. If the democracy can trigger and sustain such engagement, it demonstrates that it values its citizens’ input (Carpini and Keeter 1996).

How can we «frame» young people’s «new» forms of civic engagement?

Highly individualized societies, when combined with the dearth of structural incentives for young people, result in an increase in informal, episodic volunteering and participation (Wollebaek and Selle 2003). What seems to diminish is an awareness of the connection between the individual «problems» and the larger world of public policy (Carpini D. 2000).

Accordingly, short-term, short-sighted and individual-focused engagements take precedence (Lorentzen and Hustinx 2007). The boundary between the social and the political realms has become blurred (Norris 2003), so also the distinction between public and private spheres (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007). Speaking with Robert Putnam, it therefore comes as no surprise that personal and private foci are more often the trigger for (non)participation than are public or collective concerns (Putnam 2000: 259). To inspire (Safrit 2002) and sustain (Bortree and Waters 2008) young people’s civic engagement therefore requires much more sophistication than adult and «classic» engagement. Norris argues that the nature of youth participation has turned towards more immediate, goal-oriented ways of engagement (Norris 1999). This is for example why younger generations are more in favour of buycotts or boycotts than older cohorts, since immediate effects are perceived (Micheletti, Folloesdal and Stolle 2004).

The term «episodic engagement» is useful for framing ongoing changes in participation patterns. As intimated, these changes are triggered by individualization and disconnection from classic institutions. Research in this field is still at an early stage, but of the published findings, especially intriguing are the links made between youth civic engagement and future developments in the political economy, because the features of episodic engagement in general
and youth engagement in particular are almost alike. These similarities can be espied in the mélange of altruistic motives and the focus on personal satisfaction via personal growth. Findings also show an important congruence between an organization’s set of values and those of its participants (Beder and Fast 2008). Furthermore, individuals pay particular attention to those organizations embracing the exact same values, goals and motives as they themselves (Hamm, MacLean and Misener 2008).

Presenting survey data illustrating the theoretical claims

Since these claims are mainly derived from case studies and small N samples, questions arise as to whether they are supported by survey data: Are youth engaging significantly differently than older generations who have been scrutinized in representatively large N studies? And can we witness significant changes in youth engagement patterns over time?

Data from the US «Political and Civic Health of the Nation’ surveys illustrate that younger generations (here age 15 to 25) have lower rates on «general volunteering», but higher rates on the previously mentioned «new forms» of civic engagement (Lopez 2004). In addition, comparisons between birth cohorts suggest that the form and scope of participation depend more on the age of the group and less on the birth cohort (Keeter 2002). The question remains though, whether other factors can explain changes in general volunteering, as well as the trend towards new forms of civic engagement. Research conducted in the USA finds that the variable «education» is of pivotal interest; surveys conducted in 2002 and 2006 prove that young people’s civic involvement decreases in the following order: those currently enrolled in college are the most involved, those previously enrolled in college are less involved, and those who have never enrolled in college are the least involved (Lopez and Elrod 2005).

But despite interference from the education variable, German surveys corroborate the trend, showing that young people are prone to engage in episodic volunteer activities and less so in general volunteering (compared with older generations). Thus when tracing the frequency of civic engagement, it can be seen that young people engage less frequently than do older people, but that when they do become involved, they are significantly more active than their elders, whilst at the same time being less engaged in traditional organizations (Gensicke, Picot and Geiss 2005).

Data from the 2007 UK National Survey of Volunteering support these findings: young people’s long-term volunteering can hardly be witnessed, and volunteering in general is less prevalent amongst the younger generations.
In sum, a variety of surveys show that there are significant differences between the forms of volunteering and engagement of youth in contrast to the volunteering forms and engagement patterns of older generations.

The second question (introduced at the beginning of this section) concerns developments over time: have young people’s civic engagement patterns changed over time? By comparing US data from 2002 with data from 2006, researchers found that society-spanning changes barely occur, but also that the rate of «regular» volunteering of 15-25 year-olds decreased by about 10 percent from 2002 to 2006 (Lopez and Marcelo 2004, Lopez, Levine, Both, Kiesa, Kirby and Marcelo 2006, Lopez and Marcelo 2007). These outcomes might be interpreted as reflecting a rise of episodic engagement amongst younger generations in particular. The question remains open, however, since related surveys suggest otherwise: the rates of volunteering in general and the rates of episodic volunteering of younger people seems not to have changed over time (Lopez and Marcelo 2007).

When checking for voter turnout in the US – as prime form of «classic» civic engagement – an interesting phenomenon can be witnessed: voter turnout for presidential elections has been significantly lower amongst young citizens compared with older citizens. Yet when the study-group members are checked for educational background, the variable of «education» goes far in explaining the lower voter-turnout amongst youth (Lopez, Levine, Both, Kiesa, Kirby and Marcelo 2006). This outcome questions the assumption made previously, for if the education variable explains that much variance, the hypothesis of young people turning to new forms of civic engagement in general (detached from other variables) appears less convincing.
Prominent Ways of Explaining Young People’s Civic Engagement

While it still appears to be an open question whether youth engagement has changed over time, census data from the USA, Germany and the United Kingdom clearly show that young people’s civic engagement differs significantly from that of older generations. What could account for the difference? This is another key question which has emerged over the last decades. If an answer can be given here, a subtle forecasting of future developments might be in the offing. Due to the complexity of interfering variables and competing concepts, several explanations have been given. The two most prominent explanations are outlined in the next sections, followed by a summarization that dares to wrap up the results and interpret the findings.

Explaining the pertinent concepts

Due to the complexities of codifying cohort effects and life-cycle effects, it is important to define these two most frequently used concepts in detail: The «cohort effect» describes a phenomenon all people born at the same time have in common, and which is sustained over time; it is detached from the time the designated group of people are living in and how old they are. An example would be a group of 20 year olds in 1970 having the same attitudes as 40 year olds in 1990 and 60 year olds in 2010 (i.e., they have been politically socialized in the «spirit of 1968»). Meanwhile, 20 year olds in 1990 have different attitudes than the 20 year olds in 1970 (we thus witness no «generational effect»).

A «life-cycle effect» occurs when people share a phenomenon if they are same-aged, detached from the time they are living in and their birth cohort. An example is all people younger than 25 having more interest in sports than the rest of the population in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. But when these 25 year olds grow older, they change their mind, meaning that 10
years later (at the age of 35) they are less/more interested in sports than they were when they were 25 (no cohort effect).

We hence deal with two independent variables: birth cohort and age. It is especially important to bear in mind that these terms are used imprecisely. For example, when scholars deal with a certain birth cohort (e.g., «Generation X», born from 1960 to 1980), are they talking about a specific «generation»?

Putting a particular development strictly into one category is also problematic, for that development could contain both birth cohort and life-cycle aspects (Mache and Van Dulmen 2004). For example, if one assumes that the majority of people in a society in 2010 express civic engagement differently than the majority in 1985, this could point to two divergent things: first, one could see the life-cycle effect as the phenomenon causing the majority of volunteer activities in 2010; these volunteers could all be elderly and hence the elderly would account for most all volunteer trends; secondly, one could perceive the cohort effect as being the cause for the majority of volunteers, for they would all have been socialized at about the same time.

Cohort effects

The most famous representative of the cohort-based thesis is Robert Putnam (Putnam 1995a, Putnam 1995b, Putnam 2000). He made the claim that a specific cohort (referred to here as a «generation») is doing most of the volunteering in the USA, and it is the group which is most civically involved. Putnam calls this cohort the «Long Civic Generation» – the cohort born between 1910 and 1940. These people were deeply affected by the Great Depression and World War II and therefore are dedicated to the benefits of social participation. The socialization of an entire cohort therefore results in extremely similar patterns of behaviour amongst its members (Knulst and Van Eick 2006). V.W. Marshall takes the «generation» concept a bit further, describing it as a birth cohort that becomes similar to a class for itself (Marshall 1983).

But returning to Putnam; he argues that the decline of social capital, volunteering and civic engagement in contemporary times can mainly be explained by the fact that the «Long Civic Generation» is being replaced by less participatory cohorts, that is, the «Generation Baby Boomer» (birth cohorts 1940-1960) and «Generation X» (birth cohorts 1960-1980).

Despite the tremendous impact Putnam’s claims and arguments have had in academic and popular discourse, severe doubts about their validity are raised in academia. Most scholars do not deem cohort effects to be the fulcrum for changes in participation rates; what is more, very few researchers follow Putnam’s argumentation without also criticizing it heavily. Still, some scholars argue in Putnam’s vein: Kristin A. Goss makes the point that the vol-
unteering sector in the USA mainly rests on the elderly, but that the elderly 20-30 years ago by no means had a comparable rate of participation. Even more, she finds that 20-30 years ago, middle-aged adults were the backbone of US volunteering and participation. This leads to the conclusion that the middle-aged in 1970 and the elderly in 2000 are the same people – a cohort effect (Goss 1999).

Unlike Rodney Hero (Hero 2003) and Job van der Meer (Van der Meer 2003), who argue that social trust and civic engagement are strongly dependent on each other, M. Kent Jennings and Laura Stoker (Jennings and Stoker 2004) follow the argumentation of Deitland Stolle (Stolle 2001) in claiming that social trust is a cause rather than a consequence of civic engagement. This is why they elaborate that by reviewing «trust-rates», civic engagement can be predicted. Although they are more in support of the life-cycle argument, their article reveals a strong decline in social trust in the birth cohorts of 1960-1980 («Generation X»). This of course would also argue against Putnam’s assumptions.

Most scholars clearly deny Putnam’s argument and point out that structural phenomena (i.e., individualization, value change) and life-cycle effects are almost exclusively the reasons for differing participation rates (Rotolo and Wilson 2004). Further, some scholars find no significant decline whatsoever in civic participation rates – neither in Europe nor in the USA (Rothstein and Stolle 2003, Decker and Van den Broek 2005). Thomas Rotolo argues that it is «unscientific» to expect a linear trend, be it in cohort or life-cycle developments; he takes up the cudgels for paying close attention to the presence of non-linear participation trends (Rotolo 1999). Most striking in questioning the cohort argument is a recent survey published by the Corporation for National and Community Service (Corporation for National and Community Service 2006). In order to claim a cohort effect, at least two features must be proven: first, there must be a high participation rate amongst mid-aged people 20-30 years ago and elderly people today; second, there must be high participation rates amongst today’s elderly, yet lower rates amongst younger folks than in the past. Although this survey shows increased participation amongst the elderly in 2005 compared to previous measurements, it still cannot corroborate the assertion that younger citizens in 2005 participate significantly less than younger citizens in earlier measurements. Hence Putnam seems to be disproven here. The graph in Figure 1 backs up the claims of Putnam’s detractors, for the participation rates of different age groups and their respective changes over the life-course appear rather stable over the last 40 years.
Figure 1: Volunteer Rate USA, all age groups (1974-2005)

(Corporation for National and Community Service 2006: 5)

Life-cycle effects

«Over the life course, various shifting roles and responsibilities, motivations, and capacities are relevant […] Age does matter in that young and old volunteers may desire different types of commitment and different types of work, and different outcomes that are most age-appropriate may be the desired results» (Morrow-Howell 2007: 40-41). Already in 1977, David Knoke and Randall Thomson pointed to the fact that the scope of volunteering is statistically significantly different, depending on the individuals’ «stage of life» (Knoke and Thomson 1977). Figure 2 illustrates Knoke and Thomson’s findings, indicating that the number of organizations a person is engaged in is highest during parenthood and lowest in the single phase.
Complementing these assumptions, the often-used «functional approach» to scrutinizing civic engagement (Snyder and Omoto 2008) stresses the age-relevance of motivations for participating: the motivations of youth, adults and the elderly differ sharply (Omoto and Snyder 2000). Furthermore, other scholars point out that the resources needed for participation are highly dependent on the life-course; whereas young volunteers are mainly inspired by social support, older volunteers rely on human capital and social integration to enhance participation rates (Tang 2006). Keeping in mind the importance of enhanced individual well-being in social participation (Van Willigen 1997), it is noteworthy that the increase in life satisfaction via volunteering and engagement is much higher for older volunteers than for younger volunteers (Van Willigen 2000). The impact of «life course transitions» (i.e., marriage, having children, children leaving home, occupation status, retirement and so forth) on social participation behaviour have been proven by Chris Einolf (Einolf 2006) and Thomas Rotolo (Rotolo 2000) – both with the remark that
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(Einolf 2006) and Thomas Rotolo (Rotolo 2000) – both with the remark that the effects of life-cycle transitions are gendered (effect are stronger with men than with women).

Using the threefold categorization of young people, adults and the elderly, we can summarize life-cycle effects on civic engagement as follows: for youth and young adults, career and reflexive and hedonistic motivations prevail (compare this summary statement with the subsequent sections of this paper); for mid-aged adults, their engagement in organizations is a response to their specific stage in life (e.g., marriage, parenting, sports, early retirement); for elderly people, such engagement can reflect the fact that they have free time (perhaps too much—they feel the need to compensate for it) and relatively good health (Morrow-Howell 2007, Okun and Schultz 2003, Omoto and Snyder 2000).

We shall now postpone saying more about young people’s motives for volunteering and instead say a few more words about mid-aged adults and the elderly. Findings show that mid-aged adults distinguish themselves clearly from the elderly in that their life satisfaction and happiness do not directly increase via increased participation (Borgonovi 2008b). Mid-aged adults’ rate of participation is highly dependent on the variables of education, religion and family context (Rotolo and Wilson 2004). Only one linear relation can be seen, namely, that family socio-economic status may lead to an increase in social participation over the life course (Mustillo, Wilson and Lynch 2004). Adult participation serves three main purposes: first, it serves «functional» needs, because the adults usually involve themselves in organizations which concern their children and community building; second, it fulfils «obligations» rooted in religious participation – be it community work or «altruism»; third, since participation is also dependent on individual character traits, it enables the participant to live up to such established traits.

Turning now to elderly people’s civic engagement, two main thoughts can be highlighted: first, the health benefits of participation, and second, the high value of their contributions. Age, education, and the importance of religion are usually the key factors upon which elderly people’s participation rates depend (Choi 2003). Participation increases their life-satisfaction, happiness and health significantly (Grimm, Spring and Dietz 2007). Some scholars go even further, perceiving voluntarism in later life as a «means of compensation» (Li and Ferraro 2005). Even though in some forms of participation, mid-aged adults have the highest rates (Morrow-Howell 2007), there is no doubt that the elderly (usually understood as «older than 45») spend the most time in volunteering and civic engagement (Butts 2003).

To sum up, the life-cycle argument is backed up by various data sets consisting of survey material and studies on individual motivation and institutional circumstances. Whereas young people’s motives for becoming civically engaged are largely hedonistic or career-related, mid-aged people engage for
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«functional» purposes and the elderly are motivated by wanting to «especially help the needy» (Gallagher 1994).

Rejecting Putnam: cohort effect, or life-cycle effect?

Descriptive research has shown the emergence of episodic volunteering (Handy, Cnaan, Brudney, Ascoli, Meijs and Ranade 2000, MacDuff 2005). This is supported by recent data provided by the Corporation for National and Community Service (Grimm, Dietz and Foster-Bey 2006). Robert Wuthnow argues in the same vein:

In place of enduring membership [in] organizations, we now see a wide variety of activities that involve short-term or sporadic commitments and task-specific relationships that bring together individuals and organizations from different sectors of the community (Wuthnow 1998: 203).

Other scholars, moreover, point to the fact that increased vertical and horizontal mobility in recent decades has had a significant impact on participatory behaviour. But taking into account the previous section’s discussion, it seems we cannot be absolutely sure whether this is a life-cycle phenomenon mainly carried out by younger generations (a life-cycle effect), or whether this behavior will be sustained in later life (a cohort effect) (Castells 2000, Wellmann 2001).

Thomas Rotolo, for instance, argues that we should not expect a linear development in any sector of civic engagement, or amongst any cohort or life-cycle, and he instead emphasizes «nonlinear trends»: the overall trends of volunteering and engagement might be linear over time periods, he thinks, but they in fact consist of various trends that do not follow streamlined mathematical laws. Nevertheless, although different voluntary organizations have been affected by different trends over the last decades, a combination of all indicators of civic engagement do at least superficially describe linear trends (Rotolo 1999).

Despite these noteworthy considerations, however, the pure cohort thesis ought to be doubted. Both quantitative and qualitative data disprove Putnam’s thesis. The life-cycle hypothesis, on the other hand, is verified in countless ways.

But coming back to the prime question – are we witnessing the beginning of a new era with new forms of civic engagement and with the younger generations as heralds? – we must not jump too quickly to an answer. Although survey data speak in favor of the life-cycle hypothesis, various indicators show that structural changes severely impact young people’s behaviour in ways that are unprecedented in modern democracies. Even
though research has not fully measured these changes, we should not expect the changes in young people’s civic engagement to be entirely level throughout their life-cycle. Data presented in the discussion of the structural changes affecting civic engagement show that the features characterizing the engagement patterns of young generations also characterize episodic volunteers – detached from age. So although the impact of structural changes is of course more significant for younger generations than older generations, these structural changes engender civic-behaviour changes in all age groups (compare this with Section 1.4 and Part 2).

Whether young people are indeed heralding a new trend in civic engagement in general is not yet confirmed, since researchers have not yet measured a clear cohort effect. But the tremendous structural changes, as well as the mélange of motives of young and episodic volunteers in general, might lead us to expect that civic engagement patterns are likely to change in the direction of younger people’s engagement. This is not yet seen in surveys, but it might play out as an incremental process.
Young People’s Motivation for Civic Engagement

Thus far we have shed light on key social changes affecting civic engagement, especially amongst young people, and introduced the most prominent theories and literature explaining these trends. Now we turn our attention to young people’s individual motivations for becoming civically involved.

Career benefits

Individuals participate in civic activities because they (perhaps subconsciously) assume it will serve their purposes. Social scientists have identified five basic categories of egoistic motivation: career reasoning, gaining knowledge, personal development, esteem enhancement and social concerns (Kiviniemi, Snyder and Omoto 2002). Barbara Moschner finds two additional egoistic motivations: sensation seeking and reciprocity (Moschner 2002). Episodic volunteering in particular rests on egoistic motives, in addition to being strongly correlated with the variable of religion (Allison, Okun and Dutridge 2002). In general, egoistic motivations seem to be of pivotal importance for younger generations (Rehberg 2005).

Career merits play a key role in young people’s engagement. Lewis Friedland and Shauna Morimoto in fact conclude that young people’s prime incentive for becoming civically engaged is «résumé padding» (Friedland and Morimoto 2006). This conclusion ought to be augmented by an awareness of the peculiarities of the US economic setting. Still, based on data culled from Canadian volunteers, Frank Jones argues along the same lines: Canadian young people deem that the prime merits of volunteering are the opportunity to gain knowledge and improve interpersonal skills, communication skills, organizational and managerial skills, fundraising skills and technical or office skills (Jones 2000). If the «career merit assumption» is valid, it would go far in explaining why a young American’s civic engagement increases as he or she approaches high school and college graduation.
Such motivations are however evaluated with some scepticism: «These conditions challenge us to rethink what citizenship itself means for a generation for which achievement is the dominant value and investments in community and civic life [are] one lifestyle choice among many» (Friedland and Morimoto 2005: 17). What of course needs to be checked before jumping to any hasty assumptions is whether such a «lifestyle choice» has been made consciously and voluntarily, or whether young people, in addition to being exposed to significant value changes, are also confronted with economic circumstances that require résumé padding. For this reason caution is necessary when trying to use American cases to make inferences about the Norwegian case.

Whilst studies from the US stress the dominance of economic motives in explaining young people’s volunteering patterns, the question arises as to whether high rates of volunteering really «pay off» in the job market. Due to countless interfering variables, this is difficult to measure. Still, Lionel Proutéau and François-Charles Wolff conducted a «switching regression» examining just this, and came up with the following conclusion:

[…] using a French data set, our empirical analysis indicates that in the public sector, volunteers receive a positive wage premium, but this does not influence their involvement. In the private sector, the premium is negative. Secondly, we wonder whether volunteers are motivated by a job-search motive. Among wage earners, the purpose of changing job does not foster volunteer participation. (Prouteau and Wolf 2006: 1011)

Thus, whereas findings from the USA suggest a positive relation between volunteering and higher occupational status (Wilson and Musick 2003), these findings have not been duplicated in France.

It seems as though the benefits in the job market depend on the institutional setting of each economy. Still, the question of whether civic engagement actually pays off on the job market might be less important for our purposes than to ask whether the mere assumption of some sort of pay off is the basic motivation for youth engagement in volunteer activities.

Hedonistic Motives

Hedonistic motivations derive from egoistic motivations, but due to their complexity, they will be dealt with separately here. Walter Rehberg stresses the «quest for the new» and the «quest for oneself» in his research on youth volunteering in Switzerland (Rehberg 2005). It is worth comparing these two quests with the young volunteers’ «wish list» that the Institute for Volunteering Research in the UK has set up; it lists flexibility, legitimacy, ease of access, experience, incentives, variety, organization and laughs as prime incen-
tives for doing volunteer work (Institute for Volunteering Research 2008). Although this list does not clearly point to hedonistic reasons for engaging in civic acts, it does indicate a certain tendency in that direction. Interesting also is a distinct feature of young volunteers stressed by Haski-Leventhal et al., namely their relationship-orientation, in contrast to the service-orientation of older peers (Haski-Leventhal, Ronel, York and Ben-David 2008). Young people seek after like-minded people just as do adults, a factor which underscores the strong link between volunteering during childhood and volunteering during adolescence and adulthood. Finally, we do well to keep in mind the «fun» factor; the prime incentive for children (ages eight to twelve) to volunteer is because it is just plain fun (Shannon 2009).

### Altruistic Motives

Altruistic motivations usually are grounded on religious obligations or the «secular» norm of social responsibility (Moschner 2002). (The factor of religion will be discussed in detail later.) When studying the norm of social responsibility, a major problem emerges: it is difficult to measure social responsibility (Amato 1985) because there is no clear, concise reference point for measuring it. The level of social responsibility is highly dependent on the individual volunteer’s environment. As such, it is crucial to understand the volunteer’s attachment to the environment or community in question (Bussel and Forbes 2001). Furthermore, when studying the norm of social responsibility, the dichotomy between egoistic and altruistic motives breaks down. This is for two reasons: first, because the social responsibility norm is so heavily dependent on the environment, the form of engagement, and the particular organization the volunteer engages with. Such factors all must be grappled with if the researcher ever hopes to determine whether the volunteer is egoistically or altruistically motivated (Chinman and Wandersman 1999). Second, individual character traits also heavily influence the preponderance of egoistic or altruistic motivation (Gillath, Shaver, Mikulincer, Erez and Ijzendoorn 2005).

### Role identity theory

*Role identity theory* describes civic engagement not only as «action», but also as a substantial part of the volunteer’s identity (Penner 2002). Studies prove the highly significant correlation between a «helper identity» – when a person identifies with his or her volunteer role – and the person’s giving and endurance in service (Matsuba, Hart, Atkins 2007). Some scholars interpret the
volunteering identity as the strongest predictor of both time spent and length of service (Finkelstein 2005). Confronted with fluid identities, it is no wonder that for some people, volunteering transcends being what one does and comes to define who one is (Van Dyne and Farmer 2004).

Since a young person’s identity is still largely in the making, this theory should be applied with caution; furthermore, it is unclear whether chosen ‘roles’ endure through later adulthood.

The impact of life-changing events

When studying young people’s individual motivations for becoming civically involved, it is important to underscore how ‘late modernity’ and its ‘fragmented’ individual biographies coincide with individuals’ loose affiliations. Such ‘fluidity’ is often claimed to account for the rise of irregular and incidental volunteer commitments (Macduff 2004). This claim is anchored in the fact that life-changing events are likely to trigger engagement – a phenomenon clearly measured in qualitative research (Perry, Brudney, Coursey and Littlepage 2008). Life-crises and actively-chosen biographical re-orientations often function as triggers for civic engagement (Hustinx 2001).

Understanding the impact of life-changing events is especially crucial in dealing with younger generations; due to their identity-in-the-making, such events might have a considerable impact during youth and adolescence (Harré 2007) and become integral to a young person’s quest for meaning.

The quest for meaning: identity formation and civic engagement

Since identity formation is most salient during youth and adolescence, the mechanisms to be discussed are of great merit in understanding young people’s civic engagement. In 1968 Erik Erikson proffered the theory that an individual’s ‘search for identity’ begins in early adolescence; in this formative period experiences are accumulated which lead to an enduring commitment to particular beliefs and value-sets. Adolescence is the crucial period for identity-formation, and external references such as civic engagement have a significant share in this process – civic engagement, then, in turn becomes heavily dependent on identity formation (Erikson 1968).

Erikson’s theory is still unquestioned in contemporary psychology; neither is its value questioned for our research (Marta and Pozzi 2008). The dimensions of personality which emerge during adolescence are shown to remain stable throughout adult life (Johnson, Beebe, Mortimer and Snyder 1998). For example, research suggests that the non-exposure to certain forms
of civic engagement directly impacts the way young people value individual rights, representative rule and civic equality when they are asked to describe democracy (Flanagan, Gallay, Sukhdeep, Gallay and Eti 2005). Civic engagement during the formative years can moreover lead a person to adopt an «alternative life-style», one detached from economically based rationalism (Amna 2000). It is however still an open question whether this is only a phenomenon of youth, or whether such choices are sustained throughout an individual’s life-cycle (Weller 2006).

Nevertheless, these studies point to a strong intertwining of individual identity formation and civic identity (Yates and Youniss 1999: 273). Effects influencing a person’s perception of political and civic issues never have a stronger impact than during adolescence and young adulthood (Schumann and Corning 2000). Civic identity formation is, moreover, a fluid process; Smith et al. for instance measured differing individual «civic identities» during a three-year study (Smith, Lister, Middleton and Cox 2005). No research, however, has as yet fully deciphered the merging of various «youth identities». This remains one of the most striking conundrums in studies of civic engagement (O’Neill 2007).

As mentioned earlier, one hallmark of our contemporary era is the lack of structural certainties and the overwhelming number of choices and opportunities young people have. The relative shortage of role models and structural benchmarks thus allows us to understand civic engagement as an opportunity for «identity work» (Gross 1999). On the one hand are highly pluralistic, heterogeneous environments and options which partly hamper young people’s access to civic engagement (Youniss, Bales, Christmas-Best, Diversi, McLaughlin and Silbereisen 2002). On the other hand, once voluntarily engaged, young people experience major benefits from the clear ideological positions they are confronted with and over which they reflect (Eyler and Giles 1999). Anne Quénieart even concludes that youth engagement corresponds largely with a search for ethical consistency – the aim being to give meaning to the values individuals adhere to both individually and collectively (Quénieart 2008).

The key characteristic of a young person’s civic engagement thus seems to be the opportunity for reflection, not only in order to formulate a clear ideological position, but also to come to terms with one’s individual life situation and to compare it with that of others (Youniss and Yates 1997: 156-166). This is especially apparent in political participation (Jarvies, Montoya and Mulvov 2005). Besides defining the young person’s civic attitude and identity, the close interaction with a certain community leads to two additional and major outcomes: firstly, the young person develops a sense of community as an extension of his or her own identity (McDevitt, Kiousis, Wu, Losch, and Ripley 2003); secondly, community participation functions as a testing ground, a «safe haven» for exploring one’s interests. But more than this, it is especially a testing ground for personal abilities and capabilities. In short, civic engagement helps develop a young person’s identity (Zarrett and Eccles 2006).
Environmental Influences on Young People’s Civic Engagement

Since individuals do not live in social vacuums, but are heavily influenced by their surroundings, this section is devoted to discussing how young people’s individual environments influence civic engagement.

Mass media consumption

Given that mass-media consumption has been linked to levels of social capital (Putnam 2000), civic literacy (Milner 2002) and political knowledge (Galston 2001), it thus also appears to be related to civic engagement. Negative and cynical media coverage of politics, some scholars claim, is to blame for political disengagement, increased political cynicism and decreasing political knowledge; other scholars counter this argument by highlighting the key role such media plays in stimulating political mobilization. As Pippa Norris points out, «people who watch more TV news, read more newspapers, surf the net, and pay attention to campaigns have consistently been found to be more knowledgeable, trusting of government, and participatory» (Norris 2002: 22). Young people, she finds, pay less attention to the news than other age groups, and she identifies this factor as a potential explanation for their engagement patterns. Other researchers, however, have suggested that problems in this area might have more to do with the way news is presented and less to do with how it is consumed (Saunders 2007).

But despite the disagreement between scholars, mass media is truly the prime source of information and opinion-making for young people (Kuhn 2000). Although a general link between mass media use and young people’s civic participation cannot be precisely formulated, social scientists find that reading newspapers and watching public affairs programs on television are positively correlated with political participation amongst young people. The frequency of Internet use and watching televised entertainment are thus far not shown to have any such positive correlation (Zhang and Chia 2006). Fur-
ther, the total time spent viewing television remains inversely related to both social capital and civic engagement. Hence, when all factors are considered, with the exception of heavy television watching, findings show a positive relation between young people’s media use, social capital and civic engagement (Romer, Jamieson, Pasek 2009).

Internet use

In 1997 the link between the Internet and civic engagement came to prominence and raised great hopes for increasing the total amount of civic engagement. Since, at the time, young people accounted for the majority of online activities, it was expected that their engagement in particular would increase (White 1997). And indeed, research shows that young people still dominate online activities. There are two major ways in which such activities can be used to increase civic engagement: first, through «online democratic problem solving», and second, by using online social networks as extensions of offline social capital. Through these means the Internet becomes a tool for a tolerant nation/world-wide community (Wilhelm 2002). It appears that the very architecture of the Internet, with its flexible, «hypertextual», networked structure, its dialogic mode of address, and its alternative, even anarchic feel, should particularly appeal to young people and their informal, peer-oriented, anti-authoritarian approach (Bentivegna 2002). Caveats have been made here too however, for the Internet suffers from a problem of credibility, but this seems to bother younger users far less than older users (Flanagin and Metzger 2008).

Meanwhile, no effect has been measured thus far as to the extent to which young people’s general use of Internet affects their participation in civic life (Quintelier and Vissers 2008). This is despite scholars in the US finding «nuanced relationships» between certain dimensions of Internet use and forms of civic engagement (Moy, Manosevitch, Stamm and Dunsmore 2005). Shanto Iyengar and Simon Jackman, for example, argue that Internet use can increase young people’s participation under certain circumstances (Iyengar and Jackman 2004). But what are these «circumstances»? For those who are not civically involved, the Internet appears even less effective in mobilizing them than traditional means. On the other hand, it proves very effective in mobilizing those who are already interested in civic activities (Livingstone 2008). Felecia Wu Song, in her dissertation, comes to the following conclusion:

The findings show that online communities tend to have high ease of exit, are socially constituted and oriented towards exclusive group identity goods. Producing a relatively narrow range of democratic effects, they are conducive to fostering inner-group trust, personal efficacy, and the public representation of difference. They are poor sources of mutual obligation, reciprocity, delibera-
According to Song, Internet use positively affects civic engagement for those who already engage offline; it enhances their civic activity and fosters their in-group spirit. It works as a platform for project-based political identities (Collin 2008). But «online democratic problem solving» or an outreach beyond set homogenous groups has not been seen. The Internet appears primarily to function as a tool, as an extension, a catalyst and a re-producer of offline patterns of young people’s civic engagement.

Online social networks

Since online social networks now play a big role in reproducing and boosting offline youth activities, they are dealt with separately here. Scholars claim that especially for younger citizens, the contemporary formation of social capital stands in correlation to the individual’s patterns of Internet use. This holds for generations born after 1960 in particular: what we could call the Generations X and Y, or perhaps the latter could be called the «Dot.com Generation» (Shah, Kwak and Holbert 2001). The concept of «online social capital» has been used as a powerful predictor for «online civic engagement» – furthermore, a spill-over of «online» to «offline» social capital appears reasonable to some scholars (Kobayahsi, Ikeda and Miyata 2006). Young people’s online social capital is mainly generated in online networks such as Facebook, Myspace and similar set-ups. Amazed by these phenomena, researchers have sought to explain why they are so popular with young people and offer the following explanation:

By interacting with unfamiliar others, teenagers are socialized into society. Without publics, there is no coherent society. Publics are where norms are set and reinforced, where common ground is formed. Learning society’s rules requires trial and error, validation and admonishment; it is knowledge that teenagers learn through action, not theory. Society’s norms and rules only provide the collectively imagined boundaries. Teenagers are also tasked with deciding how they want to fit into the structures that society provides. Their social identity is partially defined by themselves and partially defined by others. Learning through impression management is key to developing a social identity. Teenagers must determine where they want to be situated within the social world they see, and then attempt to garner the reactions to their performances that match their vision (Boyd 2008: 137).

An unprecedented three-year study of youth Internet behaviour has concluded that social networks are now «fixtures of youth culture» and are almost only
used as extensions of «offline» friendships. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, the possibilities for civic engagement are not to be underestimated: «by its immediacy and breadths of information, the digital world lowers barriers to self-directed learning […] and interest driven participation» (MacArthur Foundation 2008). But until more detailed research is conducted, it appears as though previous claims are reaffirmed: online social capital reproduces offline social capital, thus youth civic engagement is primarily dependent on offline social capital.

Peer groups/communities

After emphasizing the online reproduction of offline social capital, the question arises as to how offline social capital – the foundation of civic engagement – is generated. Scholars stress the prime importance of peer groups in this context, for when seeking to account for youth civic engagement, peer groups appear to offer the greatest explanatory value (Kleon 2006). Here is a general formulation: the more «memberships» a young person has in various peer groups, the more likely he or she is to be civically engaged (Youniss, Mclellan and Mazer 2001). Nansook Park argues along similar lines by stressing the importance of close peer relationships for positive youth development and, in turn, pro-social behaviour (Park 2004). Friends’ aspirations and attitudes strongly affect young people’s attitudes and behaviour, hence the civic involvement of peers makes the individual’s own involvement much more likely (Zaff, Malanchuk, Michelsen and Eccles 2003b). Research on online networks has lower explanatory value than research-approaches focusing on community cohesion; the higher the cohesion of the peer group, the higher the civic engagement of each member (Fahmy 2006).

In dealing with youth, it is particularly striking how important social connectedness is in enhancing civic engagement (Zhang and Chia 2006). The higher the younger citizen’s sense of community, the higher the social participation (Cicognani, Pirini, Keyes, Joshanloo, Rostami and Nosratabadi 2008); moreover, a young person’s neighbourhood experiences seem to have a very strong impact on his or her later sense of community and, presumably, conception of society at large (Zeldin and Topitzes 2002). Joseph Kahne and Sue Sporte, for instance, find that growing up in a civically responsive neighbourhood has a long-lasting impact on a young person’s later engagement (Kahne and Sporte 2008). This is not akin to a one-way street. Volunteering and civic engagement are highly beneficial to community development (Brennan 2007). The scale of these effects is even larger when younger citizens play crucial roles in such efforts (Nenga 2004).
Family

The most important «group» a young person is exposed to is his or her own family. The family therefore plays a critical role in a young person’s civic engagement. Generally speaking, a young person is more likely to become civically involved if issues with a «civic» character are touched on at home, and the more issues addressed, the greater the likelihood of involvement (Kelly 2006). Discussions within the family enhance the young citizen’s civic engagement (Pancer, Pratt, Hunsberger and Alisat 2007). If the young person spends little time with family members, this, in part, seems to account for a decrease in civic participation (Turcotte 2007).

Although some scholars question the link between parents and young people’s civic engagement (Zaff, Malanchuck, Michelsen and Eccles 2003a), the link is well documented. Parents primarily function as role models for civic engagement (Andolina 2003), especially when children are young. This decreases when children reach adolescence, even though this might be when parents most of all pressure or encourage their children to become civically engaged (Safrit, Giem and Gliem 2004). A striking correlation between parental volunteering and youth civic engagement has been measured in the Netherlands (Bekkers 2007) and the USA (Caputo 2008). For instance, a study conducted by the US Corporation for National and Community Service reveals that young people belonging to families where at least one parent volunteers, are almost twice as likely to volunteer; but more than this, they are nearly three times more likely to volunteer on a regular basis than youths deprived of family member volunteering (Grimm, Dietz, Spring, Arey and Foster-Bey 2005).

Mandatory service in school

Parental pressure, peer pressure, the immediate environment and previous experiences with civic engagement all have been studied and found to impact young people’s civic engagement. Accordingly, scholars have wondered whether mandatory volunteering in the US school system would offer an explanation for young peoples’ engagement patterns. Debates on this matter have been passionate, since finding such a link would challenge the positive link between educational achievement and civic engagement (Flanagan, Levine, Settersten 2008). Strong arguments have been made in favour of there being a link between mandatory school-initiated volunteering and youth engagement patterns because it would show schools to be great levellers, evening out the disparate opportunity structures of households – from those «deprived» of resources benefiting civic engagement to those clearly nurturing it (Spring, Dietz and Grimm 2007).
The question here is whether compulsory volunteering can boost a positive civic identity. No doubts about this assumption are aired in Janoski et al.’s 1998 study, for there, mandatory community service is seen as clearly boosting later civic engagement (Janoski, Musick and Wilson 1998). But in 1999, Stukas et al. raised doubts: mandatory volunteering might even prove counterproductive, and only under certain circumstances could merits be expected (Stukas, Snyder and Clary 1999). But despite the claims and counter-claims, researchers agree on which circumstances are crucial: mandatory service must be understood as an «opportunity to learn» (McLellan and Youniss 2003), and the (mandated) participation needs at least to be perceived as voluntary (Planty, Bozick and Regnier 2006). Interesting to note is that civic engagement in later adulthood appears not to be attributable to participation in mandatory programs. Thus the impact of mandatory volunteering on adult volunteering patterns would be expected to work out indirectly (Henderson, Brown, Pance and Ellis-Hale 2007).
Socio-Demographic Variables Affecting Young People’s Civic Engagement

In addition to individual motivations and the influence of immediate surroundings, socio-demographic circumstances play a pivotal role in the civic engagement of youth — they have in fact been shown to hold the highest explanatory value. It is to these variables we now turn.

Level of education

Schools affect young people’s civic engagement in two key ways: via mandated service (as elaborated) and via the multiplication of knowledge. With respect to the latter way, findings show that the number of years in school is the strongest link to political knowledge, tolerance and participation (Torney-Purta 1997). What can be measured is a strong correlation between political knowledge, formal education and voter-turnout (and in turn civic engagement) (Pluterz 2002).

On the subject of knowledge about political and social issues in particular, Michael Carpini gained a great deal of attention in 1996 by stating that the levels of knowledge about the political system is decreasing, and therefore the US society would soon witness decreasing rates of civic engagement (Carpini and Keeter 1996). He reaffirmed his argument in 2000, claiming that no democracy can live up to its desired standards without having a high level of high quality civic knowledge (Carpini M. 2000). Carpini’s argument inspired several branches of research regarding civic engagement, especially of young people. One finding from these studies is that the simple lack of information can be perceived as a main barrier to adolescent volunteering (Wilson, Allen, Strahan and Ethier 2008). Furthermore, rethinking the age gap in voter turn-out has revealed that when trying to predict voter turn-out, age is a less important factor than the prospective voters’ level of information on political issues (Rubenson, Blais, Forunier, Gidengil and Nevitte 2004). Focussing on teaching civic skills in schools has yielded fruitful results (Comber 2003), and
voter turnout can, it seems, be directly influenced via certain changes in cur-
riculum (McDevitt and Kiousis 2006).
These claims of course fit with something social scientists have already
known, namely that teaching civic knowledge has the greatest impact in the
formative years. One study shows such teaching having three times more im-
 pact on 15-17 year-old students than on adults (Comber 2005). One possible
conclusion, then, is that the best way to boost civic knowledge and, in turn,
civic engagement via schooling, is to foster deliberate discussions (Feldman,
Pasek, Romer and Jamieson 2008) and the often-cited «open classroom cli-
mate» (Campbell 2008).

Does civic engagement improve educational
performance or are we witnessing a self-selection bias?
Earlier in this paper the career-enhancing motive for civic engagement was
discussed. Now in this section, civic engagement will be examined as an in-
dependent variable: does it really benefit educational performance?
Countless studies have argued for the positive impacts of civic engage-
ment in general. Reed Larson is a case in point, for he shows that structured
civic engagement offers a great opportunity for positive development since
psychologist can observe the very rare combination of intrinsic motivation
and concentration (Larson 2000). Hence it is no wonder that civic engagement
in younger years strongly favours the development of pro-social behaviour
(Zaff, Moore, Papillo and Williams 2003). Increased self-esteem (Barber,
Eccles and Stone 2001) and higher self-awareness (Risler, Holosko and Hat-
tcher 2002) are also measurable. Further, youth civic engagement is shown to
lead to a decrease in risky behaviour (Darling 2005) and to have very positive
outcomes on high-risk adolescents (Smith and Havercamp 2002). There are
many studies within the fields of sociology and psychology on the positive
correlation between civic engagement and educational performance. These
studies reached the same results in 2007 (Dàvila 2007), 2005 (John 2005) and
2003 (Eccles, Barber, Stone and Hunt 2003) (we list only a few).
The earlier studies claim civic engagement has a positive impact on the
individual, but more and more, scholars see it less as an independent variable
and speak instead of a «self-selection» bias: they wonder whether it is less a
matter of civic engagement affecting the individual’s behaviour and more a
matter of the individual’s behaviour affecting civic engagement. They suggest
that presumed outcomes of civic engagement mainly obtain due to the per-
son’s individual characteristics and opportunities, detached from his or her
engagement. If this is the case, a self-selection bias seems to be in place.
Scholars particularly address this phenomenon when highlighting the positive
circumstances enabling young people to involve themselves in civic activities: young volunteers, Richard Sundeen and Sally Raskoff point out, tend to have a «dominant status» in their peer group (Sundeen and Raskoff 2000); Kirkpatrick Johnson et al. present data suggesting that adolescents who engage in volunteering have higher educational aims, higher self-esteem and higher intrinsic motivation to do school work (Kirkpatrick Johnson, Beebe, Mortimer and Snyder 1998); Jacobs et al. write that general self-confidence is a high predictor of social participation and hence engagement (Jacobs, Vernon and Eccles 2004); Gruo Ødegård argues that young people get politically involved if they are exposed to a highly competitive political environment (Odegard 2007); Atkins et al. claim childhood personality and adolescent volunteering are not mediated by membership in social institutions (Atkins 2005); most recently, Schmidt et al. found zero or negative effects of civic engagement on the young volunteer (Schmidt, Shumow and Kackar 2007). Finally, when measuring a variety of socio-demographic factors, e.g., parental education, income and ethnicity, young volunteers appear to be significantly differentiated from less engaged youngsters even before the volunteers start volunteering (Metz and Youniss 2005). US surveys confirm this picture (Corporation for National and Community Service 2005).

It looks like as long as engagement is voluntary, the well equipped young people are volunteering, but that those who might be much more in need of such an experience are lagging behind (Henderson, Brown, Pancer and Ellis-Hale 2007). A recent study comes to a similar conclusion: when controlling for pre-existing individual characteristics, civic engagement is shown to have no positive effect on the young volunteer. The types of young people who do voluntary work are those who have a higher self-perceived intellectual potential and pro-social and dominant social status (Cemalcilar 2009).

It has furthermore been shown that people with high levels of empathy are much more likely to engage in civic activities (Davis 2005) and – vice versa – social anxiety is negatively correlated to the likelihood of engaging (Handy 2007). Nevertheless, an interesting study reveals that even highly anxious people actually are volunteering when egoistic motivations for volunteerism are involved (e.g., self-protection, self-enhancement, social approval, career promotion) (Erez, Mikulincer, Van Ljzendoorn and Kroonenberg 2008). The same patterns hold for younger generations: the more self-confident youths spend much more time with their peers than less confident youths, hence they develop more social capital and, in turn, higher levels of participation (Jacobs, Vernon and Eccles 2004). The beneficial character traits thus also seem to influence higher levels of volunteering in a direct way (Sundeen and Raskoff 2000).
Family’s/parents’ socio-economic status

Besides the discussed effects stemming from the familial context, family income deserves special attention. The likelihood of civic engagement increases along with socio-economic status – that is, status depending mainly on parents’ income, job prestige and level of education (Wilson and Musick 1998). Most scholarly studies find this phenomenon (i.e., the correlation between civic engagement and socio-economic status) is caused by an increase in social capital, knowledge, skills and enhanced self-efficacy (Wilson and Musick 1997). As Ronald Inglehart argues, people in positions requiring higher education are more likely to have a more post-material attitude, and hence, a more favourable opinion of civic engagement (Inglehart 2003). On the other hand, citizens deprived of social, cultural and economic capital are the least likely to become civically engaged (Gildengil, Blais, Nevitte and Nadeau 2004).

The question worth studying is this: how does the socio-economic status of parents influence the civic engagement of their children? Hart et al. find that children from families with lower socio-economic status face more barriers to civic participation because they lack «civic opportunities» (Hart, Atkins and Ford 1998). Family income is the crucial variable here: the higher a family’s income is, the less worry there is about finances, and the higher the rate of participation by the youths in the family (White and Gager 2007). Zaff et al., meanwhile, find that higher levels of parental education increase the rates of engagement of children (Zaff, Malanchuck, Michelsen and Eccles 2003a). Judith Torney-Purta interprets this effect as so devastating that she calls for schools to level out the tremendous gaps between young people’s «civic possibilities» (Torney-Purta 2001).

Religiosity

Religion is probably one of the most interesting variables because although a person’s religious commitment is a strong predictor for civic engagement, it is only so indirectly. Religious commitment coincides with church attendance and community spirit, which in turn results in a high level of social cohesion and social capital. These then result in a high level of engagement with the community (Park and Smith 2000). But religiosity is neither a predictor for general or secular volunteering/giving (Wang and Graddy 2008), nor for higher social capital outside the church community (Stromnes 2008). Anne B. Yeung stresses that religiosity results in choosing between four different kinds of volunteer groups, each of which maintains different kinds of social capital (Yeung 2004). Still, individuals are equally likely to give to, and volunteer for, religious and secular causes whether they live in counties where their religious group represents the majority or the minority of the total popu-
lation of religious adherents (Borgonovi 2008a). Moreover, within communities of «morally committed» citizens, religious activity remains the variable with the overwhelmingly highest explanatory value (Perry and Brudney 2008).

Studies from the US also confirm the same patterns for youth. The likelihood for engaging in the community increases significantly when religion plays an important part in a young person’s life (Youniss, McLellan and Yates 1999). Troy Gibson adds a crucial note, however, in pointing out that adolescents’ political engagement is not related to religiosity (Gibson 2008).

**Gender**

Common knowledge has it that women are a little more likely to become civically engaged than men (Wilson 2000). But regression analysis shows that gender orientation accounts for more of the variance in these patterns than gender per se (Karniol, Grosz and Schorr 2003). But especially in younger cohorts, females report a higher motivation for volunteering (Wymer, Self and Findley 2008). How come?

In studies on political participation, findings show that young women have different perceptions of power – transmitted by the different experiences of daughters and sons – and hence, they strive for other forms of political engagement than men (Gordon 2008). Holding in mind the egoistic motivations discussed in Part 4, another interesting explanation is that men and women have distinctly different sources of happiness: whereas men rank «sexual activity», «sports», being «liked» and having a «good social life» significantly higher than women, women rank «helping others», having a «close family» and being «loved by loved ones» significantly higher. As such, young women would be expected to express higher levels of pro-social behaviour. Furthermore, if gender-specific distinctions are used to explain patterns of engagement, it ought to be kept in mind that men choose their volunteering activities mainly based on an ethic of justice, whereas women are prone to base their engagement on an ethic of care (Crossley and Lagdridge 2005).
The Role of Organizations in Young People’s Civic Engagement

One of the major determining factors explaining civic engagement is the «performance» of the organizations immediately affecting those who become civically engaged. Since major structural changes have occurred in these organizations in recent decades, scrutinizing how organizations affect young people’s civic engagement is of vital interest.

General remarks

Instead of beginning medias in res, some general remarks are first in order. Civic engagement is largely affected by institutional and organizational structures (Salomon and Sokolowski 2003), and in particular, by political and economic macro-frames (Bühlmann and Freitag 2004).

Recent developments leading to increased episodic and therefore informal civic engagement have also significantly altered organizational influence (Selke 1999). Some scholars perceive informal and episodic civic engagement as so distinct from formal and regular engagement that the term «Fourth Sector» has entered academic discussion (Williams and Windebank 2006). A recent study, however, reveals that the predictors for formal volunteering can also account for informal volunteering (Finkelstein and Brannick 2007). But unlike formal civic engagement, the distinction between the reasons for starting and sustaining engagement appear to be more crucial in the «Fourth Sector» (MacNeela 2008).

Young people’s civic engagement has become more immediately goal-oriented (Norris 1999), so organizations need to develop more sophisticated ways to inspire (Safrit 2002) and sustain (Bortree and Waters 2008). Consequently, organizations should be «broadly conceived as well as scrutinized as potential impediments to the development of civic attitudes and behaviors among young people» (Junn 2006: 40). This is due to the fact that the role of organizations in young people’s civic engagement is subject to a fascinating
paradox: on one hand classic organizations are becoming less important as formal, regular engagement is diminishing. On the other hand, the form and endurance of informal, episodic engagement is largely dependant on the organizations’ structures and strategies.

Adopting an often-cited theoretical framework, the remaining sections of Part 7 address the reasons why young people initially become involved in a civic organization, the influence of the organizations on them during participation, and finally, the organizations’ long-lasting impact on the young volunteers (Snyder and Omoto 2008). Table 1 gives an overview of the three main stages of the volunteer process that are scrutinized in studies of civic engagement: antecedents, experiences and consequences.

Table 1. Schematic of the volunteer process model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Analysis</th>
<th>Antecedents</th>
<th>Experiences</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Personality, motivations, life circumstances</td>
<td>Satisfaction, stigma, organizational integration</td>
<td>Knowledge and attitude change, health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal/ Social Group</td>
<td>Group memberships, norms</td>
<td>Helping relationship, collective esteem</td>
<td>Composition of social network, relationship development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency/ Organization</td>
<td>Recruitment strategies, training</td>
<td>Organizational culture, volunteer placement</td>
<td>Volunteer retention, work evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal/Cultural Context</td>
<td>Ideology, service programs and institutions</td>
<td>Service provision, program development</td>
<td>Social capital, economic savings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Snyder/Omoto 2008: 7)
Antecedents: how organizations incite civic engagement

Is there something that must obtain before a person decides to volunteer for an organization? To begin with, the institutional structure largely determines who will start volunteering and at what point in time (Burns, Toncar, Reid, Anderson, Wells, Fawcett and Gruben 2005). The reasons why a person continues volunteering are usually rather detached from the motivations to join, and hence, also detached from the institutional structure (Finkelstein 2008). Generally speaking, starting to volunteer one’s services depends on successfully overcoming three main reasons of absenteeism, namely lack of time, lack of interest and ill health (Sundeen, Raskof and Garcia 2007). Deciding to become a volunteer can be heavily influenced by advertisement-induced arousal (Lindenmeier 2008) and an enhancing of «contextual opportunities» (Steen 2006). Establishing these «contextual opportunities’ is especially crucial for recruiting young people because they lack adult structural frames (for example, they lack having responsibility for children) leading to civic engagement.

Organizations must focus more on each individual adolescent rather than assume a homogenous entity of youths. Motivations and incentives for engaging differ widely from individual to individual, and a young person’s reasons for engaging in one institution may differ from his or her reasons for engaging in another institution (Burns, Toncar, Reid, Anderson, Wells, Fawcett and Gruben 2005). The organizations that can afford to be less concerned with individualization tendencies when recruiting volunteers are of course those institutions offering education. They therefore play the most important role in raising the level of civic engagement. The greatest challenge for organizations is to find ways of approaching young people and to generate interest for their causes – this underlines just how decisive experiences during school-years are, for during these formative years, ties to organizations and their causes are made, «for free», so to speak (Helms 2005).

Experiences: Sustaining civic engagement and organizational ties

As will be seen, scholars have only recently become interested in studying processes of «organizational socialization» (Haski-Leventhal and Bargal 2008) and the new studies offer great insights. One recent study shows that the reasons why a young volunteer continues with a certain form of civic engagement are dependent on the success of an organization in matching the multiple motivations of the volunteer (Stukas, Worth, Clary and Snyder 2008). This is especially the case since the private interests and preferences of
the volunteer appear to be more crucial for sustaining involvement than are the organization’s goals (Glasrud 2007). What with highly individualized and reflexive individuals, this is rather tricky, but the best way to circumvent volunteer lapse is to create a strong bond of identification between the young participant and the organization (Tidwell 2005). To sustain youth engagement, some scholars recommend maximizing the volunteer’s involvement with the organization (Marta and Pozzi 2008: 44). This is crucial because the more reflexive the individual, the more likely he or she will be to discover the organization’s «shortcomings» and quit being involved (Institute for Volunteering Research 2007). Dropping out hence appears to be a way of trying to preserve one’s positive well-being (Yanay and Yanay 2008).

Another key feature institutional structures can offer in order to increase and sustain participants’ civic engagement is to give them a permanent feeling of individual achievement (Kulik 2007). For young people, it is interesting that both the matching of motivations and the provision of achievement are significantly facilitated in groups with little age dissimilarities (Caldwell, Farmer and Fedor 2008).

Consequences: organizations and long-lasting impacts

If sustained participation can be established, the institution can claim responsibility for two effects: first, as a socializing and habitualizing institution, one offering a group identity, it has regained ground lost on account of late modernity (Cameron 1999); second, it can claim to have cultivated and sustained the individual participant’s rational for civic engagement (Hardill and Baines 2007). Since the sustained engagement of young people is becoming more and more unlikely, the direct impact of one particular organization is of course rather difficult to measure. Even so, only certain types of organizations are shown to have positive outcomes on the civil engagement of young people (Hooghe 2003). For example, urban areas rely more on organizations to enhance civic engagement, whereas more rural areas rely more on informal networks (LeRoux 2006).

When discussing organizational practise in light of episodic and informal civic engagement, perhaps the most interesting aspect is how social capital is formed. Until recently, scholars held that the scope of activity within the voluntary sector should be crucial for defining social capital. Yet now it appears that activity scope is less crucial than actual membership. This seems at least to be the case in Nordic (Wollebaek and Selle 2007) and other Western Democracies (Maloney, Van Deth and Roßteutscher 2008). Following this line of argumentation, voluntary organizations institutionalize rather than generate social capital (Wollebaek and Stromsnes 2008).
Organizations’ use of Internet

The Internet is used by voluntary sector organizations in two major ways: first, to communicate with members, and second, to try to reach out and enlist new participants (Burt and Taylor 2000). Some organizations offer opportunities to do «online volunteering» – as such, neither the volunteer nor the respondent need leave their desks. Examples of this would be to set up a new web page for online fundraising or to reshape the web presence of a voluntary organization (Amichai-Hamburger 2008).

In trying to enlist new participants, organizations set up issue-based online campaigns to gain attention and mobilize – especially young people – for their causes, but this does not mean the campaign remains solemnly under the organization’s control (Guerguivea 2008). Organizations close to the government primarily use the Internet to promote traditional, offline ways of civic engagement (Ward 2008). This is comparable to young people primarily using the Internet as a channel of communication within a civic engagement operating «offline» (Kim, Kavanaugh and Pérez-Quinones 2007). It seems as if the new media is stuck with reproducing offline patterns online. (On this point it is worth recalling the discussion in Part 5 on young people’s Internet use and online social networks.)
Main findings

The most intriguing finding in the studies of civic engagement is the significant increase in young people’s «episodic engagement». In contrast to «regular» and «classic» forms of engagement, this new form has a different time-dimension and cause-dimension; it is rather short-sighted and thus devoted to a specifically defined goal. Further, it is project-targeted, not oriented towards a broad agenda defined by an organization or by an all-embracing cause.

Especially curious is that episodic engagement is taking root in all age groups, but predominantly amongst younger birth cohorts. This is why the study of youth engagement might yield a significant contribution in understanding contemporary democracies: researchers could forecast youth behaviour and develop ways of prolonging engagement, and in addition, youth civic-engagement patterns might be understood as harbingers of a new trend in individual conduct in the civil society.

But as the discussion of concepts in Part 3 showed, research has not revealed a sufficient and reliable explanation for the ongoing changes. Since we do not know what «effect» we are witnessing, we are invited to continue putting together tiny pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. A forecast of future developments seems only reasonable after taking into account the various interfering variables for a specific, limited context.

As for young people’s individual motivations for civic engagement, it is important to scrutinize civic engagement as both a dependent and an independent variable. With respect to the link between young people’s identity and their engagement patterns, the high explanatory value of civic engagement as an independent variable becomes especially visible.

Here a key finding ought to be stressed: there are good reasons why researchers are concerned about the possibility that the positive impact of civic engagement might merely be a chimera – strong arguments have been raised supporting the «self-selection» hypothesis. Since civic engagement is heavily influenced by group homogeneity and beneficial contextual factors, it might be a mere catalyst for social inequalities – this is a finding one ought to pay particular attention to in scrutinizing the Norwegian scene. Whether institutions such as schools can level out social inequalities is still an open question.

With respect to the Internet and new media, most studies can be summarized in one sentence: up to this point, we might assume a reproduction of offline conduct in the online sphere.

Part 7, which dealt with the influence of organizations in general, portrays the contemporary situation as being subject to an intriguing paradox: on one hand, the classic institutions have lost and most likely will continue to loose ground in inspiring and sustaining young people’s civic engagement in the years to come. On the other hand, institutional policies are the very foundation for making good use of the «voids» caused by the loosening of traditional ties. In a nutshell: organizational performance might be the most decisive factor and variable in elucidating youth patterns of civic engagement.

Possible directions for future research

We do not know to what extent young people’s civic engagement can work as a precedent for age-spanning «episodic engagement» – studies focusing on patterns of engagement reveal no outcomes here. Comparing intentions, motivations and contextual factors of different age groups might prove fruitful in this regard. If the assumption proves valid – that civic engagement is primarily based on homogenous grounds and shared commitments – to what extent can societies coping with immigration, growing income disparities and value-pluralism rely on strong civil societies as means of integration? Under which circumstances does civic engagement incite heterogeneous contributors? How can it succeed in heterogeneous settings? These questions already intrigue plenty of researchers, but they have not yet been answered.

There are strong arguments for interpreting civic engagement as a catalyst for social inequality, but a change of focus might also yield interesting results: sustaining citizens’ commitment might depend less on «soft» variables like school curricula and individual motivations, and more on «hard» socio-demographic variables like income, education and peer-group behaviour.

All things considered, we might end up with economic prosperity, homogenous surroundings and shared values as prime facilitators of civic engagement, especially as far as young people are concerned. Strong institutions and the fast pace of civil society might actually not be self-perpetuating; instead they might be based on benign macro-economic conditions and subtle organizational behaviours that fill the «gaps» caused by the loosening of structural commitments. Despite the hampering circumstances, by studying organizational behaviour and how it is able to successfully inspire and sustain civic engagement, social scientists might reveal strategies and prospects for encouraging higher rates of young people’s civic engagement.
Literature


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This report is devoted to trends, patterns and explanations for civic engagement amongst younger generations in western democracies. The civic engagement amongst younger generations is of key interest for students of contemporary democracies for two reasons: at first, since it plays a salient role in sustaining strong civil societies and in turn vibrant democracies; secondly, since researchers have good reasons to assume that forecasts and predictions about the future shape of the political economy can be derived from understanding young people’s engagement patterns.

Scholars particularly interested in the Norwegian case already scrutinize to what extent younger Norwegians’ civic engagement patterns change, and whether implications and forecasts for Norway’s democracy can be deduced from these results. This report adds on to these efforts. It does not discuss the Norwegian case in particular, but offers comparative theory and data that can complement ongoing debates and research.

The report is concerned with an array of intertwined topics; they deal with conceptualizing the subject at hand, general trends in young people’s civic involvement, the most prominent concepts explaining these trends, young people’s individual motivations, environmental influences on civic engagement, the impact of socio-economic variables and the role of organizations with civic engagement of youth. The final part summarizes the report and discusses possible directions for further research.

Index terms
Young people, volunteering, civic engagement, democracy