

Report on Integrated Missions

Practical Perspectives and Recommendations

An Independent Study commissioned by the
United Nations' Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nature of the UN involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is rapidly changing. Peacekeeping is becoming more robust, and the UN is increasingly taking a stance on on-going conflicts and on the direction of change in post-conflict settings. After a decline in “blue helmet” peacekeeping around the turn of the century, there is now a rapid surge in deployment. An increasing number of operations are multifunctional in nature. Mandates range from immediate stabilisation and protection of civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance, organising elections, assisting the development of new political structures, engaging in security sector reform, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants and laying the foundations of a lasting peace.

The UN frequently works with other global institutions, regional organisations, donor countries, NGOs and host governments, in trying to achieve these ends. The Secretary-General, however, still refers to a “gaping whole” in the UN system’s institutional machinery when it comes to meeting the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace effectively.¹ While performance is improving, the success rate in long-term stabilisation is still too low, and many countries relapse into conflict after an initial period of stabilisation. This conclusion can in part be ascribed to a lack of strategic, coordinated and sustained international efforts.

An “Integrated Mission” is an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.

Beyond the very general assumption that integration is the way of the future, however, the Study Team found little specific agreement about what comprises an integrated mission in practice. There is no unified definition of the concept, nor are there set templates for integration. A variety of practices have emerged based on different actors’ and different missions’ own interpretations of the concept, some more successful than others.

At least three dilemmas are raised in relation to integration: The *humanitarian* dilemma reflects a tension between the *partiality* involved in supporting a political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect humanitarian space. The *human rights* dilemma relates to the tension that arises when the UN feels compelled to promote peace by working with those who may have unsatisfactory human rights records, while still retaining the role of an “outside critic” of the same process. The *local ownership* dilemma relates to the need to root peace processes in the host country’s society and political structures without reinforcing the very structures that led to conflict in the first place.

Furthermore, there is a continued need to ensure that the long-term perspectives of *transition and development* are embedded from the outset of a mission, that

¹ In *Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005, paragraph 114.

preparations for “post-mission activities” are done early, and that funding practices are adapted to underpin the “integrated” nature of the operation.

The Study Team concluded in favour of an approach to integration that is built on mutual respect for, and a shared understanding of, the various functions and roles that the United Nations have to play in the context of complex, multifunctional operations. For instance, the Report discusses ways that integrated missions can assist those involved in humanitarian action without compromising humanitarian impartiality and neutrality. That said, for certain humanitarian actors, integration seems to be more warranted when a peace agreement is in place and a transition from war to peace is underway than in the midst of conflict.

The Study Team does not propose fixed templates for integration. The main argument in this report is that *form must follow function*. When developing strategic and operational plans, designing mission structures and selecting key personnel for integrated missions, the desired *function* (i.e. what overarching strategic objectives the mission is supposed to achieve, and the activities needed to get there) should determine the *structure*. Only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated, and “asymmetric” models of integration may provide for deeper integration of some sectors than others. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is but one example of an area where integration is clearly required, because of the way it involves the full stabilisation-to-development spectre as well as very different actors working under very different budget regimes.

Planning for integrated missions should be an inter-organisational process both at headquarters and in the field, and should therefore involve Country Teams and other relevant actors present in the area of the operation before the integrated mission arrives. These actors, however, also need to recognise that with the advent of a Security Council mandate, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and a peacekeeping force, the “political wind” has changed and old practices may have to be adapted to new realities. Mission design must reflect the operational inputs of participating organisations, and not be reflections of the perspective of one UN department only. While integration is intended to facilitate rationalisation, the reality to date is that the implementation of integration has frequently resulted in the creation of parallel structures and in rare cases even system dysfunction.

It has also become evident in the course of preparing this report that there is a basic lack of clear, unambiguous and transparent guidelines and terms of reference for senior mission management as well as that doctrine for uniformed peacekeepers is not tailored to the requirements of integration. These gaps complicate the ways in which the issues of humanitarian space, human rights as well as development can be most effectively managed. Equally important, it has left a kind of authority vacuum in missions that need to be filled if the value of integration is to be achieved.

The Report ends with a series of recommendations, which the Study Team views as essential in order to further improve the practices of one of the UN’s most important tools in contributing to lasting peace, development and human dignity.

INTRODUCTION

Why integration?

The UN's and the international community's success rate in assisting war-ridden countries transitioning from war to lasting peace remains limited. All too often, peace agreements fail or countries relapse into conflict, even after an initial period of early stabilisation.² This regrettable fact is not the outcome of lack of interest; never has the international engagement in ending internal conflict been as high as today. The UN is approaching a record number of "blue helmet" peacekeepers deployed: currently, some 68.918 military personnel and police serve in 17 missions, and the number is expected to increase with the deployment of the recently authorised 10.000 strong UNMIS operation in the Sudan.³ More and more regional organisations are becoming engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding independently of, or in parallel with, UN efforts, and international organisations and member states alike are struggling to improve the tools required for peacebuilding. While there is a tendency to blame the limited success rate on lack of resources, it is equally possible that the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available.

In his report on UN reform, *In Larger Freedom*, the Secretary-General recognises that there is a "gaping hole" in the United Nations institutional machinery in this area: "No part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace."⁴ As an attempt to remedy this lack of overall coherence at headquarters level, an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission as well as a peacebuilding support office within the Secretariat, are proposed. They are expected to provide a forum for coordination of the "many post-conflict activities of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies" as well as the activities of bilateral donors, troop contributors, and other international organisations and international financial institutions.⁵ The Secretary-General furthermore aims to establish a cabinet-style decision-making structure in his own office. In many ways this is the UN version of the "whole of government" or "joined-upness" approach increasingly developed within key member states.

Integrated missions are conceived of as the field-level expression of the same approach. They are supposed to bring the UN's resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors. The purpose is not simply to rationalise resources, however: just as importantly, integration is seen as a prerequisite for tackling a set of peacebuilding challenges that are themselves narrowly intertwined.

It is well recognised today that security, development and human rights are intrinsically linked, but institutionally the multilateral system has not been sufficiently

² Recent studies does show a certain increase in success rate, though: see for instance Dobbins, James (ed.): *The UNs role in nation-building: From Congo to Iraq*. Rand Cooperation, Santa Monica, 2005.

³ Some 12.187 civilian personnel (international and local) also serve in these missions, in addition to the large number of personnel serving in other UN agencies, funds and programmes in the field. The combined UN troop levels may even exceed the record year of 1993 within the course of 2005.

⁴ *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005, paragraph 114.

⁵ *Ibid.* Paragraph 115.

adapted to cater for this recognition. The UN remains stove-piped, with largely separate structures for different activities. This is true both for the Secretariat itself and for the UN's intergovernmental structures. In the absence of major institutional reform – which is an issue that goes well beyond the purview of this report – integration has to start with the institutional machinery existing today.⁶

International support for transitions from war to peace requires a series of parallel efforts. *First*, it requires an overarching strategic vision of what the main goal of the UN's effort should be: what the desired “end state” of the transitional process is, what the main steps required to achieve that goal are, what part the international community should play and what the responsibilities of the host society and government are. Each mission has its own “centre of gravity”, which needs to be clearly defined.⁷ *Secondly*, mission planning has to reflect this strategic vision, in order to avoid “supply-driven” planning processes that tend to focus more on what individual actors want to do, or expect funding for, rather than what is most needed. Planning is closely related to budgeting: given the division between assessed and voluntary contributions, it is important that realistic and implementable plans for the right sequencing of efforts are addressed from the outset. *Thirdly*, in the field, integrated missions must be designed to bring all relevant UN and non-UN actors together in a way that reflects and maintains the operation's overarching vision. In mission design, there should be no fixed templates: *form should follow function* and only that which needs to be “integrated” should be brought into the “mission”.⁸

At the same time, at least three dilemmas arise out of integration, due to the trade-offs between important contending principles. The *first* dilemma relates to the contraposition of the *partiality* involved in supporting a political transition process as opposed to the continued need for *impartiality* (or neutrality) in providing certain forms of humanitarian assistance. For both the peacekeepers and development actors involved in a transitional process, their activities are normally based on a peace agreement and/or a Security Council mandate that points out a particular direction. For them, the challenge is to make sure that stability, recovery and development are linked effectively to produce the defined goal. In contrast to its Cold War days, the United Nations of today does not shy away from taking a side in a peace process, for instance in favour of an internationally recognised transitional government and against the “spoilers” trying to undermine the transitional process. On the other hand, for some humanitarian actors, be they humanitarian agencies or NGOs working closely with the UN, the well-established humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality must still be upheld. The distinction between active conflict and post-conflict is seldom clear-cut in reality, and humanitarian actors may need uninterrupted access to all areas, and communications with all actors, in order to save lives, even when the UN at large cannot due to political considerations. Several critics of integrated missions argue that integration by implication undermines the impartiality of humanitarian action. Others argue that on the contrary, “humanitarian

⁶ The Study Team believes, however, that the arguments put forward in this report also could lend themselves to discussion about institutional reforms

⁷ Centre of Gravity is discussed in further detail in Section 2.2, but refers the decisive parameters that must be influenced to achieve the strategic goal that makes all the other efforts possible, and without which the mission is likely to fail.

⁸ In the section on Mission Design, however, those consistent structural features that nevertheless should be present in any Integrated Mission are discussed.

space” can better be protected through integrated structures than in situations of fragmentation, because the humanitarian perspective is now a part of the mission itself.

A *second* dilemma relates to human rights. Often, transitional processes require that individuals and groups that themselves were part of the preceding conflict – often with blood on their hands – become accepted and at times necessary partners in making transition work. Hence, the quest for peace may suggest that past sins are forgotten, while the quest for truth, reconciliation and dignity suggests that they are brought into the open, and that a culture of impunity is avoided. The human rights system of the UN will often be required both to provide “inside” support to transitional processes (for instance in the design of governance reform measures, justice and security sector reform etc.) while maintaining the role of “outside critic” of the overall process. These roles may not always be easily reconcilable. The report nevertheless attempts to suggest ways that these contending principles can be accommodated while furthering the overall benefits of integration.

A *third* and related dilemma is the dilemma of *local ownership*. If not rooted in the host society, peace efforts are likely to fail in the long run, or parallel structures are developed outside of the formal institutions brought into place by the peace agreement and the peacebuilding effort. Hence, local capacity building and local ownership are crucial variables in modern peacebuilding. However, in some situations the key players in a national post-conflict political environment are more focused on personal economic or power gains than in contributing to genuine transformation of societal structures. Transitional governments, for instance, may at times de facto undermine or delay progress towards national elections, simply because some members do not expect to get re-elected. Former warlords, now in Government, but still controlling key resource bases, may not always be interested in a more transparent economic system. Furthermore, several issues arise in striking the right balance between encouraging home-grown solutions and the introduction of “universalist” models of statehood, including greater attention to and interaction with civil society and indigenous structures.⁹

Furthermore, there is a continued need to ensure that the long-term perspectives of *transition and development* are embedded from the outset of a mission, and that funding practices are adapted accordingly.

These dilemmas and perspectives provide an essential backdrop to this report. Its primary focus, however, is on integration in practice.

The structure of the Report

Chapter 1: Defining Integrated Missions explores the concept of integrated missions by placing it into its historical context, presenting the reasons for which the concept is promoted as well as the debate surrounding it, and concludes by presenting the Study Team’s working definition of an integrated mission.

⁹ For an interesting discussion on this theme, see Chopra, Jarat and Tanja Hohe: ‘Participatory Intervention’ in *Global Governance* 10, no 3 (2004). See also Anja Kaspersen and Ole Jacob Sending *Civilian Crisis Management in Africa* Oslo, NUPI 2005, forthcoming and Annika S. Hansen *Building Local Capacity for Maintaining Public Security*, forthcoming, Oslo, FFI 2005.

Chapter 2: Integrated Missions – Theory into Practice discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of the ways in which integrated missions are designed and implemented, with a particular focus on the issues of strategic and operational planning, mission design, leadership, and relates these structural considerations to the crucial issues of humanitarian space, human rights and development. These perspectives reflect the results of the Study Team's research at UN headquarters in New York, Geneva and Rome and its visits to six field operations, namely, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan.¹⁰

In *Chapter 3: Recommendations* the Study Team presents its specific proposals, organised along the four broad issue areas discussed in the preceding chapter. These recommendations reflect what the Study Team feels are essential for achieving the objectives of integrated missions in peacebuilding situations.

This Study was commissioned by The Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) in October 2004.¹¹ In presenting this report, the Study Team would like to express their appreciation for the time, insights, and assistance it received from UN staff in the field and at headquarters. Also it would like to thank all those multilateral institutions, donor countries, host governments, local and international NGOs and research institutes that made such important contributions to this effort. The team would like to give special thanks to OCHA's Policy Development and Studies Branch, DPKO's Best Practices Unit and the UN Development Group Office for their unstinting support, without ever seeking to infringe on the Study Team's independence.¹²

¹⁰The selection of five of the missions to be visited was set out in the TOR for the study, the Sudan was added later. The team also held several interviews with mission and UNCT staff from Afghanistan and Haiti without visiting these two missions in the context of this study. Further, the team participated in Heads of Mission and DSRSG Conferences, met with other multilateral institutions (the World Bank, the IMF), regional organisations (NATO, the European Union), NGOs and NGO consortia, and held discussions with key member states, both individually and at meetings with intergovernmental bodies (the UN Security Council, the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, the Group of 77 and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping). See Annex II about the project methodology.

¹¹ See Annex I for the Terms of Reference of this Study.

¹²The Study Team would like to thank the vast number of individuals who have given extremely valuable comments and insights to this study and commented on drafts in various stages of completion.

CHAPTER 1: DEFINING INTEGRATED MISSIONS

There is no adequate definition of an integrated mission. Nor is there an example of an integrated mission that serves as a model of what an integrated mission should be.¹³ In part this is due to the fact that beyond establishing integration as an overarching principle, the United Nations has not adequately provided operating principles that should govern such missions.

In the view of the Study Team, a clear definition would require the UN to have the will and capacity to clearly define its peacebuilding strategies for each peacebuilding mission. It would need to have the planning capacity to formulate operational objectives that were truly inter-organisational and that could be benchmarked as part of a long-term sequential process. For a definition of integrated mission that had operational impact, the UN, too, would have to commit to more modern management approaches when it came to organisational design and more accountable approaches to leadership and management. The Study Team furthermore believes some level of flexibility is required to any definition, as the conditions it needs to function within are so different. However, the Study Team believes that focusing on structural issues like the institutional set-up of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC) is insufficient. Integration is at least as much about process as it is about structures.

Before moving towards a definition that suggests what integrated missions should and could be, it is worth reflecting briefly on some of the historical and institutional factors that have influenced the theory and practice of integrated missions to date. While logic and broader trends within the UN system suggest that integrated missions are the best way for the UN to have maximum impact in the complex environment of peacebuilding, the practical reality to date is that the implementation of integration has frequently resulted in the creation of parallel structures, and in rare cases even system dysfunction.

¹³ There are nevertheless various perspectives emerging from those who have had practical day-to-day experience in peacebuilding missions about what integration is in practice. Frequently, the focus is on structural aspects of integration. In operations based on traditional and 'narrow' peacekeeping mandates (as overseeing a ceasefire between to clearly defined parties), there may be no need for integration. Using the role of the humanitarian coordinator as an indicator of perceived integration, in situations where traditional mandates (ie, authorised under Chapter VI, such missions as UNIFIL, UNMEE (though with a strong UNCT HC), UNDOF, UNTSO, MINURSO (though with an electoral dimension) and UNMOGIP, the humanitarian coordinator and his or her structure remain separate from the peacekeeping element. Following this line of thought, *partial* integration is perceived as situations in which the Humanitarian Coordinator is included in the mission structure in the function of a plural hatted DSRSG, usually a mix of HC/RC/Resident Representative and DSRG, while the OCHA office remains a separate entity and the day-to-day work of the UNDP is done by a Country Director (in all missions visited, also in a separate location). Partial integration is one that endorses integrated procedures, not systems, as the way to deal with the diversity of the UN system. This is consistent with the approaches that have been implemented in UNAMSIL, MINUSTAH, MONUC, ONUB, MINUCI and UNMIS. At the other end of the spectrum, in the fully integrated model, and again using the Humanitarian Coordinator as a symbol of the model, he or she and a support team are all part of the mission structure under the leadership of the SRSR. Full integration proposes that all UN components are merged into one structure. Its proponents, including some in the Liberia mission, argue that the UN can only realise its full impact when the system's structure as well as functions are harmonised. Examples of this type of mission include UNMIK, UNMIL, UNAMA, UNAMI, and UNTAET.

1.1 Historical context

The origins of integrated missions can be found in the transition from “first generation” peacekeeping to the complex, multifunctional operations that have characterised the post-Cold War period. By the early 1990s, the UN increasingly found itself in the midst of a series of “complex emergencies” that simultaneously called on the political, military, humanitarian and developmental sides of the UN system.¹⁴ The majority of the UN’s contemporary operations are multifunctional. Typically, they are based on an internationally brokered peace agreement between former warring factions. Security Council mandates generally state objectives that reach well beyond what can be achieved by the mission itself. Hence, the success of the mission, in a narrow sense, depends on the success of the overall efforts – of the UN Agencies, international financial institutions, regional organisations, bilateral donors and NGOs as well as national and local authorities. At the same time, a new peacekeeping environment is evolving: more and more operations are “hybrid” in the sense that the UN is responsible for only parts of the overall effort, as in the Balkans, Afghanistan or the Sudan. Hence, in seeking to maximise its own peacebuilding capacities through mission integration, the UN’s new challenge is to determine how its own integrated activities and structures can be supportive and principled without becoming subordinate to the objectives of others in the field.

The objective of the UN’s peacekeeping missions evolved from maintaining the *status quo* (as defined, for instance, by a cease-fire agreement) to a more ambitious programme of *managing transitions* – assisting in post-conflict reconstruction, and in some instances, state-building. Mandates typically authorised the mission to assist in establishing minimum conditions of security, organising elections, developing new political structures, engaging in security sector reform, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants, and laying the foundations of a lasting peace – often in adverse conditions. Even as the enhanced stature of the UN was broadly celebrated after 1990, several notable failures – Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia – instigated a reform process at the UN when it came to its peacekeeping responsibilities. The reforms also led to an increased understanding that, in transitions from war to peace, security and development are inextricably linked. The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, as defined by the UN Secretary-General, refers to the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. The multi-dimensional nature of such an enterprise, thus, demands effective coordination measures.¹⁵

In parallel with the growth of efforts to manage transitions was a spate of highly complicated and large-scale humanitarian crises. Emergencies such as Ethiopia and Somalia in 1991, coming in the wake of state collapse, exposed the fact that the UN had few means to garner the capacity of its own system, let alone, a wider system to assist those so urgently in need. In 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 46/182 which gave the United Nations the role of overall coordinator, but at the same time reaffirmed the fundamental importance of abiding by the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Unappreciated by many of those directly involved in the creation of the resolution, GA 46/182 was to add an additional burden

¹⁴ Examples could be found in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Haiti, Mozambique and Somalia.

¹⁵ *Renewing the United Nations - A programme for reform*, A/51/950

to the complex and multidimensional work of the United Nations, namely, to pursue the *partial* engagement of peacebuilding while at the same time to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that were *impartial*.

Attempts to reconcile these contending issues as well as to make the organisation more responsive to the growing demands of peacebuilding were reflected in the Secretary-General's continued quest for a more effective UN. In his 1997 report on *Renewing the United Nations – a Programme for Reform*,¹⁶ he called for a more integrated and unified UN, both at headquarters and in the field. To this effect he gave his Special Representatives (SRSGs) more authority, and “instituted a system of integrated missions”. The SG declared that system-wide integration in the field would be one of his key objectives,¹⁷ particularly when it came to peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, both in the field and at headquarters. The purpose was to ensure “that humanitarian strategies as well as longer-term development aims are fully integrated into the overall peacekeeping effort”¹⁸ In promoting integration he emphasised that “the reform process is designed to maintain and reinforce the distinctive nature of UN entities while seeking to facilitate their functioning in a more unified, cooperative and coherent framework as members of the United Nations family”¹⁹.

The principle of integration was also reflected in the note of guidance issued by the Secretary-General in October 2000, clarifying the relations between SRSGs, RCs and HCs, and giving the SRSG in residence the mandate to give political guidance to the UN presences on the ground²⁰.

Subsequently, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, more commonly known as the *Brahimi Report*, proposed concrete ways to harness all UN resources in order to consolidate peace and support the re-establishment of a stable and legitimate central government. While the Brahimi Report did not refer to integrated missions as such, it proposed that *Integrated Mission Task Forces* should become the standard vehicle for planning and supporting UN missions.²¹

The Integrated Mission concept was initially developed for Kosovo in 1999 in order to ensure an effective division of labour between different actors operating on distinct mandates of peace implementation in Kosovo.²² The Kosovo Integrated Mission largely succeeded in resolving “technical” issues of day-to-day coordination and policy differences. However, with the large numbers of regional organisations (the EU, NATO and OSCE etc.), UN agencies and major powers directly involved in the

¹⁶ *Renewing the United Nations – A programme for reform*, A/51/950

¹⁷ In his 1997 report, *Reviewing the UN – a programme for reform*, he declared that the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) should be given ‘authority over all UN entities’ in field operations.

¹⁸ SG Annual report 1997, para 116 and 117

¹⁹ A/51/950 14 July 1997, para 149

²⁰ Note from the Secretary-General, Guidance on the relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, 11 December 2000; DPKO, Civil Military Coordination Policy, 9 September 2002

²¹ A/55/305-S/2000/809 p. 34-37.

²² Bruce D. Jones: *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*. International Peace Academy, June 2001

process, there was still a “lack of cohesion among major powers and differing, even contradictory, policy goals contributed further to the overall incoherence in the international response mechanisms.”²³

The concept has since been revised, refined and adapted to UN missions in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire and the Sudan.²⁴ In particular, the experiences of Sierra Leone had a strong influence on how the concept is understood and applied today, in particular with regard to the role of a multi-hatted Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).²⁵

1.2 Overarching perspectives

The Secretary-General recently noted that “United Nations peacekeeping missions today are much better designed than they used to be, and have a more integrated understanding of the many different tasks involved in preventing a recurrence of fighting and laying the foundations of a lasting peace.”²⁶

There is, however, no commonly agreed understanding of what qualifies as an integrated mission. For the UN, the system’s multiple goals and institutional cultures explain some of the main difficulties that arise when trying to define integrated missions as concept and practice. The UN, broadly speaking, approaches the issue of integrated missions from three perspectives:

- restoration of stability, law and order
- protection of civilians
- providing the foundations for long-term recovery, development and democratic governance

All these perspectives are ostensibly inter-related. In reality, however, each leads to differing views on the objectives and priorities of integration for different clusters of peacekeeping, development and humanitarian actors.

Peacekeepers typically see integrated missions in terms of supporting peace agreements, ensuring stability through the cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilisation, creating civilian structures to enforce policing and judicial functions, and promoting the return of civilian governance – normally through an election process. Each of these objectives is bound by specific sets of time-bound actions, but it is broadly recognised that the purpose of these activities is to lay the early foundations for long-term peacebuilding.

Development actors undoubtedly share many of the same objectives as the more security oriented actors, as evidenced in their common interest in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). The

²³ Susan Woodward: “Economic Priorities in Peace Implementation’ in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens eds, *Ending Civil Wars: Volume II. Evaluating Implementation of Peace Agreements*

²⁴ Prior to this, the closest the UN system had come to establishing a system of formal authority for coordination was the use of the lead agency model. I.e. Former Yugoslavia

²⁵ See Manfred Eisele’s evaluation of UNAMSIL in 2000, Secretary-General Reports on Sierra Leone to the Security Council in 2000 and 2001, Lessons Learned report from UNAMSIL, PBPU 2003 and Alan Doss “Squaring the Circle’ January 2003.

²⁶ *In Larger Freedom*, op. cit., paragraph 155

difference between the two clusters centres principally on the dimensions of time, process and level. Yet, “at the country level ... fragmentation and overlap make it difficult for the United Nations to respond to the needs of countries in a consistent, coherent and cost-effective manner”.²⁷

If immediate stabilisation and relief are not followed by transitional and development efforts, conflicts tend to return, as has been dramatically illustrated by several recent experiences from Liberia to Haiti and Afghanistan²⁸. But without security, development will not take hold in the first place. On a conceptual level, this inter-relationship between security and development is well recognised. The UN and the wider international community, nevertheless, are still struggling to transform this conceptual recognition into actual practice.

A key question in this context is therefore whether long-term transitional and developmental perspectives are given the necessary attention when planning for and implementing integrated missions. Peacebuilding takes several years, and requires strategic sequencing of different actions. This highlights not only the issue of the duration of mandates, but also the importance of planning for post-mission commitment and for the involvement of national governments, civil society and regional organisations.

A third cluster of actors affected by integration involves those dealing with *humanitarian* assistance. Their perspectives are based on a set of principles (i.e., humanity, impartiality and neutrality), which cannot be easily reconciled with the sort of political processes required for peacebuilding. And yet, those humanitarian actors in the UN are part of a system which, in its peacebuilding pursuits, is deeply political. Their perspectives therefore have to contend with a host of contradictions. Integration, for example, inevitably implies politicisation for those actors focused upon the objectives of durable peace. Humanitarian actors, though concerned with enduring peace and stability, are primarily focused upon what are regarded as the apolitical objectives of preserving and saving lives.

A key concern raised by parts of the humanitarian community – both by humanitarian agencies and NGOs working alongside the UN in the field – relates to the possibility of infringement of humanitarian principles that could follow from integration. Those defending this position typically argue that integrated missions, with its political leadership, almost by definition will end up prioritising what is seen to further the overarching political goals of the mission, even when this contrasts with the immediate humanitarian concerns related to saving lives.²⁹

Beyond the immediate needs of beneficiaries, there is another very practical element to their argument. They hold that the mere fact of operating side-by-side with the military and political components of a mission puts humanitarian actors at risk of being identified with the mission. Accordingly, they become soft targets for enemies

²⁷ A/51/950 14 July 1997, paragraph 149

²⁸ See, for instance, Paul Collier: *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, (Washington DC, World Bank Publications 2003)

²⁹ The debate precedes integrated missions as such. In Somalia in 1992 then SRSG was reported to have told the World Food Programme that 10.000 mts of food would not be offloaded to feed almost 250.000 IDPs ‘in order to teach their leaders (the warlords) a lesson.’

of the mission, and their operations are undermined by the resulting security constraints. As frequently noted, “these principles are practical. They help us save lives and help save our lives.” Other humanitarian actors argue that, quite to the contrary, in violent and complex political environments, humanitarianism must join in broader efforts to protect the lives of people through building peace.

This debate raises the issue of what one means by “humanitarian” and its very boundaries. One of the problems that became apparent to the Study Team is the difficulty for those in missions to translate the scope of humanitarianism into operational terms. Over the past two decades, the subject has become increasingly amorphous and its boundaries uncertain. A more precise agreement on humanitarian activities and “humanitarian space” in the often hazardous environments of complex peacebuilding operations would be important for all. A more restricted focus, for example, upon urgently required assistance to protect and save lives, would provide a clearer understanding of what was needed and why to safeguard the humanitarian operating environment.

1.3 Towards a working definition of integrated missions

For the purposes of this report, the term “integrated mission” is defined as *an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.*

In defining the purpose of engagement, the UN should set out the steps for agreeing on common objectives and strategy based on the comparative advantages of the UN system. It should provide an organisational structure and draw from pooled resources to achieve these objectives and ensure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness for the beneficiaries.

Thus, an integrated mission should entail:

- A clearly defined purpose for UN engagement, based on a robust analysis of the situation. The nature of the situation and the development of the UN objective for engagement should determine the composition, role, scope of authority and, as applicable, the latitude for freedom of action of the UN capabilities working with, and through, the representative of the Secretary-General within clear chains of command;
- A structure to ensure effective external and internal communications, the ability to deploy needed assets and resources, and capacities to monitor, review and revise in collaboration with headquarters strategic and operational objectives;
- A process whereby the wider United Nations system is mobilised and collaborates, in pursuit of the goals defined by the integrated mission planning process.

Where the UN works with regional organisations, other multilateral organisations or multinational forces, an UN integrated mission should also provide the background of

overall international community coordination to achieve commonly defined objectives.

This construct serves as the basis for comparing and contrasting realities in the field and at headquarters against the desired outcomes. The following chapter attempts to weigh this theoretical construct against realities.

CHAPTER 2: INTEGRATED MISSIONS – THEORY INTO PRACTICE

There are a variety of aspects that are working well under the broad rubric of integrated missions. Recent selections for senior mission management positions have brought on board personnel that are more knowledgeable and better prepared to deal with the multidimensional complexities of integrated missions. This is not to suggest that the selection process should not be more transparent and that the pool of candidates could not be widened. It does suggest, however, that senior mission staff are better able to balance the contending demands between the political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights objectives of the UN's in-country activities than what was the case five years ago.

Overall there is also a general acceptance throughout the UN system that integrated missions – in some form – are the way of the future for the United Nations in post-conflict situations. This acceptance must be acknowledged as a breakthrough; for whatever uncertainties surround the theory and practice of integrated missions today, at least the need for practical manifestations of system coherence has been accepted. It should be recognised, however, that some actors in close proximity to the UN remain highly sceptical of integration, a fact that is particularly evident in parts of the international NGO community.

It is also important to note that, though by no means sufficiently adequate, integrated missions have operational objectives that are at least no longer restricted to enforcing or overseeing peace accords. A broader perspective of mission responsibilities has been accepted, and adds reality to the UN's commitment to foster sustainable peace. In this context, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), rule of law and security sector reform (SSR) are just some of the activities pursued in various ways by most integrated missions.

The role of human rights, too, has become a mission norm, supported by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and DPKO. This MOU is one of several MOUs finalised or in the process of finalisation between DPKO's mission planners and other UN bodies. This, too, is further evidence of efforts to bring together the capacities of the system in more systematic ways.

A number of activities intended to strengthen both the concept and operational realities of integrated missions are underway. They range from Standard Training Modules and DPKO's proposed integrated mission guidelines to efforts to systematise assessments of economic impacts of integrated missions and senior leadership induction programmes. All these are clear demonstrations of commitment to the concept of integrated missions and to improving the ways such missions function.

In that regard, there is still a great deal more to do; and this became evident when the Study Team moved from its theoretical construct of what integrated missions should be, to the practice at headquarters and in-country levels.

2.1 The core issue: form must follow function

The main argument in this report is that *form must follow function*. When developing strategic and operational plans, designing mission structures and selecting key personnel for integrated missions, the desired *function* (i.e. what overarching objectives the mission is supposed to achieve, and the activities needed to get there) should determine the *structure*. Hence, fixed templates should be avoided. Only that which needs to be integrated should be integrated, and “asymmetric” models of integration may provide for deeper integration of some sectors rather than others.

Lack of common understanding about integration

In a meeting of DSRSs organised by UNDGO in March 2005, the participants noted that there is rarely anyone below senior management in missions who has a full appreciation of what integrated missions are or are supposed to be. This point was even more evident in meetings with NGOs and civil society that were arranged by OCHA on behalf of the Study Team in all the missions visited.

UN Country Teams and NGOs contended that the concept of “integrated missions” and what it would imply for their daily work were not adequately conveyed to them. The Study Team was repeatedly asked by UNCTs and NGOs about what an integrated mission actually was. In some cases, integration had been “declared” rather than arrived at through mutual exchanges, and NGO and UN agency personnel felt insufficiently involved in discussions about its remit for their own area of operations.

When the term “integrated mission” is used, the Study Team found that for non-mission UN staff, “integration” is often understood as “integration into DPKO”, as the word “mission” is strongly associated with the *peacekeeping* mission. The Study Team found less evidence of complete resistance to integration *per se*, however. Several non-DPKO interlocutors argued that if integration really was about bringing the whole UN community together as equals, then they would support it, but that current structures represented a one-way transfer of power from UNCTs to “missions”, with the latter being understood as DPKO-run entities.

Each mission adopts a different approach, embodies a different structure and pursues different objectives. This does not necessarily imply that they are sensitive to the particular context in which it operates, but rather that each mission instead introduces mission structures in a relatively improvised manner. In three different missions, senior management explained that it had applied best practices from other missions. Yet, there was no evidence that such practices had ever been rigorously and systematically identified. Rather, as was apparent in the case of Liberia and Sudan and to a lesser extent in the case of Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, design reflects the inclinations and predilections of senior mission management, with little if any substantive reference to best practices, concepts of integration or modern management practices.

These diverging approaches mask a more fundamental problem relating to tensions that emerge between the UN Country Team and DPKO-led missions.

The members of the UNCT, in most cases, had been working in the country in question before the mission arrived. In their view, missions “descend” on them with their white vehicles, military troops and equipment, along with their alleged military

mindsets and robust behaviour. They assert that the mission is now in charge, and that all UN activities should be under the auspices of the SRSG. Newly arrived political and civil affairs officers are perceived to act, it is argued, as if they are experts, with scant regard for the expertise of those already in place. In almost all cases, members of the UNCT held that they were not involved in the planning of the new mission to the degree they would like. A large number of field staff felt that mission planners had created structures from pre-conceived and mostly inappropriate templates. Mission planners are often seen as being oblivious to the experience, capacity and mandate of other UN actors, who feel that the purpose of the mission is principally to “subordinate” other actors rather than including them.

From the perspective of the DPKO field staff, on the other hand, key personnel claim that the Country Teams are unwilling to adapt to the new realities. The perceived “old-timers”, they argue, do not recognise the extent to which the “political wind” has changed due to a peace agreement, a recognised transitional government and a Security Council mandate. These are typically situations in which the bulk of the UN efforts move from being “impartial” (to the warring factions) to “partial”, in that the UN subsequently supports a specific transitional process. According to some incoming mission personnel, the implications of this transformation are not always appreciated by the pre-existing UN presence. These conflicts can be ascribed to institutional, structural, cultural and personal factors. They all, however, influence the atmosphere in which integrated missions are developed.

Some SRSGs, recognising this problem, reported that they regretted not involving the UNCT more at an earlier stage in the process. Others argued that, while they would have liked to work more closely with the UNCT, the members of the UNCT in their mission area were perhaps not the right ones for the new situation, and that there were limits to how useful they could be in, for instance, the planning process.

Both mission and UNCT personnel pointed out to the Study Team that some of the limitations to integration in the field actually flowed from the fact that headquarters itself remain fragmented. Frequent turf battles in HQ were an example cited by many as a constraint on more effective integration, beginning with the prospect of system-wide planning processes. It was argued that the actors in the field couldn’t be expected to solve these issues on their own while receiving contradictory signals from their respective headquarters.

An issue that further complicated the relationship between mission planners, senior mission management and members of the UNCT is the confusion or outright disagreement over the *hierarchy of mandates* that should guide the overall UN effort. Repeatedly, the Study Team found that some individual agencies argued that their “mandates” were based upon international obligations that transcended Security Council mandates, or the original resolution establishing their agency. Not all agencies or UNCT members saw the adoption of a Security Council mandate authorising a UN mission into their country of operation as actually affecting the nature of their own job. SRSGs and key mission personnel, on the other hand, would refer to the Mandate establishing the mission itself, and point to the fact that there is one UN and one Secretary-General. Even within the Secretariat itself, this tension between the “original” mandates of, for instance, UN funds and programmes and the calls for integration expressed in Security Council mandates remains unresolved.

The Brahimi Report strongly emphasised the need to avoid fixed templates, and to be sensitive not only to local and regional cultures, but also to a country's economic and political situation. DPKO planners, on the other hand, have noted the difficulties in trying to introduce "context" into the planning process, particularly given that the *status quo* in most conflict and post-conflict countries is far from uniform: some areas may be at peace, others embroiled in fighting, and others in transition. One country can reflect different levels of economic and institutional development, while the sources of instability as well as future economic growth may originate from outside a country as much as from within.

From its extensive discussions at headquarters and in the field, the Study Team has drawn two overarching conclusions about integrated missions. In the first place, headquarters does not have a consistent and thorough appreciation of the purpose of integrated missions. This is reflected in the field: in the mission itself, among the wider international community and by the local society in the host countries. Secondly, the UN approach has been overly concerned with the structure of missions, and far less focused on the strategies required to ensure sustainable peace. What needs to be integrated, when and how it should occur, and with whom, should instead be determined by the mission's strategic policies and operational objectives that stem from those policies. Once again, form should follow function.

Based on the second conclusion, the process by which strategic policy is formulated and ultimately translated into operational objectives should lie at the core of integrated missions. Once this is accepted, the issue of clarity and purpose raised in the first overarching conclusion should also be resolved.

2.2 Strategic policy perspectives

Strategy refers to *the art of distributing and providing means to fulfil the ends of policy*.³⁰ A strategic vision is the overarching statement that both describes the desired end-state and defines the actions necessary to achieve this. Establishing a strategy implies making clear priorities: while complex peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations all require a myriad of activities, but the strategy should be clear about what the *centre of gravity* (or "main effort") should be. The centre of gravity (in this context) is the decisive parameters that must be influenced to make all the other efforts possible (and without which, the operation is likely to fail). Strategic visions and centres of gravity will have to be mission-specific. One mission may have to concentrate on assisting the formation of a new national government out of diverging power centres; another operation may have a local government to relate to but needs to focus on key transitional tasks to make a peace agreement stick. Without a defined (and agreed) centre of gravity, a plethora of individual efforts may exist in parallel but not necessarily contribute to an overall goal.

³⁰ The concept is derived from military theory, but is here used in the broad sense of prioritising and allocating efforts and resources based on a defined, overarching goal. See for instance Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, 'Introduction: On Strategy' in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (ed.), *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.1

The strategic vision may have to be regularly updated in order to cater for new developments. In the real world, the fluidity of the situation in the mission area may not lend itself to clear definitions of the long-term goals at the time of planning the mission, hence, initial assumptions and priorities may need to be revisited as the situation evolves. That said, a crucial argument here is that *some* indication of the longer-term development goals should be included from the outset in any given situation, even where the focus has to be on immediate stabilisation. Issues of local ownership, national capacity building and the inclusion of non-UN stakeholders should be included in the strategic vision.

In discussions with key headquarters personnel it became clear that the UN lacks a system-wide “strategic culture”. Nor for that matter is there a “real culture of planning” in the UN, whether it be planning by objectives, contingency planning, etc. In part this is because the system, broadly speaking, is reactive rather than proactive, and departmental or agency perspectives and interests tend to overshadow the need for more holistic approaches. There is widespread recognition of these weaknesses in the Secretariat itself, and these findings seem to be confirmed by other studies. A major study on UN peacebuilding operations concluded that the UN Secretariat and the DPKO in particular needed to strengthen their strategic planning capacity. The study made specific reference to the need to ensure that that capacity is far more “context driven.”³¹

The problem clearly is not limited to the Secretariat. The Security Council frequently authorises broad mandates, stating bold, long-term goals, without sufficient prior consultation with, for example, the ACABQ about the feasibility of corresponding funding. The discrepancy between ambitious mandates and limited and unpredictable funding remains a crucial problem to enable strategic thinking in the UN.

2.3 Mission planning

Operational planning should be based on the clear priorities for the overall UN effort set by the strategic vision. Ideally, the planning process should be as inclusive as possible by bringing together the key departments, other relevant non-UN entities, and stakeholders at both headquarters and field levels.

The UN’s main operational department, DPKO, has developed extensive planning capacity within the remit of its core functions. This has given the UN an ability to deploy peacekeepers far more swiftly and effectively than had been the case a few years ago. Given the logistical and personnel-related challenges these entail, this is a very commendable development that seems to answer parts of the critique of the UN from the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, mission planning still does not reflect an overall strategic vision of what the UN is supposed to achieve in terms of durable peacebuilding.

³¹ Nicola Dahrendorf et al., *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, Kings College, London, 2003, p. 18. Another well-placed observer commented about the implementation of the Brahimi Report that ‘more concrete and operational recommendations, implementable by the UN bureaucracy, fared better than those pitched at the level of doctrine or strategy or those addressed to the member states themselves.’ William Durch et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 2003, p.xv’

Senior officials from different departments rarely join forces to discuss the overriding imperatives of a given situation. In its place, discussions at this level tend to focus on appointments and structures. As discussed above, the Secretary-General's Cabinet should be responsible for ensuring that genuine interaction about the policy parameters is ensured from the outset as well as throughout the process.

The UN has experimented with various ways of utilising its capacity in the operational planning process. The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) has been used with mixed results thus far. The IMTF process was undermined by a lack of clear lines of authority and decision-making leverage.³² In the field, it was frequently felt that the IMTF process had not been sufficiently country focused, but that it primarily had provided a very loose form of integration at headquarters level. IMTF had, it was suggested, been "shut down by DPKO" and the whole process was not taken sufficiently seriously. The full benefits of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), on the other hand, still needed to be tested and conformed into a UN system-wide planning tool, expanding with a plan of implementation, in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders. Similarly, the implementation of the Integrated Task Force (ITF) concept still has to contend with the challenge of transforming a plan developed at headquarters into a sustainable field product.

In a related vein, the implications for the advance mission concept might also be considered for future pre-mission planning. Although the situation in the Sudan in 2004 was unusual in several aspects, the advance mission concept – as applied in UNAMIS – can be a very valuable tool for United Nations peace operations to better ensure integration from the outset of a mission. It offers opportunities to begin identifying key players and establish connections in the field even before a Security Council mandate is in place. Advance missions should, as other integrated missions, be inclusive of the emergency, transition and development roles that will be involved in the succeeding mission once it is in place, so that advance-planning processes are not exclusively focused on short-term needs.

One of the most difficult mission planning challenges to be addressed revolves around the issue of "inclusion", who, when and how are those that can contribute to the peacebuilding process to be best engaged. Mission planning must engage UNCTs, and they in turn must be able to adapt their own activities to the new realities emerging from an integrated mission. As was noted earlier, they need to do so in ways that avoid supply-driven planning processes, where participating organisations compete to carve out a space for themselves based on what they already do, would like to do, or expect funding for.

One of the problems that need to be faced is ways to promote that appropriate levels of *inclusiveness* for the all important development sector. To some extent, OCHA fulfils that function for humanitarian actors. That is to say, that OCHA can on occasion act as conduit for the opinions of IASC-participating organisations. It can and has on various occasions served as a humanitarian advocate and, through the

³²Evaluation of the Afghanistan/UNAMA IMTF, 7 February 2002 and Briefing on IMTF to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations by Salman Ahmed, DPKO, 11 March 2003; Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 2003

IASC, generate common positions, humanitarian-related training programmes, policies and position papers.

The undg membership seems to be reluctant to see the undg develop into a substantively pro-active entity. One might assume that whereas OCHA could garner the views of its constituency on matters pertaining to integration and present them accordingly, or could use the IASC to determine levels of inclusiveness, undg would not be able to achieve the same substantive level of coherence and agreement.

If development actors are to have a truly coherent and substantive role in mission integration, then there ought to be a means by which agreement is achieved as to what that role should be. If OCHA offers lessons about ways to generate greater coherence within the humanitarian community, the development community should be attentive to what those lessons are.

When representatives from OCHA, DPA, undgo and other UN organisations stressed that existing “integrated” mission planning processes were too DPKO-driven, one might also suggest that from the development side that may in part be due to the fact that development actors have not agreed on ways to participate in DPKO planning processes.

All three – OCHA, DPA, undgo – have argued that DPKO comes with its own perspectives on what the rest of the UN needed. These respondents recognised at the same time that they had not necessarily been as effective as they felt they should be at responding to DPKO’s requests for inputs. They also implied that DPKO’s failure to consult adequately had in part to do with being overstretched and under ever mounting pressure. DPA sources argue that in many cases, their political analysis is only sought after key parameters have been set.

In tracing the patterns of mission planning at the headquarters and field levels, the Study Team identified three issues that were of particular importance to the planning process. The *first* was that there is extensive knowledge at the field level about countries that might host peacebuilding missions. This information resides within the UNCT, and yet the reports that are finally transmitted by the RC/HC and received by headquarters are often too anodyne to provide sound planning information. The reports themselves are rarely brought together in an integrated way by the various political, development and humanitarian recipients, and feedback on such reports the exception rather than the rule.

Secondly, there is no single entity at headquarters that can link an integrated headquarters approach to the field and, more specifically, to the Country Team in the pre-planning and planning stages of missions. Thirdly, UNCTs have little if any training in planning. Most representatives of UN agencies in the field have been involved in programme design and implementation, but few have been exposed to planning methodologies, per se. Hence, for planners from headquarters to receive the sort of *participative* field support that they require, the field has to be capacitated accordingly. The Resident Coordinator will need to play a crucial role in this respect.

Thirdly, planning has consistently lacked anything that approaches adequate dialogue and exchange with national and local authorities as well as civil society groups and

local NGOs. No matter how tired the mantra, the Study Team was amazed in most of the countries it visited how isolated the activities of the mission were, and how rarely did the officials or local organisation representatives whom the team interviewed mention their involvement in mission objectives, let alone input into planning.

This last point to some extent relates to another planning gap, namely that mission planning exercises normally do not take into account the broader macro-economic consequences of peacebuilding missions. There is, in other words, little evidence that the macro-economic implications of integrated missions themselves were incorporated into the planning process;³³ and – based on the team’s discussions with officials from the IMF – this can be done and should be done.

Peacebuilding missions are marked by rapidity of change, unpredictable consequences and complexity. The plans that one might develop at the outset of a mission inevitably will require adjustments along the line. Yet, neither at headquarters nor in the field are operational plans subjected to systematic and rigorous reviews to update and adjust overall strategies and operational objectives. Such a review process is essential, and should be seen as a permanent aspect of mission design and working procedures. Here, again, no SRSG office has the sort of planning or planning review capacity that could systematically accommodate this essential planning and planning review requirement.

2.4 Mission design

Having established that form should follow function, the next critical challenge is how best to design or structure an integrated mission. While there should be no fixed templates, the Study Team did note certain consistent issues – strengths as well as weaknesses – that should be considered when designing missions. These issues were reflected in the team’s observations about development and related funding matters as well as about humanitarian space, human rights and relations with host governments and civil society.

2.4.1 Development and mission design

One of the principal arguments for integration is to ensure that a long-term developmental perspective is included in the strategic vision and mission planning. Not only should the “long-term” perspective guide early efforts, but deliberate mechanisms must be introduced for ensuring that activities introduced in the “stabilisation” or “humanitarian” phase are carried over to the “developmental” phase.

Long-term success in peacebuilding requires that efforts to support recovery and development be built into the operation from the start.³⁴ The Study Team found, however, that mandates establishing integrated missions rarely provided such a precise definition of the scope of economic growth and development, nor of concrete long-term goals. There is room for improvement, as noted earlier, when it comes to

³³ A Study aimed at finding better ways of measuring economic impacts of peacekeeping operations is being developed, however, by the UN and the Peace Dividend Trust. See also Ramesh Thakur et al: *Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations* (United Nations University, forthcoming).

³⁴ UNDP internal paper on Integrated Missions (2004) – op.cit.

utilise local NGOs or civil society organisations, the wider UN system, and various important international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the IFIs. The planning that does take place normally occurs just prior to the establishment of a mission, even though the tools and expertise housed in many international institutions could feed into regular monitoring of economic trends and provide early warning and planning advice. Nor do integrated missions fully incorporate a regional perspective when planning development activities, particularly in terms of facilitating the movement of people, goods and remittances.

When it comes to mission design, the same DSRSG position that is supposed to protect humanitarian space from the political objectives of integrated missions is also needed to play a more *integrative* role for transitional measures and longer-term development.³⁵ Given the importance of the DSRSG as a conduit between the development focus of the UNCT, the transitional objectives of the mission, and the development-security interface, it was discouraging that no mission had adequate mechanisms to use the broad capacities of the UN system to promote peacebuilding. Individual UN agencies engaged with various parts of the mission, but there was no consistent pattern of interaction across the mission. DSRSGs in their “resident coordinator” function ensured that information was shared and views exchanged, but did not introduce or foster initiatives that would mobilise the UNCT *as a whole* towards a UN mission objective. Furthermore, the RC component of the DSRSG role tends to be inadequately staffed and funded, given the complex task they are expected to fulfil. UNDGO should be the key “home base” for this function, but it should also be recognised that current UNDGO resources are inadequate to fully support this task.

If missions are to be effectively integrated, then the capacities of the agencies need to be focussed upon a set of priority operational objectives that directly stem from the proposed mission strategy. The consistent tendency of mission planners and designers to create parallel structures to fulfil transitional and development tasks seemed to the team to be a contradiction to the fundamental purposes of integration. The UNCT should form the backbone of operational design for essential peacebuilding programmes such as DDR and SSR. UNDP should take the lead in regard to such programmes, under the overall coordination of the Resident Coordinator. To promote this sort of integration, however, the agencies will have to show their own commitment to the process by being more pro-active in the planning process, ensuring that the relevant expertise is on board and working more closely and coherently with other partners such as the World Bank.

2.4.2 Funding, resource management and mission design

In discussions with agencies, the concern was regularly raised about the impact of integrated missions on their individual programme resources. Even in those instances where agencies would like to become more involved in mission objectives, there is a clear concern that they will neither have the funds nor the financial flexibility to restructure funding arrangements. In conversations with mission Chiefs of Administration as well as with UN agency representatives, it was apparent that the financial rules and regulations do not support the flexibility that complex

³⁵ The role of the DSRSG in his or her HC capacity is discussed below in the section on humanitarian space.

peacebuilding efforts demand. Similarly, unless missions have some means by which they can mobilise resources on behalf of all UN entities that are needed to achieve the UN's strategic vision, there will always be reluctance to participate. This appears to be the case, despite the Secretary-General's recent call for joint programming.³⁶

And yet, as the DAC guidelines clearly suggest, the challenge "is to overcome the functional distinctions of the various agencies involved and to integrate, rather than merely coordinate, relief, rehabilitation and development objectives within the framework of a long-term strategy"³⁷ Rendering effective responses to address the challenge identified above, should at a minimum include an agreed strategy, a convening authority, common needs assessment tools including country specific analyses, real time evaluation tools, field based coordination and management mechanisms, strategic financing mechanism and mechanisms of tracking and monitoring of financial flows.³⁸

The problem in meeting the challenges posed by the DAC and very evident in the field is that, when it comes to development resources or resources for transitional periods to development, the instruments or field support are not available. Nor, for that matter, is there adequate commitment on the part of the donors.

Post-Conflict Needs Assessments and Joint Assessment Missions are supposed to lead to a transitional results framework that should in turn define the work of the development community over a multi-year period. Yet, before doing so there would have to be agreement on what such frameworks were to achieve, and how they were to be achieved. In a recent meeting of a Joint ECHA/UNDG Task Team on transition financing, the lack of capacity in UNCTs was evident. "There was general agreement," according to the minutes of the task force, "that the UNCTs were not being provided equivalent support in planning and managing the recovery and development aspects of transitional situations as they were being provided for the humanitarian aspects..."³⁹

This lack of support was reflected not only in the fact that UN agencies in the field lacked adequate staff resources to switch into recovery planning and programming, but that there was no adequate guidance documentation to steer country offices during interim periods while the slow PCNA/JAM processes were underway.

Of considerable importance in this regard is the use of Multi-donor Trust Funds to support integrated mission objectives, including DDR and SSR. It is clear that such trust funds can have significant impact, and their importance in DDR & Reintegration

³⁶ The Secretary-General agenda for UN reform called for increased joint programming and pooling of resources to further enhance the effectiveness of the UN to ensure the system's combined resources are put to best use.³⁶ The idea of joint programming as a realistic mechanism to mobilise resources was seen as bringing out the comparative advantage of the different UN agencies. Joint programming should not be viewed as competition for resources, since donors are prepared to provide resources for such activities. Moreover, an interagency assessment needs to be followed by a inter agency monitoring and evaluation process.

³⁷ *Conflict, peace and development co-operation on the threshold of the 21st Century* (Paris, OECD/DAC, 1997) p. 48

³⁸ Shepard Forman and Dirk Solomons: *Meeting Essential Needs in Post Conflict Recovery*. Center for International Cooperation, NYU, 2003.

³⁹ Report of meeting of Joint ECHA/UNDG Task Team on Transition Financing, 11 February 2005, p.2

in the Great Lakes was held up by all concerned as an important innovation. And yet, it was also evident from interviews that the process of establishing such funds is slow and time-consuming. In light of the importance for the overall mission to demonstrate its value from the outset, one needs to look for quicker ways to design and implement such funds – principally when it comes to transitions.

With this in mind, the UN should be prepared to develop and offer MDTFs that it can administer in the transition period. Donors, however, will need to appreciate the importance of such substantive and relatively quick action mechanisms; and UN development organisations will in turn have to appreciate the need for more coherent funding guidance tools and procedures and better staff resourced missions than appears to have been the case to date.

The use of assessed and voluntary contributions has particular importance when it comes to transitional requirements and engaging UNCT capacities.⁴⁰ The programming mismatches that were noted during field visits – though anecdotal – seemed to have an all too consistent pattern: mission staff funded by assessed contributions awaiting voluntary resources to implement programmes; programmes – e.g., DDR – where DD is paid in part by assessed contributions and R is stalled through lack of voluntary contributions; agency capacities in the field that could meet mission needs if only assessed resources could be transferred from the mission to the agency.

There is no doubt that SC members are hesitant to open up their respective coffers to fund an ever growing number of peacebuilding activities, but without some expansion of mission resources to cover agreed objectives of the UN system in country, integration will suffer and one can only assume that so, too, will the objectives of the mission itself. Donors need to accept that start-up funds for transitional requirements should come from mission costs.

The Secretary-General has recently underlined the importance of strengthening the accountability of representatives on the various executive boards to realign and work in coordination with the overall UN goals, and the need for increased quality, transparency and accountability of ODA funds, to better attune responses to local needs and away from donors' national agendas.⁴¹

While there seems to be room for improvement in the funding of missions, particularly with regard to the use of assessed contributions, UN organisations are still unable to rely on predictable sources of funding to support mission objectives. This in part reflects persistent donor reluctance to coordinate assistance in truly operational ways. Ironically, if one listens to the impressions of those heads of agencies in UNCTs, it is donor behaviour that often leads to funding “feasts and famines,” duplication, unnecessary overlaps and gaps in the provision of humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, inadequately defined mission mandates, as well as lack of coordination among the various appeal mechanisms may also be to blame. The UN

⁴⁰ The use of assessed budgets for placing particular UNCT expertise in mission has been a recent development. With the increase in civilian staff in modern peacekeeping missions, some posts have been earmarked for UNCT expertise to be brought into the mission, while the programme itself still belongs to the relevant agency.

⁴¹ *In Larger Freedom*, op.cit.

is clearly attempting to deal with the issue of resource coordination if one looks at the spate of studies, reports and recommendations as well as actions taken by the UN system, often in collaboration with the IFIs.⁴² Yet, while donors recognised their own contributions to the lack of funding coherence – as noted in the High Level Working Group in January 2005 – it would seem that the UN will have to take the initiative and make this issue a higher system-wide priority than has been the case to date.

In the field, mission assets and resources are not consistently used in ways that support or promote the overall effort of the mission. Opportunities to foster greater UN cohesion and integration are lost, for example, by the way that decisions regarding the use of aircraft are made and implemented. The sharing of mission equipment to support agency projects is limited by mission compartmentalisation as much as it is by restrictive rules and regulations. Decisions about infrastructure, such as improving access roads, are made by one part of the mission (in this instance, the military), with little consideration about the needs of the wider UN community and the local population.

It is significant in the context of design and structures that a high profile effort to create a Joint Mission Assessment Cell (JMAC) in the DRC mission failed to include any UN agency representation, and was only open to mission personnel. When asked about the lack of UN agency representation in the JMAC, one official remarked that he had never thought about it. This incident does not suggest a universal pattern. The Burundi mission's joint cell equivalent is designed to be more inclusive, yet in practice it is still not fully integrated. Yet, DRC in this regard reflected a lack of awareness about the full capacities of the UN system in country, and a lack of "automaticity" about engaging the wider system.

On the other hand, it is also interesting to note that well established mechanisms of UN agencies such as the inter-agency Joint Logistics Centre, which, according to the Centre's staff, tends to be under-utilised. DRC, it was felt, proved to be an excellent example, where DPKO ran a parallel air service to that of WFP. WFP in turn had had to establish its own humanitarian air operations because DPKO and the mission were seen to have ignored the needs of the humanitarian side, and in the absence of agreeing on ways to utilise available capacities, "integration" resulted in duplication.

2.4.3 Humanitarian space and mission design

As illustrated above, transition and development programmes need to be incorporated into the long-term strategic policies and operational objectives of integrated missions. The objectives of the humanitarian community are somewhat different. When it comes to humanitarian principles, space and action, the Secretary-General has stressed that, in order to save unnecessary pain and suffering, it is essential to ensure a conducive humanitarian operating environment, including safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations.⁴³ In that regard, the principles of neutrality, impartiality

⁴² See, for instance, Douglas Lindores: *Financing for Post-Conflict Transition Situations*, paper commissioned by UNDG, February 2005.

⁴³ *In larger freedom*, paragraph 211. For the definition of humanitarian space, see: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, New York 2003

and humanity are seen as practical tools for providing access and protection for humanitarian workers.

These principles in the first instance limit the extent to which humanitarian actors can integrate into the more “political” activities of peacebuilding missions. The tension that has arisen between mission integration and humanitarian principles is intensified by: (i) the ambiguous nature of humanitarianism; (ii) competing agendas within missions; (iii) contending peacekeeping perspectives; (iv) definitions of humanitarian space (v) ill-defined roles of senior mission management; and (v) assumptions about UN structures. Each of these issues carries implications for mission design and structure.

The ambiguous nature of humanitarianism. In complex and frequently insecure environments, operational parameters need to be clear. However, the ambiguous nature of humanitarianism and the difficulties of operationalising it in post-conflict situations was a theme that, when discussed with representatives of humanitarian organisations at headquarters as well as in the field, did resonate.⁴⁴ Few came to the defence of the rather all-embracing nature of humanitarianism, and most acknowledged the need for greater specificity and clearer humanitarian priorities, particularly when it came to difficult field operations.⁴⁵ Yet, means to establish even a broad framework of action and an agreement on ways to monitor, evaluate and update operational priorities for humanitarian action do not exist. Only acute crises seem to introduce any element of joint prioritisation among humanitarian actors in the field.

Competing agendas within missions. The Study Team left most missions with the impression that SRSGs recognised the importance of humanitarian principles and space, and virtually all with whom the team spoke accepted these as obligations in principle. The issue is whether or not under day-to-day operational pressures these obligations can be met, and whether there are contending mission objectives that just cannot be readily reconciled. The case of Afghanistan in 2002 is particularly instructive when it comes to both day-to-day pressures and contending objectives.

Despite assurances from senior mission management that integration would not affect “the humanitarian profile,” the mission’s “political component rapidly outpaced the consolidation of its assistance arm.” Similar complaints arose in the Liberian operation where the team was informed by representatives from UN humanitarian organisations as well as those from NGOs that the SRSG had – contrary to their advice – encouraged IDPs and refugees to return to ill-prepared home areas so that they could vote in mission-supported elections.

The day-to-day tensions between political and humanitarian objectives can be seen as a paradox between promoting the “good governance” and “responsible authority” image of nascent governments and the need for rapid humanitarian action. In the

⁴⁴ This included individual discussions at the regular Inter-Agency Standing Committee “working group” meeting in Geneva and separate discussions with NGO consortia and agency representatives at the formal Working Group meeting of the IASC in March 2005.

⁴⁵ A highly respected representative of a major NGO in Cote d’Ivoire explained that the government accepted humanitarian space when it came to the delivery of medicines, but balked at the idea of providing education as a humanitarian activity. The former, the interviewee said, was regarded by the government as humanitarian, the latter could be ‘politically exploited.’

former, missions – as in the case of Afghanistan – are tempted to endow governments seeking legitimacy with responsibilities for a range of assistance-related activities, including humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian actors on the ground regarded such assistance as a form of public relations at the potential expense of human life.

Contending peacekeeping perspectives: The Force Commanders whom the Study Team met were clearly versed in humanitarian law and principles; and though they expressed some frustration about the seeming ambiguity of humanitarianism when it came to the diversity of activities on the ground, there was little doubt that most understood their obligations under the Geneva Convention.⁴⁶ That said, while senior management – i.e., SRSRs, DSRGs, Force Commanders – may believe they communicate adequately together and, hence, understand the complexities facing each other – there is a considerable gap between the uniformed peacekeepers' understanding of humanitarian issues and those civilians outside the mission.

In part the invention of a multi-hatted DSRG, being the HC, yet with a separate OCHA office, is an attempt to bridge that gap, without compromising humanitarian principles and space. Yet, given the stove-piped nature of organisations even within missions, let alone between missions, UNCTs and other humanitarian and development actors, a means as well as a process is needed to address differences affecting relations between the UN mission and the wider humanitarian community.

The main divisions, however, between uniformed peacekeepers and humanitarians related to the dilemmas that confronted each side in their obligations to protect and save lives.⁴⁷

The military arm of the UN mission usually intervenes to protect civilians armed conflict. By way of example, in DRC beginning of 2005 military force was needed to deal with the perpetrators of violence. Humanitarian organisations regarded such action as endangering the lives of civilians but also those humanitarian workers who could have come to their assistance. In the DRC instance, the communication channels between the Force Commander and the DSRG responsible for humanitarian activities were clear, and the decisions that were taken to use the military to protect civilians were taken openly within the mission.

While this fact may not fully satisfy humanitarian critics, it reflected a transparent approach in which the civilian authority had overall responsibility. The humanitarian concern is that this may not always be the case, and though there may be instances

⁴⁶ It is worth noting in this context that considerable efforts have been made over the past four years to enhance understandings between military and civilians organisations, the latter very much including humanitarian agencies. In this regard, one can point to UN OCHA's MCDU, the work of DPKO's Training and Evaluation Services, DPKO's Personnel Management Support Service. There are also special training packages directly through the UN and member-states, e.g., Civil-Military Coordination Basic and Staff Officer Courses, Standardised Generic Training Modules on Civil Military Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance.

⁴⁷ These dilemmas were less acute when conventional peacekeeping was the order of the day. Well over half the NGOs working in Liberia with whom the team discussed this issue said that they would not be averse to 'integrated planning', i.e., collaborative planning and information sharing, though 'integrated implementation' was out of the question. These same NGOs were also quite relaxed about using mission assets, e.g., vehicles and aircraft, while others would not consider the use of such assets as a matter of principle. However, when robust peace-enforcement came into play, including the use of force to save civilians, NGOs in virtually all the missions made it very clear that they would keep their distance in principle and practice from the uniformed peacekeepers.

where military intervention may be the only realistic way to provide protection, there is – as presently constructed – no systematic way to ensure that the humanitarian perspective will always be accorded such decisional rights. Such decisional rights, in the view of the Study Team, lies at the core of humanitarian space.

Definitions of humanitarian space: The operational definition of humanitarian space is straightforward, and rests upon the importance of “maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military...(as) the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely⁴⁸”. Such policy guidance⁴⁹ does not, however, address the dilemmas noted in the previous section, nor does it address the implications for humanitarian space and action of issues pertaining to uniformed peacekeepers’ “hearts and minds campaigns”. In discussions that the Study Team had with humanitarian workers in the field, the issue of “hearts and minds” was one of the issues most consistently raised by them. The issue was less focussed upon the military’s delivery of assistance (though that, too, was a concern), but more often on the unintended impact that such deliveries had on the operating environment.⁵⁰

Addressing potential conflict arising out of these sorts of military seems easy. As the SG’s 2000 guidance note on the role of SRSGs and DPKO’s policy guidelines make clear,⁵¹ those activities that are humanitarian and development are “performed by civilians”, and within the UN system, humanitarian and development coordination is within the purview of the RC/HC or the DSRSG serving as HC. Yet, the reality of the issue is that “hearts and minds” – from the military perspective – are not necessarily seen as either humanitarian or development. They are in the words of one Force Commander with experience in Rwanda as well as in the DRC, “merely gestures of good will.”

The Study Team believes that there is a need for a clear doctrine that will, amongst other things, guide UN uniformed peacekeepers in the future on these and related matters such as QIPs and better means of dealing with unintended consequences of UN intervention.⁵²

⁴⁸ It is a perspective that is emphasised in the June 2004 IASC reference paper on *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*, and implicitly in DPKO’s 2002 Civil-Military Coordination Policy.

⁴⁹ See: ‘humanitarian operating environment’ in UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Glossary of Humanitarian Terms in relation to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, New York 2003

⁵⁰ One example where humanitarian workers saw a negative impact upon the operating environment involved a hospital provided by a South Asian contingent in a rural area of a West African country. The hospital was open to all in need, except women, because as the officer in charge explained, the contingent did not have a female doctor. This, it was feared by various humanitarian workers, would be seen as the way that the international community delivered assistance, i.e., assistance limited on a gender basis. This would, it was argued, undermine the overall profile of the humanitarian effort in the area.

⁵¹ Note from the Secretary-General, Guidance on the relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, 11 December 2000; DPKO, Civil Military Coordination Policy, 9 September 2002

⁵² It is essential to note that an additional difficulty presented by ‘hearts and minds’ funding is that resources for such activities are given to military contingents by member-states, adding intense pressure upon such contingents to use them independently of any wider UN objectives. This is an issue

Ill-defined roles of senior management: If there is any single position in structures of integrated missions that directly reflects all the potentially contradictory objectives of integrated missions, it is the arrangement of a “multi-hatted” DSRSG. In some instances, such as Cote d’Ivoire, the DSRSG has resolved that potential conflict by agreeing with others in senior management about his priorities i.e. his role in coordinating humanitarian assistance. Others have not been allowed to do so⁵³, or still feel compelled to juggle the diverse and complex “hats”.

This calls for better mission guidelines and terms of reference that make the humanitarian responsibilities of DSRSGs designated with that function clear and explicit. In those instances where the multi-hatted DSRSGs have terms of reference – and mission-specific TORs are by no means standard for that position – it is essential to ensure that a DSRSG (i) knows what his or her humanitarian responsibilities are supposed to be, how such responsibilities relate to the obligations of the SRSG, and when to wear what “hat”, and (ii) is provided with facilities and staff that can serve the humanitarian concerns and objectives of the wider humanitarian community.

In the first instance it must be headquarters that supports humanitarian principles and space by providing explicit instructions. After discussions with a number of former and present DSRSG the team feels that one essential way to mitigate the unnecessary tensions inherent in the position of the “multi-hatted DSRSG” is for terms of reference to provide specific guidance and instructions through unambiguous terms of reference.

In this context and as suggested in the Secretary-General’s 2000 guidance notes to his representatives, the DSRSG should be able to report directly to the Emergency Relief Coordinator on issues of humanitarian concern. One such concern would have to be the inability or unwillingness of the mission to support the DSRSG’s mandated responsibilities, as explicitly stated in his or her terms of reference. To date, the Study Team has received mixed reviews about the effectiveness of such “dotted-line reporting”. One DSRSG said that reporting to headquarters only led to delays and obfuscation. Officials who worked for other DSRSGs complained that dotted-line reporting meant that substantive issues were handled by desk officers who had insufficient authority to provide support or who were too busy to respond sufficiently quickly to field concerns.

However, changing the reporting lines will not resolve the tension alone. Here, the necessary level of authority – noted in *In larger freedom* – must flow from the SRSG to his or her deputy responsible for humanitarian assistance. In so many ways, that authority already exists (e.g., the SG’s 2000 guidance note), but here again all the residual ambiguities of earlier instructions need to be removed. Yet, the tensions inherent in the multi-hatted assignment can be even further relieved if greater attention was paid to the structure that supports the responsibilities of the person responsible for humanitarian affairs.

that needs to be addressed through member-state consultations, including the TCCs and Security Council members.

⁵³ One senior UN Field official told the team about a conversation held with senior DPKO officials in NY, where he was told to “fall in line” when raising concerns about the implications of the proposed model of integration.

Assumptions about structures. In the midst of the drought crisis in Africa in 1984, the then executive heads of UNICEF and the World Food Programme convinced the Secretary-General that an initiative was needed that would mobilise the relief community as a whole to focus on a drought that was affecting 21 countries in Africa. The eventual solution was a UN office in New York, i.e., the Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA), which was of the UN but not in it. It had the imprimatur of the UN, but was not involved in its day-to-day operations. Its office was staffed by NGO representatives as well as by UN agency representatives, and it did not have to comply with standard UN administrative practices. When the crisis ended, so, too, did the office. Yet, throughout the OEOA's brief two-year existence, the UN Secretariat felt uncomfortable about an organisation that was in part staffed by outsiders, which had reporting lines outside conventional chains of command and that did not follow standard procedures.

In countries faced with humanitarian crises and supported by integrated missions, the OEOA precedent has particular relevance. While UN OCHA has established offices in many crisis stricken countries around the world, integrated missions have exposed a serious structural dilemma. To what extent can an entity of the UN be of the UN but not part of the ethos of integration? Can the role and authority of an SRSG be all-pervasive in country, and still not have direct control over the operations of a key component of the UN system?

In all but one of the countries visited by the Study Team, there were OCHA offices that fulfilled essential tasks. In one way or another they brought International NGOs, local NGOs, UN agencies and civilian-military liaison officers together. They were regarded as essential sources of information, and – perhaps paradoxically – they were also seen as the links between government ministries and the UN system. This certainly was the impression conveyed in discussions with representatives from Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Cote d'Ivoire. And yet, despite an admirable record overall, where the OCHA offices fit into the UN structures remains uncertain.

As long as there is a humanitarian function, the official responsible for humanitarian coordination needs a support office. That support office in turn needs to reflect the interests of the wider humanitarian community and in that regard should be staffed by representatives of those main UN agencies and other entities within and outside the system that can substantively contribute to an agreed set of prioritised humanitarian activities. The OCHA offices of the future – like the OEOA of the past – will be physically distinct, open to the wider community, be a recognised part of the UN family but not be *integrated*. It would be the direct responsibility of the official in charge of coordinating humanitarian activities, e.g., the DSRSG for humanitarian activities, to ensure that the office fulfils not only the agreed set of prioritised activities, but helps to fulfil obligations clearly noted in his or her terms of reference.

2.4.4 Human rights and mission design

In his March 2005 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General noted that “the increasing frequency of the Security Council's invitations to the High Commissioner (on Human Rights) to brief it on specific situations shows that there is now a greater awareness of the need to take human rights into account in resolutions

on peace and security.”⁵⁴ This statement reflects the organisation’s growing emphasis upon human rights as a crosscutting issue in all the work of the United Nations. In the SGs report, human rights are seen on pair with the more traditional security and development focus of the organisation. Correspondingly, the role of human rights protection and monitoring in integrated missions has become more important.

As discussed in the introduction, however, there is often an inherent tension between upholding the precepts of human rights law and preparing the groundwork for a return to peace. By way of example, transitional justice concerns interfered with peace processes (and vice versa) in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

In some missions, the UNHCR’s Human Rights Advisors have a direct reporting line to the SRSGs. This has proven to be a double-edged sword. Whereas proximity might result in influence, it can also be a factor in limiting the freedom to speak out against violations of human rights committed by actors who are seen as crucial to the peace process. In some cases, the Study Team found that Missions had exercised excessive self-restraint in forwarding critique that potentially could derail the peace process. But there are also cases where the SRSG plays a strong role in raising human rights issues across the spectre of mission activities and speaking out clearly, as for instance seems to be the case in Burundi.

The human rights portfolio tends to be extensive, encompassing monitoring, reporting, advocacy and intervention, capacity building, and support to rights-related work of humanitarian and development actors and local society. It furthermore includes human rights sensitisation programmes within UN operations themselves.

The Study Team found that staffing and available resources available tended to be insufficient in light of this vast range of tasks. Lack of adequate resources seemed to cause an imbalance between the emphasis placed on human rights monitoring and reporting, and the comparatively limited attention paid to capacity development on human rights issues. There was a distinct impression in countries such as the DRC and Liberia that human rights representatives in Country Teams have their own programmes, albeit with limited resources, and rarely worked in tandem with human rights experts in missions. That said, while human rights work is intended to be a crosscutting theme for all aspects of UN activities, few organisations within country teams suggested that they relied on these experts, but preferred to work with their own human rights specialists. In that sense, the team felt that there was a clear need for the Resident Coordinator to identify and promote areas of collaboration.

2.4.5 Local ownership and mission design

Any integrated mission (as well as other forms of international involvement on a large scale) expresses the “paradox of intervention”: a massive and exceptional foreign presence is in place to assist in re-establishing or establishing sovereignty and national control over the machinery of governance. Hence, consistent with the focus on long-term developmental perspectives, local ownership needs to be reflected in mission objectives, processes and outcomes.

⁵⁴ *In larger freedom*, paragraph 144

This seemingly self-evident statement, however, is not adequately reflected in the UN activities that the Study Team discussed with civil servants and local NGOs in the countries it visited. In Liberia, for instance, considerable efforts have been made to have government ministers chair key sectoral groups in that country's joint reconstruction programme. Discussions with the Liberian Ministry of Planning, however, made it clear that there is virtually no capacity at all to deal with sectoral issues or to support the minister himself. Similarly, the team was informed by a senior advisor to the prime minister in Cote d'Ivoire that his government felt divorced from the mission efforts, a point reconfirmed by officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The issue – from the perspective of government officials and representatives of the local press and NGOs – is not necessarily the merits of the missions themselves. A good proportion spoke relatively well about some of the positive aspects of the UN presence, but suggested consistently that few conveyed the sense that they were part of the overall process that was determining the fate of their country and its institutions.

Engaging host governments effectively – except perhaps at the highest diplomatic and political levels – is notoriously difficult. Yet, it is key to the long-term success of peacebuilding. Recognising that fact, the Study Team wondered why there were few if any attempts to place UN experts in those ministries essential for reconstruction, human rights and planning. It also wondered why there were no communication mechanisms between UN and mission personnel that brought civil servants and other interested parties into planning processes from the outset. These and a host of similar issues seemed to suggest to the team that there was a clear operational gap between the mission that was trying to foster effective governance and those who ostensibly would eventually be responsible for governance at the day-to-day level.

The ability to sensitise a mission to the perceptions, expectations and attitudes of local populations is directly related to a mission's success, and effective management of the above is an important problem-solving tool. Whether in the Sudan, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, the DRC or Sierra Leone, this lack of two-way communication between mission and society allows minor incidents to take on major importance and impact, and in extreme cases, can derail a mission. This is crucially important regardless of whether the operation is "light footprint" (focusing on assisting nascent government structures) or a "transitional administration" or somewhere in between.

Significantly, even though national government ministries are supposed to take the lead in economic planning, they rarely have the capacity to do so, and international efforts more often supplant and marginalise, rather than bolster, that capacity. UN planners do not have appropriate information in advance of a mission as to the extent of national capacity, nor do they have the means to assess it. If international actors keep working independently of emerging governmental structures for too long, this may end up undermining the transition process because it reduces the credibility of the national governmental structures.

2.5 Leadership and management

The quality of commitment and breadth of experience of senior management in those integrated missions covered by the Study Team was impressive. Yet, despite considerable efforts by DPKO, senior management often reported that they felt

unprepared for missions, either in terms of an adequate understanding of the dynamics of the UN system, or in terms of a full appreciation of the country context in which they were to operate.

An integrated approach has proven particularly important in the field, where lack of cohesion or differences among the United Nations entities can be exploited by the local parties. Thus, the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is vital. In countries where large multidisciplinary field operations are in place, the Special Representative, according to the Secretary-General,⁵⁵ should ensure that the efforts of the different components of the system are mutually reinforcing. There can be little doubt, therefore, that “there is a high correlation between effective strategic coordination and the presence and good management of an SRSG to succeed” in the above.⁵⁶

Donor governments, NGOs and UN agencies also complained about the selection process. To assess the level of quality of senior mission management beyond the six countries visited by the Study Team would be inappropriate. It must be said, however, that both at headquarters and in the field there was a consistent refrain about the lack of transparency in the selection process of SRSGs. There were also frequent references to the lack of accountability and oversight of those at the very top of integrated missions. Both issues must be addressed if the credibility of integrated missions is to be established.

The ability of the SRSG to ensure effective coordination is also a function of the degree to which he or she takes on strategic coordination as a central part of the mandate and job description. In the early stages of the UN operation in Kosovo, for example, the UN presence was headed by both an SRSG and a Deputy SRSG, each of whom had both experience and an organisational interest in coordination. This is one reason that coordination of the work of both UN and other actors in Kosovo was a central part of the design of the UN mission there. One of the most striking instances of effective continuity is the UN operation in Guatemala, where the UN had a substantive, even leading, role among international actors during both the mediation and implementation phase.

The support of the Secretary-General is critical both to an SRSG’s standing within the wider international community and his or her ability to coordinate the multiple UN departments and agencies that have a stake in implementation. Beyond the UN, an effective SRSG can usually generate a degree of involvement and coordination with other key players such as the World Bank and bilateral donors.

When it comes to mission management, the authority of the SRSG needs not only to be clarified but also made more robust. Due to the complex nature of the UN, however, an SRSG does not have the same power of instruction as, for example, a corporate CEO or a prime minister, and the degree of authority varies in relation to

⁵⁵ SG report (1997), paragraph 119

⁵⁶ The importance of a single mediator as a lead coordinating agent is one of the principal conclusions of Crocker *et al.* (1999) “Introduction” in *Herding Cats. Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, pp. 3-18.

the components of the system.⁵⁷ The SRSG needs authority and structure to ensure his or her overall financial, administrative and substantive control. The complex and varying rules and regulations that govern the use of resources and assets make this complicated. The SRSG's authority is also limited due to the typically very strong position of the Chief Administration Officer, who reports to the intergovernmental part of the UN system (i.e. ACABQ and Fifth Committee) about resource allocations. Current practices, for instance in the use of mission assets, tend to run counter to the overall principle of genuine integration.

Different DSRSGs handled the ambivalence of their positions in different ways – some enjoying the rough and tumble of reconciling contending roles, others more prone to fall in with the SRSG to ensure mission coherence. In all cases, however, there is no doubt that the system has not yet found a way to resolve the multiplicity of responsibilities tasked to DSRSGs. In the majority of missions reviewed by the team, the DSRSG had at best “make-shift” support, cobbled together between OCHA office staff, one or two support staff from the mission and UNDP-funded staff for the RC role. This is inadequate for someone responsible for humanitarian affairs, development and often delegated security responsibilities, as well as a deputy function. The situation is not eased by the presence of a second deputy, who in turn has responsibilities that overlap, e.g., DDR, SSR.

One of the operational challenges for humanitarian actors is the need to negotiate “humanitarian access”, for instance into rebel-controlled territory or through contested territory. This illustrates one of the dilemmas in integration introduced at the outset: the SRSG and his core staff is possibly not the right authority, since the mission's political head may be engaged in political conditionality or pressure on some of the actors with which humanitarian access will have to be negotiated, and asking for “favours” might weaken their position. Hence, where applicable, specialised negotiation teams under the authority of the HC might be established in order to ensure that this task is conducted in relative separation from (other) political processes, though without undermining the mission's overall purpose.

Only two missions visited had integrated training cells, and those who existed were insufficiently resourced. The Study Team sees common training as a valuable tool for enabling better interoperability between conflicting organisational cultures, yet this is seldom adequately reflected in mission structures or in HQ. The DPKO Training Advisory Group and the attempts to establish a DPKO integrated training strategy are steps in the right direction. If intended to cater to an integrated mission, however, attempts to establish joint training programmes must be developed with genuine buy-in from the overall UN community.

CHAPTER 3: RECOMMENDATIONS

⁵⁷ A 1999 study identified four dimensions of authority for SRSGs: the *formal dimension* (e.g., high in the mission itself, very limited vis-à-vis agencies), the *financial dimension* (i.e., influence over the flow of funds), the *personnel dimension* (e.g., ability to lead through building personal relationships) and the *organisational dimension* (e.g., structures of inter-agency cooperation). See: Mark Taylor and Rick Hooper ‘Command from the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peacebuilding Missions’, *FAFO Report* #66, Fafo, Oslo, 1999.

The recommendations presented below are based on the observations and conclusions summarised in the previous chapter, *Theory into practice*.

3.1 The concept of integrated missions

1. The role, function and form of integrated missions must be determined by their operational objectives, which, in turn, should be based on a long-term strategy for building sustainable peace. This axiom supports the principle of *asymmetry*, where integration should encompass only that which *needs* to be integrated.

3.2 Strategic policy perspectives

1. A strategic vision and long-term commitment are prerequisites for sustainable peace, and should in the first instance reflect a mission's centre of gravity. Accordingly, they should be firmly embedded in the mandates of peacebuilding missions, pointing towards a continuum with identified transitional phases. The proposed Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the introduction of a Secretary-General's Cabinet should become the mechanism for devising strategic frameworks for broader peacebuilding operations.⁵⁸

3.3 Mission planning

1. Operational planning for integrated missions must be based on clearly defined strategic policies that should act as a framework for guiding the UN's long-term support for peacebuilding. These objectives should reflect benchmarked transitional targets in order to ensure a smooth hand-over from the peacekeeping to the reconstruction and development phases of the UN's in-country activities. Where relevant, regional dimensions of a specific conflict as well as appropriate means for realising regional goals should be incorporated into such planning exercises.
2. When authorising integrated peacebuilding missions, the Security Council and the Secretary-General must ensure a coherent link between mandates and resources. The ACABQ and the Fifth Committee must be consulted at an early stage, to both ensure a common understanding and also be made accountable of the requirements implied by the SC mandate and to enable a speedy and integrated implementation of the mandate. The distinction between mission and non-mission contributions must be made explicit, and stakeholders within and outside the UN brought into the planning and budgeting process from an early stage. Supply-driven planning and budgeting should be avoided through a clear focus on the operational objectives.
3. These operational objectives should be a major factor in determining the organisations that should be involved in the mission planning process at the outset, as well as those organisations that should be engaged in different phases of the overall operation. The planning process in any event would normally include

⁵⁸ Among the many important features of the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office, it is worth noting the PBSO's proposed role of working with the UNCT prior to the deployment of a Special Representative and with other in-country actors, acting as a UN system-wide focal point on peacebuilding, and providing direct assistance to Special Representatives, once established, in identifying relevant expertise in multilateral institutions.

representatives of DPKO, OCHA, DPA and the main UN operational organisations, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

4. A headquarters entity such as the proposed PBSO, with a system-wide representation, should collaborate with the UNCT as a first step towards defining the parameters of a strategy and the centre of gravity. The PBSO should normally recommend that an Integrated Task Force (ITF) be established to support field-based planning activities.⁵⁹
5. At the field level, mission planning must engage the UN Country Team and relevant local partners from the beginning of the planning process. The Resident Coordinator must be authorised to, and made responsible, for ensuring active interaction between the UNCT and mission planners. Together, the mission planners and the UNCT must determine the extent to which existing country team capacities can be brought in to support the objectives of the mission, and these arrangements should be reflected in mission budgets.
6. At the headquarters level, UNDG should strengthen mission preparation procedures for development organisations by endowing UNDG and its support office, UNDGO, with resources to promote training for planning and staffing for integrated missions. In this context, UNDG and PBSO should also finalise guidelines on transition assessments, joint programming and funding processes.
7. UN agencies, funds and programmes in country must be sensitive to the fundamental political and structural changes that will occur due to the introduction of a UN peacebuilding intervention. They should ensure – both at headquarters and in the field – that they have the flexibility and the expertise required to adjust their programmes and projects to meet the overarching needs of mission objectives.
8. Strategic policy and operational plans need to be subjected to periodic and systematic real time reviews and updates. This process should be led at the headquarters level by the proposed PBSO in collaboration with a designated lead entity. At the mission level, the SRSG should have within his or her office a capacity to engage actively with that review process and to ensure that all relevant actors, including the UNCT and, where possible, the IFIs are part of that process.
9. At an early stage of the planning process the incoming SRSG should meet with his or her proposed “cabinet” (See *Mission design and structure*, below), including relevant representatives of the UNCT, the proposed Force Commander, the Chief Administrative Officer and the DSRSGs in order to review preliminary planning proposals, alternative implementation structures and targets and their implications.

3.4 Mission design

1. Integrated missions should reflect the wider UN system in country. Towards that end, the SRSG should have the support of a cabinet structure that will bring

⁵⁹ In this context the Study Team uses the concept of ITF not as a substitute to IMTF, but as a means to distinguish between previous HQ based planning processes and a more field oriented task force.

together those with major sectoral responsibilities that directly and indirectly affect the UN's peacebuilding strategy and operational objectives in country.

2. Mission design and structure should draw on the expertise of relevant UN organisations in country to promote integration and avoid unnecessary duplication. Those UNCT activities that will be directly used to support the mission's strategic and operational objectives should be funded at least in part (e.g., "kick-start" funding) through assessed contributions. With this in mind, the UNCT should be fully represented in all mission planning meetings and in all reviews pertaining to adjustments of the mission's objectives.
3. To support the work of the senior mission official directly responsible for humanitarian coordination (e.g., a DSRSG, Humanitarian Coordinator), OCHA will provide an office designed to assist in developing and implementing a situation-specific, prioritised humanitarian action plan. The office also will assist that official in fulfilling those humanitarian obligations, *inter alia*, outlined in his or her terms of reference. The OCHA office will be staffed by representatives of UN agencies and other organisations that will be substantively engaged in the humanitarian plan of action, and will be located in a place where all concerned with humanitarian activities can have reasonable access to it. The office will be under the direct authority of that humanitarian official, and will not be part of the mission structure.
4. While integrated missions should not be based on a fixed template, they should have certain consistent structural features – provided through assessed contributions – to enhance their policy and planning capacities, to establish more effective outreach programmes among local populations, and to strengthen resource mobilisation. These would include:
 - a joint operations centre open to all relevant UN organisations and other actors as appropriate;
 - a strategic policy planning capacity, reporting directly to the SRSG, to ensure consistency with headquarters counterparts;
 - a capacity to establish a "cabinet structure" in the mission to promote greater coherence for the UN in-country system as a whole;
 - a cell reporting directly to the SRSG on the status of mission funding requirements. Beyond monitoring the overall flow of funds for UN activities into the host country, the cell would undertake activities that the mission and UN agencies agreed would support overall resource mobilisation efforts. These could include resources required, for example, for reintegrating ex-combatants and security sector reform;
 - a dedicated capacity to mainstream the mission's role and objectives throughout the mission;
 - a substantive external outreach capacity to interact with national and local organisations, including international and national NGOs, in order to explain the mission's role and objectives, to assess attitudes, and to undertake focus-group activities;
 - support for real-time evaluations of mission activities and achievements in the context of agreed strategies and operational objectives.

- a best practices focal point
 - a common structure for operational security
 - a common training framework and on-the-ground training facilities for all UN staff and other actors as appropriate
5. Within the broader context of UN reform, attention must be given to changes in financial and administrative rules and procedures to allow for greater interoperability between missions and UN funds, programmes and agencies. Harmonisation of administrative practices is fundamental to integrated programming and implementation of agency activities.
 6. The need to observe humanitarian principles in peacebuilding missions should be recognised in all mission mandates. Linked to this overarching principle is the need for the generic guidelines noted above to ensure that humanitarian principles are observed and that humanitarian space is protected. Under the overall authority of the SRSG, it will be the responsibility of the DSRSG/HC to ensure that these guidelines are observed.
 7. The proposed guidelines should include consultation and implementation arrangements between the DSRSG/HC and the Force Commander. The former should be responsible for determining the appropriateness of “hearts and minds” campaigns and the use of QIPs. In those instances where mission activities contravene guidelines or the responsibilities of the DSRSG/HC, as specified in his or her terms of reference, the DSRSG will be able to seek guidance from headquarters through “dotted reporting lines” procedures.
 8. Doctrine needs to be developed to guide the activities of UN uniformed peacekeepers in order to ensure clarity and consistency in relations between the military and the wide range of civilian actors, including those in the humanitarian community.
 9. There should continue to be a Human Rights Advisor that directly reports to the SRSG. At the same time, human rights offices within the UNCT should act as planners and advisors to the DSRSG/RC for developing policies and plans responsible for development activities in order to ensure coherence between the human rights objectives of the mission and the UNCT, and to support a coherent human rights-based strategy for development.
 10. Greater attention has to be given to human rights assessments and monitoring of agency and mission programmes and projects. Resources should be made available to support the work of UNHCHR to assist UNCT members as well as mission programmes and projects dealing, for example, with DDR and SSR.

3.5 Leadership and management

1. While the Secretary-General has reiterated his determination to have his in-country representatives assume overall authority for the UN system in peacebuilding missions, the substance of that authority needs to be established in

clear operational detail. This is a prerequisite for determining the reality of leadership and management in integrated missions.

2. Mission-specific profiles for SRSGs should be developed once the Security Council and the Secretary-General have defined the “centre of gravity” of the mission in question, and before individual candidates are identified. The Standard Directives for SRSGs should be revised in light of the broader emphasis on system-wide integration.
3. The selection process for SRSGs needs to be more transparent, and draw from a larger pool of candidates, including UN staff, and the corporate and non-governmental sectors. Orientation programmes for SRSGs and senior management need to be fully developed and implemented to ensure a sound understanding of the UN’s approach to integrated missions and the country and regional situation to which he or she is being assigned.
4. Clear generic guidelines and specific terms of reference are needed to ensure coherence and coordination at the operational level between the SRSG, DSRSGs and the Force Commander. The power of instruction must also be clear and unambiguous, and reflected in the proposed guidelines and Terms of Reference.
5. A communications strategy must be introduced at the outset of each mission, in order to ensure clarity within the mission and amongst the population in general about the strategic and operational objectives of the UN mission. The overall UN presence also needs to be sensitised about the importance of communication and public information in all activities. This will require a comprehensive review of the current working methods of the Department of Public Information, in particular to assess its ability to cater to a system-wide mission.
6. To ensure proper mission accountability, an independent oversight capacity should be established to review and evaluate the mission’s progress against clear benchmarks, mission guidelines and the specific terms of reference of senior mission management on a regular basis.
7. In order to ensure that integrated missions maximise their true and positive potential, member states will have to work with the UN to determine practical means that will provide for greater administrative and funding flexibility and harmony for all organisations that participate in the peacebuilding work of the United Nations. At the same time, the UN should also discuss with member states ways that donor funds can be provided in ways that add to the coherence of the strategies and operational objectives of peacebuilding missions.

ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Expanded ECHA Core Group Joint Study

THE PEACEKEEPING-HUMANITARIAN/DEVELOPMENT INTERFACE

Background

- 1) In the mid to late 1990s, responding to the challenges thrown up at the end of the Cold War and galvanised by increasingly critical external performance assessments, the UN embarked on a search for greater coherence among its various departments and agencies. The objective, as put forward in the Secretary-General's reform agenda, was a more integrated crisis management system able to deal effectively with restoring peace, security and good governance in failed or failing states, building upon the skills and competencies of each part of the UN system. This led to the – now prevalent – concept of the “integrated mission”, whereby all UN resources are harnessed under common direction towards consolidating peace and supporting the re-establishment of stable and legitimate central government with viable institutions. In this view, integration has three critical advantages:
 - a) Facilitates a common strategic vision, harnessing collective system-wide action;
 - b) Ensures the capacity to rationalise resources and systems (e.g., procurement, services);
 - c) Allows for overall direct management of UN system resources.
- 2) Alongside these developments, there has been an ongoing and extensive debate on the ethical, security, access and protection costs arising from integration from the perspective of humanitarian and development operations and the adherence to humanitarian principles. Some actors see an inherent tension between the need for a clear command and control structure for all UN entities on the ground, and the requirement for some degree of insulation of humanitarian/development operations from the political and military elements of an integrated (multidimensional) mission. Others question whether and how best to manage potential trade-offs between humanitarian action and transitional processes and efforts to negotiate and/or implement peace agreements.
- 3) Experience in integration has been gained in a range of different missions, but there has been no clearly defined model for integration, and various missions have been integrated to a greater or lesser extent. Assessments as to the benefits of these experiences also vary between different parts of the UN system. There has been no consolidation of lessons, including on the potential gains of integration for humanitarian or development activities, the minimum criteria for and best practice in integration, the overall costs versus the benefits of the various integration exercises thus far, and impact that the integration of UN activity has on the UN's effectiveness in supporting the overall peace process. In addition, much discussion remains to be had on the linkage between the work of the mission, and the longer-term work of the UN system in the country, including the potential roles of the UN System agencies in the execution of the mission's non-military or peacebuilding objectives. The result has been the lack of a policy position on principles and practices that might enhance gains and minimise costs for both

sides. Some elements of mission design have become more or less common, such as the double or triple “hatting” of a DSRSG with development and humanitarian responsibilities, and the integration of mission field offices. However, overall there remains a relatively ad-hoc approach to mission design, in which all the potential lessons have not been learnt. At the same time, missions are increasing in size and scale and, in some cases, complexity in terms of their broader “less traditional” peacekeeping mandates.

- 4) There have been some studies on integrated missions (such as those produced by King’s College and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and various evaluation reports on Afghanistan) but these have not addressed these issues as their primary concern. Furthermore none of these studies has focused primarily on defining practical steps that may be taken to maximise gains and minimise costs from integration.
- 5) To remedy this situation, and in view of recent new mission deployments, a joint lesson learning review is proposed, with the aim of defining the overarching issues of concern to the respective humanitarian, development and peacekeeping constituencies regarding the question of integration of humanitarian and development coordination and operational responsibilities into multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, including issues of security and protection, and achieving agreement on measures to address them. The study will also consider the implications for humanitarian and development action of working alongside non-UN peacekeeping or multinational forces, in light of emerging hybrid missions.

Purpose and scope of the Study

- 1) This study is a joint initiative by the members of the Expanded ECHA Core Group: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the ECHA Core Group (OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and WFP). The primary purpose of the review is to draw lessons from the interface between peacekeeping and humanitarian and development work in the context of integrated missions, including during the planning and design phases, and the consequent effects on the relationships between UN and non-UN humanitarian/development actors. These lessons will translate into practical policy and operational input on the humanitarian/development–peacekeeping interface for the design and implementation of current and future multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. It is hoped that the review will permit the United Nations to identify circumstances and criteria for the integration of either humanitarian or development coordination and the mechanisms for making it efficient and successful in different situations, both at headquarters and in the field.
- 2) The review will focus on the period between 2000 and mid-2004 and will address policy, operational, security, management/reporting and information sharing issues, drawing on practitioners’ insights at headquarters and in the field. Key integrated missions to be studied include: UNAMSIL, UNMIL, ONUCI, UNOB, UNAMA and MINUSTAH . The current OCHA–DPKO joint lessons learned exercise on MONUC will be incorporated into this broader study because of the humanitarian element to the mandate and the humanitarian component to the

mission (although it is not a traditional integrated mission). A case study approach will be taken for UNAMSIL, UNMIL, ONUCI, MONUC and UNOB, while the remainder will be covered by interviews and a desk review. A brief desk review of lessons from UNMIK and UNTAET will also be undertaken.

- 3) The main scope of the study is the overall effectiveness of the integration of the UN system in fulfilling the range of mandates given to it, especially the integration of humanitarian, development and peacekeeping/building mandates, coordination structures and management responsibilities in the context of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations and the interpretation and application of such mandates and responsibilities by the various actors involved (at headquarters and in the field), the interface between the peacekeeping and humanitarian/development actors, and the resulting outcomes in terms of coherence of UN policy, programming and operations.

Key issues to be covered

- 1) The study is tasked with assessing the efficiency, effectiveness and value added of integration, what form it should take under which circumstances, and the overall peacekeeping–humanitarian/development interface in situations of integration, with a view to ensuring the goals of the whole United Nations system in country are effectively met within the context of the Secretary-General’s reform agenda. A number of key issues and questions will be raised (the list of key issues will be refined by the consultants and the steering committee following the desk review):

- Is there clarity on the respective roles and responsibilities, both within the mission and with external actors? How can efficiency be improved and duplication avoided? What role have structures and staffing, and reporting lines played in the efficiency and effectiveness of the various integrated missions? What are the perceived benefits and costs in terms of administration, logistics, common services, funding etc?
- Based on these lessons and the analysis of opportunities and costs, what is the added value of integrated missions and what are the pitfalls to be avoided, including in structural, operational and security terms? When is integration most applicable?
- What are the criteria needed for deciding on the extent of integration of humanitarian or development approaches in peacekeeping operations in different types of situations? What should integration entail from the perspective of furthering the UN’s overall agenda and fulfilling its various mandates? Or from a humanitarian perspective? Or from a development perspective in the transition from relief to nation building? What should integration entail from a peacekeeping perspective? How can the space necessary for humanitarian operations be maintained within a mission framework? How can joint processes be properly established? How can crosscutting issues be addressed and by whom?

(Note: The review should not propose strict templates for integration, but rather criteria and a menu of options for differing degrees of integration depending on the situation on the ground, as well as appropriate structures and policies to make these work.)

- In all the above areas, the study will establish what has worked well in integrated missions and for whom, what has not, and why? What can be learned from this, both in terms of the mission design process, structure, who should be involved in the process and at what stage?

Management of the Study

- 1) The Study will be jointly organised and managed by OCHA's Policy Development and Studies Branch and DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, in full consultation with DPA, UNDGO and the ECHA Core Group. Two consultants will be chosen to carry out the review, who between them should have familiarity with multi-dimensional peacekeeping, humanitarian principles and practice, and countries in transition and development more broadly.
- 2) The consultants will be expected to provide two interim reports to the Expanded ECHA Core Group: after the headquarters interviews, and after the field trips.
- 3) A Steering Committee at the decision-making level will be created to monitor the exercise throughout the process. It will be composed of representatives designated by the members of Expanded ECHA Core Group and UNDGO. The Steering Committee will meet at least four times: Screening and selection of consultants; Overall briefing for the consultants upon selection; Commenting on the consultants' proposal for the field portion of the review; Debriefing on the field work, prior to drafting process.
- 4) The draft report will be submitted to the Steering Committee for comment, and the final draft will go to the Expanded ECHA Core Group for a ten-day comment period prior to finalisation.

ANNEX II: METHODOLOGY

This is a qualitative study that principally draws on three types of sources: 1) extensive and semi-structured interviews in field and headquarters, 2) desk reviews of missions not visited in the context of this study, and 3) literature surveys.

Semi-structured interviews

The Study Team, in its discussions with approximately 700 people at headquarters and in countries where integrated missions were established, followed a set of consistent issues in virtually all its interviews. This approach was based upon semi-structured interviewing. That is to say that rather than a specific interview schedule or indeed non at all, an interview guide was established for the study – not based upon fixed wording or fixed ordering of questions, but instead upon a general direction so that questions should focus on the crucial issues of the study.

As intended, this approach permitted greater flexibility and, as noted by Burns, “permits a more valid response from the informant’s perception of reality.”⁶⁰ The price that the researcher has to pay for this is the difficulties involved in encoding and analysing results. Nevertheless, the informants use language natural to them, the researcher gains the informants’ perspective rather than imposing rigid assumptions. This approach holds that more is learned from a dialogue process than from standard questionnaires.

With this in mind, the core issues that guided the Study Team were the following:

1. **the meaning of integrated missions.** In the absence of any clear definition of an integrated mission, the Study Team sought the views of a wide range of respondents about the purpose of integrated missions. Of related interest was the Study Team’s interest in probing what respondents felt were strengths and weaknesses of integrated missions, as concept and as practical reality;
2. **strategic policy and mission planning processes** – the Study Team was interested in exploring the ways that missions were designed from their inception. Hence, it traced the processes by which the Security Council and the UN departments anticipated and designed mission mandates;
3. **operational planning** – based upon mission mandates, it was important to understand how operational planning related to the broad conception of the mission. To what extent was such operational planning guided by an overarching concept of what needed to be achieved;
4. **inter-institutional relationships** – it was assumed that one clear reflection of integration would be the ways that institutions and their respective capacities related to one another. For that reason, the Study Team pressed respondents on ways that their organisations dealt with policy formulation and operational planning and the sorts of inter-institutional structures and relationships that were and should be required in integrated missions;

⁶⁰ Robert B. Burns, *Research Methods*, 4th edition, Sage Publications, London, 2000, p 424

5. **leadership issues** – in light of the important role of SRSs in integrated missions, the Study Team asked respondents – some of whom were SRSs themselves – what leadership issues arose in dealing with integrated missions. Questions and answers ranged across a wide spectrum of issues, including the selection process, training, orientation and leadership styles;
6. **management issues** – the complex task of managing integrated missions would inevitably involve – so the Study Team assumed – a broad spectrum of management issues that involved the relationships between institutions, between key officials within the mission, between the mission and government, funding, human resource management and communications;
7. **development perspectives, humanitarian and human rights approaches** – of central importance to the Study was the way that an integrated mission handled the contending principles and operational requirements of humanitarian, human rights and development actors. Hence, this was a key focus of interest and guided questions for the Study Team.

The interviews were conducted on a “not for quotation” basis. The Study Team tried to ensure that conditions surrounding the interviews were conducive to an open exchange, for instance, that mission staff was not present during discussions with the UN country teams, or with local authorities.

The interview base

The Study Team conducted a total of six field visits to ongoing UN missions: Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan.⁶¹ At headquarters levels, the team had two separate missions to UN Headquarters in New York, during which time it held meetings with Security Council representatives, the High Level Working Group, the Group of 77 and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping as well as with relevant UN departments, the Office of the United Nations Development Group and the main New York-based UN agencies, funds and programmes. It also used its time in the United States to consult with research institutes in Washington DC, the US Agency for International Development, the United States Department of State and various committees in the US Congress as well as with the NGO consortium, InterAction. It was essential for the Study to meet with the international financial institutions, and with that in mind, extensive meetings were held principally with the World Bank and also with the International Monetary Fund.

During three missions to Geneva, the Study Team met with major NGO consortia (i.e., ICVA, SCHR) as well as with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition to all relevant Geneva-based UN agencies, funds and programmes, the Study Team also met with donors at their February 2005 retreat in Montreux concerning coordination in humanitarian emergencies.

⁶¹ The selection of the six missions was in the TOR for the Study. Sudan was not originally in the TOR but was added later.

A member of the Study Team also had the opportunity of interviewing a large number of officials both on the policy and implementation sides of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. A second trip to Rome enabled a team member to discuss the Study Team's findings with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Working Group in March 2005. In a separate trip to Brussels two members of the Study Team also met with representatives of NATO and the European Union.

Before finalising the work on this report, the team circulated a draft of this document to ECHA and received very constructive comments from DPKO, OCHA, DPA, UNDP, UNDGO, WFP, UNHCR, UNAMA and UNMIS, and from a number of individuals. We are very grateful for all the comments received.

ANNEX III: ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Adm. and Budgetary Questions
CAO	Chief Administration Officer
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DO	Designated Official
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRM/R	Disaster Risk Management and Reduction
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
IASC	Interagency Standing Committee
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
ITF	Integrated Task Force
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operation Center
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JOC	Joint Operations Cell
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development	
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCF	Regional Conflict Formations
RR	Resident Representative

SCHR	Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response
SMT	Senior Management Team
SMT	Senior Management Team
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TOR	Terms of reference
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	UN Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA	United Nations Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIS	United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDG	UN Development Group
UNDGO	UN Development Group Office
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOWA	UN Office for West Africa
UNPE	UN Programme on Elections
UNSECOORD	UN Security Coordinator
WFP	World Food Programme

