

BACKGROUND PAPER
ON
MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES ON
INTEGRATED PLANNING

PREPARED FOR
OECD-DAC THEMATIC (EXPERT) MEETING
OSLO, 11-12 FEBRUARY, 2008

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTEGRATED PLANNING
IN FRAGILE STATES AND SITUATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is provided as background for the planned Thematic (Expert) Meeting in Oslo (Norway) in February 2008, part of the consultation process within OECD/DAC on a more coherent inter-ministerial (“whole-of-government”) approach to fragile states and situations. The purpose is to summarize the current status of ongoing multilateral initiatives on integrated planning and increased coherence in peacebuilding efforts, and to identify topics for discussion on the role of bilateral processes, actors, and agendas vis-à-vis these multilateral efforts.

The paper begins by reviewing experience with post-conflict needs assessments and transitional results frameworks (PCNA-TRF), outlining the results of the collaboratively led World Bank-UN process that has brought together field expertise from multilaterals together with national counterparts, regional organizations, and bilateral governments to reform the PCNA. The revised PCNA-TRF guidance supports a common platform for action¹, with explicit linkages to relevant security, political, and humanitarian processes and actors, and the paper highlights the desired involvement of bilateral actors in PCNA-TRFs at country level, and in the elaboration of a PCNA Toolkit and common training. The paper presents a brief description of the new contributions to integration offered by the Peacebuilding Commission, where potential benefit is seen in the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy being based upon assessments such as the PCNA-TRF and helping to inform downstream planning, including the PRSP and the UNDAF, enhancing coordination effort with other multilateral and bilateral actors at country level and informing the engagement of member states in governance boards of UN agencies, funds and programs.

The paper continues with a summary of trends and challenges of UN integration in the field, including the ongoing work to deepen capacity for multidimensional peace support operations through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).² The paper notes that most governments who have made progress on their internal whole-of-government (WOG) coordination have also noted the need for an overarching whole-of-government approach in specific country cases, where they are not the only actors involved, and a challenge arises on how to reconcile “their” WOG planning with the WOG planning of other international actors.

Recognizing a history of gaps in the transition from relief to early recovery, the paper outlines the cluster approach for coordination and planning of humanitarian assistance and shows how leadership and responsibilities are established at the sectoral level, thereby clarifying lines of accountability. The paper concludes with a set of discussion questions for the Thematic Meeting sessions, seeking explicit feedback on the connection between these multilateral initiatives and member states’ whole-of-government efforts. Key questions include:

- How can we better mobilize bilateral expertise to enhance multilateral assessment, planning, and response across political, security, economic, and social dimensions?
- The IPBS is as a tool premised on national ownership of the peacebuilding process, for use in countries under consideration by the PBC. What are bilateral actors’ views on the desired linkages between the PCNA-TRF and the IPBS ‘compact’?
- Should integrated peace operations, transitional results frameworks, and IPBSs, all use common results benchmarks for success, thus aligning discussions in the Security Council with those at economic fora such as donors’ meetings?
- What are the desired linkages between the PCNA-TRF, the IMPP, the IPBS, humanitarian planning, and bilateral whole-of-government planning?


¹ The PCNA-TRF is an integral part of the OECD-DAC *Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, and has been endorsed as the common entry point for post-conflict recovery planning by the DG-ECHA Working Group (April 2007) and by the Heads of the Multilateral Development Banks (October 2007).

² The IMPP is described in the Secretary-General’s *Guidance on Integrated Missions* (rev), 9 February 2006.

A Background

1. Fragile and conflict-affected situations require close collaboration between diplomatic, security, economic and development actors; the interconnected challenges of conflict, governance, economic performance, and poverty are acute in the world’s unstable countries and regions. These issues and concerns have prompted calls for more integrated responses from governments who mobilize an increasingly complex range of actors, instruments, and interventions. Most governments who have made progress on their internal whole-of-government (WOG) coordination have also noted the need for an overarching whole-of-government approach in specific country cases, where they are not the only actors involved, and a challenge arises on how to reconcile “their” WOG planning with the WOG planning of other international actors. Little has been written on the intersections between bilateral whole-of-government efforts and comparable efforts by multilateral institutions to leverage greater integration of and linkages between security, political, humanitarian, and recovery/development planning, but they do face common challenges – such as the difficulty of putting together resources from different budget lines.
2. As Figure A illustrates, the range and purpose of planning processes through which the international community engages in crisis and post-conflict settings is complex, and purposive linkages are important.

Figure A: Multilateral Planning Processes in Crisis and Post-conflict Settings



3. These three multilateral planning processes are interlinked but separate, for important reasons:
 - o The planning of peacekeeping deployments is consulted with national government, but is an internal UN process which is not nationally “owned”, since PKOs by their nature substitute for a security and protection capacity that national governments were unable to provide alone, and derive their legitimacy from a Security Council mandate.
 - o Humanitarian interventions are similar, in that they help solve short-term problems where national governments have been unable to provide adequate protection for the population; over time, humanitarian and relief operations are often able to become more closely coordinated with national authorities as recovery programs progress.

- In contrast, post-conflict needs assessments and transitional results frameworks focus on the actions of national institutions needed to stabilize the fragile peace, while taking account of the stabilizing efforts delivered by the peacekeeping and humanitarian actors and supporting the transition to national responsibility.
 - In recent months, the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy has also been introduced in two countries handled by the UN Peacebuilding Commission, presenting a summary of actions critical for peacebuilding.
4. In the following pages, Section B describes the joint World Bank-UN process that brings together multilateral field expertise, national counterparts, regional organizations, and bilateral governments to reform the post-conflict needs assessment and transitional results framework (PCNA-TRF) and link that process more closely with relevant security, political, and humanitarian processes and actors. Section C describes the new contributions to integration offered by the Peacebuilding Commission, while Section D summarizes ongoing work to deepen UN system-wide integration, including guidance on planning and launching multidimensional peace support operations through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). Section E provides a brief overview of the shift to the cluster approach for coordination and planning of humanitarian assistance in crisis and post-conflict situations. Section F concludes with questions for discussion.

B In Support of Peacebuilding: Reforming the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment and Transitional Results Framework (PCNA-TRF)

5. As a country emerging from conflict engages with the international community, a common platform is needed to identify and focus efforts on key recovery priorities, foster coherence across a multitude of stakeholders, and mobilize human and financial resources. Effective recovery is dependent on actions not only of the national and local entities but also of donors and other key international actors such as humanitarian agencies and peace-keeping missions who bring capacity and resources.³ Therefore, a process whereby national actors define their priorities, with participation and in cooperation with bilateral donors, regional organizations, and international financial institutions, is needed at the very onset of the recovery phase. This process must be aligned with plans for UN inputs according to the timing and specific situation on the ground.
6. A nationally-agreed document is needed that summarizes the strategic priorities for recovery, but it is impractical to wait for a traditional government-implemented plan (e.g. the PRSP). Recognizing the need for a nationally-led planning process that can deliver a joint national-international compact, and the limited capacities of national authorities in post-conflict settings, it is necessary for international actors to support national authorities in developing their priorities. It is this articulation of shared responsibility which defines the framework within which international partners will align their assistance, and with which the government and its national and international partners will monitor the recovery process.
7. The *Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA)* maps the terrain of key needs in the country; it is usually jointly coordinated by national stakeholders and multilateral or regional agencies. Cluster teams, comprised of national and international technical experts, conduct field and desk assessments, seeking to be comprehensive but recognizing that the reality of the post-conflict context is that data will be incomplete or rudimentary and access to stakeholders and

³ While the IMPP process described later in this paper provides strategic focus for elements deployed by the United Nations and covered by assessed contributions, it does not define the national authorities' priorities nor commit their budget resources, and it cannot delineate the contributions of the full range of international actors although it strives to coordinate with them.

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communities may be challenged by logistics and security concerns. Using this information, the **Transitional Results Framework (TRF)** is developed, with key milestones in the terrain mapped by the PCNA. An effective TRF would normally provide coverage of country-appropriate aspects of four functions – political, security, public finances, and social/economic recovery – as shown in Figure B. Outputs that “fill” the matrix should be crafted to reflect strategic dimensions of peace building and conflict mitigation by referring to gender-, ethnic-, age-, or region-specific actions.

Figure B: Basic Structure for a TRF

<i>Vision</i>				
<i>Cluster/Sector/Theme</i>	Political (Priority Outcome or Objective)	Security (Priority Outcome or Objective)	Economic (Priority Outcome or Objective)	Social (Priority Outcome or Objective)
Baseline	Actions or Outputs at Key Intervals			
1st six months				
2nd six months				
Costs/Budget				

8. Thus, the TRF lays out a selective group of priority actions and outcomes with their financial implications, and allows national and international stakeholders to align efforts to support a successful transition, minimize the risk of reversal into violent conflict, and take necessary early steps to support building an accountable, effective and responsive state. Transitional Results Frameworks are an integral part of the OECD-DAC *Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* and the *Paris Declaration on Harmonization*.
9. In 2006, the UN and Bank reviewed shared experiences with PCNAs to identify lessons learned, and found that past processes were strong in providing a baseline of information and analysis, and in generating visibility at a crucial stage that then led to substantial external financing commitments. However, the PCNA Review found that post-conflict transition efforts were weak in several aspects that, if strengthened, could improve coherence and results during the critical period when recovery efforts must consolidate the fragile peace:
 - i. A lack of an agreed overall vision (‘storyline’) that sets the **strategic direction** for conflict transformation and peace consolidation,
 - ii. Insufficient **realism** in timelines for key recovery outcomes, resulting in unreasonable expectations amongst the population, national leadership and international partners,
 - iii. Little explicit provision for the early ‘**statebuilding**’ actions, visible and invisible, needed to help build a responsive, accountable, and effective state, and
 - iv. Inadequate **links** between priorities and actions in the political and security arena and priorities and actions in the economic and social arena.
10. After a substantive operational review, and a broad period of consultations on reforming the PCNA-TRF, a *Working Draft Strategic Guidance Note* was developed in mid-2007 as the starting point for building a shared platform for post-conflict recovery planning. Perspectives of national partners from countries who have undertaken PCNAs were brought in through their active participation in the 2006 PCNA Review and its culminating Validation Workshop. Input from member states across the diplomatic, defense and development areas was critical to the development of this approach: a series of dedicated workshops in New York with defense and development advisers, as well as sessions at DPKO-hosted workshops in Accra and Ottawa,

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feedback from members of the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group and a consultation with European Union member states in Brussels were invaluable in this regard.

11. The revised PCNA-TRF process is flexible enough to cover situations where: (i) there is a sudden breakthrough in a peace or political transition process which makes it imperative to have a clear plan and budget to support the process; (ii) a peace or political transition process is at a stage where mediators believe it is useful for parties to focus on practical transition planning; (iii) a later transition – for example, from a transitional to an elected government – requires a new process to confirm national priorities; or (iv) a political, security, economic or social crisis requires a re-evaluation of priorities and plans.
12. As with more comprehensive national plans, such as the PRS, the Transitional Results Framework should serve as a national-international ‘compact’ - the platform for all institutional country strategies during the transition period, including UN Transitional Strategies and eventually UNDAFs, Bank Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs) and eventually Country Assistance Strategies (CASSs), and bilateral donors’ country strategy papers. The TRF is most effective as common platform for crisis response and recovery when the PCNA process has been carefully linked with other processes and when the prioritized TRF integrates key political, security, and development actions in a focused effort to stabilize the fragile peace.
13. Bilateral partners have historically provided technical and financial support to the fieldwork for the PCNA-TRF; some bilateral partners have also shown great willingness to strategically (re-) align their programming and funding within the agreed priorities of the TRF. As the reformed PCNA-TRF process moves forward, bilateral contribution of country expertise and perspectives can enhance the coherence of the overall international response in three dimensions:
 - i. Diplomatic/political, as lead parties supporting a peace process and therefore as potentially important partners in implementing the peace agreement;
 - ii. Technical and policy, as partners with technical expertise and past and/or current programs in-country, both of which are critical inputs to a coordinated post-conflict recovery effort;
 - iii. Security (for a limited subset of bilaterals), as partners in multilateral or bilateral efforts across the spectrum of security stabilization and (later) security sector transformation, on the international side of key actions for which the recovery planning process can articulate complementary national activities and national budget requirements.
14. Finally, support is critical from defense, development, and diplomatic voices within individual bilateral partner governments and from the OECD-DAC, to signal commitment to a common recovery platform — an agreement to share responsibility for mobilizing resources and aligning bilateral assistance within the Transitional Results Framework and to work with national and international partners to jointly monitor the recovery process.

C New Contributions to Integration: the Peacebuilding Commission and Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies

15. The Peacebuilding Commission was created to extend the attention of the international community to countries emerging from conflict and to support the development of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS). Members of the Commission are drawn from key stakeholders in the recovery process, including troop contributing countries, the main donors to the UN, members of the Security Council as well as other member states drawn from the General Assembly and the ECOSOC. Importantly, the PBC also confers membership to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

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16. In engaging with the first two countries under consideration, the PBC deliberated and adopted a strategic framework for Burundi and a cooperation framework for Sierra Leone, respectively. Both agreements contain specific commitments by the Government and the PBC, in support of the peacebuilding process. The PBC will at regular intervals examine the progress made in addressing the stated peacebuilding priorities.
17. The IPBS is a new tool of engagement between the international community and post conflict countries under consideration by the PBC. Its articulation is premised on national ownership of the peacebuilding process. The frameworks adopted by the PBC for Burundi and Sierra Leone provide for a number of further applications which are currently under development. In particular, the IPBS is intended to inform other critical planning processes, including the UNDAF, thereby enhancing the coherence of the UN's operational effort in peacebuilding. It should also underpin the coordination effort with other multilateral and bilateral actors at country level and inform the engagement of member states in the various governance boards of UN agencies, funds and programs.
18. The IPBS is not meant to supersede existing frameworks but rather, to strengthen their focus on the broader peacebuilding effort and the development of an IPBS would thus be based on existing assessments such as a PCNA. Although a PCNA was not undertaken in the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, there is great interest in the UN system to demonstrate how the findings of a PCNA process could feed into the development of an IPBS, in the context of a future PBC country.

D Trends and Challenges: The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

19. The strategic aims of United Nations (UN) peace operations have changed fundamentally as UN mandates have become increasingly multidimensional. Peacebuilding is not an exit strategy for UN peacekeepers, but the guiding principle for our entry; it does not follow peacekeeping in a linear chronology. Integration enables the UN to sequentially and simultaneously link its conflict and crisis management capacities into a coherent support strategy so that the impact of its overall effort is greater than the sum of its disparate parts.⁴ As stated by the Secretary General, “earlier reforms addressed the symptoms, more than the causes of, our shortcomings. It is now time to reach for deeper, more fundamental change... [to enable the organization] to perform the new kinds of operations that Member States expect of it”.⁵
20. The success of the integrated mission concept will be significantly influenced by the progress of these coherence processes within member states and other inter-governmental organizations, including the “comprehensive approach” that is being debated within NATO and the “security and development” focus of the EU. Although policy coherence, coordination and integration are highly desirable modes of operations, caution is urged against thinking of the UN work on integrated missions as a panacea in place of a broader, robust process involving the full range of stakeholders. Mandates and objectives should be reviewed and updated throughout the missions; it is vital that member states engage in this important debate, and help address the notorious disconnection between the political context wherein mandates are drafted in New York and the operational conditions of mandate implementation.
21. The Secretary-General, following the recommendation of the Policy Committee, endorsed guidelines for the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) in June 2006, in the culmination of a process starting with the recommendations in the Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”) from 2000, and based on recognition

⁴ “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions”, para. 4.

⁵ Statement by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly to introduce the Report on "Investing in the United Nations" (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10602.doc.htm>)

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of the need to promote coherent UN system-wide responses to post-conflict situations. The internal UN development of the IMPP process shares aspects of the WOG approach by national governments, in that it shares the recognition that articulation of development, political issues and security enhance the efficiency of interventions, while at the same time identifying where the increase of efficiency outweighs the transaction costs of integration.

22. It is important to make the distinction between integrated planning and integrated operations. Whereas integrated *planning* is something that the UN system is striving to implement in all crisis situations, whether a peacekeeping operation is present or not, integrated *operations* are one of several options on the ground, depending on the specificities of the situation at hand. Regardless of specific operational choices, integrated planning and coherent operations are both primary aims for UN operations. Against this background, integrated planning constructs a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives at country level, based on a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to arrive at a shared understanding of what the priorities for the stabilization are, what mandates and functions of the various UN elements should be, and to subsequently use this understanding to maximize the UN's impact in all aspects of its work. On a more operational level, an Integrated Mission is one where structure is derived from a shared understanding of the specific country setting and of the particular mix of assets and capacities required to achieve sustainable stabilization in that specific country.
23. The purpose of the IMPP is to help achieve this common understanding through an inclusive planning process that engages the capacities of all parts of the UN system relevant to achieving shared objectives in a given country setting. The IMPP does not subsume other planning processes; rather it seeks to ensure that the right UN institutions are at the planning table discussing the right issues, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place.
24. According to current discussions, the start of an IMPP is likely to be preceded by a Strategic Assessment (SA) to be lead by the appropriate Secretariat department; drawing upon existing analysis including Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and other relevant tools, the SA outlines possible strategic objectives for an integrated UN response, alternative strategies, options and scenarios for UN efforts, key planning assumptions, and factors and risks that could condition or restrict UN involvement. The Secretary-General then determines if a peace operation is an option that could be considered by the Security Council, and/or whether other operational responses should be pursued.
25. Following the conclusions of the SA favoring the establishment of a peace keeping mission and endorsement of this recommendation by the Secretary-General, the process flows in parallel to the overall planning and decision making for the establishment of a peace keeping operation and is overseen both at headquarters and field level by, respectively, the IMTF (Integrated Mission Task Force) and IMPT (Integrated Mission Planning Team).
26. Work related to the operationalization and implementation of the IMPP, which is being led by DPKO in close consultation with IMPP partners (DPA, OCHA, OHCHR, DGO, PBSO), has focused on clarification of remaining policy issues, the development of guidance materials and the development of human resources capacity in the field⁶. The IMPP is an internal UN process designed to draw upon and feed into other internal and external planning processes.

⁶ In order to support the further implementation of the IMPP at HQ and country level, DPKO in the spring of 2007 initiated efforts to develop a comprehensive set of operational guidance notes on key steps of the IMPP process, through the IMPP partners group mentioned above. The guidance notes are to be tools for planners, providing for the necessary flexibility to incorporate the specificities of the situation on the ground. It is planned that they will be periodically updated on the basis of lessons learned. The guidance notes (expected to be completed early 2008), will further develop the adopted policy into standard practice.

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This is particularly true regarding the Strategic Assessment phase, where existing analysis of the country are taken into account, such as that provided by a PCNA. One can also envisage the situation where a Strategic Assessment is taking place at the same moment in time as the preparatory phase of a PCNA, in which case these processes would be expected to unroll jointly, as much as possible. At another key juncture, the prioritization phase, it is critical that priorities and resources of all partners (multilaterals, regional organizations or bilateral actors) be coordinated in order to provide for an overall coherence of operations on the ground.

27. Member States have a strong role to play in advancing the full implementation of IMPP, not only by assisting the system in developing the necessary planning tools and processes internally, but also by taking this planning into account when of the planning of their specific interventions. The development of shared priorities articulated in a common platform that recognizes the mandates and strengths of the different actors, and mechanisms for the alignment of resources towards these common priorities, are two points where Member States also have a strong role to play.

E Recent Developments in International Humanitarian Architecture: The Cluster Approach

28. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee⁷, comprised of UN humanitarian agencies, NGO consortia, IOM, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and chaired by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), agreed that the cluster approach should be the framework for response in major new emergencies and should eventually be applied in all countries with Humanitarian Coordinators. The cluster approach involves strengthening humanitarian response in three main ways: (1) ensuring that roles and responsibilities among humanitarian partners are worked out through transparent, inclusive, consultative processes; (2) ensuring leadership and responsibilities are established at the sectoral level, thereby clarifying lines of accountability and providing counterparts (or a first port of call) for national authorities, local actors, humanitarian partners and other stakeholders; and (3) ensuring that all relevant sectors and cross-cutting issues for the humanitarian operation in question are covered.

Figure C: Pooled Funds for Humanitarian Response

	Funding Mechanism	Purpose	Decision-making	Eligible Organizations	Location/Size
Country Level	Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF)	Established to enable the HC to direct funding to priority needs inside a common planning framework (DRC Humanitarian Action Plan and Sudan Work Plan)	HC in consultation with country team and Advisory Board	UN agencies; IOM and NGOs through UNDP ⁸	DRC (2006: \$92.2m) Sudan (2006: \$171m) Average project size in DRC in 2006 was \$610,000
	Emergency Response Fund (ERFs)	Provides quick funding to small-scale rapid response activities to meet unforeseen needs; does not cover chronic social problems or long-term development activities.	HC in consultation with Advisory Boards	Mainly NGOs (international and national) but also UN agencies/IOM for some ERFs	Somalia, DRC, Indonesia, Sudan and Ethiopia (soon to be established in Iraq) Project size range: \$20,000-\$100,000
Global Level	Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	Contains grant and loan components. Grants are used for rapid response (sudden onset and rapidly deteriorating existing emergencies) and under-funded crises.	Overall: ERC Field level: HC/RC in consultation with country team (development of grant requests)	UN agencies and IOM (NGOs only indirectly as implementing partners)	Loan facility (\$50m) Grant facility (2006: \$299m, 2007: \$345m, target by 2008: \$450m) Average project size in 2006: \$800,000.

⁷ The ICRC is not taking part in the Cluster Approach.

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29. The other aspects of the ongoing humanitarian reform process include initiatives aimed at strengthening humanitarian financing (see Figure C, above) and efforts to strengthen the Humanitarian Coordinator system. It also involves efforts to increase awareness and build capacities of Resident Coordinators to exercise effective leadership in promoting preparedness for humanitarian emergencies in disaster prone countries and in overseeing humanitarian responses when emergencies occur in their countries.

**F Linking Bilateral Actors and Whole-of-Government Agendas to Multilateral Efforts:
 Questions for Discussion**

30. This overview paper concludes with questions meant to provoke discussion during the Thematic meeting on how bilateral actors and agendas can most effectively complement and support multilateral initiatives, and what opportunities might exist for governments to link their own whole-of-government efforts to specific elements of the IMPP and PCNA-TRF reform processes:
- a. How can all relevant bilateral donor ministries/agencies be brought into a whole-of-government approach to develop the agreed transitional results framework/peacebuilding ‘compact’ in an integrated international response to national recovery challenges?
 - b. What prevents bilateral actors from (re)aligning their programming and funding with the priorities agreed to in a transitional results framework or peacebuilding compact? What mechanisms can help balance the agreed priorities in the country of concern with the national interests of donors?
 - c. How can we better mobilize bilateral expertise to enhance multilateral assessment, planning, and response across political, security, economic, and social dimensions? Specifically, what actions can be taken to increase bilateral participation in conducting the PCNA and developing the TRF in post-conflict situations, and in helping now to build the new “Toolkit” for the PCNA-TRF?
 - d. The IPBS is as a tool premised on national ownership of the peacebuilding process, for use in countries under consideration by the PBC. What are bilateral actors’ views on the optimal connections between the PCNA-TRF and the IPBS?
 - e. Should integrated peace operations, transitional results frameworks, and IPBSs, all use common results benchmarks for success, thus aligning discussions in the Security Council with those at economic fora such as donors’ meetings?
 - f. What are the desired linkages between the PCNA-TRF, the IMPP, the IPBS, humanitarian planning, and bilateral whole-of-government planning?