



Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges

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1. Preface

The Norwegian Government launched an initiative in 2006 to review the current debate on multidimensional and integrated peace operations, aiming at mapping out the level of progress as well as identifying continuing dilemmas and remaining challenges. The project is a follow-up of the 2005 UN *Report on Integrated Missions*, the work of the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) on the integrated missions concept. Since March 2007 a series of comprehensive regional consultations and seminars has been held around the world.

The first seminar was co-organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and held in Beijing on 26–27 March 2007. It brought together stakeholders from a number of current UN missions, from the UN Headquarters, UN Funds and Programmes, the World Bank, NGOs, local and regional partners, and high-level officials from the diplomatic, military, political, humanitarian and academic communities in a total of 22 Asian countries. The aim of the series of seminars is to gather experiences and views from practitioners and decision-makers across a wide range of operational and institutional sectors.

This report summarises the two days of discussion in Beijing and does not reflect the views or policies of the Norwegian and Chinese Government. The topics, presented here are in the same order as in the conference sessions, cover both an assessment of the nature of peace operations and in-depth discussion of specific concepts.

2. Executive Summary

On 26–27 March 2007, the first in a series of comprehensive regional consultations and seminars to be held around the world took place in Beijing, co-organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Norwegian Government.

Participants discussed current trends and challenges facing today’s multidimensional UN peace operations.

Since the turn of the millennium, UN-led peace operations have experienced an unprecedented growth, both in terms of their number and size. But their growing multidimensionality also represents a clear paradigm shift in the history of peace operations. During the course of the seminar, participants identified and focused on a number of current trends:

- The renewed importance of the UN in planning, managing and conducting international peace operations;
- The fact that peace operations are becoming increasingly multidimensional;
- The importance of an integrated approach to the planning and management of international peace operations, both at international and national levels;
- The growing “civilian nature” of modern peace operations;
- The role of regional organisations and the related emergence of “hybrid” operations, whereby the UN and regional actors operate alongside each other;
- The role of Asian countries as the key providers of military personnel to UN peace operations; and
- China’s emerging role as a global peacekeeper.

These trends and the growth in operations has placed a significant burden on the UN system, with implications both at headquarter level and field level. Although significant efforts have been made to increase the UN’s capacity to manage these operations and integrate them within the larger UN system, there are still many challenges to be met in order for the UN system to deliver efficiently and effectively in the field.

During the two days of discussions participants focused on, among other things, the importance of the sustainability of troop levels. Many of the top troop-contributing countries have limited resources. Due to the demands posed by UN peace efforts that are growing both in size and number, the shortage of qualified troops and other personnel was identified as a potential challenge in the future.

The critical subject of local ownership was also discussed at length. With the ever-growing complexity and multidimensionality of missions, there are fears that establishing local

ownership and building local capacity have not been given enough attention. In connection with this, the UN also has to improve its communication strategies in order to realistically adjust local populations' expectations.

The need for stronger and clearer mandates, with robust Rules of Engagement was also stressed by participants. There was hope that the UN reform process would help improve the mandates of the Security Council by providing better channels of information with relevant analysis upon which to base mandates.

The need to re-evaluate the conditions for exit strategies was also discussed. Everyone agreed that in most cases, exits have been premature. It was suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission could play a significant part in providing a more realistic analysis of when an exit can be perceived to be achievable and responsible.

Challenges faced by the UN Headquarters were also allotted time during the conference. Here, the importance of solid joint analysis was stressed as essential when establishing strategies and plans that are commonly agreed upon. Participants also stressed that fixed templates should be avoided. Each mission is unique and requires unique and flexible guidelines and strategies. In other words, the structure of each mission must be adapted to suit the situation in the field; "form must follow function".

Participants also recommended that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) should be given greater authority, and identified this as an essential prerequisite if coordination in the field is to improve and the desired impact is to be achieved.

The need for integrating peace operations and peacebuilding response mechanisms in general and the challenges that arise when this is done were also discussed at length. It was suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission could play a significant role here by acting as a focal point for long-term strategic planning. In this way, the Commission could counteract the sequential understanding of how peace develops and act as an authority to help persuade all UN entities as well as key contributors of personnel and financial resources to give the necessary backing for implementing an integrated approach at field level. The importance of strengthening integration at the strategic level in both New York, Washington and Geneva was also emphasised, as was the importance of "integrating" national efforts and pursuing a whole-of-government approach in the way peace operations are dealt with nationally.

The importance of providing and safeguarding humanitarian space was also discussed. An integrated context does not imply the physical or structural integration of all parties, rather, more secure humanitarian space can be achieved through an integrated plan outlining what is to be achieved through dialogue and communication/coordination. It was

agreed that integration should not be seen as a structural set up, but a tool to improve the impact and delivery of services as set out in the mandate.

Last but not least, Asian perspectives and experiences from multidimensional and integrated peace operations were given. The rapid development in, inter alia, China and India in recent indicates a geopolitical shift towards Asia. This trend can have significant consequences for the further evolution and development of international peace operations. For the time being, though, participants stressed the importance of expanding civilian deployment in peace operations from Asian countries.

3. International Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges

With 18 UN peace operations currently in place around the world and with over 100,000 troops deployed, the UN is in a phase of unprecedented activity. There are also clear indications that these numbers could increase in the future, along with the complexity of the job. The UN has come a long way in its efforts to meet the broadened scope of operations, as well as reforming its capacities in order to cater to the multidimensionality of modern operations. However, there are still many challenges that remain if the UN is to be able to deliver more effectively in the field. It was with this in mind that the participants, from their own specific perspectives and experiences, mapped out the many barriers and challenges that UN peace operations face today.

Participants noted the shift in the role of the UN since 2000. Modern peace is no longer about observing and maintaining the status quo, but rather about “doing”, i.e. ensuring political stability, promoting democracy and human rights, providing humanitarian assistance and laying the groundwork for sustainable development, as well as achieving military goals. The history of UN peace operations can be depicted as having had five phases: i) the monitoring of ceasefires between states; ii) a series of mono-dimensional post-Cold War operations in the early 1990s; iii) regional arrangements, whereby regional organisations conduct peace operations either on the basis of or supported by a UN Security Council mandate; iv) the management of transitional administrations; and v) the emergence of what are today commonly referred to as multidimensional and integrated peace operations or missions.

The need for increasingly complex peace operations has gradually become apparent, due to many contributing factors. During discussions the main reasons for this were identified as i) a response to lessons learned, especially from some tragic failures; ii) the recognition that providing security alone was not enough, i.e. that the root causes of conflicts needed to be addressed; and iii) the “four pillars” defined by Kofi Annan, i.e.

security, development, governance and human rights.

When discussing the many challenges and relevant recommendations for improving integrated missions, it is essential to be aware of the current trends affecting peace operations today:

- The renewed importance of the UN in planning, managing and conducting international peace operations;
- Peace operations that are becoming increasingly multidimensional;
- The importance of an integrated approach to the planning and management of international peace operations, both at international and national levels;
- The growing “civilian nature” of modern peace operations;
- The role of regional organisations and the related emergence of “hybrid” operations, whereby the UN and regional actors operate alongside each other;
- The role of Asian countries as the key providers of military personnel to UN peace operations; and
- China’s emerging role as a global peacekeeper.

In light of these trends, participants identified many new challenges, but also some familiar ones.

The question of the ability to sustain high levels of qualified UN troops was discussed at length. Worries were expressed with regard to troop sustainability, since troops are unfortunately only drawn from a small number of contributing countries. Financial concerns added to the worries regarding a lack of sustainability. Many of the main troop-contributing countries have limited resources, and struggle to sufficiently equip their troops and maintain standards in accordance with UN requirements.

The question of deployment time was also discussed. Mono-dimensional operations have taken up to six months to be deployed. Participants underlined the importance of adapting current arrangements (including procedures relating to force generation and reimbursement) to ensure that delays are avoided and that deployment time for multidimensional and integrated operations is no longer than for mono-dimensional operations.

Some participants were concerned about the current trend whereby the UN contributes to the privileging of some areas of conflict over others, a problem heightened to some extent by the “war on terror”. For instance, attention was drawn to the fact that there is a much higher percentage of European troops involved in European and Middle Eastern operations than in UN operations overall. The UN operation in Lebanon was given as an

example. Similar disparities can also be seen in the current situation at UN Headquarters. One concrete example given was that of the strategic planning cell for UNIFIL, which is mainly made up of European representatives.

The question of integration at interdepartmental and interagency level, between UN Headquarters and country teams, between the UN family and coalition partners, and within and among coalition partners in mixed operations, was also discussed. In the case of mixed operations, the consequences of failed integration can be disastrous. Here, references were made to the coalition between UNMIK, KFOR and the OSCE in Kosovo, which was unable to prevent ethnic cleansing, as well as the current operational set-up in Afghanistan, with the UN trying to provide overall guidance in a very difficult environment with NATO and the US operating almost independently of the UN and to some extent of each other and the Afghan Government. In light of this, the importance of coherence and command in “hybrid” operations was stressed.

Similarly, the need for a better understanding of the concept of integration (and in turn coherence) with regard to setting strategic procedures as well as attuning the operational and tactical responses are required at all levels, including at the respective headquarters was stressed as critical.

In addition, an interesting and highly relevant reflection was made concerning the enormous difference in capacity organisations have when working alongside each other. What are the barriers organisations with low capacity face in an integrated setting? With comparatively fewer resources and personnel, would integration be too much of an administrative strain? Or, if done correctly, could integration serve both as an incentive and tool for ensuring greater efficiency and impact, even with limited resources?

The importance of having received the endorsement of the host government was stressed. Moreover, the consent of the local population in general, as far as possible, was also considered to be vital if the mission is to have any chance of success. If sections of the local population object to the presence of the operation, whether due to (mis)perceptions or inadequate communication on the part of the UN, or for that matter the host government, regarding what can be expected, then the UN mission will face not only an extremely difficult operation, but also a dangerous one. These can partially be attributed to lack of knowledge concerning the real role and mandate of the UN and/or poor or misleading communication strategies for realistically adjusting the expectations of the general public.

Participants also conveyed concerns with regard to the role of the UN in states emerging from conflict and the impact of a peace operation. They expressed a number of qualms, for instance that i) a peace operation will change internal power relationships or that a

solution to the conflict will be coerced; ii) the peace operation has an agenda imposed by the West; and iii) the very decision to launch a multidimensional peace operation and the presence of such a mission indicates a failed state.

Another important concern that was raised by participants was the question of how to effectively manage violence in a country emerging from conflict. It was stressed that a UN force cannot be too passive, but neither should it use force unnecessarily. In connection with this, it was argued that strong mandates with corresponding rules of engagement and relevant directives are essential for the optimal functioning of a peace force. It was also agreed that robust mandates are not adopted or needed because the military wants or should use them, but rather as a very important, visible and clearly-defined “deterrent” to manipulative spoilers putting civilians in danger.

Participants also discussed the way the Security Council’s role is perceived by some important developing nations constituencies and the worrying trend towards unilateral action by some nations. It is therefore essential that the UN reform process contributes to improving the UN organisation as a whole, making the UN more effective both at headquarter level and in the field. However, this can only happen if the member states use their powerful position within the system in accordance with the integration agenda (the UN reform agenda), and look into ways of improving coherence in their national structures as well as vis-à-vis the UN. It was reiterated that ultimately “the UN not only is but remains the sum of its members and their willingness to act and sufficiently support the UN in its endeavour”.

Specific challenges within the Security Council were also discussed, for instance its allegedly limited attention span; working methods that do not effectively involve the troop-contributing countries or other critical parts of the UN system; the host country’s lack of engagement and involvement; the dormancy of the Military Staff Committee; the challenge of how to “energise” the Working Group on Peace Operations; the issue of strengthening relations between the Council and other parts of the UN system; and the importance of linking the work of the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission in such a way that a “dual-track” process is avoided.

Exit strategies was also discussed at length. It was agreed that elections should not be viewed as a ‘benchmark’ to exit. On the contrary, studies show that turbulence within the population usually occurs after an election. Neither should the end of a mission be determined by financial considerations. It was also generally agreed that in order for responsible exit strategies to be developed, more emphasis has to be placed on the need for regular and common assessment, reviews and adaptations of mission mandates and corresponding needs, and existing capacities both within the UN family at large and contributing states. It is also necessary to better adapt the international response to the

reality and needs on the ground, thereby ensuring a more impact-driven implementation of the Council mandate, as opposed to current trends which tend towards funding-driven implementation of the mandate and the preservation of organisational identities and structural organigrams.

The role of the newly-established Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was also discussed. Participants were worried that it could easily be perceived as “just another donor” mechanism. Furthermore, the PBC has not yet successfully played its envisioned role or contributed to more coherence and coordination in the field. It was argued that a mission that has come to its end could at present not realistically hand over control to the PBC.

4. Managing UN Peace Operations: Perspectives from UN headquarters

The UN’s operational activities with regard to maintaining international peace and security have grown by more than 600 percent over the last seven years. It was agreed that this trend is likely to continue in the time ahead. Some of the most relevant lessons learned that participants highlighted when discussing challenges relating specifically to UN processes at headquarter level included the following:

- a) Not every situation requires a UN peace operation. Peace operations are not the only way for the international community to intervene, and the UN should not launch a peace operation with no prospect of success.
- b) Each conflict/post-conflict situation is unique, which means that there are no fixed templates or standard models that can be applied.
- c) It must be remembered that post-conflict environments are quite unlike any other situation.
- d) The local population should not be given false expectations. To “hold an election and then exit” is an approach that will not work, as a society may take decades to recover from conflict. The international community’s involvement should be for the long haul, although this does not necessarily mean that troops need to be deployed for a long period.

5. Managing UN Peace Operations in Insecure Environments: Perspectives from the Field

Due to the increasing multidimensionality of UN peace operations, large parts of the UN system are directly affected by and collectively involved in a peace operation. Not only

does this cause structural communication challenges at headquarter level, it also has enormous consequences in the field. Improving coordination in the field between all the different actors involved has proved to be a challenge, but when this has been managed well it has brought effective results. When providing guidelines for integration, it is important to keep in mind that each mission is unique, but most importantly so is each host country and each post-conflict situation. In other words, the structure of each mission must be adapted to suit the situation in the field; “form must follow function”. Integration should be understood as a tool to improve coherence, optimize resources and ensure greater impact of the collective UN efforts on the ground. Integration does not imply a single structure, it was argued.

Challenges to an integrated operation emerge right at the start of a mission. The following challenges were stressed:

- (i) There is often a “culture shock” upon deployment. This is not only due to the obvious dissimilarities when people from different cultures meet. It is also caused by the meeting of different military cultures; different organisational and cultural methods and approaches; issues relating to interoperability between the various actors on the ground; military versus civilian cultures and methods; and humanitarian workers encountering development-oriented and politically-oriented actors.
- (ii) There is pressure to deliver early on in a mission, while the UN mission has a relatively small capacity. It may take up to a couple of years for funding to be in place and full capacity achieved. At the same time, the local population has to feel that it is getting something tangible out of the presence of the peace operation. If there is no tangible progress and dividends, the UN’s credibility suffers. This pressure early on can lead to rushed decision-making.
- (iii) The UN must be careful not to create additional expectations. In the short time a mission is in place, the UN can simply provide a support function and should not raise expectations unrealistically. The mission should seek to improve what is already there, and should aim to engage the local structures from the outset of the mission.

5.1 Different levels of integration

Despite the fact that the concept of integration was largely accepted by the participants as an important tool in achieving coherent delivery in a peace operation, it was clear that the concept is still understood in very different ways. There was, however, general agreement among participants that integration occurs at different levels.

5.1.1 Policy/strategic integration.

Policy and strategic integration was viewed to be the most critical. This is the foundation upon which both the programme and administrative levels are based. Having an inadequate and incoherent strategic plan would inevitably make coordination efforts at field level an ordeal. Developing a shared understanding of priorities will to a large extent increase the chances of improved integration at the other levels. In the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), for example, integration functions through an instrument known as the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), providing a single framework that brings the priorities of the government, donors, the UN funds and programmes, the World Bank and MONUC together.

5.1.2 Programmatic integration.

At the *programmatic level*, integration focuses on bringing together the various sector responsibilities called for in the Security Council mandate (i.e. Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), human rights, the rule of law, holding local elections, supporting democratic institutions and economic management) with a joint political plan and clear agreement on who does (and funds) what. Programmatic integration must be determined by the desired impact, which requires that the institutional arrangements are adapted accordingly allowing the mission to adapt to the structure that will most effectively achieve the desired impact.

5.1.3 Administrative integration.

Integration at the administrative level is a critical prerequisite for other degrees of integration to work, by making the various UN entities more administratively compatible, enabling UN entities to share resources and assets and preventing systems from operating in parallel. Integration at the operational or administrative level lags behind, however, across the board in all UN multidimensional and integrated peace operations. Common services are difficult to arrange, the sharing of assets is discouraged and many administrative arrangements remain inflexible. It was recommended that the UN and its member states quickly and sufficiently started addressing these fairly straight forward challenges that remain so important of the overall ability of the UN system to work integrated in the field.

5.2 The role of Regional Actors, Organizations and Arrangements

There is also a growing realisation that regional organisations are, can and should continue to play a significant role in maintaining regional peace and security. This presents both important opportunities and significant challenges for the UN system at large and the continued evolution of regional mechanisms to better cater to needs entailed. It was agreed, that the UN does not have unlimited capacity and therefore it is vital that the UN

cooperates effectively with partners who can remain involved after the UN mission is phased out, for instance to help with the broader security sector reform agenda in a country emerging from conflict.

Moreover, cooperation, inter-organizational integration and so called 'hybrid' arrangements between the UN and regional organizations today remains somewhat ad hoc, but efforts are being made to improve communication and cooperation on this front. Continued efforts, on both sides, have to be made in this regard due to the significant challenges that naturally arise due to the different doctrines, decision making structures and political agendas organisations adhere to, which in return result in different interpretations of mandates.

5.3 The role of police in an integrated mission

It was acknowledged that policing takes on an increasing importance in an integrated mission. Policing is vital for the continuance of peace after a mission ends. Participants discussed the many areas of expertise in which a police force can and should provide assistance. For example, the military cannot, and should not, undertake crowd control. During the discussion, the policing experts present emphasised recruitment, adequate training, co-location (the UN police and local police working from the same facility) and local ownership as the keys to success.

There has been some progress on this matter, with several countries, including China, setting up the Peacekeeping Training Centre and the UN setting up an "integrated training unit" in the Secretariat also trying to replicate the same structure at the field level, thereby providing more guidance on longer term strategic training needs to potential police contributors.

When it comes to local ownership of policing tasks, it was stated that this has to be ensured throughout the process. This can be achieved by local police and UN police being co-located, undertaking patrols or investigations together, having a process of gradual handover, etc. Another important aspect that was stressed was the necessity of having police staff as part of the planning team for the integrated mission.

5.4 The role of the military in an integrated mission

From a military perspective, it was observed that progress ought to be defined on the basis of how the local population sees it. In other words, the military is dependent upon successful implementation by the other entities, i.e. in judicial, economic, administrative, diplomatic, humanitarian and development areas. The following recommendations were made:

- Ensure mandates that empower the SRSG. Take the “One UN” in each country approach. The military Force Commander and all elements of peacebuilding should be subordinated to the SRSG.
- Have an authoritative doctrine that lays out the principles of integrated planning and execution. “Form follows function”.
- Ensure that the planning elements in the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) reflect all elements of a multidimensional mandate and an integrated approach.
- Have integrated planning and coordination elements at each level of command.

6. **The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Interface**

Part and parcel of the concept of integration is the link between peace operations and peacebuilding. While peacebuilding efforts are dependent upon the success of the peace operation, the reverse is also the case; the success of the peace operation cannot be claimed unless one has achieved essential peacebuilding goals. Today, all mission mandates given by the Security Council are multidimensional, implying in practice the necessity of cross-sector cooperation with UN Funds and Programmes. In practice, this effectively blurs the line between peace operations and peacebuilding. Participants discussed the many barriers that can arise when aiming to achieve a marriage between peace operations and peacebuilding. Trying to synchronise diplomatic, military, development, human rights and humanitarian efforts is extremely difficult at the best of times, let alone in a post-conflict environment. A few of the larger barriers were mentioned to explain the complexity of the task at hand.

Through the Security Council mandate, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for implementing programmes that are beyond its traditional expertise and more within the realm of UN Funds and Programmes. The real catch here is not the fact that other parts of the system are called upon to contribute expertise during a mission, but the fact that outdated and insufficient rules and regulations block coordination efforts and thereby chances of effectively making use of expertise from other parts of the system. While the Security Council provides multidimensional mandates which make the services of UN Funds and Programmes essential, authority for Funds and Programmes resides with the General Assembly.

In other words, an implication of this is that while the peace element of integrated

missions is funded through assessed contributions from UN member states, all other elements, including humanitarian and development activities, are funded through voluntary contributions. Experience shows that unnecessarily dangerous gaps emerge due to the great disparities between sources of funding to the different parts of a mission, which in turn increase chances that the conflict will reignite.

Participants stressed the importance of joint analysis and assessments as one way of compensating for an inadequate structural system. A joint analysis and assessment can provide the various Funds and Programmes with coordinated strategies. By striving for a coherent analysis of the root causes of a conflict, a stronger foundation could be laid for coordinated strategies between the various interventions.

Participants agreed that the long-term involvement of the international community is required for development. It can take decades to bring about a change to a society and its institutions. There is a tendency for victory to be declared too soon. Once there is modest success, foreign aid is often stopped, whereas it should continue in order to “lock in” success. It was recommended that the Peacebuilding Commission could play a significant role here by acting as a focal point for long-term strategic planning, counteracting the sequential understanding of how peace develops and acting as an authority to help persuade both UN Funds and Programmes and member states to give the necessary backing in order to implement the integrated mandate.

The other recommendations that were made for a successful mission, based on lessons learned from the past, can be summarised as follows:

- The planning process is best undertaken in collaboration with national actors. This is one of the essential first steps towards successfully establishing local ownership and capacity building. The local ownership dilemma relates to the need to root peace processes in the host country’s social and political structures without reinforcing the very structures that led to conflict in the first place.
- Empower local actors, hold them accountable as the UN will be held accountable, and do not act as a substitute for them.
- Get the political analysis right.
- Establish credible and legitimate national security forces, defence and police to replace external security forces as soon as this is feasible.
- Build the institutions required for the implementation of rule of law and the provision of justice.

- Invest in economic and social development.
- Contribute to and do not distort the local economy.
- An indigenous national development plan, facilitated where necessary by external advisers, is the best way to ensure buy-in from both national and international stakeholders.

6.1 Local Ownership

The issue of local ownership was stressed by the participants. This is an area requiring much greater focus and heightened efforts. Ultimately, if local ownership is not established or the host country is unable to govern itself, then the mission has not succeeded. In other words, an integrated mission is not only a matter of effectively organising different international actors into a coherent whole, but also of making sure that the international community's efforts will eventually result in a stable situation with a representative government and strong civil society, thereby providing the population with all the functions to perform as a "whole of government" that a stable and peaceful society requires.

7. Humanitarian Partnerships in UN Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations

The conference heard the perspective of several humanitarian organisations including representatives from the strongest NGO advocacy bodies in Asia and Europe, and discussed the way humanitarian organisations operate in relation to an integrated UN peace mission. As stated earlier, the international response to a situation in a country does not begin with a peace presence, nor does it end there. Humanitarian organisations can be involved in a country for decades, so it matters very much that there is coherence between ongoing humanitarian action and a peace force. Because of the many sensitive overlapping areas that can emerge between the military and humanitarian agencies, it is vital that the peacekeeping force and the humanitarian organisations reach a common understanding. An integrated mission offers this opportunity, with the chance to have a dialogue at all levels.

It was also agreed that the peacekeeping force and the humanitarian organisations need to recognise each other's roles and to understand when and when not to work together. It is important from the peacekeeper's point of view that the humanitarian organisations are able to function, because the humanitarian organisations have the greatest delivery

capacity and presence on the ground. In other words, an integrated approach to implement the Security Council mandate, can, if managed well, safeguard the humanitarian space which is an essential prerequisite for a successful mission. As recommended in the 2005 *Report on Integrated Missions*, where OCHA is placed outside the integrated structure, securing the necessary impartiality and independence, while at the same time being able to support and advise the Humanitarian Coordinator inside the mission has proved effective in this regard. The importance of physical space between the mission and the humanitarian actors in the field was stressed by participants, in order to maintain impartiality, a humanitarian profile and independence. This also relates to the need to retain access to the population.

However, within this equation it is vital to distinguish between NGOs that have a political role and ones that do not. For instance, it is not only developmental organisations that can easily be perceived as political, many humanitarian organisations also blur the lines with their work. It is important therefore that the NGO community becomes more self-critical and is very clear on where the line for humanitarian activities should be drawn.

Furthermore, dilemmas, specifically relating to the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, whereby use of military assets to distribute humanitarian assistance were addressed. It was generally agreed that it would be damaging to the overall aims of humanitarian assistance the mission if important humanitarian actors were compromised through having too close relations with the military, or if a scenario occurred where the military compromised the impartiality of the humanitarian community by conducting humanitarian relief in order to provide a cover for military action.

Putting the discussion of the dilemma of humanitarian space aside, participants stressed the important role NGOs play within the peacebuilding phase, by:

- Providing a human security framework.
- Providing grounding in local needs, conditions and specificities. (The stages of development following a conflict can be described as post-conflict preparation, rehabilitation, productivity, micro-enterprise and finally market-oriented enterprise).
- Providing community-based conflict resolution.
- Building a constituency for peace. (NGOs have found it useful to use the following guidelines for facilitating multi-stakeholder consultations: i) identify the

stakeholders; ii) define the parameters for participation of all stakeholders; iii) define and establish mechanisms for involving the stakeholders; iv) build stakeholder capacity).

8. Preparing for Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Doctrine and Training

8.1 The UN Capstone Doctrine

A new, and peace doctrine, referred to as the Capstone Doctrine, is currently being drawn up. It will replace the outdated version from 1995 (*Guiding Principles for UN Peace*). Since 1995 UN peace operations have evolved, growing in size, scope, complexity and costs. The doctrine, a landmark document, constitutes the first attempt in over a decade to clarify the nature and scope of UN peace operations for the benefit of peacekeeping practitioners and partners. It provides key principles that should guide the planning and conduct of operations. The doctrine, it was emphasised, should be considered a living document that will need to be updated and reviewed to reflect the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations. It was stated that the main test for the doctrine is whether the mission on the ground finds the guidance realistic and helpful. The original guidance from 1995 is now felt to be lacking in some areas.

Participants recommended the following with regard to doctrine:

- Peace operations should never be carried out in a one-dimensional manner, as this creates the risk of a prolonged low-intensity conflict. What makes a difference here is comprehensive integrated planning and execution.
- Training in UN doctrine//Training in the Capstone doctrine must be a creative process: exploring options, sharing insights, testing options, challenging opinions, preparing for the unknown. Avoid template solutions and recipes based on previous experience. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of conflict itself in the 21st century.
- Military operations create more problems than they solve unless planned and executed within an integrated context.

8.2 Training for multidimensional and integrated peace operations

It was argued that the personnel are the most important element of a mission, which makes strict selection, profiling, teambuilding and systematic training essential. The following recommendations were given regarding training: uniformed units must be

combat-ready and given mission-specific training (training in cultural awareness; developing an understanding of the fact that the military function is only one aspect of the mission; sharing experiences with NGO and governmental organisation representatives; and learning how to reach out to youths, women and children). The SRSG, the DSRSR/HC/RC, the Director of Administration and the Force Commander with their teams should attend team building sessions, seminars and courses – together and with the rest of the UN mission (including the UN country team) – to build common understanding and trust. The importance of fully internalising that the UN system is different from any national or alliance system was stressed. To avoid frustration and lack of efficiency the “UN way” of doing business should be taught to civilian and military officers before deployment. Training also provides the foundation for improved team building across all sectors and institutional affiliations.

9. Asian Perspectives on International Peace Operations

There was some discussion relating to Asian perspectives, with many participants talking of their countries’ experiences of and contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. It was suggested that the economic and political rapid development in, inter alia, of China and India in recent years indicates a geopolitical shift towards Asia, yet it was felt that Asian countries have not yet secured a significant voice when it comes to peaceoperations, despite the fact that they provide the largest percentage of peace troops. This is a situation which should be given greater attention in the future.

Participants also suggested that there should be greater civilian deployment in peace operations from Asian countries. A handful of Asian countries supply 50% of all troops but their contribution of civilian personnel is marginal. Having a greater number of Asian civilian personnel would give integrated peace missions distinct advantages. Firstly, this would help prevent local populations from misperceiving the UN presence as the imposition of a Western agenda. Secondly, it was felt that Asian expertise may be relevant and useful to the host country, given that so many Asian countries share similar governance and institutional challenges. There is very specific expertise that can be found in Asia. Some Asian countries have experience of building democratic institutions in a complex, multicultural and multi-ethnic society; some have experience of anti-corruption campaigns; some have experience of model government-NGO collaboration; and some have experience of development strategies that have transformed their economic growth.