

**Protection in Practice – UN Integrated Missions**  
**9 February 2007**

- Quick preview

**Today's Larger Missions and 'Integration'**

- A few words on 'integrated missions' – worth recalling what this really means in practice for humanitarians, at least in the biggest missions in Africa, MONUC, UNMIS and UNOCI. The main feature of integration is the position of the HC as DSRSG with a reporting line to the SRSG (and on a mission post at the ASG level). OCHA outside the mission, reporting to the HC (and in the case of Sudan, the Deputy HCs); of course agencies retain their own programming and coordinate through the country team, as anywhere else. This model, first used in Sierra Leone, is clearly the preferred one now.
- Probably even less integration (HC separate) in Chad/CAR if mission is deployed. No integration at all, not even between military and political, in Lebanon (for unique reasons). Still some examples of full integration (i.e. no separate OCHA office) but either in political missions with no military components (UNAMI and UNAMA) or clear post-conflict situations (Liberia), or at least where there's no clear humanitarian emergency (Haiti).
- Also have new guidance note from the SG on relationship between SRSG, DSRSG/HC/RC, Country Team, human rights components of missions, etc. that defines roles and responsibilities much more clearly. Maybe 'unified mission' preferable term going forward; integrate only as much as necessary (Pronk in the summer of 2004).
- Interesting cases for our purposes are missions with major military components in countries that also have large humanitarian operations (and of course major protection issues, by definition)
- Last seven UN missions had some form of protection mandate. Mostly quite similar language ('under imminent threat', 'within its capacity', etc.). But what exactly does this mean? How do the military components implement it? A number of workshops being done with PDSB to explore these questions. Need for guidance and consistency. Now too often left to force commanders, battalion commander and levels below to interpret. Rules of Engagement mostly don't address specifics. Most national military doctrines and therefore training don't include protection of civilians so PK contingents generally don't have any basis on which to interpret this part of their mandate (except Canada and UK).
- Despite discomfort among many, several major potential benefits to having a peacekeeping mission come in:
  - Most obviously, physical protection.

- Significantly more political leverage for international community, at least in many cases ('protection about power and changing behavior')
- Better analysis that hopefully is accessible to humanitarians; most mission still quite bad at doing good analysis or sharing it but there's a lot of potential.
- Maybe most important: 'exit strategy' from protection perspective – international substitution not sustainable, whether military, police or humanitarian. Broad range of mission activities can contribute to sustainable protection in the long term: political, support to government institutions, rule of law, but also DDR and SSR – humanitarians need to push for these aspects, as they are in many countries.

### Sudan, especially Darfur

- Sudan with two missions, only one UN and integrated/unified: UNMIS proper, implementing the 1590 mandate related to the CPA with about 10,000 troops; has standard protection mandate but deployed in areas with relatively low levels of violence (except clashes like in Malakal last year, LRA attacks before peace talks; and tribal and militia fighting and skirmishes that have been going for decades).
- AMIS separate, and even hybrid won't be integrated in any real sense – in that sense Darfur not a good example at all of 'protection in integrated missions' but still some important issues.
- Protection coordination – not much to add; recent mission of UNHCR supported by OCHA, in Khartoum today to review conclusions and recommendations (one specific point related to OCHA: Sudan already by far our largest field presence; 20% of total field office requirements; having UNMIS do protection coordination was also related to budgetary constraints in 2004 and thereafter).
- Vast amount written about AMIS, humanitarian operation and every other aspect of Darfur; focus on a couple of points.

### *Darfur Planning Process for UN mission and Relevance for Hybrid*

- Planning for transition started in earnest about a year ago; guidelines for integrated mission planning process (IMPP); integrated team created with full time humanitarian and human rights staff alongside military, police, logistics, etc.
- Having these staff, and the right staff (previously based in Sudan) critical to our ability to influence the planning process; went on each assessment mission, part of drafting teams, etc. Two examples:
- Protection mandate in SG report and SC resolution important but a given. But how presented relative to other aspects (protection vs. implementation of the DPA) key to us. Didn't quite succeed vis-à-vis SC, still very focused on DPA implementation when 1706 adopted.

- Key planning variable for military and police planners: protection of civilians at large vs. protection of humanitarians or refugees/IDPs. Temptation by military planners (and politicians) to emphasize the latter, easier to do, more media attention, and a lot of inaccurate reporting.
- Security in and around IDP camps mostly law and order problem. With some exceptions, particularly in West Darfur, not being targeted by military attacks. Refocus military planner on protecting civilians in rural areas and providing 'wide area security'; need for highly mobile units, air assets, intelligence and liaison capability, etc.
- Success during Darfur mission planning process reflected in Secretary-General's report of late July 2006.
- Relevant for hybrid; mandate, size, etc. based on SG report; quick exercise going on now with AU to lock at force size. Of course fundamental issue is lack of inclusive political agreement. Something Eliasson and Salim are now working on.

*Reasons for AMIS's relative ineffectiveness in protecting civilians*

- Multiple reasons that are well known but three very important – command and control; relationship with the Government; and, since May 2006, association with the DPA (a bit less relevant most recently) and of course absence of real peace deal key to dynamics on the ground. Relatively more important than some of the others often mentioned. Mandate based on AU PSC resolutions not the real issue; mystery why so many NGOs have focused so much attention on it. Very similar to typical Security Council language.
- First two hopefully will be addressed at least partly as we move into heavy support package and hopefully hybrid mission.
- Importance of command and control, rules of engagement, other guidelines and standards; high degree of inconsistency; often lack of communication and information flow down from Addis, Khartoum and El Fasher. Very frustrating for humanitarians. Overall dramatic decline in basic protection activities.
- Relationship with the Government, or ability to stand up to it; curfew most frequently cited but many other examples (fuel tank seized to refuel attack helicopters, not allowed to move to certain areas, etc.). Lack of political leadership after Kingibe departure but also structural/larger political reasons; much greater ability of GoS to exercise pressure through AU leadership structures. Don't overestimate how different that would be under UN lead or in hybrid but it would change, also because of much more direct link to the SC.

*Poor analysis – and why?*

- Humanitarians mostly not trained to do it. No time to do it. Very high turnover in the toughest areas. Often not being shared among humanitarians. And certain degree of bias in favor of those most in need of assistance inevitable.
- One of the greatest benefits an integrated mission can add potentially, e.g. civil affairs in UNMIS Darfur; but again poor quality of staff; role not clear, etc. But humanitarians should push for this, and for access to the analysis, and then of course incorporate it into their programming, etc. which is often the hardest part.
- Only other source is UNDSS ('different tribe') – lots of complaints from NGOs about lack of analysis; but also biased, main interlocutors are security, military, police, armed groups. Not a good source of political and social analysis.

### DRC

- DRC much better example than Darfur – large UN mission with 17,000 troops and massive humanitarian operation; Ross Mountain as HC.
- Vast protection challenges across the country.
- MONUC protection of civilians as overarching objective of the mission; military protection mandate very specific – if imminent threat cause by Congolese or foreign armed groups, allowed to use all necessary means to deter these threats, use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks, and disrupt military capability of illegal armed groups to use violence (usual qualifications as well – within capabilities and where MONUC units deployed; imminent threat)
- Very negative impact of FARDC/MONUC joint operations last year, generated close to 500,000 IDPs starting late December 2005 in North Kivu; highly traumatized populations; mostly very short term displacements (1 months; short distances) but looting, missed season, etc. As a result, each rebel killed or captured meant huge cost in humanitarian terms. All happened despite Joint Protection Working Groups established for Eastern provinces in 2005 and strong HC who was also DSRSG.
- Offensive operations against rebels and militia ended last November. Also much stronger mechanisms in place now (and military awareness at the top levels) after Egeland and Guehenno visits last year.
- Working groups turned into Protection Clusters co-chaired by UNHCR and MONUC; still major lack of good capacity despite big human rights/protection section in MONUC. Used for planning and assessment of protection aspects of joint MONUC/FARDC operations that are ongoing.
- Cluster in DRC extending its coverage, incorporating national NGOs (previously associated through separate meetings) and strengthening cooperation with elected

authorities; priorities include monitoring, early warning, rapid response mechanisms, impunity and SGBV, property issues; nationality law and protection of minorities. Elaborating plan at the moment to try to address these many issues.

- Increasing impact in terms of physical protection. Each time MONUC asked (by the HC) they send troops to areas under threat, based very often on information from the humanitarians; very significant reduction in violations even with small contingent (50 men); also attracts returns.
- Also finally guidelines issued in December 2006 to maintain clear distinctions between peacekeepers and humanitarians; OCHA, Civil Affairs, CIMIC doing joint training sessions across the country.
- Challenge to engage new DRC government structures with very little capacity. And large number of violations perpetrated by FARDC. Critical importance of SSR and DDR. Much greater opportunities now after the elections because no real willingness by anyone to do it before. Still no real military structure; new proposed EU approach; 70-100,000 have to be integrated into unified; very few demobilized.
- Generally the wider international system is still bad at doing DDR and SSR. On SSR, no clear lead, very little capacity at HQ and in the field, etc. Lots of discussions in OECD, UN system, etc. Some parts better (police) but defence sector reform a big gap. In DRC, unclear who will lead; EU, AU (SA and Angola), MONUC. Huge problem in Afghanistan and Iraq of course but should be easier in many of the African countries we operate in. Of course also linked to larger governance and rule of law issues. But even when UN in charge of all that, very hard to do well; see police in East Timor.

#### Other general comments/dilemmas

- Protection coordination in integrated missions? Key to us is that it remains under HC and has capacity to do the analytical and field work. Could be inside missions, could be UNHCR as cluster lead or OCHA, depending on circumstances.
- Alternative to peacekeepers (and humanitarians)? DPKO being dragged into Somalia, Chad, CAR. Maybe army of mediators that are actually on the ground; constant Egeland appeal. But extremely small and poor capacity, local knowledge, etc. Most efforts in UN and even among NGOs focused on top level mediation (MSU in DPA). Can't be part of humanitarian effort. Some reference to reconciliation projects by small NGOs but almost never part of coordinated and strategic effort.
- Lack of political capital and investment; no zero sum game with humanitarian protection (see Darfur)
- Primary responsibility of government vs. international protection mandate. How do you avoid creating false expectations and make the governments responsible. Either

no political will or no capacity (Darfur mix of it as well, see police deployments in 2004 under the 'plan of action'). Dilemma that every action can be seen as transferring responsibility but often governments acting in bad faith so we don't have choice.

- 'Explosion of substitution' and reduction of political pressure on governments but largely unavoidable – exit strategy because substitution not sustainable (see above); dilemma also not unique to protection.