

SEMINAR ON MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND INTEGRATED PEACE
OPERATIONS: INTEGRATED MISSIONS REVISITED

OSLO, NORWAY: 29TH AND 30TH OCTOBER, 2007

**“Implementing UN Integrated Peace Operations: Re-aligning
Mandates, Programmes and Resources”**

1. At the outset, please allow me, Excellency, to express my sincere appreciation to the Government and the people of Norway for your sustained interest in the search for lasting global peace and security.
2. Your commitment to contributing to the development of all peoples around the globe, driven essentially by the full knowledge that there cannot be sustainable development amidst raging conflicts, underpin the organization of seminars, devoted to finding ways in which the United Nations can better manage the complex issue of multidimensional and integrated peace operations.
3. I am therefore humbled and equally grateful that I was invited to focus my intervention on the aspect of re-aligning mandates, programmes and resources in the context of multidimensional and integrated peace operations.
4. As a serving member of the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (commonly known by its acronym, the ACABQ), I am pleased to confirm to this august gathering that the issue of how best to align mandates and resources is uppermost on the minds of the members of ACABQ.
5. Indeed, my colleagues and I take serious interest in this matter, as we believe we have a responsibility to contribute to its meaningful development. We are conscious of the fact that, if significant changes and the attendant results are not demonstrated in the way resources are aligned with mandates, Member States may become exasperated with the ever increasing price tags associated with peace operations.

6. Without the unflinching support of Member States, demonstrated *inter alia* through their timely payment of assessed contributions and release of their troops, UN peace operations would be in jeopardy. To this end, any effort that can bring about a better alignment of mandates and resources should be welcome.

7. In my opinion, the concept of Integrated Peace Operations is yet to properly take-off. As recently as the 60th Session, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to refine the concept and its functioning, to clearly draw lines of responsibility and accountability within the concept of integrated missions, including the interaction between such missions and the different partners.

8. An integrated operation has two fundamental relationships: vertical and horizontal. Effort has been made in the horizontal relationship. So far, attempts have been made to incorporate High-Level representation of Funds and Programmes and Specialized Agencies within the structures of UN's peacekeeping operations. As you are aware, recent complex peacekeeping operations consist of peace/security pillars and development/reconstruction pillars where the Deputy SRSG also acts as Resident Coordinator.

9. However, familiarization field visits by the ACABQ to different peacekeeping missions (recently in the DRC) have revealed that, in spite of the induction of Funds and Programmes into the Peacekeeping structure, actual coordination at the operational level remains very poor, if not lacking.

10. In addition, whenever questioned in the budget submission hearings with ACABQ about the activities of the UN Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes operating on the ground along side UN peace operations, representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) often provide very little input on how much they understand to be the relationship between DPKO and other members of the UN family. This lack of coordination has to improve starting with Headquarters by ensuring regular contact and coordinated planning between the SG and the Heads of the Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes.

11. In recent years, the only model that DPKO has thus far found attractive to mimic is the mind-boggling question of harmonization of conditions of service and benefits with their counter-parts in the field!

12. This demonstrates that more work is needed in defining the relationship “between the role of the UN and the role of other agencies and organizations, both within and outside the UN system; the leadership the UN should exercise, and at what stage; how to adjust the UN Country Team mechanism to be intone with the reality on the ground, and avoid indiscriminately templating mission structures and resource needs, without any distinction.

13. By way of example to demonstrate this point, one could take the example of Somalia and the Sudan. For sometime now, Somalia has been in perpetual search for a functional state. The absence in Somalia of a single national central authority blurs the sensitivities attached to national sovereignty, which in many instances gets invoked to decline external intervention.

14. But in a country like Sudan, where there is at least a functional authority in Khartoum, the Government would certainly not easily accept any assertion that it has lost total control.

15. These two examples demonstrate that the mission’s activities, though emanating from its mandate, would therefore need to be adapted to the local realities, bearing in mind that intervention can only move from peace-making, to peacekeeping and to peace-building. It therefore appears to us in the ACABQ that a greater coordination between all the UN actors is required, both at headquarters and at the operational level.

16. Given the competition for the limited resources available to each of the different actors operating on any single country, be it the DPKO, Specialized agencies, and Funds and Programmes, a clear exposition to the General Assembly of the resources available to all the actors involved in a given mission, (a full disclosure of resources), should be a pre-requisite for the GA in its determination of the resources required by any peace operation. This pre-supposes joint appearance of the relevant actors before the GA during such discussions.

17. Secondly, it is also important for the General Assembly to ascertain whether the resources allotted to a mission are yielding the desired results. While improvements have been made in recent years, the Secretariat sometimes uses the unpredictability of peacekeeping as an excuse for inadequate planning and interaction between the budget section at

Headquarters and the field. Providing clear explanations on the utilization of resources will provide Member States with assurances that under- and over-spending were unavoidable. This will not prevent senior management from deploying resources to correspond with the changing realities on the ground.

18. The ACABQ, despite its very busy schedule, endeavours to undertake field visits for its own independent evaluation and appreciation of the activities of peace operations. Such first hand information has proved to have unquantifiable value added when the Advisory Committee undertakes analysis of the crucial issue of how to better align resources with mandates. The Member States' repeated expressions of appreciation of the improved contributions reflected in the ACABQ's reports show that such undertaking is very worth-while. The DPKO will have to make a more concrete effort to record and share best practices in the planning, implementation and down-sizing stages of an operation's mandate.

19. Thirdly, alignment of resources to mandates places accent also on the need to ensure that resources are utilized more efficiently which necessitates the avoidance of duplication of work and invariably greater coordination. At this stage, results-based budgeting (RBB) that develops the logical and programmatic framework around which a mission's budget is built is still largely a paper exercise. The resources to be allocated and aligned with mandates continue to be largely approximations.

20. So far, there is no system in place that can, after analysis of actual needs of a mission, quantify the resources that should be earmarked for the implementation of the mandate. Cost-accounting has been proposed as a possible solution and it is still under study. The Secretariat will also move towards implementing a new accounting system, IPSAS, in the coming years. However, I must hasten to caution that not every activity should have a price tag as it would cost too much to attribute and track every dollar with no obvious benefits. Member States generally are more concerned about receiving assurances that resources were used properly, in accordance with the mandate and that there was no waste, fraud or mismanagement.

21. Real alignment of resources and mandate should be about measuring performance with regard to impact or result achieved to enable the mission determine if it should continue with its strategy and where impact lags behind, to change strategy. There should be a clear leader of the mission,

the SRSG who should lead all the implementing partners on strategic priorities and resource allocations in the theatre of operation.

22. In my opinion, the on-going research on, and a possible eventual implementation by the United Nations of a Results-Based-Management (RBM) system, holds better prospects to enable meaningful focus on results and outcome. Further strengthening auditing and oversight of peacekeeping operations are also positive measures. Efforts should be made to improve the relationship between internal auditors and management in order to ensure more regular and open dialogue. The ACABQ is ready to play a part in this regard.

23. In this respect it is also important to point out the very obvious fact that mandates for peace operations derive mainly from Security Council resolutions, based of course on the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Council. For a better alignment of mandates and resources, it is necessary, that at the stage when the Secretary-General is submitting a report to the Security Council, the Council also receive detailed picture of all the activities being undertaken by the entire members of the UN family active in a particular area. Such information would enable the Council to give the mission a clearer mandate. Similarly, once the Council gives a mandate, the "One UN family" should prepare a consolidated resource requirement for the operation.

24. What obtains now is a piecemeal approach that makes it difficult to clearly ascertain the extent of the resources each entity will commit to the same operation. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the clearance of requested resources is processed by different organs. While the DPKO channels its request to the GA, Funds and Programmes submit theirs to their Governing Boards, while the Specialized Agencies proceed to their Executive Boards.

25. For a better alignment of resources and mandates the GA should be able to make more informed decision on the allocation of resources. This can be accomplished if the GA engages all the UN actors in any one operation, Funds and Programmes and the Specialized Agencies, in a discussion on resource allocation.

26. As the resource requirements for multidimensional and integrated peace operation continue to grow, the need for re-alignment of mandates and

resources becomes more acute. Further, there is need to ensure that the objective of the mission is achieved at the end of the operation, and within realistic time-frames. Exit strategies should not be driven by cost.

27. One should hasten to observe that “realistic time-frames” should neither be too early nor too late! Haiti and East Timor taught us one thing – stay as reasonably as possible. This cannot be achieved if in the implementation of the mandates conscious effort is not made to better align resources to achieve peace and stability, and thus jump start development, without which the UN may find itself returning to the same theatre of conflict after its initial departure.

28. Again, going by the existing pattern of allocation of resources in addressing mandates, there is reason to be concerned. The trend thus far is that about 70% of requested amounts tend to be devoted to human resources requirements, 20% to infrastructure and only about 10% is spent on the local economy.

29. If greater emphasis is not placed on boosting the local economies through a deliberate involvement of the local population from the onset, the multinational and integrated peace operation may expend much more money and linger around the same mission for an extended period of time before accomplishing its objective.

30. A simple analysis of the allocation of resources as pointed out above, demonstrates where our focus lies. This is amplified by the fact that in many of the places where the UN has peace operations, the United Nations’ budget is larger than the annual budget of that country. A case in point is Burundi. While its national budget was \$319 million, the UN mission’s budget was \$341 million. Can this be sustainable?

31. Without the greater involvement of the local population at the very early stage in all fields of operations including in substantive sectors, the local population will remain outside the system. We should recruit and train the local population from day one and not only for logistics as is the case now, but in substantial areas to enable the United Nations leave a legacy behind. This can be accomplished if in planning a peace operation we enlarge the scope of quick impact projects and devote more resources to them. The HRM policies of the ICSC should be relaxed to facilitate the

recruitment of local staff – obtaining academic records that meet UN requirements in a war-torn area is not always realistic.

32. At the very beginning of the mission, attention would be paid to small projects that can touch the lives of the local population in a manner that will win their hearts and minds to the work of the UN. Such a powerful positive impact of the presence of the UN would pave way for a smoother transition from peacekeeping to peace-building and give the UN better chance of leaving behind an enduring/lasting legacy.

33. If we commit to this, then the motto of the United Nations can become: “helping people to help themselves”.