



**Report on Wilton Park Conference WP844**

**INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:**

**HOW CAN THE CAPACITY CHALLENGES BE MET?**

**Monday 4 June – Thursday 7 June 2007**

**Summary**

- Effective peacekeeping requires the development of a multinational doctrine on the use of force at the United Nations (UN), taking into account the responsibility to protect;
- Identifying the relative advantages of the different organisations in peace support operations, including private military security companies, should aim to create a global interlocking security architecture;
- Integration and coordination, in planning and implementation, is crucial between security, political, humanitarian and development sectors; such planning should be civilian-led; there should be mechanisms to promote local ownership and consultation with local actors, to promote a joint negotiated vision;
- Building institutional capacity, particularly in the UN and African Union (AU), is needed; moreover, the AU needs to have predictable funding for its operations;
- Benchmarks, or measurement indicators, need to be built into the planning of peace support operations to enable progress to be assessed and transition or exit strategies established;
- Security sector reform (SSR) needs to be improved, and a holistic approach adopted from the outset of peace support operations to include all actors involved in the administration of justice; additional funding needs to be found for SSR, including from official development assistance;
- Peacekeeping is not the only tool in the box; conflict prevention and mediation should be given greater emphasis.

## **Introduction**

1. In 2007 more than 100,000 UN personnel (military, police and civilians) are deployed in the field in peace support operations, representing a 500% increase since 2000. Peacekeepers deployed by regional organisations have risen to some 68,000. Together with the growth in peacekeeping actors, the number of peacekeeping operations has increased, as well as their size, scope and diversity. Contemporary peacekeeping deals predominantly with intra-state conflict, including the involvement of irregular armed forces, or even criminal gangs; it is often more difficult to gain agreement and commitment from warring parties in a civil conflict, and there are many potential spoilers. Civilians are often targets of violence. The UN adopted in 2005 the norm of the 'responsibility to protect', which it now needs consistently to apply in practice. Operations have had to become more robust. International peacekeepers are regularly deployed to situations where there is a humanitarian crisis; infrastructure has been destroyed, and state institutions have collapsed requiring peace support operations to engage in sustained state-building. The growth of international public opinion creates pressure on governments and international organisations to act.
  
2. While there is concern about the general problem of overstretch and rising costs of international peacekeeping, as well as the lack of a growth management strategy at the UN, the UN and regional organisations should take credit for what has been done: fewer people are now dying in warfare. For this to continue in the face of unprecedented demand, there is a need: to improve the peacekeeping tool, identify the capacity challenges and prioritise its use; plan from the outset of operations for the transition from international peacekeepers to other actors, including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) which, some feel, has to-date made a slow start; and look to other means of preventing and resolving conflict. Peacekeeping should not be a substitute for political engagement or an "easy way out" for the UN Security Council (UNSC), and its five Permanent Members (P5), when dealing with difficult situations; deploying peacekeepers may not always be the appropriate response.

## **Interlocking security architecture**

3. As has been demonstrated, particularly in recent years, the UN is not the only peacekeeping or peace support organisation; regional, and sub-regional, organisations have a significant role to play. The regional dimension to civil wars is an element that should be kept in sight. Regional organisations (ROs) are, by definition, closest to conflicts in their part of the globe and may have a better understanding of the local environment. Some ROs may be best placed to act most quickly, driven by the proximity of realities on the ground. Yet strong feelings are expressed that when ROs intervene they do so on behalf of the international community, and not to replace international action. The AU reflects this view; peacekeeping in Africa, some urge, should be seen as a global responsibility, yet there is a perception that African priorities are not necessarily seen as such by the UNSC. In part, the current composition of the UNSC does not provide Africa with a strong voice. Some suggest the UNSC should establish criteria for undertaking peace support operations based on how its limited capabilities can best be used to guide the creation of new mission mandates.

4. There is a need to identify the capacities and comparative advantages of the UN and ROs, and create predictable frameworks and common standards for the various actors to work in partnership, building a global interlocking security system. Efforts to institutionalise cooperation among primary decision-making organs, such as the UNSC and the AU's Peace and Security Council, are improving. Developing an institutional framework for regional support operations may evolve in time into meaningful regional economic, social and political cooperation beyond the stabilisation of a conflict; the European Union (EU) is able to provide this prospect for Balkan countries.

5. Most acknowledge the UN's universality provides its legitimacy and recognise the primacy of the UNSC in the maintenance of peace and security. While there remains some sensitivity in the UN-NATO relationship in this respect, with NATO now cooperating with a number of non-NATO allies, attitudes at NATO are felt

to be changing. Perceptions of NATO at the UN also need to change, to recognise NATO as a genuine partner, not simply the provider of certain capabilities.

## **Doctrinal challenges**

6. UN member states have traditionally been reluctant to develop a UN doctrine for peace operations, but the complex and dangerous situations of contemporary peacekeeping demand the codification of UN lessons learned and development of a multinational doctrine on the use of force. Doctrine needs to have clearly defined goals and methods, set performance standards and improve accountability. It will have to go beyond self-defence, to include at least the protection of civilians. Some suggest the doctrine on the protection of civilians should provide for the calibrated use of force, even pre-emptively. Ultimately, it must preserve the distinction between robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement, where force is used for limited objectives, and war, where force is used to defeat an enemy. There is general agreement the UN should not manage initial suppression of wholesale violence; regional organisations are seen to have added advantage in this respect. A multinational doctrine should identify the outer limits of what each organisation can do, especially the UN and AU (NATO already has a doctrine). It should situate military doctrine in a broader and comprehensive 'doctrine' for all elements of peace operations, providing a unity of purpose. Many underline the importance of the new Capstone doctrine currently being elaborated at the UN.

7. Strengthening the conduct of operations, the chain of command and rules of engagement, will provide for better cohesion of forces on the ground. A multinational doctrine will enable troop contributors to anticipate and comply with UN, and other organisations', mode of operations. Some suggest it may build confidence and help re-engage European or Western troops in UN peacekeeping operations. European troop contributions to UN operations have significantly diminished in recent years. At the same time, some question whether providing for a tougher UN doctrine may risk getting mandates from the UNSC that exceed new capacities as has occurred in the past. It may also require faster deployment with forces ready to fight, but without greater commitments of availability of such forces.

## **Building capacity**

### **UN**

8. To improve the UN's approach to peacekeeping, some argue the UNSC needs to become more inclusive and involve all stakeholders to a peace support operation in its deliberations, in particular troop contributing countries. There is a need for greater military expertise for the conduct of an operation. The ratio between staff at UN headquarters and in the field is seen by some as completely inadequate; yet member states are reluctant to create posts at headquarters, and the UN has to make a virtue of decentralisation. Some express concern that restructuring the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) into two departments will exacerbate the shortage of posts, creating instead the need for more staff liaison positions.

9. The creation of a Strategic Military Cell for the reconstituted UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been much contested: it falls outside DPKO's military division, is manned only by the P5 and troop contributing countries, and is seen by some as micro-managing the UN and constituting special treatment for one mission only. It may nevertheless provide some pointers for consideration in the current process of DPKO restructuring and how better to manage UN missions. It compensates for the weakness in long-term military analysis and assessment from which DPKO suffers. Some suggest that if it could evolve into an entity with oversight for other operations, as necessary, it would substantially add capacity to DPKO.

10. Despite the unprecedented numbers of troops currently deployed by the UN, some suggest that for the moment availability of light infantry is adequate; there is, however, serious overstretch in force enablers or multipliers with much fewer numbers of Western troops committed to UN peacekeeping. For example, the UN needs capacity in night fighting and intelligence. The absence of a strategic reserve, still much debated at the UN, is also felt by some to be a serious impediment to peacekeeping. It prevents the UN having a deterrence force to deploy when spoilers create problems, and other rapid deployment such as bridging operations. Yet member states are unwilling to provide troops without knowing where they will be

deployed, and to fund the cost of a reserve. Without such a reserve, the UN is largely dependent on outsourcing to other organisations, such as the EU's battlegroups.

11. A standing police capacity to plan new missions and deploy rapidly is also needed to enhance UN capacities. A standing cadre could move between headquarters and the field, gaining familiarity with both planning and conduct of missions. Many feel there is reluctance among member states to contribute their best police officers to international peacekeeping, fearing a domestic backlash if this is seen to impact on law and order capabilities at home (this applies also to police missions conducted by other organisations, such as the EU). Yet not only police officers are needed, but experts in the criminal justice field should also be seconded. Member states need to address police recruitment issues, advertising vacancies more widely and, when necessary, providing training for those seconded in project management. Finding the right people, including women, and dedicated leadership, is key to successful missions. A standing capacity may not need to be large; some estimate 25 officers may suffice. The measurement should be on quality, not quantity.

12. Deployment of police missions could also be improved if there is a clear strategic purpose provided in the mandate the UNSC provides. Too often the object of deployment is to monitor local police, rather than build the police as an institution, joined to the community it serves ('community policing'). The timeframe provided is also often too short; capacity building and police reform is of generational duration; consideration needs to be given at the outset as to how to sustain reform efforts when the police mission ends. Some suggest the UN Development Programme (UNDP) could play a major role in this respect. Rebuilding the police needs to be done in conjunction with similar efforts directed towards their counterparts throughout the criminal justice system. Restructuring DPKO should facilitate this in future. Providing police with the required equipment should also be part of the package. To avoid creating dependency, some argue strongly that payment of the police should become a responsibility of the national authorities after an initial short period when an international budget could be used.

13. Preventing situations becoming critical in the first instance, through proactive mediation, is another tool which some consider should be strengthened at the UN. Greater capacity needs to be built in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and political support generated for its activities. At times, it may be appropriate to deploy preventive missions. Some question whether it makes best sense to separate the functions of DPA and DPKO.

## **AU**

14. Some suggest the AU's advantage in peacekeeping could be to provide short-term, holding-pattern operations, with a robust mandate if possible, as a complement to long-term, multidimensional UN operations. Yet the AU is still a new organisation, with weak institutions. Its relations with the UN are tenuous, though being built up gradually. While a programme of capacity-building and training for AU forces has been underway for several years, supported by the EU, the AU urgently needs predictable financing of its operations. There are strong arguments in favour of using assessed contributions for RO operations, but some major contributors to the UN budget are not yet on board for this approach. Moreover, the AU needs not only funding, but the capacity to handle these contributions, as well as the bilateral assistance it receives. Oversight and accountability mechanisms need to be established.

## **Partnerships**

15. Partnerships are essential to create interlocking security architecture. Yet no-one has a clear answer for building relationships between organisations that are very different in nature. The EU, for example, shares common values and principles with the UN. But decision-making, with the need to seek agreement among all 27 members, is very different, as is conduct of operations, force generation and organisation of the chain of command. The EU has no permanent planning mechanism, a weakness which it needs to remedy. What the EU can bring to the UN is often an exit strategy, rapid deployment (although on EU terms) and considerable financial resources for development and humanitarian assistance in post conflict situations. NATO has a different terminology and doctrine to the UN. Operationally there is generally felt to be good cooperation, although at UN headquarters there is scant liaison. NATO can contribute logistics and potentially

joint planning capabilities to the UN although current deployments result in overstretch of its forces.

16. Many partnerships are still felt to be ad hoc; a formal memorandum of understanding is not sufficient. Organisations need to work together systematically and more closely, with a road map based on joint decision-making. Information sharing in the field is important. They need to understand each others' processes better; mutual 'education days' or briefings could help disseminate information about concepts and processes. The best liaison points need to be established, and the right people talking to one another. The timing of hand-overs is a particularly sensitive area. Inter-institutional coordination needs clarity. Some argue this can be best managed when it comes from the bottom up; staff who know and understand one another are more likely to be sending back to their organisation similar or compatible messages. Hybrid operations resulting from a political, not military, agreement pose a major challenge, and are generally not operationally desirable; command and control issues are often unclear and the AU engages in hybrid operations for which it often has no control over resources. Ensuring hybrid operations fit tight military controls is felt by some to remain an outstanding issue. Hybrid missions are, nevertheless, a fact of life; ways have to be found to make them work.

17. Co-operation in the field with international financial institutions, as well as agencies and non-governmental organisations working in development, human rights and/or providing humanitarian assistance also constitute vital partnerships in peace support operations. The PBC is designed to provide a framework for this, at a strategic level, and create an economic dividend for peace. Some question whether to-date the PBC has met these expectations. The PBC should be part of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) from the outset, to ensure a coordination of effort, direction and sustained engagement. Partnerships need greater coherence and integration within the UN system.

## **Planning, coordination and implementation of peace support operations**

18. Many believe the UN, arguably the only body with global legitimacy, should invariably lead the coordination of international peace support efforts, creating a unity of effort within and among the different components, both at headquarters and in the field. Integrated planning in peace support operations needs to start from day one, with military, police and civilians sitting together, so that the totality of issues will be addressed. Implementation should similarly be jointly approached. At the same time, some propose that ‘form follows function’: while there should be as much integration at possible, it should equally be no more than is necessary. Some suggest this should be a civilian-led process, running at two-speeds: at quicker pace, the response to emergency humanitarian issues; longer-term planning considerations, including security sector reform (SSR), will be at lesser speed. Not only the army and police, but prosecutors and the range of actors involved in administering criminal justice and creating the rule of law, should be included in SSR. It is a very long-term activity, and cannot be sustained by the UN alone; it can be appropriately undertaken through bilateral assistance, although under the UN’s guidance, coordination and benchmarks (see also paragraphs 21 and 23 below).

19. A comprehensive national development plan needs to be elaborated, so there is coherence in efforts across the country. The state has to have access to funding, and some suggest a reconstruction trust fund is the best option, such as that created for Afghanistan. Competent officials should administer such a fund. Combating corruption needs political will to be demonstrated from the top, institutional robustness, with a rules-based structure of financial accountability, and prosecutions when these are infringed. Investment in leaders of integrity is essential. The low institutional capacity of governments in post-conflict situations needs to be taken into account; building government capacity is a slow process with no short cuts. While the government should be helped to articulate what it is attempting to do, civil society should also be supported. Because of the pressure to deliver, quick impact projects (QUIPs) will inevitably be necessary. They should be seen as a tool to promote or reinforce the engagement of government or civil society and the international community with local communities. QUIPs will inevitably be ad hoc in nature, but they should not be guided simply by populist demand. There will trade-offs between delivery in the short and long-term, with the more urgent getting precedence and

government restructuring, for example, being put off. There will also be constant diversions, and it is important to remain focussed. Information operations are also key for the international community; government opponents or insurgents are often seen to be more adept in transmitting their messages.

20. There needs to be a viable and dynamic political process, which may be difficult to accommodate in situations in which military operations are conducted; military plans may require revision in the light of the political process. Key to the success of the political process is keeping the main parties to the conflict politically engaged, and fostering inclusiveness. There should be a 'joint negotiated vision', balancing the primacy of local ownership with the need to ensure international standards are met.

### **Financing of peace support operations**

21. A number of problems are encountered in funding peace support operations: a multiplicity of funding sources and planning processes often does not deliver a unified effort; there are regularly delays in funding approvals; and financial support may taper off rapidly. Some components in peace support operations are traditionally under-funded, for example SSR, rule of law and infrastructure projects. From a donor perspective, there may be barriers between different budget lines and agency decision-making processes; when resources are scarce, the priorities and sequencing may not be clear. At times, generating the political commitment domestically is difficult and carries risks: will results be achieved which justify the expense to a domestic constituency, or will corruption, or an unsatisfactory human rights situation, cloud the outcomes? Donors also need a clear transition or exit strategy.

22. To try to counter these challenges, peace support operations must present a realistic integrated plan together with an external financing requirement. Such a plan needs to demonstrate the interdependencies between political, security, humanitarian and development support, extending a joined-up donor government effort to the governance structures of multilateral institutions. Measurable results should be defined at the outset, and these benchmarks or measurement indicators should be tracked, so as to be able to demonstrate progress. Some suggest an

international meeting could usefully be convened during 2008 to develop these benchmarks, including indicators for when responsibilities can appropriately be handed over from the international community to national authorities. Specific efforts should be made to help national authorities raise revenues.

23. Most donors contribute towards peace support operations through official development assistance (ODA). Some suggest that the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD should discuss in 2008 the need to expand the criteria for ODA, so that it can be used for security projects, such as SSR. Already, some perceive a move in this direction, with the DAC having less resistance to involvement in military or security issues; DAC guidelines were drawn up only recently on engagement in SSR. The need is not only for assistance to train and equip, however, but to build accountable security institutions. To increase funding for this sector, some suggest the World Bank should also look specifically to support SSR and justice programmes; already the direct budgetary support it gives to governments can be used for SSR. Some propose the Peacebuilding Fund could be used more strategically and, at early stages, support military and police reform.

24. To promote political will among domestic constituencies for peace support operations, governments and others need to demonstrate the 'spillover' arguments that failure adequately to tackle conflict and peacebuilding may bring, and benefits that may appeal to political interests, for example decrease in asylum requests. Visits and exchanges should be used to familiarise ministries of finance, and others, with peace support operations and the value to which government contributions are being put; similarly the UN's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) might occasionally visit to see how missions are using UN budget resources or governments send their Fifth Committee members. Improving communication to the public in donor countries, in a strategic way, is needed both to manage expectations and to anticipate problems such as donor fatigue. Publicising some early action on corruption, or human rights issues, can harness domestic support, as will providing information on measurable progress. Signalling from the outset the fiscal sustainability of assistance, and the increasing contribution from the beneficiary country's own domestic revenues over time, is a response to critics who fear an open-ended engagement.

## **Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs)**

25. While a few remain implacably opposed to the increasing role of PMSCs on the grounds they represent the abrogation of fundamental responsibilities by governments, most adopt a more pragmatic approach and accept PMSCs as a contemporary and future reality. Yet the international community struggles with how to regulate the activities of these companies, a question entangled with their legitimacy. Current international treaties have proven insufficient, and there are few existing national statutes which apply specifically to PMSCs. Some believe government use of registration and licensing programmes provides the best solution to this gap in regulation and oversight. Ensuring transparency in contracting, and in the standards and hiring practices of PMSCs, will increase the legitimacy of both the companies and interactions with them.

26. Contracting PMSCs in peace support operations raises significant operational questions. These include the coordination of decisions involved in the hiring process of PMSCs, either within a mission, or across and between clients involved in different missions; the coordination of activities in the same mission space between PMSCs and statutory forces, tied to which is the failure of some PMSCs to observe and promote existing international security standards; and the hiring of local staff for PMSC employment, which may raise the possibility that SSR or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) may not be implemented successfully. Governments need to determine clear standard operating procedures, information and intelligence-sharing thresholds and mechanisms. They also need to be careful that they do not negatively impact on local security and stability, for example inhibiting the growth of indigenous security forces, capacities and policies, or even contributing to local factionalism.

27. Given the propensity of governments' personnel to interact and sometimes contract with PMSCs in peace support operations, many believe governments should concentrate on developing comprehensive guidelines and doctrine, aimed at clarifying these relationships both strategically and in the field. They should further

develop and implement international norms for regulating the PMSC industry via its different international partnerships and donor support. On strategic and operational levels, governments could support the creation of a database, to be held by the UN or other internationally respected body, detailing PMSC contracts to overcome the current lack of oversight or knowledge. Codes of conduct for PMSCs engaged in any peace support operation would be useful, as well as the promotion of standards for PMSCs in terms of professional capabilities, health and welfare of employees, and other internal and external aspects to PMSCs to reflect standards developed for statutory peacekeepers on UN missions.

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