



*Conference Proceedings*

# The UN & Integrated Missions

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# Preface

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The Conference on *Integrated Missions* was held at Holmenkollen Park Hotel Rica in Oslo, 30–31 May 2005. This was a collaborative effort between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as initiator, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

The purpose of the conference was to discuss the recommendations of the independent study on integrated missions written by Espen Barth Eide, Anja T. Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karin von Hippel. The study was commissioned by the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group and supported by Australia, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The conference gathered around 150 participants, representing a broad variety of stakeholders from the UN system, humanitarian organisations, NGOs and IGOs, as well as academics and representatives from donor and host countries.

This report reflects the main discussions at the conference as well as the recommendations for future follow-up. It is based on manuscripts from some of the participants, and notes taken throughout the conference. We would like to extend a special thanks to the rapporteurs from the breakaway sessions: Festus Aboagye, Cedric de Coning, Elissa Golberg, Annika L. Hansen, Adele Harmer, Josephine Hutton, Comfort Lamptey, and Gjermund Sæther. We would also like to thank the keynote speakers, the facilitators and chairs, and not least all the participants.

Furthermore, we extend warm thanks to our co-organiser, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for practical support and for funding the conference, and especially to State Secretary Vidar Helgesen for his active participation. We are also grateful to the members of the organising committee: Julie M. Jacobsen, Halvor Sætre and Magnus Aasbrenn from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Anja K. Bakken, Aina Holm and Torunn L. Tryggestad from NUPI. Without them, the conference would not have been possible. Last but not least, thanks to Liv Høivik, Ole Dahlgulliksen and Susan Høivik for layout and editing this report.



# Abbreviations

<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>DSRSG</b>	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>ECHA</b>	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
<b>IC</b>	International Community
<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>PBC</b>	Peacebuilding Commission
<b>PBSO</b>	Peacebuilding Support Office
<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council



# Executive Summary

Conference participants agreed that greater coherence is needed within the UN system in order for the world organisation to fulfil its peacebuilding objectives, and that the concept of integrated missions is increasingly accepted as a way to achieve this. However, while integration is the trend, there is still no common understanding of what the concept actually means. Integration should be seen as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. Furthermore, although the *form should follow function*-recipe was largely accepted, it was remarked that this should not be seen as a general blueprint. It was reiterated that the main point is to make the UN more effective at field level.

In the various sessions of the conference, participants discussed how missions should be planned, designed and financed in order to achieve coherence, while at the same time providing necessary flexibility so that the mandates and approaches of different actors can be reconciled. There seemed to be consensus that the planning processes should be as inclusive as possible and that any new structures should increasingly focus on the needs on the ground – on the needs of the people themselves. Several participants also stressed that not only do integrated missions require coherent planning, but also that coherent planning requires coherent financing. It was noted that funding must be made available for all mission components at the same time and that the relationship between assessed and voluntary contributions must become clearer.

Both non-UN participants and representatives of the UN's humanitarian agencies raised concern whether integration is the best way in relation to humanitarian space. Discussions also indicated that humanitarian space is a major issue that remains contested. In addition to the above-mentioned points, the recommendations in the end of this report can serve as a summary of the discussions and break-away sessions at the conference.



# Opening Statement

*By State Secretary Vidar Helgesen,  
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

*Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests,*

At a time when there is much New York-centred debate on UN reform proposals it gives me great pleasure to welcome so many experienced representatives from the field, who are key stakeholders in the future of the UN and who I trust will feed practical knowledge into the discussion on how to improve the UN's field missions.

UN peace operations are not what they used to be. It is becoming increasingly evident that military means provide only part of the solution and that our response must be multidimensional. Stabilising and rebuilding failed or failing states has become a major challenge for the United Nations, and 'peacekeeping' is giving way to the more ambitious but also arguably vaguer term 'peacebuilding'.

With more complex crises and more comprehensive mandates comes the need for greater coherence in UN crisis management. The current trend towards establishing integrated missions is an attempt to respond to this need.

The debate on integrated missions is closely related to the debate on UN reform. As the Independent Study points out, it is 'the field-level expression' of the approach that will be on the agenda of the Summit in September.

Enhanced UN effectiveness at field level can also help the UN in its relations with other actors on the ground. The interest we have attracted from non-UN organisations, donors, troop-contributing countries, host countries and humanitarian organisations demonstrates that many of the issues and dilemmas involved have relevance far beyond the UN. This is no surprise. The UN itself is increasingly involved in what are called hybrid operations, in

which regional organisations play a prominent role, primarily as providers of the military component of the mission. This is the case, for example, in Afghanistan and in Darfur, and it makes the task of integration even more challenging.

Similar challenges exist with regard to the development agenda, as key donors are reluctant to engage in multilateral coordination, such as trust fund mechanisms.

Another important field, occupied by several actors, is the humanitarian sphere. Humanitarian organisations outside the UN have frequently expressed concern about integration processes – both within and outside the UN – that are putting increasing pressure on the integrity of humanitarian space. If handled badly, integration led by political or military agendas may be seen as an infringement on the operational space for humanitarian action based on established principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. For many humanitarian personnel, ‘integration’ has been largely synonymous with ‘subordination’. In conflict situations, the scepticism from humanitarian personnel has been rooted in concerns about legitimacy, security and access.

If too close association with the political or military arms of a mission is felt to increase the security risks and exposure of the humanitarian agencies, humanitarian organisations are likely to disassociate themselves from the mission. While integration may increase internal UN cohesion, it may also undermine OCHA’s established and largely accepted role in wider humanitarian coordination.

Examples of tensions related to humanitarian space are not difficult to find. For instance, there has been considerable debate on the role of the humanitarian co-ordination structure in relation to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Another example is the Democratic Republic of Congo, where active conflict in the eastern part of the country has made it difficult to reconcile the UN’s military and humanitarian objectives.

Although the situations in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are different, both illustrate the difficulties involved in integrating humanitarian, political and military objectives. In Liberia, there are clear signs that the replacement of OCHA with an integrated Humanitarian Co-ordination Section has created a wedge between the mission and the NGOs and has set humanitarian co-ordination back. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, humanitarian NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières have started painting their cars pink or yellow, to signal distance from the UN mission.

These concerns should not be taken as arguments against inte-

gration as such. My government supports the drive for coherence and effectiveness in UN crisis response. There is no alternative to a multidimensional or 'integrated' approach, but it must be done in the right manner.

The concept of integration gives a sense of direction but no clear organisational solutions. As each field operation must meet different challenges, mission mandates, planning and design must also be flexible. In my view there is room for a much more closely integrated planning process at headquarters level. This will improve the prospects for an effective and balanced approach in the field.

Experience indicates that in areas where there is an on-going conflict, there are strong arguments in favour of keeping humanitarian action partly insulated from the political and military parts of an 'integrated' operation, but with strong links to the Humanitarian Co-ordinator in the mission. This is the model that was chosen in Sierra Leone and more recently in Sudan.

Key factors for success are continuity and complementarity between the various parts of a UN operation and relevant external actors. This must be built in from the early stages of planning and be reflected in the mandates of the missions. I agree with the study team that transition and development issues must be included from the very beginning of the planning process.

In this context I would like to say a few words about the financing of integrated missions. While most of us seem to agree that the situation on the ground in many conflict areas requires complex mandates, including for example DD&R, agreement seems to end when matters are taken up in the UN's budgetary bodies. From our point of view, it is logical that all activities that are included in the mission mandates should be financed by assessed contributions. We are pleased that this issue is raised in the Report and we look forward to the discussions on this subject during the conference.

My government has been closely following the debate between the various UN departments and agencies on many of the issues that are on our agenda for the next two days. We were pleased by the joint UNDG/ECHA decision to seek outside advice in the process. Having co-financed the study by the independent experts, we found it natural to take the initiative to host a conference to discuss practical follow-up. In our view, the Report provides us with an excellent basis for these discussions.

We do not expect this conference to come up with a one-size-fits-all model for integrated missions, which is probably neither possible nor desirable. But we do hope that it will contribute to a broader

understanding of what integration involves and what are the main pitfalls that should be avoided in planning, designing and operating missions. And perhaps we will even come up with practical proposals that can be fed into the follow-up process within the UN.

Thank you for your attention.

# The Larger Context

As underlined by State Secretary Helgesen, the discussion on integrated missions should be seen within a larger context of the UN reform debate. Some documents central to this debate are the Secretary-General's Report on UN Reform (1997), the Brahimi Report (2000), the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), the so-called Sachs Report (2005) and the UNSG's response to the two latter, titled *In Larger Freedom* in 2005.<sup>1</sup>

## **Changing Nature of War and Conflict**

The first session of the conference dealt with how conflicts and wars have changed over the last decades. As stressed repeatedly at the conference, it is not sufficient to deal with the consequences of wars and conflicts: the root causes of conflict must also be addressed. In Africa, for example, it is largely poverty, diseases and bad governance that drive conflicts. On the other hand, it was pointed out that in situations where it, for various reasons, is impossible to deal with the root causes as such, it is still vital to increase our understanding of the problem.

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1 References are given in chronological order: Renewing the United Nations – A programme for reform (A/51/950, 1997); The Report of the Panel on UN Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809); We the peoples: civil society, the United Nation and global governance (A/58/817); The UN Millennium Project: Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. New York (2005); In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005).

## From Peacekeeping to Multifunctional Peacebuilding

Looking at the years from 1947 to 2005, the trend is toward larger UN peacekeeping forces. Today there are 17 peacekeeping missions (see annex 3 for an overview) and the majority of these are multifunctional. There has also been a shift from classical peacekeeping to peacebuilding, where the importance of coherence and integration has increased. However, the UN has traditionally focused on political and military actions: the developmental and humanitarian parts have been ‘add-on’s’. Several conference participants called for a change here, so that the UN can take on a holistic capacity. This is also linked to the increasing recognition that it is important to focus on local ownership and capacity building as early and as much as possible.

## Towards a New Doctrine?

Some five decades have passed since Dag Hammarskjöld identified the three doctrinal principles of peacekeeping.<sup>2</sup> Given the changing nature of war and conflict since then, some conference participants argued the need for a new doctrine to guide rules of engagement for both the military and the civilian components of peacekeeping missions.

It was remarked that the debate on integration so far has focused too much on structure and insufficiently on concepts and substance. It was also pointed out that while we largely deliver on security, we too often fail with respect to the other functions. Perhaps one reason for this might be that there are fewer actors involved when dealing with security than is the case regarding the ‘softer’ components of the mission. If this is so, emphasis must be put on improving integration, coordination and coherence also in connection with the non-security components. This is also where the debate and concept of integrated missions becomes most relevant.

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2 On the basis of the first mission labelled ‘peacekeeping’ (the UN Emergency Force, UNEF I, to the Sinai Peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis) UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and General Assembly President Lester Pearson identified several principles that should serve as guidelines for future peacekeeping missions: consent by the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission; non/use of force except in self-defence; voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force; impartiality; and control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General. Among these, consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence are seen as the three main principles of peacekeeping. For more on this see: [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/hansen\\_etal\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf)

## Integrated Missions

The integrated mission is defined as ‘...an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework’.<sup>3</sup> It was both stated in the Report by Eide et al. and reflected in the discussion that, although integration can be seen as a trend that will become increasingly important, there is still no common understanding of the concept. Several participants stressed the importance of distinguishing between integration as a concept (a way of thinking) and integration as an instrument (a way of structuring things). Furthermore, it was noted that how integration is defined could help us to decide when it is needed.

While there seems to be recognition of the need for integration, there is disagreement on the degree of integration. It was suggested that the next step should be to define the criteria that will help missions in selecting ‘that which needs to be integrated’, which in turn will guide and inform the mission planning process. It should also be borne in mind that the concept of ‘integration’ has bad connotations in some environments.

Some participants stated that although an increasing number of peace operations focus on integration, this does not mean that integration always is the best solution. In situations where war is ongoing and the warring factions have not reached a peace agreement, there is a need for the humanitarian sector, in particular, to have full independence. However, most participants argued for the need for integration when there is a general peace agreement. Furthermore, there seemed to be support for the principle of asymmetric integration – with deeper integration on the development side, which would necessarily be political, and much lighter integration on the humanitarian side, with humanitarian operations remaining outside the purview of the mission.

One of the authors of the Report noted that an impression from the field was that ‘integration’ is perceived as integration into the DPKO. Some participants urged that, in connection with integration, we must focus on what we have in common and build on what is

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3 Eide, Kaspersen, Kent & von Hippel, 2005: *Report on Integrated Mission*. Oslo: NUPI, p. 3. Unless otherwise noted, in the following ‘the Report’ will refer to this document.

already working. Hence, integration should not be seen as an end but rather a means to bring a process further. Integrated missions require integrated responses, integrated support and integrated concepts for mutual action, which in turn makes it important to further develop tools and guidelines that can support this.

# Priority Areas

Throughout the conference, some issues were repeatedly raised as priority areas, either because participants felt that they had received too little attention in the Report on integrated missions or because their importance needed to be further underlined. These issues are mentioned here, although not in order of priority.

## Form Follows Function

One main argument in the Report from the Study Group is that *form must follow function*. There is no fixed template for integration. This means that the form integration takes in a given situation – from the mandate and planning, to the set-up and support of operations – should be dictated by the function of the UN operation in question. At the conference, it was pointed out that not only should form follow function, but also that function should follow purpose. It was remarked as a caution that the axiom of form follows function should not become a dogma.

An underlying reason for the ‘form to follow function and function to follow purpose’ is to improve the mandates. As yet there has been no systematic review of the mandates within the system. It was suggested that this task should be taken on by an independent expert through the proposed Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).<sup>4</sup> It was also noted that even if the PBC is not established, a review process could still be started. The question was raised on how to find solutions if there is disagreement between the PBC and the UNSC on this, but no answer was forthcoming.

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<sup>4</sup> For more information on the proposal to establish a PBC, see the report of the High Level Panel (2004), *We the peoples: civil society, the United Nation and global governance* (A/58/817).

Another question raised in the discussions was how to gauge whether integration has been successful. It was said that it is too simplistic to claim success purely on security elements, as is often the case. Integration should be seen as an instrument for making the UN more effective at field level. This should also be seen as a key success criterion for UN reform.

## **Humanitarian Action**

As noted by the Report, the humanitarian dilemma reflects a tension between the partiality involved in supporting a political transition process and the impartiality needed to protect humanitarian space. The main risk for humanitarian actions in general is integration into a political strategy – where aid is (mis-)used for local or foreign policy objectives – because this will de-legitimise the humanitarian actors and their goals. Blurring the lines between political-military actions on the one side and the humanitarian actions on the other is dangerous. Some participants questioned whether the UN can be both partial and impartial, and argued that it is rather a matter of either/or. This was a point particularly stressed by the NGO representatives. Another participant rephrased the dilemma from ‘...the UN has to be both partial and impartial...’ to ‘the UN must sometimes take political sides and at the same time be neutral and act impartial’. One reason why blurring the lines between political/military actions and humanitarian ones may be dangerous is that the intervening parties often depend on trust from one or all warring factions – especially in situations of hot war. Besides, the construction of trust is a long and patience-demanding task.

Second, it was noted that humanitarian actors need to ensure consistency in their own behaviour. They must live up to the principles they espouse and particularly be clear as to the ad hoc employment of military assets. For example, drawing on military assets when it suits them and then refusing to enter into dialogue with military actors on other occasions sends mixed messages to both military and local populations. Similarly, it was mentioned that many military battalions are set up to be ready to fight a war. But as long as there is no war they are well equipped to do other things and there are certain situations where it can be meaningful to use these resources. However, the involvement of military assets must be carefully balanced against the concern of interfering with or undermining the activities of other actors – such as humanitarian agencies.

Third, it remains a challenge to the humanitarian community,

particularly multi-mandated agencies, to determine when an assistance measure is humanitarian, and when it is developmental (and therefore often involved in political processes). Most assistance actors recognise the importance of supporting existing structures, and the need to ensure the sustainability of interventions. However, these conditions are not a necessity for humanitarian action.

Fourth, while most seemed to agree on the need for integration, some participants queried whether it is at all possible to maintain diversity and coherence at the same time. Some argued that integration has value only when it supports the overall peace process. It was reiterated that this needs to be dealt with more thoroughly, because it is here that the real controversies lie.

### **Managing perceptions and expectations**

Several times during the conference the importance of perceptions was stressed. Wrong perceptions about the root causes of a conflict or war, the mandate of the mission, the role of different actors, etc., are often important reasons for lack of coherence and coordinated efforts. This may even have severe consequences for the mission as such, so that the country in question relapses into conflict.

An issue raised in one of the breakaway sessions was that there was a feeling in some peace processes that the ‘external mandate’ as expressed through the UN Security Council carried more weight than the ‘internal mandate’ as expressed through the peace agreement.

It was argued that the management of expectations is an element that should be heeded at a very early stage – this concerns both the international and local actors. The international actors in a mission area come from various different organisational cultures. Discussants stressed the importance of using a language everybody understands, and of finding the different points of intersection and developing these further, in order to increase interoperability. Another point is the general image of the external actors, and especially peacekeepers, in the opinion of the local population. Three issues were raised in this regard: misunderstandings related to the mandate of the mission; sexual abuses and misconduct; and the impact of the external actors on the local economy. One suggestion was to further stress codes of conduct before international workers are deployed. It was also suggested that ‘hearts and minds campaigns’ should be vetted or screened by the humanitarian coordinator. However, discussants also cautioned that this implicitly opens up for the idea

that the military assistance can be humanitarian. Some participants even claimed that the management of expectations is the factor that distinguishes success and failure and is hence a potential reason for instability.

It is also important that an attitude of flexibility is fostered, both by international and local parties. It is important that the local actors who are sitting at the ‘international table’ in the beginning of a mission period do not expect that this will ensure them a permanent seat at the table in the future.

It was furthermore stressed that it is crucial for the external actors to understand that they are there to help stabilise and rebuild a country, and not to increase the attractiveness of themselves or their organisation.

## Gender Awareness

Referring to UNSC Res. 1325, several participants urged that gender awareness must be dealt with to a much greater extent than the case today in the integrated missions debate.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, gender awareness seems to be an issue often both misunderstood and overseen by policy makers. Many aspects were mentioned, both within the mission as such and concerning how international actors deal with local actors in a mission setting.

Missions are heavily male-dominated, while international actors at the same time preach to the local government that they should work to include women. This gives an impression of double standards. It was also noted that there are very few women in managerial positions, such as that of the SRSG.

The role women can play in support of a peace process was a third aspect mentioned. Most often it is the women who keep society running during war and conflict, but they are frequently ignored in the reconstruction process afterwards. A change in attitude is needed here. And fourthly, after a war, it should be recognised that special attention should be paid to those who have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual assault.

## Sequencing

While there seemed to be agreement that most post-conflict peace operations need to focus on political, security and economic devel-

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<sup>5</sup> On Women, Peace and Security, S/RES/1325 (adopted in 2000).

opment, not all actors felt that it is possible to establish these three pillars at the same time. ‘One should do the right things first’, but the challenge is that the various actors do not necessarily agree on what is most important. This is also linked to the point of centre of gravity. As pointed out by one participant, sequencing is important but there must be a centre of gravity in order to determine the sequencing. Priorities must be set according to the conflict situation where some of the elements constituting these main pillars may be more important in a short-term perspective, whereas others should be stressed in a longer-term perspective.

### **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**

Repeatedly it was stressed that more efforts need to focus on the reintegration part of DDR processes. Although it is clear that integrated efforts are needed for success in this field, in practice, this is often ignored. Normally, it is the military who carry out the D and D processes, while responsibility for the ensuing R processes are left to civil organisations, many of which seem insufficiently coordinated. . Lack of knowledge and experience and the very complexity of the task may be some of the reasons for this. Moreover, this field seems particularly prone to turf battles between organisations – within and outside of the UN system.

It was also remarked that the R’s should be followed by assessed budget financing for a limited time, to kick-start the whole DDR process. According to several participants, lack of funding of the re-integration process often seems to be the main reason why the whole DDR process fails in the end. Furthermore, one reason why we try to pack so much into reintegration is because in a post-conflict phase, this is the main window of opportunity for access to the rebuilding of the society in question.

### **Local Ownership & Capacity Building**

The dilemma of local ownership relates to the need to root peace processes in the society and political structures of the host country, without reinforcing the very structures that led to conflict in the first place.

Throughout the discussions, it was clear that although the role of the host government, civil society and local population was recognised, not enough was done in practice to support and strengthen this role. In the field, the internal actors often feel overwhelmed by

the presence of external actors. The external actors need to recognise that if the internal actors do not take ownership of the peace process, their efforts will prove unsustainable. One participant added that one must also recognise that the external actors may have different views on local ownership because they come from different cultures: if you enter from a security perspective, you may have another perspective on local ownership than a person entering from a development perspective.

Furthermore, it was noted that consultation with local population and capacity building happens in an ad-hoc way, whereas it needs to be dealt with more systematically. Some suggested ways to achieve this: ensure regular consultations with internal actors, go beyond self-evaluation to include evaluation from internal actors about whether international actors deliver, and establish local advisory groups. Moreover, the in-country strategic framework should be part of the mission mandate – it should fit within the mandate and not the other way around. When this strategic framework is being prepared, local actors must be at the table.

However, it was warned that it is not easy to know who the owners are or should be, especially not in the beginning of a post-conflict period. Local participation does not in itself ensure ownership – some of the local parties may be part of the problem and not the solution. This is related to what is called ‘the human rights dilemma’ in the Report: the tension that arises when the UN feels compelled to promote peace by working with those who may have unsatisfactory human rights records, while the UN still retains the role of an ‘outside critic’ of the same process.

Local ownership is a long-term process and should be seen as the starting point and not the goal as such. It was also stressed that the external actors should focus on assisting in the restoration of basic social services, so that the local government can be perceived positively by its own population, which will strengthen its legitimacy.

## **Exit Strategies & Sustainable Development**

Exit strategies are closely linked to the issue of local ownership. For instance, what minimum capacity is needed in order for the international community (IC) to exit has very much to do with the extent of local ownership established. The building of sustainable peace and development are continuous processes, whereas the international presence is there for a limited period of time. One participant remarked that in order to have sustained reforms, we

need a battery with enough power to kick-start the process. It is also crucial to ensure long-term funding, so that the reform processes can continue also after the IC leaves.

There seem often to be a conflict between too much international presence on the one hand and the effect – or rather negative impact – it has on national capacity. Public information is important here.<sup>6</sup> A question was also raised concerning how to assess this kind of impact. The main point seems to be that the IC should aim to tread lightly and leave as few footprints as possible.

It was stressed that exit strategies should be clearer and more explicit, ensuring that all actors – local and international – share an understanding of what is to be achieved. This implies that it must be clear what, when and how to hand over. The ‘life’ of the mission should be made clear from the beginning, by defining clear targets and benchmarks to be reached. Furthermore, although it is crucial that the international actors address the root causes of the conflict, in the end it is the local actors themselves who must deal with this problem.

## Other Issues

It was noted that the Report does not deal with the issue of information sharing regarding security to any great extent. Participants remarked that it is vital to address this sensitive issue explicitly to a greater extent.

Second, the issue of seconded, private and contracted military forces was raised. The UN needs a clear strategy to deal with this. One participant raised a concern as to how the process of integration may work in this regard.

Third, it was noted that missions cannot be integrated without including the regional dimension. DDR processes in Africa are examples of how important this is. However, one has to exercise caution in recruiting troops from neighbouring countries within the peace operation. Concern was also expressed on the issue of regional fragmentation. For instance, DR Congo and Kosovo have missions of relatively the same size, but DR Congo is larger than Kosovo. The need for better attuning of mandate, resources and mobility was also addressed during the discussions.

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<sup>6</sup> This is affirmed in UN Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000), (S/RES/1296).

Fourth, there was discussion about the functions and composition of the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). While there were diverging views, several participants argued that the PBSO should be given a more prominent role in facilitating integration.

# Recommendations

The second day of the conference was devoted to a series of parallel breakaway sessions. The topics chosen for discussion in these groups were partly inspired by the structure of the recommendations in the Report on integrated missions. The recommendations below reflect the discussions and presentations from the breakaway sessions.

## **Mission Planning and Design**

### **Planning for the mission**

1. Assessment teams and pre-planning are essential. Pre-planning provides a key opportunity to increase understanding of local and regional interests, perspectives and capacities.
2. During pre-planning, attention must be given to identifying budgetary requirements, whether voluntary or assessed, in order to develop an informed concept of operations for the UNSC.
3. It should be ensured that planning structures capitalise on UN Country Team knowledge. A meaningful interface between HQ and the field should also be ensured in order to reduce fragmentation.
4. It is important to consult and actively engage local actors (civil society, national government and other power brokers) in the planning process.
5. The mission should be informed by a multi-staged peacebuilding strategy, with the awareness that integration and comprehensive-

ness are two different things and also keeping gender-related implications in mind.

6. In the first phase, priorities for activities should be set and the limitations for the mission should be identified. There should be a focus on four core areas:
  - a. security/political stability and transformation
  - b. human rights and the rule of law
  - c. institution building
  - d. social services/humanitarian action
7. From the beginning attention must also be paid to the ensuing phases and longer-term requirements, to enable effective sequencing of implementation along with key deliverables.
8. For each phase, benchmarks or anticipated outcomes should be established against which to measure progress.
9. The strategic plan must be regularly reviewed, also by local actors, whose perceptions of the mission should be sought.
10. The Peacebuilding Support Office should enable the best ideas from the field to feed into the planning process and thereby mitigate the impact of individual bureaucratic demands and interests.

### **Planning by the mission**

11. It is critical to emphasise staff selection and terms of reference, also for those assuming civil affairs functions.
12. Consistency in the allocation of DSRSG functions (which currently varies across missions) must be ensured.
13. The mission should carefully consider what local capacities can be tapped.
14. Consistent monitoring and reviews of the peacebuilding strategy should be established, so that assumptions can be revised and elements added and deleted depending on how circumstances on the ground change.

## **Funding and Resource Management**

15. To achieve better overall planning of both the volume of necessary financing and the type of financing needed, all key stakeholders (including donors) should be included in mission planning at an early stage.
16. Improved stakeholder involvement should take place through DP-KO mission planning, in the future perhaps through the Peace Building Commission.
17. ‘Sub-donor conferences’ in preparation for the large donor conferences could also be a venue for stakeholder dialogue and pledging of funds.
18. Use should be made of existing instruments for overall and harmonised financing, such as the UNDP/World Bank Transitional Result Matrix, which includes political aspects, humanitarian needs, security issues and socio-economic development.
19. To increase internal harmonisation in the UN, a common service approach is needed. In harmonising and coordinating services, however, one must be mindful of the different mandates of various parts of the UN. The humanitarian side might still need separate services.
20. Countries need more factual information about the role of re-integration in missions to make an informed choice about the types of costs that could be covered by assessed contributions and what should be covered by voluntary contributions.

## **Transition and Development as Key Objectives**

### **Long-term development mechanisms**

21. Security, Human Rights and Development should be aggregated and should be considered simultaneously.
22. Mandates should address the root causes of conflict.
23. The mandate should clearly establish the relationship between the

political-security elements and the developmental institutions.

24. Development fundamentally devolves on stability. But development should also incorporate a political context, in order to gain member-state support.
25. Local (national) ownership should be emphasised and should be sustainable.
26. The mandate should focus the mission on key functions of the state that speak to the needs of the people, such as transitional justice and the rule of law, socio-economic development. All elements should run in parallel and not be sequential.
27. On the other hand, there should also be an emphasis on key aspects of peacebuilding, such as economic recovery and development, and support to a vibrant civil society.
28. The organisational cultures of the various actors should be harmonised.
29. The mission should work to manage the expectations of the local population.

### **Start-up funds:**

30. Start-up funds for transitional requirements should come from mission costs and be available from the beginning of a mission.

### **Sustainable peace, operational objectives and functions:**

31. Integration should not be an end in itself, but a means to an end.
32. Therefore there should be a common agreed in-country strategic framework that is also conflict-sensitive.
33. The mandate should articulate the key strands of the strategic framework, which should incorporate all issues: political-security, developmental, and human rights.
34. The strategic framework and the mandate should include gender

perspectives, in pursuance of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

35. There should be a strong involvement of women at all levels.
36. As living documents, the strategic policy framework and the mandate should reflect and respond to evolving situations.

## **Humanitarian Space**

37. The operational definition of humanitarian space should refer to *humanitarian actions* (which include assistance and protection) rather than an emphasis on humanitarian organisations per se.
38. OCHA should maintain independence.
39. The counter-arguments to integration should be further explored.
40. Whether it is most appropriate to integrate, and when, should be decided according to the goals of saving lives and relieving suffering.
41. An evidence-based study should form the basis for deciding what criteria will be used to determine when and if it is appropriate to integrate.
42. The role and reporting lines of the Humanitarian Coordinator should be reconsidered.
43. Dissemination and advocacy of international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles to politico-military actors should be increased.
44. In all mission mandates, the need to observe humanitarian principles in peacebuilding missions should be recognised.
45. Humanitarian actors need to ensure consistency in their own behaviour.

## **Leadership and Accountability**

### **Selection of leadership:**

46. In selection of personnel, priority should be given to management skills, rather than to political profile.
47. The selection process should be more transparent.
48. Regional and gender imbalance in the selection process needs to be addressed.
49. A flexible approach to the selection of leaders is needed, to fit the shifting centre of gravity. For example, the skills and qualities of an SRSG in the mission start-up phase may be different from the qualities required when a mission is stabilised or when it is winding down.
50. SRSGs should be selected in advance, so that they can be part of the peace negotiations process.
51. There should be better pre-planning and succession planning for SRSGs.
52. The preparatory training/briefings for SRSGs should draw on inputs from the UN country team in the country of concern.

### **Accountability:**

53. Mission leadership should be accountable at the level of coordinating the work of other agencies.
54. Leadership should be held accountable for the management of the mission, not for the peace process.
55. Mission leadership accountability should not replace accountability of individual agencies.
56. Accountability should be seen as a mechanism to strengthen the functioning of the mission, and not as a mechanism for punishment.

57. Performance review and peer review should be developed and employed as constructive accountability mechanisms.
58. Performance criteria should be designed for senior mission leadership.

## **Outreach to Host Governments and Civil Society**

59. Internal actors must develop the capacity to take full ownership of the peace process.
60. It should be clear that the role of the external actors is to assist the internal actors with the implementation of a peace agreement.
61. Internal actors should be part of all decisions affecting them, starting with the assessment phase.
62. Attention should be paid to the way external actors are perceived by the internal actors.
63. Public information should be more pro-active and interactive.
64. Particular attention should be given to gender roles, and especially to the role that women can play in support of the peace process.
65. Special efforts are needed to involve refugees and IDPs who may not be present in their areas of origin.
66. Public information should work more pro-actively and attuned to previous statements on expectations and perceptions.
67. More light should be shed on the problem involved in pushing for change, yet building local ownership and ensuring accountability.

## **Security Sector Reform and DD&R**

68. Greater attention is needed to developing country-level mechanisms.

69. Donors need to be engaged in keeping the SSR and DDR processes funded and coherent.
70. Use should be made of all sources of information regarding programme design (in identifying target groups, programme scope, amount of weapons in conflict area, etc.)
71. One should recognise that while the DDR process must be seen as a whole, Reintegration differs from DD.
72. DDR should be linked to defence reform and good governance.
73. It is crucial to develop public administration capacity – to run programmes, but also to assume public service functions at a later stage.
74. For sustainable security, not only national ownership is needed, but often also regional ownership.

## **Transitional Justice and Human Rights**

75. Knowledge about transitional justice and human rights should be increased, at UN HQ and field level and among the local population.
76. Human Rights and transitional justice must be taken into consideration in the assessment, planning and strategy development phases and in the mandate for a UN peacekeeping mission.
77. At the beginning of the mission, when longer-term strategies are developed, the key actors who will take these forward should be involved and their roles should be identified.
78. Transitional justice and human rights must be funded not only through the provision of staff at the start of the mission but also for implementation.

# Annex 1: Ongoing Peacekeeping Missions<sup>7</sup>



- MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
- MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
- MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
- UNAMA United Nations Mission in Afghanistan
- UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
- UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
- UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
- UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
- UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
- UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
- UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
- UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan
- UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
- UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
- UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
- UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
- UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

<sup>7</sup> Source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>



# Annex 2: Conference Programme

## Conference on **Integrated Missions**

Organised by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Programme | Oslo 30 - 31 May, 2005 | Holmenkollen Park Hotel Rica

### **Arrival Day 29 May**

16.00-19.00 **Arrival and registration**

20.00 **Informal Dinner**

## **Conference Day 1, 30 May**

Moderator: Mr Steffen Kongstad, Deputy Director General,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Rapporteur: Ms Kari Osland, Researcher, Norwegian Institute  
of International Affairs

### **Session I: Introductions**

08.00-09.00 **Registration**

09.00-09.05 **Welcoming Address**

- Mr Sverre Lodgaard, Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

09.05-09.20 **Opening Address**

- State Secretary Vidar Helgesen, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

09.25-09.45 **Key Note Address**

- Ms. Margareta Wahlström, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

09.45-10.05 **Key Note Address**

- Dr. Kathleen Cravero, Head of the UNDP Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) - on behalf of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG)

- 10.05-10.30 Presentation of the UNDG/ECHA report – Findings and recommendations
- Espen Barth Eide, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
- 10.30-11.00 Coffee break
- 11.00-11.20 **An ICRC Perspective on Integrated Missions**
- Dr. Jacques Forster, Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- 11.20-11.40 **Key Note Address**
- David Harland, Chief, Best Practices Unit, The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

## **Session II: Thematic Discussions**

- 11.45-13.00 **Integrated Missions in Practice: Perspectives from the Field**
- Chair: Alan Doss, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
  - Mr Ross Mountain, Deputy Special Representative, UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (10 min)
  - Ed Schenkenberg, International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) (10 min)
  - General Daniel Opande, Former Force Commander, United Nations Missions to Liberia (UNMIL) (10 min)
  - Mr Anne Willem Bijleveld, Director, Division for External Relations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)(10 min)

### **Discussion**

- 13.00-14.30 **Lunch**

- 14.30-16.00 **Strategic Policy Perspectives of Integrated Missions**
- Chair: Prof Antonia Chayes, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
  - David Harland, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (10 min)
  - Mark Bowden, Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch, OCHA representative (10 min)

- Afshan Khan, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Programmes, United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) (10 min)
- Ahmed Rhazaoui, DSRSG and Director of United Nations Office in West Africa (UNOWA) (10 min)

#### **Discussion**

16.00-16.30 **Coffee Break**

16.30-18.00 **Panel Discussion – How to Reconcile Different Mandates and Objectives in Integrated Missions?**

- Chair: Ambassador Lena Sundh, Advisor on Conflict Prevention and Management, Department of Global Security, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ms Margareta Wahlström, OCHA
- Dr Kathleen Cravero, UNDG
- Dr Jacques Forster, ICRC
- Mr Jean-Jacques Graisse, WFP
- Mr Espen Barth Eide, NUPI

#### **Discussion**

20.00 **Dinner**

- Host: State Secretary Vidar Helgesen

## **Conference Day 2, 31 May**

Moderator: Espen Barth Eide, Director of Department of International Affairs, NUPI

Rapporteur: Kari Osland, Researcher, NUPI

### **Session III: Breakaway Sessions**

08.30–08.45 **Plenary: Introducing methodology for breakaway sessions.**

08.45–10.45 **Parallel breakaway sessions I**

#### **Mission Planning and Design**

- Facilitator: Alan Doss, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
- Rapporteur: Elissa Golberg, Deputy Director, Humanitarian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Canada

### **Funding and Resource Management**

- Facilitator: Alison V. Gillies, Advisor, World Bank
- Rapporteur: Gjermund Sæther, Adviser, Norwegian MFA

### **Transition and Development as Key Objectives**

- Facilitator: J. Victor Angelo, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
- Rapporteur: Festus Aboagye, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

### **Humanitarian Space**

- Facilitator: Jonas Gahr Støre, Secretary General, Norwegian Red Cross
- Rapporteur: Adele Harmer, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

10.45-11.15 **Plenary: Reports from breakaway sessions I**

11.15-11.45 **Coffee break**

11.45-13.30 **Parallel breakaway sessions II**

### **Leadership and Accountability**

- Facilitator: David Nabarro, Representative of the Director General, Head of Health Action in Crises, WHO.
- Rapporteur: Comfort Lamptey, Gender Advisor, DPKO

### **Outreach to Host Governments and Civil Society**

- Facilitator: Robert Rubinstein, Syracuse University
- Rapporteur: Cedric de Coning, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD

### **Security Sector Reform and DD&R – How to Implement a ‘Multi-Sectoral’ Approach**

- Facilitator: Spyros Demetriou, DDR and Armed Violence Reduction Adviser, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)
- Rapporteur: Annika Hansen, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)

### **Transitional Justice and Human Rights in Integrated Missions**

- Facilitator: Ameerah Haq, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG), UNAMA

- Rapporteur: Josephine Hutton, Country Programme Manager, OXFAM Liberia

**13.30-14.30** Lunch

## **Session IV: Summing Up**

**14.30-15.00** Plenary: Reports from breakaway sessions II

**15.00-16.00** Panel/plenary debate – Discussion of Recommendations and Possible Follow-Up (panel will be expanded)

- Chair: Larry Minear, Senior Researcher, Tufts University
- DSRSG Ibrahima D. Fall, United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
- Dr. Francis Kai-Kai, National Director, Development Assistance Coordinating Office, Sierra Leone
- DSRSG Ameerah Haq, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
- Nina Lahoud, Special Adviser, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
- DSRSG Alan Doss, United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

**16.00-16.10** Closing by State Secretary Vidar Helgesen



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The Conference on Integrated Missions was held in Oslo, 30–31 May 2005. This was a collaborative effort between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as initiator, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). The purpose of the conference was to discuss the recommendations of the independent study on integrated missions written by Espen Barth Eide, Anja T. Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karin von Hippel. The study was commissioned by the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group and supported by Australia, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

This report reflects the main discussions at the conference as well as the recommendations for future follow-up. In the various sessions of the conference, participants discussed how missions should be planned, designed and financed in order to achieve coherence, while at the same time providing necessary flexibility so that the mandates and approaches of different actors can be reconciled. Conference participants agreed that more coherence is needed within the UN system in order to fulfil its peacebuilding objectives, and that the concept of integrated missions is increasingly accepted as a way to achieve this.