

Minister's summary and preliminary recommendations  
**A Global Effort to Achieve a World Free of Nuclear Weapons**

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Over the last two days we have been privileged to witness a fascinating and candid exchange of views on disarmament and non-proliferation. I thank all participants for their engagement. I also express my profound gratitude to my co-hosts, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority. The personal involvement of Senator Nunn, Secretary Shultz and Director-General ElBaradei has also contributed, in no small measure, to the success of this conference. Their collective call for us to wake-up is a timely warning. Norway, working independently and together with its partners in the Seven Nation Initiative, will heed it.

## **Summary of proceedings**

### **What does it mean to advance the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons?**

The conference began by taking the long view and discussing the changes in the international security architecture that will be required if nuclear weapons are to be abolished. Although there was broad agreement about the need for a cooperative approach to nuclear security, there was a divergence of views about which organization would be responsible for enforcement, and how it would be constituted. Four criteria to help judge success along the road to nuclear disarmament were reiterated: binding commitments, irreversibility, transparency and verification.

### **What further steps could nuclear weapon states take to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies?**

There are compelling reasons for renewed efforts by nuclear weapon states to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals and the role of their nuclear weapons. Participants discussed no-first use pledges, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the importance of numerical reductions and proposals to consolidate tactical nuclear weapons. Some participants argued that the priority should be those steps agreed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

### **What further steps could non-nuclear weapon states take to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and promote a world free of nuclear weapons?**

This session discussed topics as diverse as promoting the adoption of key legal instruments (notably the IAEA Additional Protocol), the role of civil society, nuclear weapon free zones and even the desirability of nuclear energy—but it focused on governance of the nuclear fuel cycle. Some participants argued that progress toward disarmament, coupled to sufficiently robust fuel supply guarantees, would help to encourage non-nuclear weapon states not to exercise their right to develop fuel cycle technology. Others argued that international efforts should be focused primarily on disarmament, not on developing fuel supply guarantees. Also raised was the idea of a companion treaty to the NPT which would guarantee states that chose to develop fuel cycle technology a role in its governance, in return for their acceptance of more intrusive inspections.

### **How do regional conflicts impact efforts to reduce nuclear dangers?**

Different cases yield different views on the role of regional conflicts in driving proliferation. However, there is little doubt that the existence of nuclear weapons adds to their dangers and can complicate their solutions. To stabilise conflicts, international involvement—including before proliferation occurs—and arms control measures such as hotlines and strategic dialogues should be employed in today's world. Lessons from cases such as Argentina and Brazil, or Russia and the United States during the Cold War, could be usefully applied. At the same time there is also a need for the international community to address the fears which drive states to acquire nuclear weapons, highlight the dire consequences of nuclear weapon use and delegitimize nuclear weapons generally.

### **Towards Fissile Material Cut-Off and Nuclear Test-Ban Treaties: How can muscle be added to moratoria?**

The conference was agreed on the importance of entry into force of the CTBT and the start of negotiations on an FMCT, although there was no consensus about what negotiating mandate should be adopted. In the meantime, to further cement the existing moratoria on nuclear testing and fissile material production, the idea of a 'no-first test' pledge, the importance of continued funding for the CTBT's verification system and the possibility of any state which has not yet done so declaring a moratorium on the production of fissile material was also discussed. A Fissile Material Control Initiative to enhance the security and transparency of all nuclear material was raised as a potential mechanism to address the issue of past production of such material in the context of FMCT negotiations, although some disputed that it would do so effectively.

### **How can increasing demand for nuclear energy be squared with nuclear disarmament?**

Desirable or not, a significant growth in nuclear power seems inevitable. A number of ideas for fuel supply guarantees, including those with spent fuel take-back, have been suggested recently. Many participants argued that credible assurances of supply could help to prevent proliferation. Some warned, however, about the danger of creating a discriminatory two-tier system of nuclear fuel producers and recipients. In this context the importance of a serious dialogue between producers and recipients was highlighted. There was also a discussion about strengthening IAEA safeguards—and how reasonable it is to expect non-nuclear weapon states to do so. In addition, Norway pledged a \$5 million contribution to the IAEA fuel bank—and encouraged other states to do the same.

### **Minister's reflections**

If efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons are to be successful, nuclear disarmament must become a shared endeavour. Indeed, article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty places the obligation to bring about disarmament on all states. Today, the international debate about non-proliferation and disarmament is characterised by a 'you-go-first' attitude. This is short-sighted. Only by advancing non-proliferation and disarmament together will our vision of a world free from nuclear weapons be achievable. To make that vision a reality, all states—nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike—should work together on developing the verification tools and collective security arrangements that are needed.

In addition to fully endorsing the ideas put forward in the two Wall Street Journal articles, I offer five principles for progress in our global effort. They are in no way exhaustive, but I believe they are crucial.

First, achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons will demand leadership at the highest levels as well as committed outreach to key stakeholders, including the general public. Second, taking disarmament seriously requires that we begin taking concrete steps now to sustain our vision and to build momentum behind it. A third principle is fundamental: achieving a world free of nuclear weapons must be a joint enterprise among all states – nuclear-*weapon* states and *non*-nuclear weapon states alike. Fourth, in addressing the wide range of challenges before us, we should be faithful to non-discrimination – a key principle of effective multilateralism. Finally, transparency from both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states should be at the heart of our global effort.

From these principles follow a number of conclusions. These are my views from our two full days of debate and discussions. I welcome your thoughts and input as we refine these ideas in the days and weeks ahead, but I stress that they are not consensus recommendations.

- National leaders in all states should engage personally with, and make a national priority of, realizing the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons. They should seek to involve key domestic stakeholders—their populations in particular—at an early stage. Moreover, disarmament will be an inter-disciplinary endeavour and national leaders should also seek to engage experts from all relevant areas including science, diplomacy, politics, law and the military.
- The United States and Russia are encouraged to reduce the size of their arsenals significantly so that nuclear weapon numbers are measured by the hundred, and not by the thousand. This should be effected by means of a verified, legally-binding treaty. It is also important to engage China, and eventually other states that possess nuclear weapons, in a strategic dialogue to develop a cooperative approach to nuclear security.
- In order to pave the way for even deeper cuts, non-nuclear weapon states should co-operate with nuclear weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament. Nuclear weapon states should seize the opportunity presented by reductions in nuclear weapon numbers to demonstrate this technology.
- All states that possess nuclear weapons are encouraged to make every effort to reverse their reliance on these weapons as a contribution towards their elimination. These states are also encouraged to change the operational status of their nuclear weapons in order to increase decision time in the event that use is contemplated, and to take other steps to promote strategic stability.
- Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is crucial to prevent a new nuclear arms race. Until the treaty enters into force, the existing moratorium on nuclear testing should be strengthened. Each state that has tested nuclear weapons in the past should pledge that it will not be the first to restart testing. In addition, funding for the CTBT's International Monitoring System must continue.
- A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is vital to advance disarmament and prevent proliferation. In addition to starting negotiations on an FMCT, the international community should consider

the creation of a voluntary Fissile Material Control Initiative to enhance the security and transparency of all nuclear material—including material that may not be subject to an FCMT. This should entail nuclear weapon states accepting more comprehensive safeguards on their civilian nuclear facilities than they do at the moment.

- Eliminating nuclear arms requires a robust and credible non-proliferation regime. All states that have not yet done so should adopt a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and an Additional Protocol. In addition they should sign, ratify and implement all relevant multilateral instruments to enhance the safety and security of their nuclear materials.
- In order to help avert the awful prospect of nuclear terrorism, all states that possess nuclear weapons are urged to take all necessary measures to ensure that their weapons do not fall into unauthorized hands.
- We should aim to create a non-discriminatory system of nuclear fuel supply in close collaboration with the IAEA. In this regard, a serious and sustained dialogue between producer and consumer is needed so that consumers have an opportunity to explain their needs and suppliers have an opportunity to tailor arrangements and incentives accordingly.
- We should consider convening a broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.