1 Summary

1.1 Background and mandate

«Norway is a unique coastal state. Our archipelagos, fjords, northern lights and an Arctic climate in the north make us an attractive destination for cruise traffic. At the same time, we have a challenging and weather-beaten coast. Climatic conditions, long distances and the dark months of the year present special challenges the farther north we go.

The rescue operation in Hustadvika with «Viking Sky» on 23 March 2019 showed how serious a situation can become when an engine failure occurs on a cruise ship near land, amid strong onshore winds and rough seas. The incident came close to having catastrophic consequences. Combined with the fact that we are facing an increase in cruise traffic in our waters, this means that the industry and society in general must have a conscious relationship to the risk that results from increasing activity.»

Source Excerpt from the Cruise Committee’s mandate

The Cruise Committee was appointed against this background. The committee was charged with shedding light on the maritime safety and emergency preparedness challenges associated with cruise traffic in Norwegian waters and adjacent sea areas, as well as recommending risk-reducing measures, including what the cruise industry itself can contribute. The committee wants this report to provide a good basis for further political discussions, and further expert assessments and decisions.

1.2 The committee’s work and structure

The committee has gathered knowledge and input as a basis for its work, and has been in contact with a number of public, private and voluntary actors. The committee has undertaken a systematic review and assessment of the entire timeline from the time a cruise is planned, until the ship sails, until a possible incident occurs, and until the situation has been handled. In this process, the following questions have been reviewed:

• What are the issues?

• What is the status, and how does the committee assess this?

• What measures may be relevant at the various stages to reduce the risk?

Based on this, the committee has made further assessments, and made recommendations for risk-reducing measures within a number of thematic areas.

1.3 Cruise traffic in Norway

In general, cruise traffic can be divided into two types: conventional (overseas) cruises and expedition cruises. Conventional cruises are typically associated with large ships with several thousand people on board. Passengers often embark and disembark in the same port, and the ships often have a large number of facilities and amenities on board. Expedition cruises are characterised by smaller ships, usually with up to five hundred to a thousand people on board. Expedition cruises are usually off-the-beaten-path cruises that have a spotlight on the destination, including wildlife and other nature experiences. On-board experiences, which are common on conventional cruises, are replaced by lectures, disembarkations, walking tours, and sightseeing with small boats, kayaks and the like.

In 2019, approximately 26 per cent of the global cruise fleet had one or more cruise voyages in Norway. From 2010 to 2019, the number of unique cruise ships with a gross tonnage of more than 1,000 that have visited Norwegian ports, increased from 65 in 2010 to 109 in 2019. Due to the pandemic, only 22 such cruise ships were registered with calls at Norwegian ports in 2020.

The majority of conventional cruises in Norway go to Western Norway and Northern Norway. Expedition cruises in Norway take place mainly in Svalbard and have increased over the past four decades.

It is difficult to estimate how the pandemic will affect the cruise industry and the demand for cruise holidays in the longer term. However, some global trends can be identified independently of the pandemic: cruise ships are becoming larger, alternative types of fuel are on the horizon, cruise ships will be upgraded to increase their attractiveness, and more environmentally friendly solutions will be developed on board, both for existing cruise fleets and newbuilt ships.

Climate change is also likely to affect cruise traffic. The edge of the ice will recede farther north, creating an attractive destination for cruises. The northernmost areas are also the areas with the fewest rescue and recovery resources. The combination of the fact that an increased degree of extreme weather is expected and that the cruise operators are extending the season into the winter months, means that cruise operations can become more challenging.

Regulatory changes will affect cruise traffic in Norwegian waters in the future. Some have already been implemented, some have been adopted but have yet to enter into force, and other regulations are still in progress. To a large extent, this concerns international environmental regulations that will also be applied in Norway through international agreements. Furthermore, Norway has adopted certain national requirements related, for example, to reduced emissions in world heritage fjords and environmental regulations in Svalbard. Among other things, a ban on heavy oil in Svalbard came into force on 1 January 2022. Additional Norwegian environmental requirements are in progress.

The trend for cruise traffic in Norwegian waters will largely depend on the extent to which the proposed regulations are introduced. DNV has assumed that a scenario in which certain emission requirements (nitrogen) will apply in Norwegian waters out to the baseline is most likely. A decrease in cruise traffic would then be expected compared with the current level. The share of cruise ships that meet the requirements will increase as new cruise ships are delivered, and a gradual increase in cruise traffic in Norway is expected going forward to 2040.

1.4 The committee’s assessments and recommendations

The overall goal of the committee’s work has been to identify challenges, and to propose measures to reduce the risk of serious incidents with cruise ships that could lead to many injuries and deaths.

It is not possible to dimension an emergency preparedness and response system for an accident involving a cruise ship with several thousand passengers on board. This applies to mass evacuation from the ship and further handling of a high number of seriously injured people. The committee therefore emphasises probability-reducing measures to reduce the risks associated with cruise traffic. The consequence-reducing recommendations do not entail a significant increase in emergency preparedness, but are aimed at quality improvements of existing emergency preparedness and handling where practical.

The recommendations balance the consideration for maritime safety and emergency preparedness against the cruise industry’s need for a predictable and viable framework.

The Cruise Committee has not ranked its recommendations by priority, but emphasises that probability-reducing measures will be the most effective in reducing risk. Priorities will to a large extent also depend on political assessments, where a holistic approach to the cruise industry will be key.

The committee’s general assessments and recommendations are thematically listed below. A list of all the recommendations can be found in Chapter 141.

Holistic approach to the cruise industry

No overall plan exists for the cruise industry, in which the authorities clearly state desired objectives and priorities. In the current tourism report2, maritime safety and emergency preparedness challenges are not mentioned to any appreciable degree. The Norwegian authorities must therefore prepare a holistic national plan for cruise traffic in which safety, emergency preparedness and rescue play a key role. The plan should be part of the Government’s forthcoming national tourism plan.

Furthermore, organisational adjustments on the authorities’ side should be considered in order to deal with the cruise industry holistically and in a coordinated manner. As a shipping nation, Norway should also play a leading role in strengthening international regulation of cruise traffic with respect to maritime safety, emergency preparedness and rescue.

Cooperation between authorities and industry

Cooperation with the cruise industry is crucial for dealing with the challenges of cruise traffic and the choice of policy instruments. The cooperation between the authorities and the cruise industry has so far been characterised by a more random approach, and should take on more structured and predictable forms. In particular, there is potential for involving the cruise industry to a greater extent in exercises and their evaluation.

Traffic regulations

The committee believes that there may be a risk that the shipping company’s and master’s risk assessments do not include the additional risks present in Norwegian waters to a large enough extent, especially during winter cruises. A different understanding of risk among shipowners, vessels and various authorities about what should be the triggering criteria for when a voyage should be completed or not, has been pointed out as a challenge.

The Norwegian emergency preparedness apparatus is not dimensioned to handle the most serious incidents when a major mass evacuation will be necessary. This is especially true in conditions where the ship’s own evacuation equipment will be difficult or impossible to use. There are limitations on how many people can be evacuated by helicopter within a given time window, even with optimal access to helicopter capacity.

The committee has also been made aware of the limited capacity that segments of the health service have to receive and handle a large number of injured people.

In the committee’s opinion, there is consequently a need for clearer regulation of cruise traffic. Ships over 150 metres should be subject to regulatory traffic restrictions based on weather criteria such as wind speed or wave height, as well as during certain periods of the year outside the summer season. In Svalbard, there are large distances and very limited rescue and health resources, and weather and ice conditions can change quickly and unpredictably. A majority of the committee members therefore believe that a limit of 500–750 people on board cruise ships should be introduced in the territorial waters of Svalbard.

Given the concerns about an increasing trend of cruises towards the North Pole, Norway should take the initiative for international regulation of this traffic.

Access to data and information

Easy access to quality-assured and up-to-date information contributes to greater predictability, and is therefore important when it comes to reducing the likelihood of serious accidents and their consequences. It is not acceptable that it will take 35–40 years before the entire coast and Svalbard will have maps of a quality that must be expected today. This affects the safety of all sea-going activities, both the cruise industry and other professional seafaring operators as well as the leisure fleet.

The Norwegian Mapping Authority’s capacity for work on nautical mapping must therefore be strengthened, and the Norwegian Meteorological Institute must prepare ice maps for every day of the week.

Relevant information is currently spread among many different government actors. It should be ensured that official information from the Norwegian authorities to the cruise industry is on a single website or download service.

Communication systems

Reliable, good and well-known intercommunication systems are important for safe navigation, search and rescue and emergency communication. Extensive development of satellite-based broadband solutions is underway in the High North. The Norwegian authorities should actively take advantage of the opportunities this provides to deliver new practical services within maritime safety, emergency preparedness and rescue.

Training and competence on board

Good competence among on-board personnel is crucial for maritime safety and can both reduce the likelihood of incidents and their consequences. Norway has a challenging and unsheltered coast with changing weather conditions. This is especially true in winter with increased frequency of high wind speeds, lower temperatures and longer periods of darkness.

Dealing with these additional challenges means that crew must have relevant knowledge and experience that is not necessarily covered by their basic education and training. There are also special challenges associated with voyages in polar waters, which are also reflected in special international requirements. The committee has proposals for various qualification requirements that the Norwegian authorities should set, and also believes that Norway must be a driving force for higher international qualification requirements.

Research and development

The report addresses issues that require increased knowledge through more systematic efforts in research and development. It has been challenging to obtain an overall overview of funds allocated to research and development in all areas covered by this report. Nevertheless, the committee is of the opinion that the funding of research, development and innovation in the prevention of, preparedness for and handling of undesirable incidents with cruise ships must be bolstered. Furthermore, the cruise industry should increase its involvement, and contribute more to research, development and innovation projects that can improve maritime safety.

Risk assessment

A thorough risk assessment must take into account the local external risk factors such as weather conditions, waterway challenges, darkness, and distance to emergency preparedness resources. In addition to the external risk factors, there are individual risk factors associated with each cruise ship. Good risk assessments, with associated preventive measures, contribute to increased awareness and reduced risk.

There is no comprehensive list of additional risks that should be considered before cruising in Norwegian waters and adjacent sea areas. The Norwegian authorities should therefore develop a guide on risk assessment for the cruise industry.

Voyage planning

Good planning is necessary for a safe voyage. The quality of route planning will therefore be important for the level of risk associated with the voyage. Requirements for voyage planning are set through Norwegian and international regulations. However, the committee believes that these regulations could be clearer in some areas.

Norway should therefore work to ensure that the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) guidelines for voyage planning are updated. The Norwegian Coastal Administration has prepared and published reference routes for the Norwegian coast, but these routes are not adapted for the largest cruise ships. The Norwegian Coastal Administration should therefore create more reference routes for cruise ships along the coast.

Search and rescue (SAR) cooperation plans3

Requirements for SAR cooperation plans have been established through the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The purpose of a SAR cooperation plan is to increase mutual understanding, so that passenger ships on international voyages, shipping companies and rescue centres can work together efficiently in emergency situations. The committee has considered various issues related to SAR cooperation plans, including which passenger ships are covered by the international requirement for such a plan.

The committee recommends that the Norwegian authorities consider making SAR cooperation plans a requirement for more passenger ships than those currently covered. The Norwegian authorities have not systematically supervised how the cruise industry meets the requirements for SAR cooperation plans. Such supervision should therefore be intensified by the Norwegian authorities.

The ship’s technical safety and certificates

The requirements for technical safety on cruise ships have been developed over time, and structural engineering requirements are generally not introduced with retroactive effect. This means that the ships sailing in Norwegian waters have somewhat varying technical and safety standards. Many of the cruise ships do not have propulsion machinery with real redundancy, so that when an engine shuts down, there is a risk of losing propulsion completely.

Norway should therefore work through the IMO to introduce a requirement for an operational assessment in connection with the certification of all passenger ships, as well as introduce requirements for redundant propulsion machinery for larger passenger ships.

Towing equipment

Many cruise ships sail close to the coast, and often have a large wind surface that causes them to drift relatively fast upon loss of propulsion. This means that there is often little time to establish a tow and avert grounding. It is often considered less risky for passengers and crew to stay on board the ship rather than evacuate. Good solutions for towing equipment, and the right fastening devices for this on board, are therefore important for establishing a tow as soon as possible.

Norway should work through the IMO to introduce international requirements for towing equipment on board all cruise ships. Experience has shown that it takes many years to implement new international requirements for ships when the requirement entails design changes. Different solutions for emergency towing, which can be introduced in a transitional phase, should therefore be explored in more detail. Furthermore, the carrying out of emergency towing must be practiced more often.

Rescue equipment

Although the cruise ship will often be the safest place to stay during a serious incident, it is sometimes necessary to evacuate the ship. Proper rescue equipment on board a cruise ship can be crucial in reducing the risk of loss of life. Today’s requirements for rescue equipment are not sufficiently adapted to the conditions that may arise during cruise voyages.

The committee has therefore given recommendations on clearer requirements for rescue equipment. The Norwegian authorities should also stimulate research and innovation with respect to rescue equipment, including lifeboats. The cruise industry should ensure that new and safer technology for lifeboats and rescue equipment is used.

Traffic monitoring and reporting

Good monitoring of cruise ship traffic is important in many contexts. Automatic position reporting systems, such as AIS4 and LRIT5, are key tools in this monitoring along with data in ship registers and ship reporting systems such as SafeSeaNet.

However, despite good access to reporting data, it does not always contain information on resources on board that may be relevant in connection with a rescue operation. Moreover, today’s automatic reporting does not detect deficiencies and defects on equipment on board.

Smaller expedition cruise ships do not always have a requirement for an automatic identification system on board. This is a requirement the committee believes the Norwegian authorities should introduce for all ships carrying passengers. Furthermore, the authorities should require cruise ships to immediately report any changes that may affect the ship’s automatic position reporting or operational capability. Efforts to prioritise the automation of several such reporting processes should be intensified, and the Norwegian Vessel Traffic Service should be strengthened through expansions of service areas and the establishment of new ones.

Resource allocation

A correct overview of available resources needed to handle a serious incident with cruise ships is important for the actors who will take action in connection with the incident. In the committee’s opinion, the BarentsWatch «Shared Resources Register» is a suitable service that can be further developed to provide as complete an overview as possible of available resources. The BarentsWatch «Tracking and Interaction service» should also be developed to provide access to more actors who can contribute during an incident.

With new technology and new types of fuel in cruise ships, the need also arises for an updated fire preparedness system that can meet new challenges. In light of this and other factors, the geographical coverage and the operational application of Rescue Efforts at Sea (RITS) should therefore be assessed more closely.

Communication during an incident

A joint situation picture, communication and air coordination are important for any coordinated handling of serious incidents. In the event of a serious incident involving a cruise ship, this can be decisive for the outcome of the response to the incident at sea, in the air and on shore and in the transition phase between them. It can be a challenge to establish a joint understanding of the situation during major actions, and one of the reasons for this is different communication platforms.

The Norwegian authorities should therefore explore common digital communication platforms that also take into account the special challenges posed by incidents at sea.

In the event of an incident with a larger cruise ship, it will often be necessary to use more helicopters. Good air coordination is then particularly important. Work on the concept of air coordination should therefore be intensified.

Handling on board

From the moment a master has sent a distress alert, quite a bit of time can elapse before rescue resources are in place. How the master and other crew on board utilise the relevant time window can have a major impact on the consequences of the incident. If a serious incident occurs, early provision of good medical assistance can be crucial for the further response. It is also important that there is competence on board that can assist the rescue services in prioritising who is to be evacuated from the ships. The Norwegian authorities should therefore consider setting stricter requirements for medical competence on board cruise ships.

Incidents and exercises have shown that having an overview of the passengers is challenging, and that there is not a good enough system for keeping track when the passengers have to be evacuated from the ship. Sharing such information with the emergency preparedness authorities also creates challenges. The Norwegian authorities should, in cooperation with the cruise industry, explore technological solutions for passenger lists and lists of evacuees.

Mass rescue operations

When a serious incident occurs with a cruise ship with many people on board, and it is not safe to stay on board the ship, a mass rescue operation will be initiated. This entails evacuating a large number of people with relatively limited access to search and rescue resources. Helicopters, together with the ship’s own evacuation equipment, are relevant resources in connection with mass evacuation from cruise ships.

Mass evacuation from a large cruise ship is a complex, extensive and time-consuming operation, and in a worst-case incident it can be an impossible task to save everyone. In areas where there is a long distance between emergency preparedness resources, there will often be other cruise ships that arrive first at an accident site, and which may have the capacity to take casualties on board. The Norwegian authorities should therefore encourage the cruise industry to partner with other vessels on sailing in close enough proximity in order to be able to come to each other’s aid when sailing in such areas.

The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre has the overall responsibility for leading mass rescue operations and coordinating available rescue resources. The need for information from internal and external sources in a mass rescue operation with cruise ships will be almost inexhaustible. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre’s lack of capacity to meet this need was, for example, made visible during the incident with Viking Sky.

Serious incidents occur so rarely that experiences from these alone are not sufficient to maintain good competence among all actors. It is therefore absolutely crucial that mass rescue operations with cruise ships are exercised regularly along the entire Norwegian coast, not just in the Arctic.

With few resources and long distances, Svalbard’s emergency preparedness situation is highly vulnerable, and it is therefore particularly important to have a satisfactory emergency preparedness stockpile situation in Longyearbyen. Here it is also relevant to facilitate airdrops of necessary equipment.

Reception on shore

In the event of a serious incident with a larger cruise ship, there will quickly be a need to establish one or more reception points on shore. Serious incidents with cruise ships can occur anywhere along the coast. It can be a very large burden for any municipality that may be affected, not just the municipalities that normally have cruise ship calls.

Coastal municipalities should therefore plan and make arrangements so that they can be best prepared to handle such situations. This includes working with neighbouring municipalities where this is practical. Central authorities should prepare a good plan for handling cruise incidents on shore, which can be a support for the municipalities and other actors locally and regionally.

In the event of a serious accident involving a larger cruise ship, there is reason to expect a large number of injured people who will need follow-up health care both in an emergency phase and in the somewhat longer term. Especially in the emergency phase, there is reason to believe that the health care system in many parts of the country is not dimensioned to handle up to thousands of injured people. This is most evident in Svalbard and in northern Norway, although there may also be a long distance to health resources elsewhere along the mainland coast.

Especially in Svalbard, it may be necessary to establish an emergency camp on shore or ice while waiting for rescue resources. Emergency camps are also particularly challenging in Svalbard, where low temperatures, challenging weather conditions, large distances and the risk of polar bear attacks must be taken into account. Here, the cruise operators have a responsibility according to the Polar Code to ensure that they are adequately equipped to take care of passengers and crew until help arrives, and the industry must use equipment that ensures real survival. Furthermore, health preparedness in Svalbard is very limited, and here one will be dependent on establishing efficient transport of injured people to the mainland quickly.

Collaborative exercises

Exercises are an essential tool for strengthening crisis management skills and cooperation between actors. Exercises contribute to building competence and insight into the roles and responsibilities of actors, and provide a basis for improving planning work and implementing preventive measures. Exercises are therefore a topic in several places in this report.

The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre bears special responsibility as a driving force for maintaining and further developing collaboration within the rescue service. This can be ensured by initiating relevant exercises, for which they currently have limited capacity. The committee therefore believes that the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre should be enabled to hold regular rescue exercises with cruise ships, in cooperation with other relevant actors.

Evaluation of exercises and incidents

Search and rescue operations at sea are challenging. Learning after exercises and incidents is therefore very important to improve the ability to handle future incidents, including cruise ship incidents. It is known that we often have not done our best to systematically follow up and learn from previous incidents and exercises. When it comes to cruise ships, there are often very many people involved, and the consequences of not following up on experiences from exercises and incidents can be particularly serious.

As the entity responsible for coordinating rescue operations and with its responsibility as a driving force as mentioned above6, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre is closest to ensuring a good evaluation and follow-up of exercises and incidents. However, the capacity here has been limited. The committee therefore believes that the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre should be provided with resources in order to have the capacity to analyse experiences from sea rescue operations and exercises.