Norway, NATO and Transatlantic cooperation

Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal

Norway, NATO and Transatlantic cooperation.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 5 October 1995

It is an honour to be a guest at such a well-known institution as the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Since its establishment in 1920, it has been an independent and active participant in debates on international relations and has an impressive list of publications and conferences to its credit. Looking back on these 75 years, one is invariably struck by the large variety of subjects addressed by the Institute. Our Embassy here in London is a frequent guest at lectures and conferences, and appreciates the steady stream of publications on topics such as Europe, the Middle East, energy and environmental issues, to mention only a few. As politicians and diplomats we need a forum like this, which allows us to meet journalists, academics, commentators, officials, business people and many others for a stimulating exchange of views.

The war in former Yugoslavia will be my point of departure this afternoon, a war that has caused suffering, devastation and a flood of refugees on a scale unparallelled in Europe since the Second World War and its aftermath. The situation that triggered open hostilities in 1990-1991, and the development of the conflict since then, have coincided with the start of a new era in European history. And thus, the conflict in former Yugoslavia has also brought into focus the challenges facing European and transatlantic security. Today, I shall discuss some of the main issues that arise in this connection, as seen from a Norwegian and European perspective.

The political, economic and social upheaval that Europe has experienced in the last few years has resulted in fundamental changes in the parameters of European security policy. This process of change is expected to continue. The challenge facing us now is to make full use of our opportunities to develop new patterns of cooperation and security. These should be flexible enough to incorporate the dynamics of current events in Europe. However, at the same time we must maintain the institutions and cooperation arrangements that have provided the necessary stability throughout the post-war years.

It is not only the security policy landscape around us, but also the very substance of our security policy that has undergone fundamental change. Today, we realize that our security rests on several pillars, not just on purely military factors. This is what is encompassed by the expanded security concept, which reflects an increased awareness of the significance of a strong democracy, economic and social stability, environmental conserns and ethnic and national issues for the security of individual nations and for our common European security.

Today's situation makes new and greater demands on our security policy. In some areas, we must be willing to explore new avenues in our efforts to find the right balance between new elements and well-tried instruments that continue to play an important role. We are well aware, for instance, that international developments in various spheres of society are interconnected, but translating this awareness into action by means of the wide diversity of international instruments requires creativity and time.

Nonetheless, certain points have been clearly established. Today's broader and more diversified range of security challenges calls for a much more varied set of political and institutional instruments. National, regional and pan-European cooperation arrangements and institutions must be combined in a network of collaboration that will have a mutually reinforcing effect.

For Norway, transatlantic cooperation and Western European cooperation provide the point of departure. Our contribution to new European security structures is based on these frameworks of cooperation and on our geographical position at the interface between the Atlantic, the European and the Russian dimension. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this position has enabled us to contribute to new forms of cooperation across earlier dividing lines, particularly with Northwestern Russia and the Baltic states.

One of Norway's main approaches to achieving the goals of peace throughout Europe, security for all nations and a high quality of life for individuals has been to work towards the integration of all the Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia, into broad-based, binding Euro-Atlantic cooperation. We must continue to develop a network of contacts bridging old dividing lines. We are prepared to provide active and concrete assistance to support the political, economic and military reform processes in the new democracies in Eastern Europe.

To do this, we must make use of every instrument of cooperation at our disposal. This means primarily NATO and the EU, but also the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe. Each of these organizations has its own sphere of responsibility and its own distinct advantages. The various fora must be supplemented by regional arrangements and cooperation measures. At the same time, we must intensify bilateral cooperation in a broad range of fields.

The war in former Yugoslavia broke out while we were still in the process of improving the capabilities of the new Europe to deal with crises of this magnitude. Faced with imminent crisis, we have been forced to resort to temporary solutions, and not all of them have proved equally effective. We have seen the need for a coherent strategy and better collaboration between the various institutions responsible for crisis prevention and crisis management. Nonetheless, we should learn from the experience gained in this connection, which may prove useful in future efforts to devise a new system of security policy cooperation in Europe.

Firstly, there is a need for a joint, uniform international approach. There is strength in a united stance. This has in fact been strongly emphasized in former Yugoslavia. The international arms embargo, the presence of UN peace-keeping forces and economic sanctions have helped to prevent the conflict from spreading and have had a restraining effect on the parties. A particularly important role has been played by the Contact Group, including Russia, and by the EU's foreign policy cooperation. This has made it possible to coordinate viewpoints and counteract tendencies towards solo moves and a "nationalized" handling of the conflict, whether in the USA, major European countries or Russia. Such tendencies might - if allowed to develop - have given rise to a more dangerous situation. Coordination measures must therefore be strengthened, because this makes it possible to exert uniform, concerted pressure on the parties involved in conflicts such as the one in former Yugoslavia.

Secondly, Europe alone does not have the political and diplomatic or military weight necessary to resolve conflicts of such magnitude. This observation is of pivotal importance for the future organization of European crisis and conflict prevention within the framework of NATO, the EU, the WEU and the OSCE. It will doubtless also be taken into consideration in EU discussions of measures to strengthen the common foreign and security policy in connection with the Intergovernmental Conference next year. European security will benefit from closer coordination of EU policy. Europe will be given a new chance when we hopefully are able to start the process of reconstruction in former Yugoslavia. It will be natural for Europe to play a prominent part in this process, particularly given the extensive opportunities offered by EU cooperation in the economic and social spheres, and the wide variety of instruments at its disposal.

Thirdly, the USA plays a central role in European security and must continue to do so. The conflict in former Yugoslavia underscores the necessity of continued US involvement in Europe. We welcome the active role the USA is playing in current efforts to find a solution. If the USA is to succeed in its endeavour, it is also important that the majority in the US Congress support a constructive solution based on negotiations. These issues must be addressed in a way that in the long term will serve US and European security interests.

Fourthly, Russia must be drawn fully into the peace efforts of the international community. International mediation efforts in which Russia plays an active part will have a greater impact on the contending parties. Involving Moscow is also important as a means of giving a democratic Russia a share of the responsibility for and greater participation in future European security structures. Greater participation will mean more responsibility for Russia itself. The way Russia discharges this responsibility will in turn have a bearing on its future role in European and transatlantic cooperation. If Moscow is excluded, the resolution of conflicts, the development of the future European security architecture and political developments in Russia will all suffer.

The conflict in former Yugoslavia has not slowed the process of security policy restructuring in Europe, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This involves the continued reduction of the US military presence in Europe. This reduction will entail changes in transatlantic relations. The value of the foundation for long-term European stability which was laid by the termination of the military confrontation between East and West cannot be overestimated. At the same time, however, new security policy challenges have emerged, enlarging the scope of continued US involvement in Europe.

The changes in the European security policy agenda have necessitated a shift in the burden of responsibility between the North American and European allies. In plain terms, this means more responsibility for Europe. In these new circumstances, Washington expects the European countries to take concrete responsibility for the new security policy challenges. The USA has therefore supported the development of a European security and defence identity and of the Western European Union as the European pillar of NATO.

The WEU should be able to shoulder responsibility for coordinating the European response to certain types of crises in Europe. This approach might apply in the case of small-scale operations and operations where it would not be natural for the USA to take part. The WEU should be able to draw on the Alliance's resources on the basis of decisions in the NATO Council and through the principle of Combined Joint Task Forces. This presupposes transparency and task-sharing between NATO and the WEU. As far as the latter is concerned, little practical progress has been made to date.

At the same time, the US Administration realizes that active American participation in European security is still essential. A number of initiatives and proposals that are now key elements of the emerging European security architecture were first devised in Washington. These include the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP). US involvement will be particularly important in the efforts to develop relations with Moscow and to integrate Russia into political, economic and military cooperation arrangements. It will also be important more generally in efforts to strengthen democracy and achieve political, economic and social development that will promote stability in Eastern Europe and Russia.

Transatlantic solidarity and US participation will also be necessary if we are to have any hope of resolving regional conflicts, intensifying efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve disarmament, and reducing the danger of radioactive contamination. Without broad-based, active US involvement, the European security architecture will be less effective and will lose credibility. This would not be in Europe's interest. Norway therefore considers the transatlantic ties to be of fundamental importance. NATO must continue to play a central role in efforts to promote stability throughout Europe and in the development of relations with Russia.

In the light of the changes in the importance of defence and security issues on the transatlantic agenda since the end of the Cold War, various proposals were introduced earlier this year aimed at re-energizing the transatlantic dialogue. Some have suggested that cooperation should be expanded on the basis of a transatlantic treaty. It is quite clear that we need a dialogue that also encompasses political, economic and cultural issues. I have noted that my British colleague advocated a broader dialogue between the US Congress and the European parliaments in his speech to Chatham House two weeks ago. This is an interesting and timely proposal. We must maintain the US involvement by means of closer cooperation on a broader agenda. Common interests call for closer cooperation; our many common values and ideals with respect to our views on humanity and society make such cooperation essential.

Norway faces a special challenge in maintaining and developing close relations both with North America and with Europe. Both are indispensable to us. We regard close ties with the USA and the closest possible cooperation with European countries as two sides of the same coin. It is therefore also in Norway's interests that the basis of the transatlantic dialogue be broadened and strengthened. But Norway also considers it crucial that expanded ties across the Atlantic include all the European and North American allies. In other words, it is essential that the European voice in a renewed transatlantic dialogue is not limited to the EU countries.

NATO has undergone a transformation in recent years. The scope of its activities has been extended, and providing assistance for the reform process in the new democracies has become a central task. The Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council are the most important instruments at NATO's disposal. The PFP addresses the military aspects of the reform process, and one of its important tasks is to ensure real democratic civilian control of the military forces. The PFP serves as a means of adjustment for future members of the Alliance, but also provides a formal framework of cooperation for countries that do not become members - at least not in the first round of enlargement. The PFP and the NACC should be strengthened and should play an important role independently of NATO enlargement.

Enlarging the Alliance is part of the effort to integrate the Central and Eastern European countries into broader-based cooperation. This process originated with the declaration adopted at the NATO summit in January 1994, which established that the Alliance is in principle open to new members. This declaration was an expression of willingness to meet the security policy wishes of the new democracies and a way of contributing to stability and the consolidation of the reform process.

NATO has now presented the results of an internal study on the political and practical aspects of enlargement. This study is based on the fundamental principles that enlargement should promote stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and that it must be compatible with the continued fulfilment of NATO's tasks as regards joint defence and peace-keeping operations.

The study was presented to partner countries last week, and bilateral briefings will be arranged for all interested countries. NATO agencies and the governments of member countries will now evaluate how this study should be followed up. Together with responses from partner countries, these evaluations will provide the basis for the first round of discussions at the NATO foreign minister meeting in December.

The NATO study is the first stage of a process aimed at enlarging the Alliance. NATO enlargement will take place on the basis of careful consideration. It is too early to say who the new members may be or when enlargement can take place. The process of enlargement will take time. It must be carefully conducted to ensure that it does not conflict with the overall security policy objectives of NATO's member countries. However, NATO is of course an open organization in which no country is in principle excluded from participating.

As we proceed, it will be necessary to review a number of issues to which the study was only able to devote limited attention. These comprise the financing of an enlarged alliance, including the need for infrastructure investments in new member countries, changes in military forces and command structures, and the willingness and ability of new member countries to adapt to the consensus-based cooperation NATO has developed over the past almost 50 years. NATO must take the time needed to answer these questions.

Norway will emphasize the fact that the goal of the enlargement process is primarily political, not exclusively military. Enlargement will not target any particular country and must be carried out in a way and at a speed which reinforce the primary objectives. If we proceed too quickly or if the process comes to a standstill, we may upset the favourable, stability-promoting trend we have witnessed over the past few years. Enlargement may also function as insurance against the re-nationalization of security and defence policy and the emergence of new regional alliances. This is of fundamental importance now that the former division of Europe into blocs no longer exists.

We consider it essential that enlargement should contribute to the development of security policy structures that safeguard the interests of all the parties involved, whether they are included in the first stage of enlargement or not. The objective is greater security, stability and predictability both in individual countries and in Europe as a whole. Enlargement would be a mistake if it were to result in the development of new dividing lines or the resurrection of old ones.

The evolution of NATO's relations with Russia is of primary importance in this connection. Efforts must be made to strengthen the special cooperation between NATO and Russia, in which the NACC and the PFP play a vital role. The individual partnership programme can be instrumental in the restructuring of the Russian armed forces. Regular contact between military representatives of NATO and Russia can help to promote a climate of trust and openness and reduce suspicion as regards NATO's ambitions and mode of operation. This may prove to be extremely important in the long term.

As a major power on the European continent, Russia must have a central position in the security policy architecture which is currently being designed. Broad Russian participation and Russian input are essential to any new European security structure. Without Russian participation and cooperation we will not achieve the security and stability to which all European countries are entitled.

Russia is in the process of defining its position and role, but a great many pieces have yet to fall into place. Russia is clearly seeking to reassert its position as a major power. This is reflected in its scepticism regarding NATO enlargement and its protests against the bombing of Bosnian-Serbian positions. The need of Russian politicians to formulate and promote their national interests must be viewed in this context. Nationalistic currents in Russian politics reinforce this tendency. These currents are likely to grow stronger with the approach of the country's important parliamentary elections in December.

Russia is currently in a difficult transitional phase, in which the development of democracy and a market economy demands enormous efforts. We must continue to support the forces of democracy in the country and help to promote economic and social advances. We must be inclusive. The development of broad, binding political, military and economic cooperation with Russia is one of the most important elements in a new European security structure. The integration of Russia into international structures of cooperation will be an investment in peace and enhanced quality of life in all of Europe.

Relations with Russia are especially important to Norway. Although Russia does not constitute a military threat today, we cannot ignore the fact that sizeable military forces are still stationed near our borders. The northern areas still hold great strategic importance for Russia. At the same time the zone of military tension has shifted towards southern Russia. In response to this, the Russians have demanded that some of the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) be amended. This concerns what is known as the flank zone, which also includes the northern areas. Norway has participated actively in drawing up an Allied proposal to resolve the flank issue. The proposal is designed both to ensure the future of the CFE Treaty and to safeguard our interests vis-à-vis Russia in the North. I would strongly urge the Russian Government to accept the proposal.

Norway's main aim is to continue to pursue our good bilateral relations and active dialogue with Russia, while at the same time drawing Russia more closely into regional, European and broader international cooperation.

It is of great importance to Norway that the accession to the EU of new Nordic members has given the EU a border with Russia and the Baltic region and thus focused Europe's attention more closely on the Baltic region and Northwestern Russia. This has been manifested in several ways. The Europe Agreements between the EU and the three Baltic countries have been signed. The EU agreement on partnership and cooperation with Russia has been drawn up and the Interim Agreement to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has been signed. Work is in progress on shaping a coordinated policy for the Baltic region which will focus on such priorities as the environment, nuclear safety, education, transport and infrastructure, and trade and investments. Policy instruments will include the targeted use of economic measures and development aid and measures to stimulate increased cooperation in border regions.

Euro-Atlantic cooperation is supplemented and reinforced by regional arrangements. The Barents Cooperation is Norway's major contribution towards drawing Russia into regional cooperation structures. The Cooperation of the Baltic Sea States has a similar objective. They constitute important means of building trust in geographical areas which have been plagued by mistrust and scepticism. Increasing European responsibility and channelling European resources to meet the challenges in the Baltic and Barents regions are ways of promoting political stability and economic development. Both the Barents and the Baltic Cooperation have important contributions to make. It is therefore in the interests of both the Nordic countries and Norway that these efforts be coordinated and ensured favourable conditions. It is very important that EU cooperation be designed in such a way as to ensure that the Barents and the Baltic Cooperation become mutually reinforcing processes.

While NATO's efforts are primarily related to security and defence policy, EU cooperation has a broader focus in political and economic terms. Support for political and economic reforms and the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation arrangements are the most important contributions we can make to the stable development of Central and Eastern Europe, and thus to the security of all of Europe.

The EU is a key institution in the efforts to integrate the Central and Eastern European countries. It possesses the necessary resources to strengthen democracy and promote political, economic and social development in these countries. Becoming members of the EU is a primary goal of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. This is not merely for economic reasons, but is also based to a large extent on expectations that EU membership will consolidate their ties with Europe, thereby also safeguarding their security. We note that the associated countries attach great importance to the foreign and security policy contact arrangements that have been established with the EU.

Future enlargement towards the east constitutes a very important challenge for the EU today for reasons related to both solidarity and security for the member countries. Full integration into every aspect of EU cooperation will, naturally, take time. Although accession to the EU necessarily lies several years in the future, it is to be hoped that all the associated countries will be able to start negotiations soon. It is therefore very important that the speed at which the membership process advances for the associated countries is maintained, and that the EU Intergovernmental Conference contributes to this end.

The framework for the further development of EU cooperation will be drawn up during the Intergovernmental Conference, which is scheduled to begin in 1996. There is growing consensus regarding the need to strengthen foreign and security policy cooperation and make it more dynamic by increasing the efficiency of working routines, strengthening joint planning and analysis capacity and further coordinating the use of trade and development cooperation policy instruments in foreign policy. The foreign and security policy cooperation of the EU countries is therefore taking on increasingly greater importance due to its broad range of economic and political instruments and the opportunities it provides for following these up in the form of practical measures.

It is also in Norway's interests that the Intergovernmental Conference should succeed in reaching agreement as regards the institutional adjustments and other changes that are required for a future EU with a larger membership. Broad, effective forms of European cooperation should be developed with a view to strengthening democracy, resolving environmental problems and bridging the prosperity gap between east and west by means of closer integration. EU membership for Central and Eastern European countries would be conducive to this aim.

It is extremely important for Norway that foreign and security policy cooperation between the EU countries is not only strengthened and expanded in depth and intensity, but also that it remains open to consultation and cooperation with like-minded countries in the same area. Norway's special challenge in the years to come will therefore be to further develop ties with the EU. The basic mechanisms of cooperation and consultation between Norway and the EU have been worked out during the French presidency of the EU, with the assistance of close friends such as Great Britain.

The future status of security and defence issues in EU cooperation will be a key topic of discussion at the Intergovernmental Conference. Thus, the future tasks and role of the Western European Union in European security will be a major item on the agenda. The greater openness towards the east will also be an important part of this discussion, as will the future relationship between the WEU and the EU and between the WEU and NATO. The outcome of the discussion may have an impact on our own status in the WEU and on our possibilities of participating in European security and defence cooperation.

A number of initiatives have been launched by Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, among others. Discussions thus far have revealed that there seems to be support among various key European countries for the fundamental, long-term goal that the EU should assume responsibility for security and defence matters, and that all or parts of the WEU's sphere of responsibility should gradually be incorporated into the EU. Other EU member states oppose such a trend. However, little progress has been made on this issue, which will be discussed further in both the WEU and the EU.

We know that most European countries are prepared to see a strengthening of the WEU on the basis of the organization's dual role as the EU's security and defence instrument and NATO's European pillar. This is due to the shift in the transatlantic sharing of burdens and responsibilities and the necessity of implementing concrete measures to follow up the declarations regarding European responsibility for the new security challenges.

Norway wishes to participate actively in the further development of European security and defence cooperation and the WEU. We are aware that the WEU may be assigned an important role in shouldering a greater European responsibility for meeting the new security challenges. European security and defence cooperation should therefore be further developed in a way that ensures the full participation of all European allies, and that facilitates the participation of a wider circle of European countries. It would be unwise not to take advantage of the contribution towards solving common European tasks that broad participation would offer. In Norway's view, therefore, the WEU should be maintained as an independent organization. If the WEU becomes closely linked to or integrated into the EU, Norway should be given an opportunity to become associated with this part of the EU cooperation.

The EU will undoubtedly leave its mark on the development not only of the Western European Union, but also of NATO and transatlantic cooperation in the years ahead. It is this perspective, together with relations with the Eastern European countries, including Russia, that I have chosen to adopt here this afternoon. This being said, the North American element, primarily the USA's attitudes and policies, will of course have to play a key role in a more thorough discussion of the prospects for NATO and transatlantic cooperation.

Both present trends and the current debate in the USA make it clear that we cannot take it for granted that the Americans will continue to attribute as much importance to NATO and their transatlantic commitment as they have done thus far in the post-war period. To some extent, this has already been reflected in the European debate. We Europeans will strive to demonstrate that it is also in the USA's own interests to maintain strong ties with Europe. This will require an active effort vis-à-vis the US Congress, the Administration and the general public.

For those of us on this side of the Atlantic, there should be no doubt that it is both desirable and necessary that North America continues to be a reliable partner as we proceed. In addition to our strong historical and cultural ties, we share a common destiny in terms of security policy that we cannot ignore. Particularly in the field of security policy, we must be on guard against exaggerated "Europeanization", which could in reality call into question the entire notion of the transatlantic community.

The hard-earned lessons in Bosnia have not only demonstrated once again how important it is that the Americans involve themselves in European affairs, but they have also reminded us of the significance - and the shortcomings - of European involvement. And by European I do not mean the EU alone, but the whole of Europe. We must seek to avoid any repetition of the conflicts, confrontations and divisions that have dominated Europe for the last fifty years. The time has now come for us to join forces and grasp the opportunities provided by the current situation divisions. This will call for a concerted effort on the part of all of us and is to establish European security policy cooperation across former bloc surely the greatest challenge facing us today.