301 Investigations – Norway’s written comments

Re: The Government of Norway’s Reply to the Request for Comments on the Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Norway, we hereby submit these comments in response to the investigation initiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) into the acts, policies, and practices of certain economies relating to structural excess capacity and production in certain manufacturing sectors (“this Investigation”).  This Investigation was announced on March 11, 2026, pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[1]  Norway strongly rejects the allegations made in the Initiation Notice and maintains that its acts, policies, and practices do not aim to promote, or result in, structural excess capacity, and are not, in any way, unreasonable, discriminatory, or burdensome to U.S. commerce.  As such, Norway requests that USTR refrain from making affirmative findings and imposing unilateral measures on Norway as a result of the Investigation.

Norway also wishes to express its serious concerns regarding the use of Section 301 by the United States.  The United States and Norway have undertaken binding commitments under the WTO Agreement, and its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), including with respect to maximum tariff levels applicable to imports of goods and other forms of import restrictions.  These commitments reflect mutually agreed limits on the level of import duties and charges that may be imposed, and prohibitions on any form of quantitative import restriction, and form a core element of the rules-based multilateral trading system.  Norway finds it difficult to reconcile trade restrictive measures imposed pursuant to Section 301 with these commitments. 

Where a WTO Member, like the United States, is concerned that another Member’s acts, policies, or practices restrict trade or otherwise nullify or impair benefits accruing under the WTO Agreements, the WTO offers a forum to raise these concerns.  In that respect, Norway always remains open to engage in constructive dialogue with the United States, with a view to advancing our mutual interests in open, rules-based international trade.

Pursuant to the Initiation Notice, these public comments are due by April 15, 2026.  Thus, this submission is timely filed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction and scope. 4
2. Norway’s overall economic and policy framework does not exhibit structural excess capacity. 6
3. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels across the Norwegian economy. 6
4. Norway has not engaged in acts, policies and practices to create structural excess capacity. 10
5. Norway has not engaged in acts, policies or practices that have the effect of undervaluing its domestic currency. 20
6. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector. 25
7. Introduction and scope. 25
8. Norway has a rare competitive advantage in the oil and gas sector and contributes to stable global supply. 26
9. Key elements of the legal framework in Norway ensure that the sector operates on market principles. 29
10. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the Norwegian oil and gas sector. 35
11. There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector. 37
12. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the seafood sector. 38
13. Introduction and scope. 38
14. Norway’s seafood exports are a result of its unique comparative advantages. 40
15. Norway sets limits on production for biological and environmental reasons. 42
16. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the seafood sector. 46
17. There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the seafood sector. 47
18. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sector for certain electronic equipment or machinery. 52
19. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the manufacturing sub-sectors for machinery and electronic products. 53
20. There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sub-sectors for machinery and electronic equipment 57
21. Conclusion. 58

 1.  Introduction and scope

Norway and the United States share a long-standing and close economic relationship, grounded in common values, including a mutual commitment to addressing trade-distorting practices, and supporting secure and resilient supply chains that bolster economic and national security.  The United States is an important trading partner for Norway, while Norway represents a stable and reliable source of key inputs and investment for the U.S. economy.  The bilateral trade relationship is well-balanced, reflecting mutually beneficial economic integration: in 2025, Norway recorded a trade deficit in goods with the United States, of approximately USD 1.0 billion.[2]

Norwegian capital is also substantially invested in the United States, including through Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (“GPFG”),[3] supporting U.S. economic activity and employment.  Beyond trade and investment, Norway and the United States are aligned in their broader commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, and collaborate closely on security and defence.  Norway remains committed to constructive engagement with the United States in this investigation process, with a view to preserving and strengthening this strategic partnership.

The central concern for USTR in this investigation is alleged “structural excess capacity”, which USTR summarises as “production capacity that is untethered from the incentives of domestic and global demand and sustained through government intervention, resulting in overproduction, persistent trade surpluses, or underutilised capacity in manufacturing sectors.”[4]  USTR suggests that structural excess capacity may lead to overproduction and increased exports, which can displace U.S. production and investment and undermine the global competitiveness of U.S. industries.[5]

USTR identifies Norway as among the economies subject to the investigation, and expressly highlights the mineral fuels and oils, manufacturing (machinery and electronic equipment), and seafood sectors.[6]  Norway is a country with a small population (5.6 million) and a small economy (around USD 500 billion nominal GDP) that, therefore, has a very limited capacity indeed to burden the commerce of the United States.  In any event, as set out in these comments, there is no indication that Norway’s economy, including any of the expressly identified sectors, exhibits excess capacity and production untethered from demand.   Moreover, nothing supports a finding, that Norway contributes to structural excess capacity by maintaining any unfair, discriminatory or burdensome acts, policies, or practices, that attempt to promote production beyond naturally occurring, market-based demand conditions.

In the comments that follow, Norway addresses the concerns raised by USTR. 

In Section 2, Norway explains that, as a whole, its economic and policy framework shows no indication of structural excess capacity.  Section 2.a summarises key macroeconomic indicators, which consistently reflect balanced and market-driven economic outcomes rather than conditions associated with structural excess capacity.  These include stable and balanced economic growth, high levels of employment and wage growth, sustained profitability, investment patterns that are cyclical and responsive to changing economic conditions, and stable, well-anchored levels of inflation.

Section 2.b provides a comprehensive review of Norway’s relevant acts, policies and practices, demonstrating that none contribute to any alleged structural excess capacity, nor are they unfair, discriminatory or burdensome to U.S. commerce.  Norway covers labour, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition, and state aid.  There is no indication of any government interventions to sustain excess capacity and production.   Rather, the regulatory framework constrains distortive intervention and ensures that economic outcomes in Norway reflect market forces.  Section 2.c addresses allegations of currency manipulation, explaining that Norway operates a freely floating exchange rate determined by market forces and does not engage in acts, policies, or practices to influence the value of its currency with the objective of gaining a competitive advantage in international trade

In the subsequent three sections, Norway addresses each of the relevant sectors identified for concern by USTR: mineral fuels and oils (Section 3); seafood (Section 4); and manufacturing of machinery and certain electronic equipment (Section 5).  The analysis confirms that each sector operates according to market principles, with no indication of structural excess capacity nor of government acts, policies and practices to artificially create or sustain productive capacity beyond normal demand.

2. Norway’s overall economic and policy framework does not exhibit structural excess capacity

a. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels across the Norwegian economy

The following points demonstrate that Norway has an open, well-functioning, demand-driven economy that does not exhibit the characteristics typically associated with excessive capacity created or sustained by government intervention.

First, for a considerable period, Norway has experienced stable and balanced economic growth driven by domestic demand and investment.  GDP has grown at approximately 1.7 percent per year since 2005.[7]  In the same period, mainland GDP[8] has grown at approximately 2.4 percent[9] per year, supported by domestic demand growth of around 3.0 percent[10] and investment growth of around 2.8 percent.[11]  This indicates that growth is not overly export-driven, and reflects underlying economic fundamentals.

Second, Norway enjoys high and sustained levels of employment.  With a labour force participation rate of 83.6 percent, Norway is significantly above the OECD average of 79.7 percent, indicating strong labour market utilisation.[12]  This is in itself a strong indicator that there is no excess capacity to expand supply towards export growth in the short to medium term.  It means that Norway’s labour resources are already largely accounted for across the economy, limiting the ability to increase output beyond current demand conditions.

There is also no indication that high employment is the result of any government policies to suppress wages, which might allow enterprises to retain or build capacity, including labour, beyond what is warranted by market realities.  Norway has high unionisation rates[13] and relatively high minimum wages, largely set through collective agreements which strengthen workers’ bargaining power, balanced against what internationally exposed industries can sustain in competitive markets.[14]  

Overall real wage growth has exceeded productivity growth over the long term, averaging approximately 1.3 percent[15] per year compared to 0.4 percent.[16]  These features are not consistent with wage suppression or other policies aimed at sustaining excess capacity as regards labour resources and/or at suppressing domestic demand.

Third, Norwegian enterprises generate strong and sustained profitability consistent with well-functioning markets.  Average operating profit margins have been approximately 11.6 percent since 2007, rising to 14.1 percent in 2023 and 13.3 percent in 2024.[17]  On the other hand, when there is persistent excess capacity and production untethered from market demand, competitive pressures tend to erode margins over time.  The continued strength and stability of profitability in Norway indicates that such pressures are not present, and that production and investment decisions are aligned with underlying market conditions.

Fourth, over the last two decades, investment in productive assets – such as machinery, equipment, and infrastructure – has grown by approximately 2.8 percent[18] per year, broadly in line with overall economic growth.  This alignment indicates that investment has tracked underlying economic fundamentals; if there had been a surge in productive capacity, one would expect to see investment growth outpacing overall economic growth.  More recent fluctuations, including periods of contraction in investment since 2020, reflect changing economic conditions and uncertainty following Covid-19 and supply chain disruptions.  This pattern of cyclical and responsive investment is not consistent with policy-driven over-investment or sustained expansion of capacity that is disconnected from demand.

Fifth, inflation in Norway has remained stable and well-anchored over time, averaging approximately 2.6 percent[19] over the past two decades.  In an economy characterised by excessive production, persistent oversupply would be expected to place downward pressure on prices.  The absence of such price dynamics in Norway indicates that production is aligned with underlying demand conditions and not driven by excessive supply or government-induced distortions.

Sixth, overall capacity utilisation levels in Norway are generally consistent with cyclical economic conditions, under which some reasonable degree of unused capacity is both normal and efficient.  For example, capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector has fluctuated within a range of approximately 76.5-84.6 percent over past years in Norway, which is well within the range of normal, and does not indicate the development of excessive capacity disconnected from market realities.[20]  This outcome, as with the Norwegian economy more generally, is driven by market forces, including Norway’s natural competitive advantages, and not “strategic” government intervention.

 

b. Norway has not engaged in acts, policies and practices to create structural excess capacity

i. Introduction

Above, Norway has demonstrated that its economy does not bear any of the hallmarks of excessive capacity that is untethered to market demand.  To the contrary, Norway has shown that its economy has exhibited stable, consistent and incremental growth in recent years, with developments in productive capacity aligning closely with overall economic developments, and with macroeconomic indicators consistently reflecting market-driven conditions.

Consistent with this picture, Norway has not engaged, and does not engage, in any acts, policies or practices that are geared towards promoting excessive production untethered to demand, let alone any unreasonable or discriminatory acts, policies, or practices that have resulted in excess capacities that may burden U.S. commerce.  In other words, Norway’s economy does not exhibit structural excess capacity or production.

USTR identifies a range of measures that it suggests, in general terms, may result in the alleged structural excess capacity, by reducing operational costs and/or otherwise enabling production unaligned with free market conditions.[21]  A comprehensive review of Norway’s legal and regulatory frameworks across the areas of labour, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition, and state aid, demonstrates that the Norwegian government does not engage in distortive policy interventions.  Rather, the Norwegian economy is subject to a robust and well-enforced regulatory framework, which places necessary and appropriate legal constraints on how companies operate.  Compliance with these measures would more likely stifle, rather than promote, the possibility of structural excess capacity.  Key elements of Norway’s regulatory and compliance regime are summarized below.

ii. Labour

Norway maintains high standards of labour protection.  Norway has ratified all core International Labour Organization (“ILO”) conventions and a wide range of additional ILO instruments, reflecting a comprehensive, economy-wide commitment to internationally recognized labour standards.[22]  Norway complies with these requirements through the Norwegian laws mentioned below.

Since Norway is a member of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) through the European Economic Area Agreement (“EEA Agreement”),[23] Norwegian law must also afford the same worker protections that are afforded in the European Union (“EU”) to ensure a level playing field within the single market.  EU law promotes significant labour protections across areas such as working time, health and safety, and non-discrimination.  EU standards are implemented under Norwegian law, and in many cases, Norway supplements with additional standards, providing stronger protection than what is required.  Norway maintains domestic labour and workplace laws that are applied generally across the economy.  Norwegian law also has sector-specific labour rules, including for the oil and gas and fisheries sectors.

The Working Environment Act[24] and the Act Relating to Holidays[25] make up the core regulatory framework for worker protection, including rules on working hours, leave, discrimination, employment protection, and health and safety.  These rules establish extensive and enforceable rights for employees and corresponding obligations on employers, reflecting a high level of protection by international standards.

Regulatory compliance is actively monitored and enforced by public authorities, including the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority,[26] which oversees working conditions across sectors, and complementary bodies such as the Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority, Norwegian Maritime Authority and inter-agency work-crime centres.[27]  These authorities conduct both routine and risk-based inspections, including coordinated enforcement actions, and may impose orders, fines, and other sanctions for non-compliance.[28]  This system reflects a high level of regulatory oversight and effective enforcement in practice: in 2025, the Norwegian Labour Inspectorate conducted approximately 14,380 inspections, issued nearly 19,450 “improvement orders”  and imposed 574 administrative fines, alongside work stoppages and other sanctions in cases of serious non-compliance.[29]

The Norwegian working life model, developed over time, is grounded on close cooperation between employers, employees and state authorities, and emphasises social dialogue, collective bargaining and participation by employees in decision-making processes.  Norway has a high degree of unionisation and high collective agreement coverage among both employers and employees.[30]  The Working Environment Act also reflects this model by allowing the “social partners” (employees and employers) considerable scope to reach agreements, while at the same time expressively forbidding agreements that derogate from the Act to the detriment of the employee.[31]

The Labour Disputes Act establishes a structured system for wage negotiations, mediation, and dispute resolution, including protections for collective agreements and procedures that reinforce workers’ bargaining rights and support coordinated wage setting across the economy.[32]

The legislative framework above supports a framework for collective bargaining and dispute resolution; and limits the State’s ability to interfere in the substance of negotiations, outside certain basic limits.  Taken together, these frameworks establish comprehensive, economy-wide labour protections that impose real regulatory obligations and costs on enterprises.  They are not consistent with a model based on weak labour standards or cost suppression to sustain production.

iii. Social Security

Norway’s social security framework is principally established through the National Insurance Act, which governs pensions, health-care benefits, sick leave, and other forms of income protection.[33]  That framework is supplemented by rules on occupational injury insurance and mandatory occupational pensions.  While the substance of these protections is established under national law, EU rules on the coordination of social security systems are incorporated into the EEA Agreement and apply in Norway, which ensure equal application of rights to facilitate the free movement of persons.

These protections apply on a general, economy-wide basis and form part of Norway’s wider welfare and labour-market model, providing comprehensive income security and supporting high levels of labour participation.  These social security measures impose significant, broadly applicable costs on employers and the public sector, rather than constituting a framework designed to reduce labour costs or confer targeted advantages.  As with the other regulatory measures detailed here, costs of compliance more likely deter, rather than support, the potential for structural excess capacities.

iv. Environmental protection

Norway maintains high standards of environmental protection, which also imposes high and non-discriminatory compliance costs on enterprises operating in Norway.

Norway is party to a wide range of international climate and environmental agreements,[34] and a substantial share of Norwegian climate and environmental legislation is derived from EU law, implemented in Norway through the EEA Agreement.[35]

Domestically, the Pollution Control Act is the central instrument for controlling pollution, which is generally prohibited unless specifically allowed by law or by permit.[36]  More detailed rules on matters including air pollution, noise, and wastewater are set out in the Pollution Regulation.[37]

The Waste Regulations set out detailed rules on waste and wastewater management, including requirements for collection, treatment, and recycling.  These include extended producer responsibility schemes, under which producers are responsible for the lifecycle of certain products, including electrical and electronic equipment and equipment used in fisheries and aquaculture containing plastic.[38]

This core framework is complemented by additional legislation that imposes substantive obligations across environmental domains.  The Product Control Act regulates products and chemicals to prevent harm to health and the environment, including restrictions on hazardous substances.[39]  The Nature Diversity Act establishes requirements for the sustainable use and protection of biodiversity, including obligations to assess environmental impacts.[40]  The Gene Technology Act governs the use of biotechnology with a focus on safety and environmental protection.[41]

Norway’s environmental regime also includes stringent climate policy measures.  The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Act implements Norway’s participation in the EU Emissions Trading System.  This is a cap-and-trade system under which total emissions are capped and enterprises must hold “allowances” accounting for their emissions, which may be traded in the market.[42]  Norway has, as a result, overall carbon prices that are among the highest in the world.[43]  These measures place direct and measurable costs on emissions and reinforce incentives to reduce environmental impact across the economy.

Compliance with environmental regulation is monitored by the Norwegian Environment Agency (“NEA”), the County Governors and relevant local authorities, through a system of inspections, follow-up supervision, and enforcement actions.[44]  These authorities conduct regular and risk-based inspections, review permit conditions, and require documentation from enterprises to verify compliance with environmental obligations.[45]  Where non-compliance is identified, the NEA or the County Governors may impose deadlines for corrective action, carry out follow-up inspections, and apply administrative fines or other sanctions, including, in serious cases, referral to the police.[46] 

The rules are actively enforced in practice: the NEA and County Governors conduct approximately 1,300 inspections annually, and identify non-compliance in approximately 60-70 percent of cases, with 10 percent designated as serious non-compliance.[47]  In 2025, the NEA reported 305 violations to the police.[48] 

Taken together, these instruments reflect a comprehensive and high-standard environmental regime that imposes costs on enterprises, rather than a permissive framework designed to lower compliance burdens or support excess production.  Sector-specific environmental measures are addressed in further detail in subsequent sections.

v. Taxation

Norway’s tax framework is rules-based and generally applicable across the economy. Companies are subject to the ordinary corporate income tax regime, including the 22 percent corporate income tax under the Norwegian Tax Act, together with general rules on depreciation and tax administration.[49]

The Norwegian Tax Administration ensures that taxes and duties are assessed and paid correctly, and tax decisions may be appealed through administrative review and to the courts.  These rules apply uniformly and are not designed to reduce the cost base of enterprises or to incentivise expanded production.

Value Added Tax (“VAT”) rules likewise apply on a general basis across sectors, under the VAT Act.[50]  VAT is a general consumption tax applied to the value added at each stage of production and distribution, with businesses responsible for collecting and remitting the tax on sales while receiving credits for VAT paid on inputs.  Unlike the U.S. system, which relies primarily on state-level sales taxes applied at the point of final sale, VAT operates throughout the supply chain and is administered at the national level.  As a result, it constitutes a broad-based and consistently applied tax on economic activity rather than a sector-specific measure.

There are no material government support measures provided through specific exemptions from VAT or excise duties in any of the four sectors identified for concern by USTR.  The tax framework applies broadly and neutrally across the economy and does not operate as a mechanism to promote production beyond market demand or to confer a competitive advantage.

vi.  Competition and corporate governance

The Competition Act[51] and the EEA Competition Act,[52] together with the competition provisions of the EEA Agreement, prohibit anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance and establish merger control rules.  The Norwegian Competition Authority enforces that framework,[53] subject to appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal and then the ordinary courts, while European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Surveillance Authority separately enforces the corresponding EEA rules.[54]

Norway’s governance of state-owned entities adheres to OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, which separate the State’s ownership role from its other functions and require state-owned enterprises to operate on market terms, without undue competitive advantage or disadvantage.[55]  In general, Norway’s framework for state ownership in all sectors where the state holds direct ownership is set out in White Paper No. 6 (2022–2023),^[56] which establishes a rules-based approach grounded in Norway’s Limited Liability Companies Act,^[57] the EEA Agreement,^[58] and internationally recognised corporate governance standards, including the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.^[59]  Further information on state ownership is set out in Section 3.c.ii below.

Norway also maintains a broader framework directed to responsible business conduct and transparency.  The Transparency Act requires larger enterprises to conduct due diligence with respect to fundamental human rights and decent working conditions across their operations and supply chains, and to publish annual accounts of that work.[60]  In addition, sustainability reporting requirements, derived from EU law, further require companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance-related information on a standardized basis.[61]

Taken together, these frameworks impose clear obligations on enterprises to adhere to responsible and transparent business conduct and limit the scope for non-commercial behaviour or preferential treatment.  They reinforce market-based outcomes and transparency across the economy and are not consistent with a system in which state involvement is used to confer competitive advantages or sustain production beyond market demand.

vii. State support

State aid is tightly constrained under the EEA framework.[62]  Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement establishes a general prohibition on state aid that distorts competition and affects trade within the EEA.[63]  In Norway, these rules are incorporated through the EEA Act[64] and the State Aid Act.[65]  The framework applies to a broad range of financial measures through which the government may confer an advantage, including grants, tax advantages, capital injections, loans, guarantees, debt relief, and the provision of goods or services below market price.  Such government  measures constitute state aid where they provide a selective economic advantage that would not arise under normal market conditions.

As a general matter, any state aid is prohibited unless it falls within one of several, narrow, pre-defined exceptions and complies with detailed conditions.  This regime is enforced through ex ante control: any planned aid must be notified to and approved by ESA before implementation, unless it falls within a defined exemption.  In particular, certain (strictly limited) categories of aid may be granted without prior notification under the General Block Exemption Regulation, but only where they pursue specified objectives – such as environmental protection, research and development, or regional development – and comply with strict requirements on eligibility, aid intensity, and transparency.[66]  Any state aid measures are subject to ongoing ESA supervision and national judicial enforcement.

The overall effect is to tightly limit the scope for discretionary or below-market support, ensuring that public intervention is subject to strict legal discipline and economic and independent review rather than being used to sustain production or confer a competitive advantage upon the recipient(s).

Taken together, the EEA state aid framework imposes strict legal constraints on the ability of the Norwegian government to provide financial support to enterprises to develop or maintain excessive capacity or competitive advantages created or sustained by government intervention.

c. Norway has not engaged in acts, policies or practices that have the effect of undervaluing its domestic currency

USTR alleges in the Initiation Notice that certain economies, including Norway, engage in “financial repression and currency practices” that contribute to structural excess capacity, including through policies that “have the effect of undervaluing [the] domestic currency”, specifically through “the recycling of oil revenues into non-domestic currencies” like the U.S. dollar.[67]  Norway does not engage in any policies that cause financial repression or currency undervaluation, and “recycl[ed] oil” revenues do not result in any such outcomes.  Below Norway first, outlines the applicable U.S. framework for assessing currency manipulation under U.S. law; and second, demonstrates that Norway does not meet the criteria established under this framework.

i. U.S. law framework for assessing currency manipulation

As an initial matter, Norway highlights that the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) regularly assesses whether its trading partners use exchange rate policies to gain an unfair competitive advantage in international trade.  This assessment is conducted pursuant to a statutory framework which sets out the criteria by which such practices are to be identified and evaluated.  Treasury has not identified Norway as a country of concern for currency manipulation.[68]

First, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 defines currency manipulation in general terms as conduct undertaken “for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustment or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.”[69]  The assessment under this Act is based on a range of economic indicators, such as trade balances for goods and services (i.e. whether a country exports more than it imports), current account balances (i.e. whether a country receives more income from the rest of the world than it pays out), foreign exchange market activity, the design of exchange rate arrangements, the level of foreign exchange reserves, the use of capital controls (i.e. measures that restrict the movement of money across borders), and the conduct of monetary policy.

Second, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 operates alongside this framework and introduces more specific quantitative criteria.[70]  Here, the assessment focuses on whether a country: (i) maintains a significant bilateral trade surplus in goods and services with the United States; (ii) runs a material current account surplus (i.e. a persistent excess of national income over domestic spending); and (iii) engages in persistent, one-sided intervention in foreign exchange markets, meaning sustained purchases of foreign currency to influence the exchange rate.[71]

Treasury analyses these standards in its semi-annual Report to Congress on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States.  That report evaluates major trading partners against the criteria set out above and identifies those economies whose policies warrant closer scrutiny under the statutory framework.[72]  Treasury’s most recent report does not include Norway as a country of concern for currency manipulation based on an application of the comprehensive U.S. statutory criteria.[73]

 

ii. Norway does not engage in currency manipulation

Consistent with Treasury’s findings, Norway does not engage in acts, policies, or practices to influence the value of its currency with the objective of gaining a competitive advantage in international trade.  Norway explains below why its acts, policies, and practices do not result in currency manipulation.

First, the Norwegian government does not engage in persistent, one-sided intervention in foreign exchange markets.  The Norwegian krone operates under a freely floating exchange rate regime.  The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) classifies Norway as having a “free floating exchange rate regime”, meaning that the value of the currency is determined by supply and demand in foreign exchange markets.[74]  In practical terms, this means there is no indication that the government maintains the currency at any particular level, intervenes systematically to influence its direction, or operates a peg against other currencies.  Norway’s macroeconomic framework is characterised by openness and transparency and does not involve the use of capital controls or other measures designed to restrict cross-border capital movements or to manage the exchange rate for competitive purposes.

Second, Norway does not maintain a significant bilateral trade surplus in goods and services with the United States.  To the contrary, Norway has recently run a bilateral trade deficit with the United States of approximately USD 1.0 billion.[75]  The United States accounts for a relatively small share of Norway’s exports (approximately 3.8 percent), while Norway’s imports from the United States account for a larger share (approximately 7.0 percent).[76]  

This is not consistent with a pattern of deliberate currency undervaluation for competitive advantage in exports, which would be expected to manifest in sustained and significant trade surpluses, particularly in tradeable sectors like manufacturing.  Indeed, Norway’s economic structure is not consistent with an export-led manufacturing model.  Manufacturing has declined to a relatively small share of the economy, and, excluding petroleum, Norway runs a substantial trade deficit in goods, including with the United States.

Third, Norway does maintain a current account surplus.  However, as demonstrated below, Norway’s external surplus is a consequence of how it manages its petroleum revenues, and not any attempts to deliberately influence the value of its currency.

Norway currently uses petroleum revenues at a rate close to maintaining “long-term income”, i.e. the level that can be spent each year without reducing the underlying value of its total resource wealth.[77]  The remainder of the revenues are saved, to be invested globally across a diversified portfolio of assets, through the GPFG.[78]  This reflects the way that Norway manages its exhaustible resource wealth over the long-term, ensuring that future generations can continue to benefit from it.

The GPFG is not concentrated in any single market or currency, but allocated, on a commercial basis, across a wide range of countries and asset classes.[79]  While a substantial share is invested in the United States, this reflects the size and depth of U.S. capital markets rather than any targeted allocation.  Investment operations are not reactive to exchange rate movements (as would be expected if these actions were intended to influence currency values) but rather follow a pre-announced, fixed schedule.[80]

Norway’s investment strategy was designed to limit the impact of large and volatile petroleum revenues on its relatively small domestic economy.  Norway’s petroleum reserves only began production in the 1970s.  By predominantly investing revenues abroad, Norway has sought to avoid so-called “Dutch disease”.[81]  This occurs when a country experiences “sudden” large flows of income from the discovery of valuable but exhaustible natural resources.  Prices and wages rise, and higher domestic costs can stunt all other sectors of the economy outside the resource wealth.  Over time, the country’s economic wealth becomes concentrated in the resource sector at the expense of the wider economy.  This sets the economy up for long-term instability and failure once the exhaustible resource “run out”.

Norway’s approach therefore seeks to ensure that resource revenues do not distort domestic economic conditions but instead are managed to support stability over time.  In other words, Norway’s policy is defensive, aimed at domestic economic stability, and not offensive, i.e., aimed at securing an advantage in international trade.

More generally, Norway regularly makes fiscal and monetary choices that influence saving, investment and capital flows within its economy, and which thereby may have some implication for exchange rates.  This is a natural consequence of broader macroeconomic policies, rather than from any targeted effort to influence currency values.  This dynamic is not unique to Norway; the United States runs sustained fiscal deficits, which increases the demand for foreign capital and contributes to a stronger dollar.  The fact that a country has a macroeconomic policy that could theoretically influence the value of its currency is not, alone, an indication of currency manipulation. 

In sum, Norway’s policies, practices, and acts do not aim influence the value of its currency, in a way that would contribute to structural excess capacity directed towards exports in its economy, thereby burdening U.S. commerce.

3. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector

a. Introduction

This section of Norway’s comments addresses the concerns identified by USTR in the Initiation Notice, which highlight “energy goods” as a sector in Norway that may exhibit structural excess capacity and production.  

Norway is a producer of crude oil, natural gas, natural gas liquids and condensate (“oil and gas”), and a supplier to global energy markets, particularly in Europe where Norway is a major supplier of gas.^[82]  The development of Norway’s oil and gas sector is a consequence of its natural competitive advantage, namely the resources concentrated on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (“NCS”). 

Norway is one of the world’s few large, stable and reliable suppliers of oil and gas, and the industry has developed in response to market forces.  Importantly, global market dynamics, including global demand trends, drive Norway’s oil and gas production rates and capacity utilisation.  Norway has not, and does not, engage in acts, policies, and practices to create or sustain any structural excess capacity in the oil and gas industry that would burden U.S. commerce.  This Section proceeds as follows.

In Section 3.b, Norway explains that the relatively high share of exports accounted for by oil and gas reflect its comparative advantage in this sector and its ability to meet global, and in particular European, demand.  Section 3.c then sets out key aspects of the domestic legal framework applicable to the oil and gas sector, namely licensing, and describes how the legal framework applies equally to both private companies, as well as to the two licensees wholly and partly owned by the State.  This framework effectively requires all licensees within the sector to operate according to commercial, market driven principles. 

Section 3.d reviews key economic indicators for the sector, which consistently demonstrates that it is responsive to market conditions.  Finally, Section 3.e explains that Norway does not maintain any acts, policies or practices which seek to sustain or result in excess production or productive capacity unaligned with market conditions.

b. Norway has a rare competitive advantage in the oil and gas sector and contributes to stable global supply

Norway has been endowed with substantial oil and gas resources in the NCS.  The NCS that falls under Norway’s jurisdiction is about 6 times the size of the Norwegian mainland, and it is estimated that about half this area may contain petroleum.^[83]  About 56 percent of the estimated recoverable petroleum resources in the NCS have already been recovered and marketed (total recoverable resources estimated at ~15.72 billion Sm³ o.e.).^[84]

Given these natural advantages, Norway is a significant producer of oil and gas, and a major supplier of both to Europe.  Norway’s crude oil supply is about 2 percent of global demand, and its natural gas supply is about 3 percent of global demand.^[85]

In understanding the structure of Norway’s oil and gas sector, it is important to bear in mind that there is a relatively small number of countries that produce and export significant quantities of both oil and natural gas.^[86]  Although production is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, both oil and natural gas are key energy sources globally.  Oil accounts for about 31 percent of the world’s energy demand, and natural gas accounts for about 25 percent (and is fast growing).^[87]  Every country is a significant user of one or, typically, both energy sources, and the world will continue to need substantial quantities of oil and gas both for energy and for non-energy use for decades to come.^[88]

This large-scale global demand for oil and gas makes a consistent and reliable supply of oil and gas critical to the global economy.  Yet, with production relatively concentrated, supplies are subject to high levels of political risks, with state intervention to influence the market common.  Thus, as a petroleum producing country that leaves decisions on the development of new production entirely to commercial considerations, Norway plays a larger role in the global market than its share of production alone would suggest.

Since the discovery of oil and gas in the NCS, Norway has always approached the development of its oil and gas sector, and its role as a global supplier, as a country with a strong democratic tradition based on the rule of law.  In line with its democratic and rules-based traditions, Norway’s governance is open and transparent, with high levels of legal protection, and with an open, liberal market economy.  In following values and traditions, Norway aligns closely with the United States. 

Like the United States, Norway has brought these values and traditions to its oil and gas sector.  As explained below, Norway has opened access to its oil and gas reserves on a non-discriminatory basis, allowing exploration and exploitation to follow market forces; and, it has sought to act as a responsible supplier of oil and gas that seeks to contribute stability to global energy markets. 

This approach is highly supportive of U.S. geopolitical interests and U.S. commerce, particularly in a time of conflict in the Middle East and continued tensions with Russia, both of which have significant leverage in the oil and gas industry.^[89]  These ongoing tensions in the supply of oil and gas illustrate well that not all suppliers of oil and gas operate according to the values and traditions shared by Norway and the United States. 

When supplies of oil and gas are constrained, as is currently the case, this can rapidly lead to price shocks with serious negative repercussions for energy users worldwide and can severely burden U.S. commerce.  High energy prices also have knock-on effects for the prices of many other commodities in the economy, including food and inputs to produce food (e.g., fertiliser), and can, ultimately, drive up economy-wide inflation, with severe burdens for consumers.  Norway’s approach to its role as a stable and reliable supplier, aligned with U.S. interests, is designed to help counter these effects, including for U.S. commerce.

In this context, at a time of constrained supply of oil and gas, measures taken pursuant to this investigation, such as the imposition of duties on imports of Norway’s oil and gas, or any other actions in response to this sector, would increase the cost of oil and gas products for U.S. energy users, which would have an adverse impact on the U.S. market. 

c. Key elements of the legal framework in Norway ensure that the sector operates on market principles

The applicable policy and legal framework in Norway dictates that the oil and gas sector operates in accordance with market principles.  Below, Norway addresses (i) its licensing regime, under which access to, and development of resources is determined by commercial considerations; and (ii) the relevant legal framework governing the licensees Petoro AS and Equinor ASA, two wholly and partly state-owned companies, respectively.

i. Norway’s licensing regime for oil and gas

Norway has developed a licensing regime for the oil and gas sector that is driven by demand from commercial producers for access to Norway’s oil and gas reserves.^[90]  The starting point for this regime is that the right to explore and exploit petroleum resources on the NCS form part of the sovereign rights of the Norwegian State, which grants companies the right to explore and exploit the resources.^[91]  The Norwegian State owns the resources in the ground, and the licensees become owners of the oil and gas once it has been produced.  Within the regime, Norway provides a stable and predictable system under which commercial entities are licensed to develop resources, with licensees responsible for all operational decisions and activities, including exploration, development, production, and sales.  The Government of Norway’s licensing decisions are based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria.

This licensing mechanism, driven by commercial, market factors, underscores the lack of structural excess capacity in Norway’s oil and gas sector.  Because all exploration and exploitation of oil and gas is carried out by commercial actors, who receive no other incentive from the State to do so, production of oil and gas is limited by natural factors (i.e. availability of the natural resource), and the legal framework (i.e. licenses), and there is no investment or production untethered from demand.

All exploration and production licenses are granted under the Petroleum Act of 1996, and any enterprise with the required geological understanding and health, safety and environment competencies, technical and financial capacity can be granted a license.^[92]  Licenses are awarded on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria.^[93]  Besides the need to obtain a license, there are no further market access barriers imposed by the government.

Licenses are normally awarded through licensing rounds, where the government invites applications for exploration and/or exploitation in specified geographical areas or “blocks”.^[94]  In deciding which blocks to open for licensing, the Government of Norway relies on market forces.  In particular, before opening a new licensing round in a frontier area (i.e. an area where there is less knowledge or greater technical challenges associated with petroleum extraction), the Government of Norway invites companies to first specify where on the NCS they would like to undertake new exploration and exploitation.^[95]  The Government of Norway then opens licensing rounds based on the expressions of commercial interest in particular geographical areas.^[96]  Ultimately, this ensures that the geographic location of production is driven by market forces.

The grant of a license is subject to a fee for the acreage covered by the license.^[97]  However, licensees are entitled to an exemption if the licensee submits a plan for the development and operation of the resources. 

In that respect, the licensee is free to make its own independent commercial decisions about how to explore and exploit the area, including the speed and scale of production.  When it is no longer possible to produce profitably from a field, the licensees are free to shut down production at the particular field and relinquish their license, and decommission and remove the production installations.  Indeed, the licensee is free, at any time, to relinquish its license.^[98] 

In this way, the Norwegian regulatory framework ensures that the development of the oil and gas sector is driven by commercial, market-based considerations, rather than through any attempt by the Government of Norway to manage productive capacity and capacity utilisation based on non-market considerations.

ii. Norway’s legal framework for state-owned enterprises

Currently, there are 23 licensees on the NCS.  One of these is wholly owned by the Norwegian State, Petoro AS (“Petoro”); and one is partly owned by the State, Equinor Energy AS (“Equinor”).^[99] As further explained below, these two companies operate on commercial terms, without preferential rights, in order to maximize returns.  Petoro manages the State’s interests in licenses that the State retains, and Equinor is a publicly listed company that produces oil and gas.

As noted in Section 2.b.vi above, Norway’s framework for state ownership, applicable in all sectors where the State holds direct ownership is set out in White Paper No. 6 (2022–2023).^[100]  The framework establishes a rules-based approach grounded in Norway’s Limited Liability Companies Act,^[101] the EEA Agreement,^[102] and internationally recognised corporate governance standards, including the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.^[103]

The framework requires a clear separation between Norway’s role as owner and its regulatory functions, with boards and management responsible for all commercial decisions.^[104]  State-owned and state-controlled enterprises engaged in economic activity must operate on market terms and under the same legal and competitive conditions as private enterprises.^[105]  In addition, as explained in Section 2.b.vii above, the prohibition on state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement ensures that state ownership cannot confer selective advantages or be used to support production beyond market conditions.^[106]

In the oil and gas sector, as noted, the Norwegian State owns 100 percent of Petoro and 67 percent of Equinor.^[107]  Both participate in oil and gas activities on the NCS through their participating interests in production licenses.

Equinor is a commercial oil and gas company engaged in exploration, development and production on the NCS and internationally.  Equinor is organised as a public limited company, which is listed on both the Oslo Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange.  Consistent with Norwegian law, and more specifically the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, it operates on a commercial basis, with its board responsible for business decisions, including investment and production.^[108] 

Equinor holds production licenses for the NCS, alongside other companies and acts as the operator for a number of fields, taking operational decisions within the framework of the license based on commercial considerations.  It has no preferential rights within the licenses.

Petoro is a wholly state-owned company,^[109] which was established in 2001 and has around 80 employees.  The company manages the commercial aspects of government’s ownership interests in certain oil and gas licenses.  When awarding licenses, the State – as owner of the resources – has the option to retain an interest in the licenses for itself, which is called the State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI).^[110]  Petoro is designated with the task of managing these interests on behalf of the State, alongside the other companies that participate in the licenses, all as co-licensees for a given acreage. 

As manager, Petoro does not apply for licenses; rather the interests that the State has decided to retain are added to Petoro’s portfolio at the same time as the award to the private companies is made.  In managing licenses, Petoro is not granted any preferential licensing rights and, instead, enjoys the same licensing terms as other companies, including in relation to decision-making, financial terms, or access to projects, and participates on the same basis as other companies.^[111]  

Petoro manages the operation of its licenses – without preferences – on a joint basis with the other co-licensee companies.  The operational decisions are, therefore, necessarily made on commercial terms by the group of licensees, including Petoro.  Petoro does not market or sell the oil and gas produced from the licenses it manages.  Instead, Equinor undertakes these tasks, in return for commercial compensation, and does so on commercial terms to maximise returns (just as it does in marketing and selling the oil and gas it produces itself).  In sum, Petoro operates on a commercial basis, with the objective stated in the 1996 Petroleum Act being to create the highest possible value and maximise State revenues from the license portfolio.^[112]

This framework ensures that Norway’s participation in enterprises operating in the oil and gas sector does not alter how production decisions are made, and that the two companies that are wholly or partly state-owned operate on commercial basis.  As a result, production and investment in the sector remain driven by market conditions and do not reflect any effort to sustain capacity beyond demand.

d. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the Norwegian oil and gas sector

Key performance indicators show that production and investment in the Norwegian oil and gas sector is driven by market forces, with no indication of excessive capacity being created or sustained by government intervention.

First, investment in the sector is clearly responsive to market signals, in particular global price developments.  When prices decline, investment is reduced sharply.  For example, following the sharp fall in oil prices between mid-2014 and early 2016, investment fell by 11.8 percent in 2015 and declined by another 16.5 percent in 2016.^[113]  This pattern indicates that enterprises adjust investment decisions in response to expected returns, which are determined by global demand and pricing conditions.  In contrast, if a sector were characterised by structural excess capacity, one would expect sustained or increasing investment even in periods of weak market conditions, reflecting production decisions that are detached from demand.  The observed pattern in Norway – where investment expands and contracts in line with market developments – demonstrates that the sector is commercially driven and responsive to global demand.

Second, the sector exhibits sustained and market-consistent profitability.  Viewed from a long-term lens, return on equity averaged approximately 14.9 percent between 2007 and 2024, with particularly high returns in the period from 2021 to 2023, ranging from 16.4 percent to 35.7 percent.^[114]  These returns, too, were responsive to market conditions.  For example, in 2014 and 2015, returns were negative, coinciding with a sharp decline in oil prices from around USD 100 per barrel in mid-2014 to below USD 50 in 2015 and into early 2016.  During this period, return on equity was negative 13.2 percent in 2014 and negative 8.4 percent in 2015.^[115]  These outcomes reflect prevailing global market conditions, including periods of higher and lower energy prices. 

In contrast, if the sector were characterised by structural excess capacity, persistent oversupply would place downward pressure on prices and margins, leading to declining profitability over time and, in many cases, requiring non-market support to sustain operations.  The continued strength and variability of profitability in the Norwegian oil and gas sector indicates that enterprises are operating under market conditions, with returns determined by global demand rather than distorted by government intervention.

Third, production trends in the Norwegian oil and gas sector follow the standard commercial and geological profile of resource extraction industries.  Production from individual fields typically rises to a peak, enters a plateau phase, and then declines as resources are depleted.  This pattern is observed in Norway.  Total oil production reached its peak in 2001^[116] and has declined since then, while overall production on the NCS is expected to remain broadly stable in the near term, before declining over time absent new discoveries or additional investment to enhance recovery rates.^[117]  This reflects production levels that are constrained by resource availability and aligned with commercial and geological conditions, rather than sustained or expanded beyond demand.

Fourth, the oil and gas sector is currently already operating at, or close to, its effective capacity limits.  Industry reports indicate that producers on the NCS do not maintain meaningful spare capacity that could be brought online in response to short-term changes in market conditions.   For example, Equinor has noted that it does not have the ability to materially increase production given current supply constraints and elevated demand in global energy markets.^[118]

e. There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector

Norway does not maintain any act, policy, or practice that creates or contributes to structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector.  As described in Section 2.b above, Norway has set out the full range of potentially relevant acts, policies, and practices across the economy.  These include comprehensive rules relating to labour standards, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition, and state aid.  These measures apply equally to the oil and gas sector and impose real and enforceable constraints on enterprises’ operations, including compliance costs and regulatory obligations.

In addition, Norway maintains certain additional laws and regulations that apply to the oil and gas sector.  As set out above, these include the licensing regime and the governance of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, which requires that all operational decisions, including on production and investment, are taken on a commercial basis and in response to market conditions. 

Further, to ensure that Norway’s oil and gas resources benefit Norwegian society as a whole, the tax rate for oil and gas companies is 78 percent.  The petroleum taxation system is based on ordinary company taxation (currently 22 percent), with the imposition of an additional special tax.[119]

The regulatory framework, including its sector-specific dimensions, do not create or maintain structural excess capacity.  Rather, it ensures that economic outcomes in the oil and gas sector are determined by market-based considerations, including global demand conditions, and not by government intervention.  And when viewed together with the economic data from this sector, the evidence fails to support any finding that structural excess capacity exists or that Norway’s acts, policies, or practices could or have led to structural excess capacities that would burden U.S. commerce.

4. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the seafood sector

a. Introduction

The Government of Norway understands USTR’s central concern with respect to Norway’s seafood sector is the increase in exports in 2025, compared to 2024.^[120]  Allegations in the Initiation Notice suggest that these “record high” seafood exports from Norway in 2025 indicate the existence of structural excess capacity in the sector, and that “overproduction” of seafood in Norway may be exported to the U.S., directly or indirectly.^[121]

At the outset, Norway wishes to clarify USTR’s claim that seafood exports from Norway were at a “record high” in 2025.  It is true that Norway’s exports of seafood in terms of value increased by 3.3 percent as compared to 2024.  However, in volume terms, Norwegian seafood exports have showed a slight decline from 2022 onwards.^[122]  The increase in export value was a result of increased prices in the market, whereas the physical volume of exports declined.  In other words, the perceived “increase” in exports was not caused by increased production, which is a volume-based metric.

Nevertheless, to the extent USTR is concerned with the robust nature of Norway’s seafood sector, as set out below, the strength of the sector is a result of the country’s natural comparative advantages.  There is no indication that the sector has production or capacity levels that are untethered from market demand.  Rather, economic factors for Norway’s seafood sector indicate that the sector has developed in response to market conditions.

Norway has also not engaged in, and does not engage in, acts, policies or practices that lead to excessive production capacity in the seafood sector.  In addition to the measures set out in detail at Section 2.b above, Norway also maintains regulatory measures specific to the seafood sector.  Overall, the goal of these measures is to promote sustainable wild fish stocks within biological limits, ensure fish health and welfare, and keep aquaculture production within environmentally sustainable levels.  These regulatory burdens on Norwegian companies are stringent, especially relative to many other economies. 

Norway details below how and why Norway’s acts policies and practices with respect to the seafood sector do not result in any structural excess capacities that would otherwise burden U.S. commerce. 

Section 4.b explains Norway’s comparative advantage in the seafood sector.  Section 4.c outlines the regulatory constraints on harvest and production in Norway.  Section 4.d identifies key economic indicators for the seafood sector and shows that these indicators with respect to the industry reflect balanced and market-driven economic outcomes consistent with a sector that does not have excess capacity.  Finally, Section 4.e summarises Norway’s regulatory framework for seafood.

b. Norway’s seafood exports are a result of its unique comparative advantages

Norway’s long coastline, abundance of marine resources, and unique natural conditions has enabled its fisheries sector to thrive for centuries.  Norway’s coastline (over 100,000 kilometres) has some of the most productive marine fishing areas in the world (such as the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea).  This rich pristine marine environment contributes to particularly abundant fish stocks, including for certain migratory species (e.g., cod, herring, mackerel), and allows for fishing a substantial volume within biologically sustainable levels.

With respect to aquaculture, Norway’s coastline and fjords offer a unique advantage of sheltered locations, suitable temperatures, predictable currents and waters rich in oxygen that create a favourable environment for production, especially for species such as salmon.  To complement these natural advantages regarding aquaculture, Norway has seen technological innovation in the sector that has enabled the expansion of production volumes over time.

Like many other nations with an extensive coastline, Norway has always been a major producer and exporter of seafood.  Seafood exports in Norway can be traced back hundreds of years to the Viking age.  Today, seafood is a global commodity in high demand around the world.  However, resources are scarce.   Further, even in countries that have productive capacity, many fisheries around the world are fully exploited from a biological perspective, or even overexploited, often due to distortive government measures or a failure to impose government measures to properly manage fish stocks.  Environmental risks threaten a further reduction in productive resources.

Consumers all over the world have a high, and growing, demand for seafood products.  Global consumption of fish and other aquatic products has grown by 24 percent over the last decade and is projected to grow by 11 percent in the coming decade.^[123]   Rising global demand for seafood is driven not only by population growth and changing dietary preferences, but also by increasing income levels and broader economic development.  As countries become more affluent, consumers gain the purchasing power to shift consumption toward higher value, healthier, protein-rich foods, leading to steadily expanding seafood consumption and reinforcing the long-term global trend toward a greater intake of seafood.

Given Norway’s comparative advantages, the country continues to play an important role in meeting global demand, exporting seafood to more than 150 markets.  Most of Norway’s seafood exports are to countries where it is not possible or efficient to have sufficient domestic seafood production to meet domestic demand.^[124]  Norway’s seafood exports thus play a vital role in contributing to food security in many countries.^[125]

Norway’s seafood exports also play an important role in international food supply chains, creating value in importing countries.  Indeed, a substantial share of value creation associated with Norwegian seafood takes place in importing countries, where the raw material produced in Norway often undergoes processing, packaging, and further refinement within the domestic food industry.^[126]  Moreover, Norwegian seafood supports a wide range of additional sectors in the value chain, including in importing countries, such as transport and logistics providers, wholesale and retail enterprises, and the restaurant and hospitality sectors.

In this way, Norway’s seafood exports serve not only as a reliable source of high-quality raw materials, but also as a contributor to economic activity and employment generation in partner countries, including the United States.  For example, studies show that the total economic contributions of U.S. seafood imports to the U.S. economy exceeds USD 70 billion, across employment, labour income, tax on production and imports, and value addition and output.^[127]  Norwegian salmon serves as inputs for the American fish processing industry’s activities.  For these U.S. producers, import duties on Norwegian seafood would make their products less competitive and would ultimately drive-up U.S. food prices.

c. Norway sets limits on production for biological and environmental reasons

The seafood sector depends on living natural resources, linking production closely to sustainability considerations.  Consequently, seafood production is limited by biological, and environmental constraints to ensure that wild stocks are fished within sustainable biological limits, and that aquaculture production does not result in adverse biological or environmental effects.  In Norway, these constraints are addressed through strict regulations that limit both wild-catch fisheries and aquaculture production.  These regulatory limitations are based on objective scientific methods and analysis (as explained further in detail below), and they restrict rather than promote Norway’s production in order to address biological and environmental concerns.  These regulatory constraints are important context for understanding the performance of the industry and contradict any allegations of structural excess capacity within the Norwegian seafood sector.

i.   Wild catch fisheries

Norway sets Total Allowable Catch (“TAC”) limits for most of its commercially important wild fish stocks to ensure that fishing of the stocks in Norway remains within biological limits.^[128]  These limits aim to ensure the sustainability of stock levels and prevent over-fishing.  A TAC generally specifies the volume of a particular fish stock that can be harvested from a specific area.  The Institute of Marine Research in Norway advises on appropriate TAC-levels in coordination with the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES),^[129] an intergovernmental marine science organisation composed of 19 member countries.  Norway’s wild fish harvesting levels are therefore in line with international management frameworks.

Around 90 per cent of Norway’s fisheries are conducted on stocks that are shared with other states.  For the most important fish stocks, quota levels and management strategies are therefore set in cooperation with other countries.  Norway has negotiated a series of agreements with neighbouring countries.^[130]  For the stocks in the North-East Atlantic, relevant, countries include the United Kingdom, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Greenland and Russia, as well as the European Union.  Norwegian fisheries also extend to fish stocks for which TACs are set by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), e.g. the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).

The TAC is divided between relevant countries in accordance with international agreements based on scientific methods for assessing the sustainability of stock levels, then the Norwegian quota share is distributed among Norway’s vessel groups.  This distribution is done after receiving input from industry and other stakeholders.^[131]

TACs for most key Norwegian fish stocks have shown downward trends,^[132] with differing degrees of decline for particular fish stocks.  This is a result of ecosystem changes and biological factors that naturally affect fish stocks, such as availability of food resources and prey.

Within the context of those declining trends, the industry’s harvesting levels have been aligned with the available catch opportunities under the TACs.  Quotas for the main fish stocks are largely utilized, often close to full utilization, but this can vary from year to year due to factors such as weather conditions, stock migration patterns, and practical conditions in the fishery.  In some cases, quota uptake in a given year may exceed 100 per cent, since unused quotas can be transferred between years.[133]

ii. Aquaculture

Production of farmed salmon and rainbow trout in Norway is regulated through three main mechanisms.  First, the Maximum Allowed Biomass (MAB) system sets a limit on how much biomass (weight in tonnes) each license holder may hold live in production at any given time.^[134]  Second, the Production Area System (“traffic light system”) determines whether production capacity (MAB) in each area may increase, remain unchanged or be reduced based on environmental and biological conditions.[135]  Third, the license holder must have access to an approved farming site, meaning a designated locality that has obtained the necessary permits under environmental, spatial planning, food safety, animal health and -welfare, harbour and fairway and aquaculture regulations.[136] 

The producer cannot exceed the MAB-limit on either the license or the location, but as the fish at a given location reaches slaughter size it will be taken out of production and the remaining fish can continue to grow within the MAB limitation.  Within a production cycle, the total amount of slaughtered fish produced is usually higher than the MAB itself.  The relationship between the MAB and volume of slaughtered fish production is, in essence, a function of how efficiently a producer uses the licenses and location subject to the MAB in relation to other parts of the production cycle.  However, no matter how efficient a producer is, the MAB naturally curtails production capacity.

Capacity utilisation is measured by utilisation of MAB.  This is shown by the ratio between the total production of slaughtered fish in a production cycle as compared to the MAB.  In the last decade, this ratio has consistently been between 1.5 and 1.8 tons of slaughtered fish per ton of MAB.[137]

As a result of declining availability of wild fish stocks, risks of overfishing, and increasing demand for seafood, there has been a shift to supply of seafood from aquaculture.  With more market demand for aquaculture, the number of aquaculture farms, and consequently, the volume of MAB, has increased in Norway.  However, to address environmental issues, the MAB prevents producers from increasing supply in response to higher prices, stronger demand or export opportunities. 

d. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the seafood sector

Similar to the overall Norwegian economy, the fishing and aquaculture sectors in Norway exhibit strong signs of being market-driven, without distortive government intervention.

First, the volume of wild catch by Norwegian vessels has remained largely constant over the last two decades.^[138]  In aquaculture, the volume of slaughtered fish produced has increased over the past two decades as a result of increased MAB allocation in accordance with environmental sustainability.  Producers are continually improving production methods and technologies, and work towards increased survival of the fish in production, for example through improved breeding techniques and the development and improvement of vaccines.  Improved biosecurity and increased zone operation also contribute to improved production levels.  As noted above, the global increase in demand for seafood, coupled with stable volumes of output in wild catch fisheries to ensure sustainable fishing, has led to increased aquaculture production to meet the overall increase in demand for seafood.

Second, the sector has recorded robust real wage growth, over the last two decades that is significantly above the economy wide average of 1.3 percent.^[139]

Structural excess capacity in a sector will usually create downward pressures on wages, and, as USTR notes,^[140] may be evidenced by wage suppression.  High wage growth, beyond the economy-wide average, is indicative of an absence of policies that sustain excessive capacity by suppressing wages.

Third, investment patterns in the sector indicate the absence of structural excess capacity.  Investment increased by approximately 12.0 percent per annum^[141] over the last two decades, as a result of high demand.  That said, investment has reduced by around 5.4 percent per annum since 2020,^[142] showing that investment responds to economic uncertainty and market conditions.  In addition, due to the modernisation of the Norwegian fishing fleet and increased efficiencies, the number of fishers and vessels have strongly declined in Norway over the last two decades.  As Norway notes above, cyclical and market-responsive investment is not consistent with a sector that is sustained by government intervention, untethered to market performance.

Fourth, as noted above, export volumes of both wild-caught seafood and aquaculture have also been relatively stable across the past decade, indicating a lack of excessive capacity in the sector.  If the sector had experienced strategic government intervention to create excessive capacity, the volume of production would have rapidly increased, but did not.

e. There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the seafood sector

As detailed above, the seafood sector in Norway does not have excessive capacity, untethered to market demand.  Consistent with this, Norway has not engaged in any acts, policies or practices that may result in excessive capacity in this sector.

In addition to the acts, general regulatory policies and practices outlined in Section 2.b above, there are additional taxation, environmental, labour and other regulations that govern aspects of the seafood sector specifically.  Rather than cause any structural excess capacity and production, these regulations serve to restrict production.

i.  Acts, policies and practices related to wild catch fisheries

Norway implements and enforces its TACs, and other laws governing wild catch fisheries, primarily via two laws: the Marine Resources Act^[143] and the Participation Act.[144]  The Marine Resources Act provides the basis for sustainable and ecosystem-based management of marine resources, including the setting of TACs, conservation measures, and enforcement mechanisms.  The Participation Act regulates access to fisheries through licensing requirements, ensuring that participation is limited to qualified operators.

These regulations are effectively enforced.  Norway maintains an extensive control system covering the entire value chain, involving the Directorate of Fisheries, sales organisations, the Coast Guard, and other agencies, supplemented by international control cooperation to ensure sustainable fishing.[145]  Vessels are required to send electronic catch and activity data within two hours of leaving the port, and prior to starting to fish.^[146]  Vessels are required to report catch on board, estimated time and position for the planned fishing activities, as well as target species.  Automated reporting of positioning data by the secure Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) is also compulsory.^[147]  All landings are weighed, and all catches recorded, to ensure that the TAC is not exceeded.  Importantly, these rules apply to all Norwegian vessels larger than 8 meters, including those that land in foreign ports.  However, the reporting scheme for vessels smaller than 11 meters is slightly simplified, but includes real-time data on location and catch before landing.

In addition to this extensive, and real-time data, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and the Coast Guard conduct inspections, both at-sea and on land.[148]  The inspections use automated surveillance systems and drones, to ensure that reported data on landed fish are accurate and check for other violations.  Data is shared across Norwegian agencies, including the Fisheries Monitoring Centre, the Directorate of Fisheries and the Coast Guard, and joint risk-assessments are conducted to ensure that the entire value chain is evaluated for potential breaches.[149]  By combining the data subject to electronic reporting, Norwegian authorities monitor activities at sea, both by foreign vessels operating in Norwegian waters and by the various Norwegian fishing fleet groups.

The rules governing the fisheries sector, the setting of TACs, and their strict enforcement, coupled with Norway’s generally high amount of general regulation discussed further above, create the opposite effect to excessive capacity.  The regulatory framework governing Norwegian fisheries is designed to limit supply, for environmental and sustainability reasons. 

ii. Acts, policies and practices related to aquaculture

Norwegian aquaculture production is also strictly regulated.  The aquaculture sector in Norway is regulated under the Aquaculture Act.^[150]  All aquaculture activity requires a license, and production without a license is prohibited by law.^[151]  Licenses are approved after evaluation under numerous laws, including the Pollution Act, the Food Safety Act, the Animal Welfare Act, the Port and Fairways Act, and the Water Resources Act.^[152]  Norway’s regulatory framework for aquaculture is in line with the EU’s comprehensive rules on disease prevention, animal welfare, hygiene and enforcement. 

In addition to the MAB, all aquaculture production facilities are also required to ensure that the fish are in good health, and there are no pollution and waste concerns.  In addition, the Aquaculture Operations Regulation sets out rules on a number of issues.^[153]  It also sets out penalties for breach. In addition to these regulations, aquaculture producers must also comply with the Regulations on Requirement for Technical Standards for Aquaculture Facilities for fish in Seawater, Lakes and Waterbodies.^[154]

These regulations are effectively enforced by the Norwegian Food Safety Authority and the Directorate of Fisheries, with producers being subject to inspection and a variety of sanctions for violations.[155]

With respect to taxation, the production of salmon, trout and rainbow trout in seawater is subject to an additional resource rent tax of 25 per cent.  As a result, including ordinary corporate income tax (22 percent), the total effective marginal tax is 47 percent.[156]  

Thus, as with wild-catch fisheries, the strict regulation of the Norwegian aquaculture sector, including the use of MAB limits, serves to restrict production capacity and supply in the sector, rather than artificially inflate it.

iii. Norway’s seafood sector does not receive state aid, and there are no state-owned or -controlled enterprises

The seafood sector in Norway (wild-catch and aquaculture) does not receive subsidies or other government support.  Nor are there any state-owned or -controlled enterprises in the seafood value chain in Norway. 

iv. Norway maintains high levels of labour protection for workers in this sector

Unlike seafood production in some parts of the world, the Norwegian workers in the seafood sector (like all workers in Norway) have high levels of worker protection.  There are special labour regulations that apply to the fishing and shipping industries, under the Ship Labour Act and the Ship Safety and Security Act, under which breaches attract criminal sanctions.  For activities within Norway’s jurisdiction, relevant Norwegian authorities conduct inspections to ensure that living and working conditions meet the requirements.  All seafarers working onboard Norwegian registered ships have the same rights as other workers in Norway.  The Norwegian Maritime Authority is responsible for inspecting living and working conditions onboard ships, and conduct periodic and risk-based inspections.

In total, the Government of Norway’s acts, policies and practices, serve as a check against structural excess capacity.  Its acts, policies, and practices impose high costs and limitations on supply.  Norway’s seafood sector operates in the global economy in accordance with global standards and are aligned with those imposed by the U.S. government.  As a result, there are no acts, policies, or practices in place with respect to the seafood industry that would impose burdens on U.S. commerce.

5. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sector for certain electronic equipment or machinery

Norway does not have structural excess capacity in its manufacturing of machinery and electrical products.  In Section 5.a below, Norway reviews key performance indicators to show the absence of any excessive capacity relating to these manufacturing activities;^[157] in Section 5.b below, Norway then explains that it does not engage in any acts, policies and practices relating to these manufacturing activities that would create or sustain structural excess capacity or otherwise burden U.S. commerce.

Before addressing these issues, Norway wishes to highlight important contextual information about its manufacturing sector as a whole.  In the 1970s, the value added by this sector represented more than 20 percent of Norwegian GDP.^[158]  Since the 1970s, however, the economic significance of the sector has gradually declined.  In the past decade, the value added by the sector has fluctuated between just 5 and 8 percent of GDP (which is 8-9 percent of mainland GDP[159]) and, in 2025, the share was in the middle of this range, at 6.8 percent of the GDP.^[160]  Further, Norway’s manufacturing sector has a very small share indeed of global manufacturing output – roughly 0.18 percent.^[161] 

Therefore, the Norwegian manufacturing sector, even by virtue of its small size alone, does not have the capacity to burden U.S. commerce, even if there were excessive capacity (which Norway shows below that there is not).

a. Key performance indicators show market-driven capacity utilisation and production levels in the manufacturing sub-sectors for machinery and electronic products

Zooming in to the manufacture of machinery and certain electrical equipment, the size, role, and evolution of the sector do not indicate structural excess capacity.

First, data shows that the machinery sector is responsive to traditional market demand conditions as demonstrated by cyclical variation in output.  Output in the machinery sector shows periods of both contraction and expansion, tracking market conditions.  In 2015-2016, the industry contracted, with output falling on average by approximately 16.5 percent per annum.^[162]  This was prompted by a sharp fall in global oil prices, which had significant spillover effects on Norwegian manufacturing of machinery because it is an important supplier to the Norwegian oil and gas sector.^[163] 

In contrast, in 2005-2008, the period prior to the financial crisis when market demand was high, the sector’s output expanded by around 15.8 percent per annum.^[164]  This cyclical variation shows that productive output responds to market demand.  If there were structural excess capacity, changes in output would be more muted or there could even be counter results (e.g., output increasing while demand is decreasing).  No such evidence exists with respect to the Norwegian machinery sector.

Second, a similar cyclical trend can be seen for investment in the machinery sector, which has also been responsive to market shifts and shows significant annual variation.  Prior to the financial crisis (2006–2008), during a period of increased demand, investment grew at an average rate of approximately 11.5 percent per annum, before contracting sharply by 22.6 percent in 2009 and 14.9 percent in 2010.^[165]  Following Covid-19 and the global response of significant government economic stimulation efforts, global inflation levels increased leading to higher interest rates and a resultant reduction in investments globally.  In response, by 2024, investments declined by 10.8 percent in the machinery manufacturing sector.^[166]  This pattern indicates that enterprises adjust investment in response to market signals rather than engaging in persistent capacity expansion sustained by government intervention.

The nature of investments also confirms that the sector has not experienced a surge in new productive capacity.  Although investment has increased during the last two decades by an average of 2.0 percent per annum,^[167]  the capital stock in the machinery industry has remained broadly constant over the same period, increasing by around 0.1 percent per annum.^[168]  This indicates that investment has primarily supported the maintenance and replacement of existing, rather than new, capital stock.  In contrast, structural excess capacity is typically associated with sustained increases in new capital stock, reflecting continued capacity expansion.

The electrical equipment sub-sector exhibits very similar traits to the machinery sector, which suggests that both sectors are responsive to market forces.  For instance, similar to the machinery sector, output in the electrical equipment sector also contracted between 2015–2016 by 6.1 percent on average, and expanded by 9.7 percent on average between 2005–2008.^[169]  The investment cycle in the electrical equipment sector is also volatile.  For instance, in 2021, investment expanded by 116.5 percent, only to contract by 51.8 percent in 2024, and by a further 21.6 percent in 2025.^[170]  These cyclical variations in investment are not consistent with structural excess capacity, where investment would not be expected to be strongly driven by business cycles and short-term conditions.  Rather, they suggest responsiveness to market forces.

Third, capacity utilisation rates for Norway’s manufacturing sector averages 79.4 percent^[171] over the last twenty years, a rate that falls squarely within the range typically observed in advanced economies and that is consistent with economically efficient utilisation levels.^[172]  Importantly, capacity utilisation rates exhibit cyclical variation rather than a persistent downward trend, which shows that capacity and capacity utilisation adjust in response to changes in market demand.  Looking at the most recent full calendar years (2024 and 2025), Norway’s capacity utilisation remains stable and broadly comparable to peer economies, suggesting that its manufacturing sector currently operates within normal ranges and does not exhibit signs of systemic distortion.  

Figure 1: Manufacturing Capacity Rates: Norway vs OECD

Source: OECD

Figure 1 compares Norway’s capacity utilisation with that of the OECD over the last two decades.  Overall, Norway’s capacity utilisation rate has been above the OECD average in most of the period, with a temporary downward deviation between 2015 and 2019.^[173]  Over the full period, Norway’s average utilisation rate was 79.4 percent, compared to 78.9 percent for the OECD.^[174]

In sum, Norway’s capacity utilisation is consistent with the typical range observed in advanced economies, at economically efficient levels, and exhibits normal cyclical adjustment. 

Table 1: Average Capacity Utilisation Rates

Source: OECD

Period	Norway	OECD
2025	78.0	77.9
2024	78.5	77.7
2020-2024	78.9	78.8
2015-2019	78.1	80.3
2010-2014	79.4	77.1
2005-2009	81.5	79.5

 

All the performance indicators demonstrate that the Norwegian manufacturing sub-sectors for machinery and electrical equipment do not bear the hallmarks of excessive capacity that is untethered to market demand.  To the contrary, the sector is responsive to market conditions, with cyclical trends of output and investment. 

 

b.     There are no acts, policies or practices that contribute to structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sub-sectors for machinery and electronic equipment

Norway does not maintain any sector-specific laws or regulations that govern the manufacture of machinery and electronic equipment.  Enterprises in these sectors operate within the comprehensive, horizontal legal framework that applies across all industries, including stringent rules on labour, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition, and state aid, as described in Section 2.b above.

Norway does not provide specific state-aid for the manufacture of machinery and electrical equipment.  However, some general state aid schemes are available for enterprises across the Norwegian economy, including for enterprises that manufacture machinery and electrical products.  But as discussed in Section 2.b.vii above, there are significant regulatory limitations to this aid that would prevent the development of any structural excess capacity, under EU state aid rules, which are implemented in Norway through the EEA.  

In conclusion, Norway has not engaged in unreasonable, discriminatory or burdensome acts, policies and practices to create structural excess capacity in the manufacturing of machinery and electrical products.

6.              Conclusion

In concluding these public comments, Norway has demonstrated that its economy operates on market-based principles, with outcomes driven by supply, demand, and commercial decision-making, and that the indicators typically associated with structural excess capacity are not present.  A comprehensive review of Norway’s regulatory framework, across labour, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition, and state aid, confirms the absence of any regulatory intervention to create or maintain structural excess capacity.  To the contrary, the Norwegian legal framework instead imposes comparatively high regulatory burdens on enterprises; requires them to operate on market terms; and constraints the State from intervening in ways that would distort the economy.

These dynamics are further demonstrated across all individual sectors where USTR has raised concerns.  No sector shows indications of structural excess capacity that could burden U.S. commerce.  To the contrary, in the oil and gas sector, Norway plays a strategically valuable role, to the benefit of the United States, by ensuring reliable and stable production aligned with global demand, through its rules-based, market-driven and transparent licensing system.  In the seafood sector, Norway’s producers respond to global demand, subject to regulatory constraints on production to address biological and environmental considerations.  These constraints limit production and prevent excessive productive capacity.  The Norwegian manufacturing sector makes up only 0.18 percent of global output, not an amount that could plausibly burden U.S. commerce, and in any event its machinery and electronic equipment sub-sectors are characterised by key performance indications consistent with operations that are responsive to market forces, without structural excess capacity. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] See Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, 91 Fed. Reg. 12886 (Dep’t of Commerce March 17, 2026) (“Initiation Notice”).

[2] A trade deficit indicates that Norway’s trade balance is negative, meaning that the value of its imports exceeds that of its exports.  Norway’s trade balance is calculated as the difference between total exports and total imports.  See Exhibit 1, tab “Tables”, for the underlying data and calculations.

[3] See “the Government Pension Fund”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/about-the-ministry/subordinateagencies/the-government-pension-fund-/id270410//.

[4] Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12887 .

[5] Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12887.

[6] Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12889.

[7] Statistics Norway, Table 09189: “Final expenditure and gross domestic product, by macroeconomic indicator and year,” series: “Gross domestic product, market values,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09189.  Exhibit 3, tab “Expenditure, GDP, GFCF” for calculated average.

[8] “Mainland GDP” is a standard concept used in Norwegian national accounts to measure economic activity excluding petroleum extraction and pipeline transport. It is commonly used to distinguish underlying domestic economic developments from those in the petroleum sector, which can be large and subject to different drivers than the rest of the economy.

[9] Statistics Norway, Table 09189: “Final expenditure and gross domestic product, by macroeconomic indicator and year,” series: “Gross domestic product, Mainland Norway,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09189.  Exhibit 3, tab “Expenditure, GDP, GFCF” for calculated average.

[10] Statistics Norway, Table 09189: “Final expenditure and gross domestic product, by macroeconomic indicator and year,” series: “Final consumption expenditure of households and NPISHs,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09189.  Exhibit 3, tab “Expenditure, GDP, GFCF” for calculated average.

[11] Statistics Norway, Table 09189: “Final expenditure and gross domestic product, by macroeconomic indicator and year,” series: “Mainland Norway (GFCF),” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09189.  Exhibit 3, tab “Expenditure, GDP, GFCF” for calculated average.

[12] Internationally comparable labour force participation rates are available from the OECD, “Labour force participation rate,” available at https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/labour-force-participation-rate.html.

[13] See “Changes in union density in the Nordic countries”, Nordic Economic Policy Review (2025), available here: https://pub.norden.org/nord2025-001/changes-in-union-density-in-the-nordic-countries.html.

[14] Norway has legal rules for minimum wages in nine sectors: construction, electricians, fish processing enterprises, freight transport by road, agriculture and horticulture, hospitality, tour bus transport, cleaning, and maritime construction. In other sectors, there are no minimum wages, instead wages are agreed individually between the employer and the employee, or in collective agreements.  See website of the Norwegian Labour Inspectorate, available here: https://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/en/pay-and-engagement-of-employees/pay-and-minimum-rates-of-pay/minimum-wage/.

[15] Exhibit 4, tab “Real wages” for data series and calculated average.

[16] Statistics Norway, 09174: “Wages and salaries, employment and productivity by year and industry,” series: “Value added at basic values per hour worked. Change from the previous year (per cent). Fixed prices,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09174.  Exhibit 4, tab “Productivity” for calculated average.

[17] Statistics Norway, 07371: “Key figures for non-financial limited companies, by year and industry (SIC2007),” series: “Operating profit margin (per cent),” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/07371.  Exhibit 4, tab “Profitability, accounting 2” for calculated average.

[18] Statistics Norway, 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry,” series: “Gross fixed capital formation. Annual change in volume,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.  Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation” for calculated average.

[19] Statistics Norway, 14709: “Consumer price index (2025=100) by month and year,” series: “Consumer Price Index”, available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/14709. Exhibit 3, tab “CPI, Inflation Rate” for calculated average.

[20] Empirical evidence from business tendency surveys and central bank data indicates that manufacturing capacity utilisation in advanced economies typically fluctuates within a range of approximately 75 to 85 percent over the business cycle. See OECD, Business Tendency Surveys (capacity utilisation in manufacturing) (https://stats.oecd.org); Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization (G.17 Statistical Release) (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17); and European Commission, Business and Consumer Surveys (https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-forecast-and-surveys/business-and-consumer-surveys_en). Exhibit 2, tab “Yearly Averages” for calculated averages.

[21] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12888.

[22] See list of ILO instruments ratified by Norway, available here: https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102785. 

[23] See the European Economic Agreement, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement.

[24] “Act relating to the working environment, working hours and employment protection, etc.” (“Working Environment Act”), available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-06-17-62.

[25] “Act relating to Holidays”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1988-04-29-21.

[26] See website of the Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority: https://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/en/.

[27] See website of the Norwegian Maritime Authority: https://www.sdir.no/en/.

[28] See Working Environment Act, Chapter 18, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-06-17-62; see also the website of the Norwegian Ocean Industry Authority, available here: https://www.havtil.no/en.

[29] See Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (Arbeidstilsynet), Annual Report 2025: Analysis of the Labour Inspection Authority’s Activities, available here:  https://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/globalassets/rapportar/arsrapport/arsrapport-2025/arbeidstilsynets-arsrapport-2025.pdf.  See also audit reports on labour compliance from the Norwegian Oceans Industry Authority, available here: https://www.havtil.no/en/supervision/audit-reports/.

[30] See “Trade Unions in Norway”, available here: https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trade-unions-norway’; and “Understanding trade unions in Norway”: https://www.oslo.kommune.no/english/welcome-to-oslo/work-business/understanding-trade-unions/.

[31] See sections 1-9.

[32] “Labour Dispute Act”, available here: https://www.arbeidsretten.no/en/the-labour-disputes-act. 

[33] “National Insurance Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1997-02-28-19; See information on Membership of the National Insurance Scheme, available here: https://www.nav.no/en/home/rules-and-regulations/membership-of-the-national-insurance-scheme. 

[34] See “Norway’s International Climte and Environmental Efforts”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/innsiktsartikler-klima-miljo/norges-internasjonale-klima-og-miljoinnsats/id2339820/.

[35] See EEA Agreemenet, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement; and EEA Agreement on Climate and Environment, available here: https://www-regjeringen-no.translate.goog/no/tema/klima-og-miljo/innsiktsartikler-klima-miljo/eos-avtalen-og-miljo1/id2339794/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=no&_x_tr_pto=wapp.

[36] See “Pollution Control Act”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/pollution-control-act/id171893/.  

[37] See “Forskrift om begrensning av forurensning” (“Pollution Regulation”), avaliable here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2004-06-01-931/.

[38] “Regulations on the recycling and treatment of waste”, avaliable at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2004-06-01-930.

[39] See “Product Control Act”, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/product-control-act/id172150/.

[40] See “Nature Diversity Act”, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/nature-diversity-act/id570549/.

[41] “Gene Technology Act”, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/gene-technology-act/id173031/.

[42] “Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Act”, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/greenhouse-gas-emission-trading-act/id172242/.

[43] See World Bank’s “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing Dashboard”, showing that Norway’s carbon price is USD 134, the fifth highest in the world (behind (1) Uruguay; (2) Sweden; (3) Liechtenstein; and (4) Switzerland), available here: https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/compliance/price.

[44] See website of the National Environment Agency, available here: https://www.environmentagency.no/norwegian-environment-agency/our-responsibilities/; and website of the County Governors, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bfd/organisation/tilknyttede-virksomheter/County-Governors/id426157/.

[45] See NEA, “Environmental Crime – Reports and Other Enforcement Measures”, available at: https://www.miljodirektoratet.no/ansvarsomrader/tilsyn-naturoppsyn/tiltak-og-sanksjoner-mot-miljokriminalitet/.

[46] See NEA, “Environmental Crime – Reports and Other Enforcement Measures”, available at: https://www.miljodirektoratet.no/ansvarsomrader/tilsyn-naturoppsyn/tiltak-og-sanksjoner-mot-miljokriminalitet/.

[47] Norwegian Environment Agency, “Supervision of environmental regulations”, available here: https://www.miljodirektoratet.no/ansvarsomrader/tilsyn-naturoppsyn/myndighetsomrader/.

[48] See NEA, “Environmental Crime – Reports and Other Enforcement Measures”, available at: https://www.miljodirektoratet.no/ansvarsomrader/tilsyn-naturoppsyn/tiltak-og-sanksjoner-mot-miljokriminalitet/.

[49] See “Lov om skatt av formue og inntekt” (“the Norwegian Tax Act”), available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1999-03-26-14?q=skattelov.

[50] See “Lov om merverdiavgift” (“Value Added Tax Act”), available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2009-06-19-58. 

 

[52] “The EEA Competition Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2004-03-05-11?q=E%C3%98S-konkurranseloven.

[53] See website of the Norwegian Competition Authority, available here: https://konkurransetilsynet.no/norwegian-competition-authority/?lang=en.

[54] See “EEA state aid rules”, website of the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Surveillance Authority, the body that enforces European Economic Area (“EEA”) internal market rules for the non-EU EEA countries, i.e., Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, available here: https://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid.

[55] See government White paper on the State’s direct ownership of companies (“White Paper on state ownership”), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/documents/meld.-st.-6-20222023/id2937164/; and “OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2025: Norway”, available here: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-corporate-governance-factbook-2025_4d9f40fc-en/norway_c0189304-en.html.

[56] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf

[57] See “Limited Liability Companies Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1997-06-13-44/.

[58] See EEA Agreemenet, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement. 

[59] See White Paper on state ownership, Chapter 9: Legal and other important framework conditions for the State’s exercise of ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf.

[60] See “Act relating to enterprises’ tranparency and work on fundamental human rights and decent working conditions” (“Transparecy Act”), available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2021-06-18-99.

[61] See EU Corporate sustainability reporting requirements, available here: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en.

[62] See “EEA state aid rules”, website of the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Surveillance Authority, the body that enforces European Economic Area (“EEA”) internal market rules for the non-EU EEA countries, i.e., Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, available here: https://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid.

[63] See EEA Agreement, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement. 

[64] See “EEA Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1992-11-27-109.

[65] “State Aid Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2022-03-04-7.

[66] See General Block Exemption Regulation (“GBER”), available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/general-block-exemption-regulation.html; and EFTA Surveillance Authority on GBER, available here: https://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/gber-information-sheets?country=NO&year=2016. 

[67] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12888 and 12889.

[68] See latest Treasury Report to Congress, Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, January 2026, available here: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/macroeconomic-and-foreign-exchange-policies-of-major-trading-partners-of-the-united-states. 

[69] Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).

[70] Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016).

[71] Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016), Sec. 701.

[72] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress: Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, January 2026, available here: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/January-2026-FX-Report.pdf.

[73] U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress: Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, January 2026, available here: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/January-2026-FX-Report.pdf

[74] See IMF latest Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2024), available here: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/sprolls/annual-report-on-exchange-arrangements-and-exchange-restrictions.

[75] Exhibit 1, tab “Tables”.

[76] Exhibit 1, tab “Tables”.

[77] See Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Report to the Storting No. 1 (2025–2026): National Budget 2026 (Meld. St. 1 (2025–2026)), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/6b87b3bf3f2d43cc813e09630547cc9c/no/pdfs/stm202520260001000dddpdfs.pdf.

[78] As defined above, the GPFG is the Government Pension Fund Global; See Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Report to the Storting No. 22 (2024–2025): The Government Pension Fund 2025 (Meld. St. 22 (2024–2025)), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/185dca55ef5649d1bc08db2699bb861f/no/pdfs/stm202420250022000dddpdfs.pdf; see also “The Government Pension Fund”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/about-the-ministry/subordinateagencies/the-government-pension-fund-/id270410//.

[79] See Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Report to the Storting No. 22 (2024–2025): The Government Pension Fund 2025 (Meld. St. 22 (2024–2025)), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/185dca55ef5649d1bc08db2699bb861f/no/pdfs/stm202420250022000dddpdfs.pdf.

[80] See Management mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global (2023), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/9d68c55c272c41e99f0bf45d24397d8c/2023.02.27_gfpg_management_mandate.pdf; see also Report to the Storting (Parliament) No. 7 (2025–2026), The Government Pension Fund 2026, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/a31ecbab848a45f69a9fa03a56411aa1/no/pdfs/stm202520260007000dddpdfs.pdf.

[81] See IMF, “Dutch Disease: Wealth Managed Unwisely”, available at: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/series/back-to-basics/dutch-disease; and World Bank Group, “Dealing with Dutch Disease”, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/cbb07431-a7c9-5506-b04f-fc4ffe9c6eb4.

[82] Norway does not produce refined petroleum products.

[83] See factsheet on Norwegian petroleum activities, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/.

[84] See factsheet on Norwegian petroleum activities, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/.

[85] See Statistical Review of World Energy (2025), available here: https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review.

[86] See International Energy Agency (“IEA”), World Energy Outlook 2024, available here: https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024.

[87] A third of the world’s energy consumption growth in the last decade is met by natural gas; see Statistical Review of World Energy, available here: https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review?ut; Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of Oil and Gas, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/

[88] See International Energy Agency (“IEA”), World Energy Outlook 2024, available here: https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024.

[89] See “Short-Term Energy Outlook”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, April 7, 2026, available here: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php. 

[90] See factsheet on “The Petroleum Act and the Licensing System”, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/the-petroleum-act-and-the-licensing-system/#production-licences.

[91] See “Petroleum Act”, sections 1-1, 2-1, and 3-1, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72.

[92] See Petroleum Act, sections  3-5, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72; see also Norwegian Offshore Directorate, “Requirements for new players on the Norwegian Continental Shelf”, available here: https://www.sodir.no/en/facts/production-licences/pre-qualification/requirements-for-new-players-on-the-norwegian-continental-shelf/. 

[93] See Petroleum Act, sections 3-5, available here: available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72;  Regulations to Petroleum Act (“Petroleum Regulations”), section 10, available here: https://www.sodir.no/en/regulations/regulations/petroleum-activities/#Section-7.  Section 10 sets out that production licenses are granted on the basis of technical competence, financial capacity, and the plan for exploration and production.

[94] See Petroleum Act, sections 3-2, available here: available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72. 

[95] See Ministry of Energy, Licensing Rounds (2026), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/energy/oil-and-gas/licensing-rounds/id2001295/.

[96] See Ministry of Energy, Licensing Rounds (2026), available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/energy/oil-and-gas/licensing-rounds/id2001295/.

[97] See Petroleum Act, section 4-10, available here: available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72; Petroleum Regulations, sections 39-42, available here: https://www.sodir.no/en/regulations/regulations/petroleum-activities/#Section-7.

[98] See Petroleum Act, Chapter 5, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72. 

[99] Equinor Energy AS is a subsidiary of Equinor ASA, where the Norwegian State owns 67 of the outstanding shares.

[100] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf

[101] See “Limited Liability Companies Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1997-06-13-44/.

[102] See EEA Agreemenet, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement. 

[103] See White Paper on state ownership, Chapter 9: Legal and other important framework conditions for the State’s exercise of ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf.

[104] See “Limited Liability Companies Act”, sections 6-12, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1997-06-13-44.

[105] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf.  See Chapter 9.4 (outlining the prohibition under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement), Chapter 9.5.3 (outlining the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance on State-Owned Enterprises), and Chapter 12.8 (regarding “Distinguishing between the State’s different roles and fair competition).

[106] See EEA Agreemenet, available here: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement

[107] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf. See pp. 39 and 58.

[108] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf.  See p. 42.

[109] See White Paper on state ownership, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf.  See p. 58.

[110] See Petroleum Act, sections 11-1, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72.

[111] Petoro Annual Report 2024, p. 8, available here: https://aarsrapport.petoro.no/%C3%85rsrapport-sider/2024/pdf/PetoroAnnual_report_2024.pdf

[112] See Petroleum Act, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1996-11-29-72. 

[113] Statistics Norway, Table 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry” series: “Gross fixed capital formation. Annual change in volume” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.   

[114] Statistics Norway, Table 08677: “Mining and quarrying, incl. petroleum and gas. Key figures for non-financial limited companies, by year and industry (SIC2007)” series: “Return on Equity (per cent),” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/08677.  Exhibit 4, tab “Profitability, accounting 1” for average calculations.

[115] Statistics Norway, Table 08677: “Mining and quarrying, incl. petroleum and gas. Key figures for non-financial limited companies, by year and industry (SIC2007)” series: “Extraction of oil and natural gas,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/08677.

[116] See Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of Oil and Gas, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/.

[117] See Norwegian Petroleum, Production Forecasts, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/production-. forecasts/#:~:text=Historical%20and%20expected%20production%20in,the%20long%20term%20is%20uncertain.

[118] See “Equinor has no spare oil and gas capacity, CEO Says” (Reuters, March 12, 2026), available here: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/equinor-has-no-spare-oil-gas-capacity-ceo-says-2026-03-12/.

[119] Norwegian Petroleum, The Petroleum Tax System, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/economy/petroleum-tax/.

[120] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12889.

[121] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12889.

[122] Norwegian Seafood Council, Yearly exports from Norway (yearly export volumes and values), available here: https://en.seafood.no/market-insight/norwegian-trade/year/.

[123] OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034, Section 7.3.1., available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/07/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook-2025-2034_3eb15914/full-report/fish-and-other-aquatic-products_ed13346f.html.

[124] In 2025, 53.6 percent of Norway’s seafood exports was to the European Union, where Denmark, Poland, and the Netherlands were some of the largest export markets (in terms of both value and volume).  8.7 percent of Norway’s seafood exports were to the United States in 2025; Exhibit 5.

[125] Norwegian Seafood Council, 2025 was the best year ever for Norwegian seafood exports in value, January 6, 2026, available here: https://en.seafood.no/news-and-media/news-archive/price-growth-for-wild-fish-and-increased-salmon-volume-resulted-in-record-value-for-norwegian-seafood-exports-in-2025- /.

[126] See, for example, “Report: Employment in EU Fish Processing Industry based on Norwegian Seafood Export”, (SINTEF, 2014), available here: https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/upload/fiskeri_og_havbruk/internasjonalt_radgivning/sintef-rapport-14-employment-in-eu-fish-processing_industri-based-on-norwegian-seafood-export.pdf.

[127] See “The economic contributions of U.S. seafood imports – a value chain perspective”, available here: https://aboutseafood.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/S418-Ferreiraa-et-al.pdf.

[128] “Marine Resources Act”, Section 11, available at https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2008-06-06-37/KAPITTEL_3#KAPITTEL_3

[129] The U.S. and Norway are Member Countries of the ICES.  Advice from ICES is used to determine TAC for most of the fish stocks that Norway shares with other countries, and advice from the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research is used for purely national stocks.  See also: Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Norwegian Fisheries Management, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fkd/brosjyrer-og-veiledninger/folder.pdf.

[130] Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, “Norwegian Fisheries Management”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fkd/brosjyrer-og-veiledninger/folder.pdf

[131] Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, “Norwegian Fisheries Management”, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fkd/brosjyrer-og-veiledninger/folder.pdf, p. 7.

[132] Directorate of Fisheries, “Economic and Biological Key Figures from the Norwegian Fisheries 2025”, p. 8, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/english/Fisheries/Statistics/_/attachment/inline/1c23c1fd-0ba8-4d31-a8ec-467004e2f042:19627ccb457f8adf627826393b7d59852c006b41/N%C3%B8kkeltallsrapport_2025_engelsk.pdf

[133] See Directorate of Fisheries, Report to the Storting on Norway’s Fisheries Agreements for 2020 and fishing under the agreements in 2018 and 2019, p. 91, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/6bc67ca7506a4c32be66eb4799f35585/nn-no/pdfs/stm201920200013000dddpdfs.pdf; Directorate of Fisheries, Report to the Storting on Norway’s Fisheries Agreements for 2022 and fishing under the agreements in 2020 and 2021, p. 94, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/4d0c01007c1d4867b1fcb71ee3632735/nn-no/pdfs/stm202120220008000dddpdfs.pdf; Directorate of Fisheries, Report to the Storting on Norway’s Fisheries Agreements for 2024 and fishing under the agreements in 2022 and 2023, p. 97, available here:  https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/44f4a18fd9a0455c962190fcccc37647/nn-no/pdfs/stm202320240010000dddpdfs.pdf; Directorate of Fisheries, Report to the Storting on Norway’s Fisheries Agreements for 2026 and fishing under the agreements in 2024 and 2025, p. 100, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/4cf5ae2fbedd4683b3a5a7e040cff29b/nn-no/pdfs/stm202520260005000dddpdfs.pdf.

[134] “Aquaculture Act”, Section 7, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-06-17-79.

[135] “Aquaculture Act”, Section 5, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-06-17-79; See also, “Production Area Regulations”, Section 2, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2017-01-16-61?q=produksjonsomr%C3%A5deforskriften.

[136] “Regulations regarding access to an approved site”, Section 8-1, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2022-11-07-1929?q=laksetildelingsforskriften.

[137] Based on data available with the Government of Norway; Exhibit 6.

[138] Directorate of Fisheries, “Catch by Species”, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/statistikk-tall-og-analyse/data-og-statistikk-om-yrkesfiske/fangst/fangst-fordelt-pa-art-offisiell-statistikk.

[139] Exhibit 4, tab “Real wages” for data series and average calculations.

[140] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12888.

[141] Statistics Norway, Table 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry” series: “Gross fixed capital formation. Annual change in volume”, available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.  Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation” for average calculations.

[142] Statistics Norway, Table 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry” series: “Gross fixed capital formation. Annual change in volume”, available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.  Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation” for average calculations.

[143] Marine Resources Act, 2009, available at https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2008-06-06-37/KAPITTEL_3#KAPITTEL_3

[144] “Participation Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1999-03-26-15.

[145] For example, information on number of inspections and enforcement actions are reported by the Norwegian Coast Guard.  See Norwegian Coast Guard, Annual Report 2025, available here: https://www.forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/organisasjon/sjoforsvaret/kystvakten/om-kv/KV-aarsrapport2025.pdf/_/attachment/inline/e94419ae-214b-44dd-af9b-6c567a86ff24:7a7bdfcaf7a542c1c2852c857a9ce0503e281f25/KV-aarsrapport2025.pdf.

[146] Regulations on the implementation of fishing, trapping and harvesting of wild marine resources (“Harvesting Regulations”), available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2021-12-23-3910; Regulations on position reporting and electronic reporting for Norwegian fishing and trapping vessels, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2009-12-21-1743.  

[147] See Directorate of Fisheries, Electronic reporting (ERS) and Position Reporting (VMS) in Norwegian Fisheries, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/english/fisheries/reporting-systems-and-innovation/electronic-reporting-ers-and-position-reporting-vms-in-norwegian-fisheries.; see also Regulations on satellite-based monitoring of foreign fishing vessel activity in Norway's internal waters, territorial sea and economic zone, the fishing zone at Jan Mayen and the fishing protection zone at Svalbard, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/1999-12-16-1342.

[148] Directorate of Fisheries, Control and Enforcement, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/english/fisheries/control-and-enforcement.

[149] See Directorate of Fisheries, Fisheries Monitoring Centre (FMC Norway), available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/english/fisheries/fisheries-monitoring-centre-fmc-norway.

[150] “Aquaculture Act”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-06-17-79.

[151] See Aquaculture Act, Section 4, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-06-17-79.

[152] See Aquaculture Act, Section 6, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005-06-17-79.

[153] See “Aquaculture Operation Regulations”, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2008-06-17-822?q=akvakulturdriftsforskrift.  These include record keeping, hygiene and infection prevention, the use and emission of medications and chemicals, slaughtering and handling of mortalities, termination of operations, fishing- and approach limitations, water quality and supervision, biomass density, output of fish, feeding, handling and care of fish, predators, duties to prevent spawning and escapes, notification of authorities in case of escapes, rules on recatch in case of escapes, further duties for production of breeder-fish, environmental supervision of the location, supervision of prioritized substances and water-regional specific substances, hydrographical measurements, measures for unacceptable seabed impact and other environmental impact, record keeping, reporting, noise- scent and light impact, maximum allowed number of fish, common MAB- limitations between production areas, health supervision, breeding and reproduction, etc.

[154] Regulations on Requirement for Technical Standards for Aquaculture Facilities for fish in Seawater, Lakes and Waterbodies, available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2022-08-22-1484?q=nytek.  In addition to these key regulations, Norway implements the European Union Animal Health Law, 2016, which sets out requirements for disease prevention and biosecurity measures.  See Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on Transmissible Animal Diseases, available here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj/eng

[155] See Directorate of Fisheries, Annual Report 2025, pp. 59, 81, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/om-oss/aarsrapportar/_/attachment/inline/c552cf9e-a589-4835-a11c-c25451c38ba8:6a434e6e877a3164e0efdadedf2fb82cdef0b977/fdir-aarsrapport-2025.pdf; Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Annual Report 2025, p. 38, available here: https://mattilsynet-xp7prod.enonic.cloud/_/attachment/inline/d4850d0f-34eb-4bab-97ae-db31e360b8ec:d9a6397f24f6b44367ec722338e0476c4f52126a/Mattilsynets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202025_med%20vedlegg.pdf.

[156] Directorate of Fisheries, Resource Rent Tax on Aquaculture, available here: https://www.fiskeridir.no/english/aquaculture/resource-rent-tax-on-aquaculture.

[157] Where sub-sector specific data is available for machinery and other equipment n.e.c, and certain electrical equipment, Norway uses this data.  Otherwise, Norway uses data for the manufacturing sector more broadly.  In particular, Norway does not maintain capacity utilisation data specific to the manufacture of electronic equipment or machinery, so uses capacity utilisation data across the whole Norwegian manufacturing sector.

[158] Value added refers to the total sales value of output produced minus the cost of inputs.  When expressed as a percentage of GDP, this term refers to the total income earned in the period referred to

[159] “Mainland GDP” is a standard concept used in Norwegian national accounts to measure economic activity excluding petroleum extraction and pipeline transport. It is commonly used to distinguish underlying domestic economic developments from those in the petroleum sector, which can be large and subject to different drivers than the rest of the economy.

[160] See World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (current US$), “Norway”, available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=NO.

[161] See World Bank, Manufacturing, value added (current US$), “Norway”, available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS?locations=NO.

[162] Statistics Norway, Table 09170: “Production account and income generation, by industry, year and contents” series: “Output at basic values. Constant 2023 price (NOK million)”, and “Output at basic values. Annual change in volume (per cent),” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09170.  Exhibit 4, tab “Output” for average changes.

[163] Statistics Norway, Statistical Analyses 148: Norwegian Manufacturing in 2015, (July 4, 2016), available at https://www.ssb.no/en/energi-og-industri/artikler-og-publikasjoner/norwegian-manufacturing-in-2015

[164] Statistics Norway, Table 09170: “Production account and income generation, by industry, year and contents” series: “Output at basic values. Constant 2023 price (NOK million)”, and “Output at basic values. Annual change in volume (per cent),” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09170.  Exhibit 4, tab “Output” for average changes.

[165] Statistics Norway, 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry,” series: “Gross fixed capital formation. Annual change in volume”.  Available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181;  Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation” for calculated averages.

[166] Statistics Norway, 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry,” series: “Machinery and other equipment n.e.c,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181. 

[167] Statistics Norway, 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry,” series: “Machinery and other equipment n.e.c,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.  Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation” for calculated averages.

[168] Statistics Norway, 09181: “Gross fixed capital formation and capital stocks, by year and industry,” series: “Machinery and other equipment n.e.c,” available at https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/09181.  Exhibit 4, tab “Capital Stock” for calculated averages.

[169] Exhibit 4, tab “Output” for average calculations.

[170] Exhibit 4, tab “Gross fixed capital formation”.

[171] OECD, Business Tendency Surveys, available here: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/?lc=en; Exhibit 2, tab “Yearly Averages”.

[172] OECD, Business Tendency Surveys, available here: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/?lc=en; Exhibit 2, tab “Yearly Averages”.

[173] As explained above, the global fall in oil prices in 2015 caused a contraction in the Norwegian manufacturing sector because it is an important supplier to the Norwegian oil and gas sector. This explains why capacity utilisation was below the OECD average in the period 2015 to 2019.  Also, Norway’s manufacturing sector is, generally, smaller than the OECD average and also involves fewer manufacturing activities.  Thus, its response to market forces will never be exactly the same as the OECD average. 

[174] Empirical evidence from business tendency surveys and central bank data indicates that manufacturing capacity utilisation in advanced economies typically fluctuates within a range of approximately 75 to 85 percent over the business cycle. See OECD, Business Tendency Surveys (capacity utilisation in manufacturing) (https://stats.oecd.org); Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization (G.17 Statistical Release) (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17); and European Commission, Business and Consumer Surveys (https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-forecast-and-surveys/business-and-consumer-surveys_en).

The Government of Norway’s Post-Hearing Rebuttal Comments in the Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Productions in Manufacturing Sectors

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Norway (“Norway”), we hereby submit these post-hearing rebuttal comments in the investigation initiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) into the acts, policies, and practices of certain economies relating to structural excess capacity and productions in certain manufacturing sectors (“this Investigation”). This Investigation was announced on March 12, 2026, pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[1]

Pursuant to the notice published on the USTR comments portal in this investigation, the deadline for post-hearing rebuttal comments is May 22, 2026.  Thus, this submission is timely filed.

***

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction. 4
2. Structural excess capacity is characterised by distortive government action. 5
3. Norway’s overall economic and policy framework does not contribute to structural excess capacity. 8

(a)         Norway does not engage in acts, policies or practices designed to create or sustain excess capacity untethered from market demand. 8

(i)          Key performance indicators show that Norway’s economy does not exhibit structural excess capacity. 9

(ii)        Norway’s acts, policies and practices do not create or sustain structural excess capacity. 10

(b)         Norway has not engaged in acts, policies or practices to undervalue its domestic currency 14

4. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector. 16
5. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the seafood sector. 19
6. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sector for certain machinery and electronic goods. 22
7. Conclusion. 23

1. Introduction

Norway recalls its long-standing and close relationship with the United States, which is grounded in common values, and a joint commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, and the development of open economies on the basis of market principles.  As Norway outlined in the Government of Norway’s Reply to the Request for Comments dated April 15, 2026 (“Comments”),[2] Norway is committed to a cooperative approach to addressing shared concerns, including those relating to structural excess capacity, and to working with like-minded partners in support of open and rules-based international trade.

Norway submits the following post-hearing comments in addition to the Comments previously submitted, to address comments by other participants and statements at the hearings held on May 5 to May 8, 2026.  In general, these comments and statements – including those submitted by U.S. industry – overwhelmingly support Norway’s positions.  In particular, it is noteworthy that U.S. industry has requested that both energy products (including oil and gas) and seafood be excluded from the scope of any actions taken pursuant to this investigation, as neither sector exhibits structural excess capacity, and any import restrictions would harm, rather than protect, the U.S. businesses, workers, and consumers.[3]

In this submission, Norway first addresses the definition for the concept of structural excess capacity.  Second, Norway reiterates that its economy as a whole does not exhibit structural excess capacity, i.e., there is no production untethered from market demand, and no government intervention that seeks to create or sustain such production.  Third, Norway addresses the oil and gas sector, highlighting comments that reiterate the importance of Norway’s stable and reliable supply, especially in a time of crisis.  Fourth, Norway addresses the seafood sector, addressing comments that echo Norway’s own by explaining that the seafood sector does not lend itself to structural excess capacity given the biological and environmental limits placed on production; and, that imports play a crucial role in the U.S. processing sector.  Fifth, Norway addresses manufacturing of certain machinery and electronics, addressing comments that highlight the importance of distinguishing between market-driven economies and others, and the importance of appropriately calibrating any action taken in this sector.

2. Structural excess capacity is characterised by distortive government action

Norway, along with many other commenters, has emphasised the importance of clarifying exactly what constitutes “structural excess capacity”.  In Norway’s view, structural excess capacity results from government intervention to create and sustain excess production capacity that is untethered from market demand and that does not follow market cycles over time.  It occurs when businesses can make decisions leading to sustained or increased production capacity or production that would, but for the government’s intervention, not otherwise be feasible when based on market demand alone.  In other words, where government action insulates producers from market forces.

It is also important to clarify what is not structural excess capacity.  In that regard, Norway agrees with several commenters that structural excess capacity is not signalled when an industry operates at less than full capacity.[4]  Indeed, in well-functioning markets, some degree of spare capacity is normal and efficient.  As one U.S. commenter puts it, spare capacity is “typical, ubiquitous, and almost inevitable in any large, modern market economy”.[5]  Spare capacity reflects a producer’s need to retain the flexibility to compete for demand; and it is a natural consequence of the ups and downs of the economic cycle.  In a market economy, where there is no structural excess capacity, factors like investment, production and production capacity adapt to economic signals in the marketplace.  As a commenter aptly observed, if the existence of spare capacity is confused with structural excess capacity, the reasoning becomes circular: “[spare] capacity exists, therefore it is structural, therefore it is distortive”.[6]

Norway also observes some inconsistencies in how USTR relies on excess capacity as an economic indicator.  On the one hand, the Initiation Notice refers to global capacity utilisation rates of between 75.0 to 75.9 percent as an “indication” that “underlying global supply exceeds underlying global demand”, i.e., as an indication of structural excess capacity. [7]  Under USTR’s theory, the lower the capacity utilisation rate, the greater the evidence of structural excess capacity.  For example, USTR raises concerns that Norway’s capacity utilisation rate of 77.7 percent in 2025 is lower than in previous years.[8]  On the other hand, USTR cites the fact that capacity utilisation rates in the U.S. “declined to 75.2 percent in November 2024” as an indication that the U.S. industry is unfairly suffering harm.[9]  USTR thus seems to use the same economic indicator to reach different conclusions, depending on the subject of its analysis. 

In assessing the significance of any particular capacity utilisation rate, Norway suggests a careful analysis, taking into account, among others, long-term capacity utilisation trends, related economic factors, and the regulatory framework.  It will likely also be important to place these considerations into the broader context of developments in the global economy

Structural excess capacity should also not be confused with a trade surplus and exports in a particular sector.[10]  A trade surplus and exports are normal features of a market economy that are explained by comparative advantage and that reflect the operation of market forces.  They are not, therefore, inherently suspicious signs that a government is distorting trade to insulate its producers from market forces. 

A market economy country will tend to have a trade surplus in a sector when it has a comparative advantage in that sector.  This is especially so when that comparative advantage stems from natural endowments.  In that case, global demand must be satisfied by those countries that enjoy the natural endowments in question.  This is Norway’s case with respect to oil and gas, and seafood.  In this context, exports reflect the natural comparative advantages, they contribute to stable global supply of the resource-constrained product, and they serve as essential inputs for value-add downstream industries in other countries, including the United States.

In sum, as one commenter notes, “a credible finding [of structural excess capacity] must therefore rest on evidence of non-commercial, trade-distorting support that sustains capacity beyond plausible commercial justification”.[11]  As many commenters concur, a finding of structural excess capacity hinges on establishing two necessary elements: (1) production capacity and utilisation that are untethered to market conditions; and (2) government intervention in the economy that creates or maintains production capacity and utilisation at artificial levels.[12]  In Norway’s view, this careful approach serves the overall purpose of USTR’s investigation, which is to accurately identify and address genuinely distortive State intervention in the economy.

3. Norway’s overall economic and policy framework does not contribute to structural excess capacity

(a) Norway does not engage in acts, policies or practices designed to create or sustain excess capacity untethered from market demand 

In its Comments, Norway explained that its overall economic and policy framework does not contribute to structural excess capacity.  Norway demonstrates that (1) its economy as a whole does not exhibit production capacity and utilisation levels that are untethered from market conditions; and (2) there is no government intervention in the economy that attempts to create or maintain production capacity and utilisation at artificial levels.

(i) Key performance indicators show that Norway’s economy does not exhibit structural excess capacity

Norway has demonstrated, through key performance indicators, that production capacity and utilisation levels across the economy are responsive to market forces.[13]  These indicators show an economy that is driven by, and not insulated from, market fundamentals: stable and balanced economic growth and investment that is responsive to domestic and global demand; sustained high levels of employment with no evidence of wage suppression; strong and consistent profitability; and investment in productive assets that is responsive to market conditions.[14]  Inflation in Norway remains stable and well-anchored over time (whereas persistent oversupply would place downward pressure on prices), and overall capacity utilisation levels are within normal ranges observed in advanced economies and fluctuate in line with economic cycles.[15]  

Norway’s written comments demonstrated that Norway’s capacity utilisation is consistent with the typical range observed in advanced economies, at economically efficient levels, and exhibits normal cyclical adjustment.[16]  Indeed, Over the last 20 years, Norway’s capacity utilisation rates have averaged approximately 79.4 percent, whereas rates in the last five years have been 79.2 percent, which is very consistent with the longer-term average.[17]   

(ii) Norway’s acts, policies and practices do not create or sustain structural excess capacity

Norway has provided a comprehensive review of its regulatory framework, i.e., its “acts, policies and practices”.[18]  Consistent with the picture reflected in the economic indicators, this review shows no indication of distortive government intervention aimed at promoting production beyond market demand.  In sum, Norway maintains a robust regulatory framework, applicable across the whole economy, including in relation to labour, environmental protection, social security, taxation, competition and corporate governance.  Norway’s system of State aid is tightly constrained under the Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA Agreement”). Enterprises in which Norway holds an ownership stake, and which compete commercially, are required by law to operate on commercial terms.  Norway’s acts, policies and practices relating to its ownership of stakes in commercial enterprises do not provide a competitive advantage to these companies.

Norway’s legal and policy framework adheres to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (“OECD SOE Guidelines”).[19]  This legal and policy framework governs both how Norway invests in commercial enterprises and the governance and conduct of those enterprises themselves, whether they are wholly or partially owned.  These OECD SOE Guidelines, which were prepared and have been updated with input from the United States, demonstrate that the OECD considers that the partial or full ownership by a State of a commercial enterprise does not necessarily distort the market. 

Norway adheres to the OECD SOE Guidelines.  This requires Norway to separate its ownership role from its other functions (e.g., regulatory) and to ensure that commercial enterprises in which Norway holds an ownership stake operate on market terms, without undue competitive advantage or disadvantage, as set out in Norway’s original written Comments.[20] 

Three elements of Norway’s legal and policy framework bear particular emphasis.

First, the framework requires arm’s length governance, i.e., a strict division between the State’s public functions and its ownership role.[21]  This applies to wholly State-owned (full State ownership) and State-invested enterprises (partial State ownership).  For the former, operational decisions remain legally attributed to the company’s board and management, which are independent of the State.[22]  For the latter, the State exercises its rights as one shareholder among others, subject to the same ordinary company-law framework as the other shareholders.  Norway’s approach reflects the OECD SOE Guidelines, which provide that “the state should allow SOEs full operational autonomy” and “refrain from intervening in the management of SOEs”.[23]

Second, State aid rules (including EU rules applicable through the EEA Agreement) also apply to Norway’s governance of companies in which it holds an investment, without exception.[24]  These rules establish a general prohibition on State aid that distorts the condition of competition and affects trade within the EEA, including through grants, tax advantages, preferential financing terms (debt and equity), guarantees, debt relief, and the provision of goods or services at below market prices.[25]  Any such State aid is prohibited unless it falls within a narrow, pre-defined exception under EU/EEA law and complies with detailed conditions.[26]    

These rules discipline the provision of State aid by the Government of Norway both to companies in which it holds an investment, as well as by companies in which it holds an investment.  In other words, the Government of Norway is strictly limited in the aid it can provide to these companies themselves, and it is strictly limited in using these companies as a vehicle to provide aid to other companies.  The State aid rules are also enforced by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (“ESA”),[27] which, therefore, means that Norway’s governance of companies in which it holds an investment is subject to independent supra-national scrutiny to establish if Norway confers competitive advantages on these companies, or if these companies provide advantages to other companies.    

Again, Norway’s legal framework on State aid is consistent with the OECD SOE Guidelines, which provide that “SOEs’ economic activities should not benefit from or provide any direct or indirect financial support, that confers an advantage over private competitors”.[28]

Third, State-owned and State-invested enterprises that compete commercially are subject to Norwegian competition law, including competition law stemming from EU law, applicable in Norway through the EEA Agreement.[29]  These rules prohibit anti-competitive collusion and abuses of dominant positions.  Norway’s ownership policy explicitly provides that “State ownership shall not give companies with a State ownership interest undue competitive advantages or disadvantages compared to companies without a state ownership interest”.[30]

Competition rules are strictly enforced at the national level by the Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet), an independent administrative authority; and, at the supra-national level by the ESA, which is independent of the Norwegian government.[31]  Norway’s legal framework again reflects the OECD SOE Guidelines, which provide that “the state should not exempt SOEs, when engaging in economic activities, from the application and enforcement of laws, regulations and market-based mechanisms.[32]

The OECD has confirmed that, in practice, Norway’s legal and policy framework, and governance practices, regarding its ownership in commercial enterprises are “well-aligned with key OECD best practices aimed at ensuring a level playing field with private firms”.[33]  The OECD regularly monitors countries using “Product Market Regulation” (“PMR”) indicators, which “measure[] the distortions to competition that can be introduced by the barriers to entry and expansion faced by firms across the economy, as well as by the involvement of the state in the economy”.[34]  Norway is ranked “among the best performers” globally based on PMR indicators, whereas the United States “performs worse than the average OECD economy”.[35]

There is, therefore, strong evidence on the record confirming Norway’s position that its acts, policies and practices regarding its ownership in commercial enterprises does not distort markets or otherwise create or sustain structural excess capacity.  Moreover, there is no evidence to the contrary. 

More broadly, Norway’s regulatory framework establishes standards that place costs on companies, and does not foster conditions where companies are encouraged to develop or maintain production capacity and production untethered from demand.  The defining elements of structural excess capacity are therefore not met in Norway’s case.

Finally, USTR identifies two sectors (oil and gas, and seafood) in which Norway has a trade surplus.  The oil and gas sector alone drives Norway’s overall trade surplus – excluding that sector, Norway runs a trade deficit.  As addressed further below, Norway’s trade in these two sectors reflects its unusual natural resource endowments and, hence, comparative advantages in meeting strong global demand for oil and gas, and seafood, products.  A sector-specific analysis of key performance indicators, and the applicable regulatory framework, confirms that these sectors – as with the whole Norwegian economy – operates on, and is not insulated from, market principles.

(b) Norway has not engaged in acts, policies or practices to undervalue its domestic currency

Norway’s written comments also addressed USTR’s concerns regarding alleged efforts to undervalue its domestic currency, specifically through “the recycling of oil revenues into non-domestic currencies” like the U.S. dollar.[36]  Norway understands that these concerns connect to the concept of structural excess capacity because currency manipulation – in particular efforts to artificially lower the domestic currency – can be used as a tool to gain an advantage in international trade by making exports cheaper than they otherwise would be. 

However, the hallmarks of currency manipulation are not present in Norway’s case.  The IMF confirms that Norway operates a free-floating currency, and does not engage in persistent, one-sided intervention in foreign exchange markets.[37]  As would be expected from a free-floating currency, the NOK has experienced periods of both depreciation and appreciation in response to economic fundamentals, including changes in oil and gas prices, economic instability due to COVD-19, and interest rate differentials between Norway and its trading partners.

Norway also does not maintain a significant bilateral surplus in goods and services with the United States; indeed, Norway’s economic structure is simply not consistent with the type of export-lead manufacturing model where devaluing its currency would lead to an advantage. 

Norway does maintain a current account surplus, in that its income is in excess of national spending.  This is a function of Norway’s natural endowment in a globally in-demand resource.  Norway has chosen to invest its oil and gas revenues in its sovereign wealth fund, consisting of a global portfolio of diversified assets.  Under its fiscal framework – the so-called “fiscal rule” – the government is permitted to spend only a limited share (three percent) of the value of its fund each year.  This spending level is set to reflect the expected real return of the fund over time on a sustained and predictable basis that will not leave a gap in budget planning in any given year.  

Both Norway’s investments in global markets and its spending of a portion of the fund, are done transparently, following a pre-announced, fixed schedule that is not reactive to exchange rate movements.[38]

The fiscal framework serves two main purposes.  The first is to create a mechanism to share petroleum revenues with future generations and ensure long-term management of Norway’s petroleum revenues.  The second is to gradually phase petroleum revenues into the Norwegian economy.  As the fund has grown, so has the size of the three percent share.  Thus, the fiscal rule operates to stabilise the impact of oil revenues on the Norwegian economy. 

4. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector

Norway’s Comments explained that its oil and gas sector does not exhibit structural excess capacity.[39]  There is no government intervention aimed at creating or sustaining production untethered from market demand, and production volumes are determined by resource availability, commercial considerations, and global demand conditions.

Norway’s production in this sector reflect its rare natural resource endowment.  With an open, rules-based, market economy, aligned with U.S. geopolitical interests, Norway is one of the world’s stable and reliable suppliers of energy products – a role that has become especially important in light of ongoing instability and supply disruptions in global energy markets.

The development of Norway’s oil and gas sector is driven firmly by market signals.  Norway grants licenses to explore and exploit its petroleum reserves on a transparent, market-oriented and non-discriminatory basis, and the government’s decisions regarding the opening of new production areas are informed by its formal consultation with producers on where to open new commercial exploration and production opportunities.  Other than granting a license, the State provides no further incentive to produce, and production volumes are dictated by natural factors (resource availability) and global demand.[40]

Key economic indicators confirm the absence of any structural excess capacity in the oil and gas sector: investment is responsive to market signals; profitability is sustained and consistent; and production trends follow the expected pattern of resource extraction industries, declining since a 2001 peak.[41]  Current reports indicate that the sector cannot increase production despite current supply constraints and increased global demand.[42]

As discussed at length above, State ownership does not confer advantages nor can it be used to create or maintain production untethered from market demand.[43]  Indeed, in the oil and gas sector, two privately-owned companies, Vår Energi and Aker BP, among Norway’s largest companies, have been able to establish themselves as significant independent operators in the oil and gas sector.  They have won important licensing rights from the State, notwithstanding Norway’s investment in Equinor.[44]  Whereas Equinor’s production has increased by approximately 2.8 percent from 2021 to 2025, Vår Energi and Aker BP and have increased production by approximately 35 percent and 101.1 percent respectively, over the same period.[45]  This shows that the Government of Norway allows the oil and gas sector to develop through open competition and that the Government does not deny or stifle commercial opportunities for other Norwegian companies in a bid to secure Equinor’s position as a unique national champion.

Comments from U.S. industry support Norway’s arguments.  The American Petroleum Institute (“API”) is the leading U.S. trade association in the sector, with approximately 600 members representing all segments of the U.S. industry, including producers, refiners, pipelines and general service providers.[46]  The API agrees that “a finding of structural excess capacity requires clear evidence of sustained, policy-driven over-investment resulting in chronic overproduction, persistent under-utilisation, and distortion of global markets.”[47]  The API considers that the sector does not exhibit these features, and requests that no Section 301 action be taken on energy products.  The statement bears quoting in full:

API also respectfully requests that unimpeded U.S. imports and exports of energy products – crude oil, refined products, natural gas liquids, and natural gas – be maintained without being subject to tariffs.  Recent developments in the Middle East have significantly affected both the cost and availability of energy products, which, if it endures, may negatively affect U.S. consumers.  In the immediate term, there is an urgent need to ensure a stable and reliable supply of these products, which necessitates that the U.S. oil and gas industry be able to import and export [energy products]. U.S. consumers benefit from oil and natural gas imports…”.[48]

These views are echoed by the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers association (“AFPM”), representing mid- and downstream processing activities in the sector.  AFPM states expressly that it “does not request any form of trade protection for its membership and further urges USTR to avoid tariff and non-tariff barriers that will impede the flow of [energy products]”, since “it is critical that U.S. refiners have continued duty-free access to global crude oil”.[49] 

In sum, Norway’s oil and gas sector is resource-constrained, market-driven, and deeply integrated into global supply chains that support downstream industrial activity and energy security, including in the United States.  It does not exhibit structural excess capacity.  Norway’s positions in this regard as amply supported by other commenters, in particular the U.S. industry.

5. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the seafood sector

Norway’s Comments explain that its seafood sector does not exhibit structural excess capacity. In particular, there is no indication of government intervention aimed at creating or sustaining production or capacity untethered from market demand.

Norway’s seafood exports reflect its rare natural marine resource endowment, including favourable aquaculture conditions.  This gives Norway a comparative advantage in producing seafood products, which enables its producers to meet widespread and growing global demand for seafood. 

Norway’s seafood sector operates within a framework shaped by regulatory constraints on production to account for biological and environmental considerations.  Thus, production is limited by science-based fisheries management systems, including wild catch quotas, and strict limits on the maximum allowable biomass (“MAB”) in aquaculture to protect the marine environment. 

In the case of aquaculture, the MAB is designed to control populations of sea lice, which have detrimental consequences for the marine environment, in particular, stocks of wild salmon.  Norway also uses a “traffic light” system to adjust production levels in each production area on a 2-yearly basis, based on evidence relating to sea lice-induced mortality from farmed fish on wild salmon.[50]  Thus, Norway’s regulation constrains production for environmental reasons – this is the very opposite of government action to create structural excess capacity.

U.S. industry agrees that the seafood sector does not exhibit structural excess capacity because production is resource-constrained.  The record includes comments from the National Fisheries Institute (“NFI”), which is the largest U.S. seafood trade association, representing the full value chain from primary producers to processors, distributors/retailers and restaurants.[51]  The NFI’s position is unambiguous: “[t]he concerns underlying this investigation – namely, structural excess capacity – plainly do not apply to seafood”.[52]  Echoing Norway’s own Comments,[53] it explains that “seafood harvesting and farming are inherently constrained by biological limits and geographical constraints, and governed by science-based management systems”.  This means that “seafood cannot generate the type of excess capacity that an investigation of this nature is intended to address”.[54]  Indeed, the NFI explicitly identifies Norway as a major seafood-producing country that manages its fisheries and aquaculture production “under comprehensive regulatory frameworks designed to ensure sustainability and prevent overfishing”.[55]  Very similar sentiments are expressed by individual U.S. seafood production companies;[56] members of the U.S. Congress (across the aisle);[57] and a range of international stakeholders.[58]

U.S. industry raises particular alarm over the negative impact of import restrictions on seafood.  According to the NFI, “nearly half of U.S. commercial seafood industry employment relies on an imported fish”.[59]  These workers – over 750,000 of them – must “have reliable supply if they are to have reliable work”.[60]  Imports are crucial to downstream U.S. industries because U.S. production of unprocessed seafood products cannot reliably or sustainably fill U.S. seafood demand.[61]  As explained above, this is because supply depends on a country’s natural endowments, which rarely align with a country’s demand.  The NFI also recalls the Administration’s focus on consumer affordability, and notes that tariffs on seafood will contribute to significant inflation in food prices and contribute to food insecurity for low- and middle-income Americans.[62]

In sum, the NFI considers that “tariffs imposed [on seafood] under this investigation would impose direct costs on U.S. businesses and consumers, disrupt domestic supply chains, and undermine the Administration’s affordability agenda”.[63]

6. Norway has no structural excess capacity in the manufacturing sector for certain machinery and electronic goods

Norway’s original written comments also explained that there is no indication that its manufacturing sector exhibits structural excess capacity.[64]  Norway demonstrated that output, investment, and capacity utilisation in the sector are responsive to market conditions and exhibit normal cyclical variation, rather than persistent overcapacity sustained by government intervention.  Norway’s manufacturing sector operates within the same broader regulatory framework discussed above, including economy-wide labour and environmental protections and strict limits on State support under the EEA framework.[65]

Norway’s manufacturing sector is also relatively small, making up only 0.18 percent of global output.[66]  Even by virtue of its small size alone, Norwegian manufacturing is simply not of a scale that could plausibly harm U.S. commerce.  In this regard, Norway agrees with comments from U.S. industry that call on USTR to distinguish carefully between the practices of market versus non-market economies.[67]  As one leading U.S. trade association notes, “investigating allied economies alongside state-directed competitors treats fundamentally different policy environments as interchangeable”.[68]  As another argues, “USTR should take a disciplined approach that differentiates among economies, practices and sectors”, or “risk[] misidentifying normal market behaviour as unfair trade and applying remedies that do not address the underlying issue”.[69]

The key performance indicators, and the robust regulatory framework (which applies equally to companies in which the State holds an investment) demonstrates that Norway’s manufacturing sector falls squarely within the category of allied market economies.  The manufacturing sectors of market economies like Norway’s contribute to stable global supply chains and serve as important inputs into downstream, value-added economic activity, including in the United States.  In this context, broad-brush import restrictions risk harming, rather than helping, U.S. industry.[70]

7. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, Norway respectfully submits that neither its economy as a whole, nor the sectors identified in this investigation, exhibit structural excess capacity.  The evidence on the record confirms that capacity and production levels in Norway are responsive to market conditions, constrained by commercial, environmental, and regulatory considerations, and not sustained through distortive government intervention.  U.S. commenters overwhelmingly agree, cautioning that import restrictions on key Norwegian sectors would harm U.S. industry, workers and consumers.  Norway accordingly requests that no action be taken against Norway pursuant to this investigation.

 

[1] See Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, 91 Fed. Reg. 12886 (Dep’t of Commerce March 17, 2026) (“Initiation Notice”).

[2] Comments submitted to USTR from the Government of Norway, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127173, (“Comments from the Government of Norway”), p. 4 available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=HX9PRHGQVG.

[3] See Comments submitted to USTR from the American Petroleum Institute, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126932 (“Comments from the American Petroleum Institute”), pp. 2, 9, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=JXB9QK6CDP; Comments submitted to USTR from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127612 (“Comments from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers”), pp. 1-4, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=Y4BCM8RQ7B; Comments submitted to USTR from the National Fisheries Institute, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127500 (“Comments from the National Fisheries Institute”), pp. 2, 4-5, 12, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=TVHYYTG9YM; Comments submitted to USTR from the FMI - Food Industry Association, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127569 (“Comments from the Food Industry Association”), pp. 2-3, 8, 14, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=V4GQQY6FFR. 

[4] See, e.g., Comments submitted to USTR from the Cato Institute, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126449 (“Comments from the Cato Institute”), p. 2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=QBQFXVM2CD; Comments submitted to USTR from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126412 (“Comments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce”), p. 5, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=GYCKHRDVMF; Comments submitted to USTR from the Global Electronics Association, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127014 (“Comments from the Global Electronics Association”), p. 2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=PWBDRQXG8Q.

[5] Comments from the Cato Institute, p. 2

[6] Comments from the Global Electronics Association, p. 2.

[7] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12887.

[8] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12889.

[9] See Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12887.

[10] See Comments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, p. 5.  

[11] Comments from the Global Electronics Association, p. 3.

[12] See, for example: Comments from the Global Electronics Association, p. 2; Comments from the Cato Institute, p. 2; Comments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, p. 5; Comments from U.S. Consumer Technology Association, p. 3.

[13] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.a.

[14] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.a.

[15] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.a.

[16] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 56.

[17] Source: OECD Business Tendency Surveys, capacity utilization data for Norway, available here: https://data-explorer.oecd.org/?lc=en.

[18] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.b.

[19] OECD SOE Guidelines, available here: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/06/oecd-guidelines-on-corporate-governance-of-state-owned-enterprises-2024_68fa05cd.html.

[20] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.b.

[21] See White Paper on state ownership, p. 127, available here: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/b45b4a63e301435293bd1b10d1ede45b/en-gb/pdfs/stm202220230006000engpdfs.pdf (“White paper on state ownership”).

[22] See White Paper on state ownership, p. 77.

[23] OECD SOE Guidelines, p. 30.

[24] See White Paper on state ownership, p. 77.

[25] See Comments from the Government of Norway, pp. 19-20.

[26] See Comments from the Government of Norway, pp. 19-20.

[27] The EFTA Surveillance Authority monitors compliance with European Economic Area (EEA) rules in Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway (see here: https://www.eftasurv.int/).

[28] OECD SOE Guidelines, p. 44.

[29] See White Paper on state ownership, p. 84.

[30] See White Paper on state ownership, p. 84.

[31] See Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 18.

[32] OECD SOE Guidelines, p. 43.

[33] “OECD Market Regulation (PMR) indicators: how does Norway compare?”, December 2025, available here: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/product-market-regulation.html#by_country.

[34] “OECD Market Regulation (PMR) indicators: how does Norway compare?”, December 2025, available here: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/product-market-regulation.html#by_country.

[35] “OECD Market Regulation (PMR) indicators: how does the United States compare?”, January 2024, available here: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/product-market-regulation/United%20States_PMR%20country%20note.pdf. (the OECD’s report on the United States notes that “although public ownership is limited compared to most OECD countries, the governance of state-owned enterprises does not align with key OECD best practices aimed at ensuring a level playing field with private firms”).

[36] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.c., citing to Initiation Notice, 91 Fed. Reg. at 12888 and 12889.

[37] See IMF latest Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2024), available here: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/sprolls/annual-report-on-exchange-arrangements-and-exchange-restrictions.

[38] See Comments from the Government of Norway, pp. 23-26.

[39] Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 3.

[40] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 30.

[41] Comments from the Government of Norway, pp. 36-37, citing to Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of Oil and Gas, available here: https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/.

[42] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 37, citing to: “Equinor has no spare oil and gas capacity, CEO Says” (Reuters, March 12, 2026), available here: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/equinor-has-no-spare-oil-gas-capacity-ceo-says-2026-03-12/).

[43] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 33.

[44] See “Vår Energi awarded 14 new licenses”, 13 January 2026, available here: https://varenergi.no/en/newsroom/stock-exchange-announcements/?release=1201EE251846DC0D; and “Aker BP awarded 22 licenses in APA 2025”, 13 January 2026, available here: https://akerbp.com/en/borsmelding/aker-bp-awarded-22-licenses-in-apa-2025-2/.

[45] Sources: (i) Annual reports for Equinor available at https://www.equinor.com/investors/annual-reports-archive; (ii) Annual reports for Aker BP available at https://akerbp.com/en/investor/reports-and-presentations  (iii) Annual reports for Vår Energi available at https://varenergi.no/en/investor/reports-presentations.

[46] See Comments from the American Petroleum Institute, p. 2; the American Petroleum Institute, “About API”, available here: https://www.api.org/about/.

[47] Comments from the American Petroleum Institute, p. 2.

[48] Comments from the American Petroleum Institute, p. 9 (emphasis added).

[49] Comments from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, pp. 1-2.

[50] Areas with low mortality (green) can increase production by 6 percent; areas with moderate mortality (yellow) maintain production at unchanged levels; and areas with high mortality (red) reduce production by 6 percent.  As of the last assessment (2024), six areas are green, five areas are yellow; and two areas are red.

[51] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 1.

[52] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 2 (emphasis added).

[53] Comments from the Government of Norway, pp. 40-42.

[54] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 2.

[55] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 4.

[56] “Shrimp production is constrained by biological growth cycles, aquaculture capacity, disease management, environmental conditions, and market demand. It does not reflect the type of state-driven industrial expansion, subsidized idle capacity, or persistent dumping associated with structural excess capacity in manufacturing.” Comments submitted to USTR from Chicken of the Sea Frozen Foods LLC, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126680, p. 2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=W8PP2973KK.

[57] See Statements of Congressman Rick W. Allen and Congressman Earl L. “Buddy” Carter, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127470-CAT-15552 attached to Comments submitted to USTR from Chicken of the Sea International, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00127470-CAT-15551, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=TX2GMTKBVY.

[58] Comments submitted to USTR from the Viet Nam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126344, pp. 1-2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=9YYKTJFJH9;  Comments submitted to USTR from the Thai Tuna Industry Association, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00125873 , p. 1, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=CRGFTXYFYV.

[59] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 9.

[60] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 9.

[61] “Domestic production alone, however, cannot meet domestic demand because of the large volumes, highly varied product forms, exacting customer specifications, and year-round availability that the U.S. market requires. Global sourcing is therefore essential to ensure reliable supply, drive affordability and quality, and maintain consumer choice.” Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 2.

[62] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, pp. 8-9.

[63] Comments from the National Fisheries Institute, p. 2.

[64] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 52.

[65] See Comments from the Government of Norway, Section 2.b.

[66] Comments from the Government of Norway, p. 58.

[67] Comments from the Cato Institute, p. 2; Comments from the Global Electronics Association, p. 1; Comments submitted to USTR from the Consumer Technology Association, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126435 (“Comments from the Consumer Technology Association”), p. 3, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=3V4B8TM22Q;  Comments submitted to USTR from the National Association of Manufacturers, Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, Submission No. USTR-2026-0067-00126503 ,p. 1, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=M3KH88W43H.

[68] Comments from the Global Electronics Association, p. 4.

[69] Comments from the Consumer Technology Association, p. 3.

[70] Norway notes one comment from Ryanair Advanced Materials (RYAM), a producer of high-purity dissolving pulp, alleging that Norway contributes to structural excess capacity in this sector. Norway does not consider these allegations to be well-founded. The same economy-wide regulatory framework described throughout Norway’s comments applies equally to this sector, and RYAM fails to point to any act, policy or practice of the Norwegian government.  The Norwegian company in question, Borregaard, has submitted post-hearing comments in the section 301 forced labour investigation and the section 301 structural excess capacity investigation.

Re: The Government of Norway’s Reply to the Request for Comments on the Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Norway (“Norway”), we hereby submit these comments in response to the investigation initiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) into the acts, policies, and practices of various economies related to the suspected failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor (“Forced Labor Section 301 Investigation”).  This investigation was announced on March 12, 2026, pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[1]  Norway strongly rejects the allegations made in the Initiation Notice and maintains that its acts, policies, and practices (or any alleged lack thereof) are not, in any way, unreasonable, discriminatory, or burdensome to U.S. commerce.  Norway’s participation in this Forced Labor Section 301 Investigation should not be understood as anything else but its willingness to clarify the relevant Norwegian acts, policies, and practices.  As such, Norway requests that USTR refrain from making affirmative findings and imposing unilateral measures on Norway as a result of the Forced Labor Section 301 Investigation. 

Norway also wishes to express its serious concerns regarding the use of Section 301 by the United States.  The United States and Norway have undertaken binding commitments under the WTO Agreement, and its General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”), including with respect to maximum tariff levels applicable to imports of goods and other forms of import restrictions.  These commitments reflect mutually agreed limits on the level of import duties and charges that may be imposed, and prohibitions on any form of quantitative import restriction, and form a core element of the rules-based multilateral trading system.  Norway finds it difficult to reconcile trade restrictive measures imposed pursuant to Section 301 with these commitments. 

Where a WTO Member, like the United States, is concerned that another Member’s acts, policies, or practices restrict trade or otherwise nullify or impair benefits accruing under the WTO Agreements, the WTO offers a forum to raise these concerns.  In that respect, Norway always remains open to engage in constructive dialogue with the United States, with a view to advancing our mutual interests in open, rules-based international trade.  

Pursuant to the Initiation Notice, these public comments are due by April 15, 2026.  Thus, this submission is timely filed. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction and scope. 4
2. Norway is actively engaged in international efforts to eradicate forced labour in supply chains. 5
3. Norway’s legal system ensures a high level of worker protection that prohibits the use of forced labour. 8
4. Norway has pioneered laws to prevent forced labour in supply chains. 9
5. There is international consensus that due diligence is an essential tool to prevent forced labour in supply chains. 9
6. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are aimed at eradicating forced labour in supply chains. 12
7. The Transparency Act makes human rights due diligence mandatory, including to prevent forced labour in supply chains. 13
8. The Transparency Act is effectively enforced and regularly evaluated. 14

iii.         Norway’s public procurement rules prevent forced labour in supply chains. 16

5. Norway will implement the EU’s Forced Labour Regulation that bans import and export of products made with forced labour. 18
6. Conclusion. 19

Annex. 22

1. Introduction and scope

Norway and the United States share a long-standing and close relationship grounded in common values, which include their commitment to democratic values and the rule of law, and to upholding fundamental human rights and eliminating forced labour in global supply chains.  Both countries have consistently engaged in international efforts to address forced labour, recognising its serious humanitarian consequences and its impact on fair conditions of competition in international trade.  Norway is always open to engage in dialogue with other countries, including the United States, in order to further strengthen global efforts to prevent forced labour. 

The central concern for USTR in this investigation is the alleged failure by 60 countries to impose and effectively enforce a ban on the importation of goods produced with forced labour.  USTR identifies Norway as among the economies subject to the investigation.  However, as set out in these comments, Norway has not failed to act to exclude forced labour from supply chains.  To the contrary,  Norway has taken robust steps to address adverse human rights impacts in supply chains, including forced labour, and was one of the first countries to adopt human rights due diligence legislation.  

In the sections that follow, Norway addresses the concerns raised by USTR. 

Section 2 demonstrates that Norway is actively engaged in the international community and for many years has successfully cooperated with the United States in international fora to promote their shared goal of eradicating the abhorrent practices of forced labour. 

Section 3 outlines that Norway’s domestic legal system ensures a high level of worker protection that is designed to eradicate the use of forced labour in Norway. 

Section 4 describes Norwegian laws that have pioneered exclusion of forced labour in supply chains through its Transparency Act and public procurement rules, and it provides details about its forthcoming implementation of an EU regulation, which will complement Norway’s current acts and policies against forced labour by expressly targeting imports of products made with forced labour. 

2. Norway is actively engaged in international efforts to eradicate forced labour in supply chains

Norway underscores that it has, for many years, actively contributed to international efforts aimed at establishing and implementing global guidelines and standards designed to eradicate forced labour, including in supply chains.  In this regard, Norway has been engaged in such efforts in various international fora, in particular, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), the United Nations Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). 

Norway has ratified 113 conventions and 3 protocols at the ILO, including all eleven fundamental instruments and four governance conventions,[2] and actively contributes to the ILO’s work.  In particular, Norway has ratified key ILO instruments prohibiting forced labour, including ILO Convention No. 29,^[3] its 2014 Protocol,[4] and ILO Convention No. 105.^[5]  Norway has also ratified several other international conventions impacting and protecting workers’ rights, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,[6] the European Convention on Human Rights,[7] and the European Social Charter.[8]

At the OECD, Norway plays an active role in the organisation’s continuing work program regarding the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct (“OECD MNE Guidelines”),^[9] as an Adherent to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.[10]  In particular, Norway was recently involved in the process leading to the adoption of the updated OECD MNE Guidelines at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in June 2023.[11]  These updates, among other things, emphasised that enterprises should take steps to prevent forced labour and other coercive means, including in the supply chain, and bolster transparency around actions taken to address risks of forced labour associated with their operations, products and services.^[12]

For many years, Norway has successfully cooperated with the United States in these international fora, and through the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)-U.S. Trade Policy Dialogues.[13]  This cooperation has always been driven by the two countries’ shared commitment to promoting labour rights and decent working conditions, including their common goal of eradicating forced labour.  The most recent dedicated exchange on forced labour took place on December 12, 2024.  Discussions focused on domestic and international measures to combat forced labour in supply chains, reflecting shared concerns about due diligence, enforcement mechanisms, and the role of trade policy in addressing labour abuses.  The exchange also covered labour protection provisions in trade agreements, including experiences under the EFTA model labour chapter, with a view to comparing approaches and implementation practices.  Norway is committed to continuing and developing these efforts. 

In its trade relations, Norway has made forced labour a priority, integrating commitments in its trade agreements to promote the elimination of forced labour.  As part of EFTA, Norway has concluded 19 free trade agreements (“FTAs”) and economic partnership agreements (“EPAs”) that include specific commitments against the use of forced labour.[14]  Specifically, in these FTAs, the parties commit to respect, promote, and realise the fundamental principles and rights at work that include the elimination of all forms of forced labour.  They also formally “recall the obligations” of the FTA/EPA parties to implement the ILO conventions that they have already ratified, and to make efforts to ratify other fundamental ILO conventions, including on elimination of forced labour. 

These commitments go well beyond baseline international obligations, reinforcing that Norway has not only accepted disciplines aimed at preventing forced labour in law and practice, but has worked consistently to actively strengthen them and served as a leader within the international community. 

3. Norway’s legal system ensures a high level of worker protection that prohibits the use of forced labour

Norway’s efforts to eradicate forced labour in its markets are exemplified in its domestic legal system.^[15]  These measures affect imports, and make clear Norway’s commitment to prevent forced labour.[16] 

The Norwegian Constitution prohibits forced labour and imposes an obligation on the authorities to oppose forced labour,^[17] illustrating the importance that Norway attaches to this issue.  The use of forced labour is punishable under several different provisions of the Penal Code.^[18]  The importation of goods produced using forced labour in foreign jurisdictions is punishable under Norwegian criminal law if the circumstances demonstrate complicity in such offences.^[19]  The use of forced labour also constitutes a breach of numerous provisions of the Working Environment Act.^[20] 

4. Norway has pioneered laws to prevent forced labour in supply chains

a. There is international consensus that due diligence is an essential tool to prevent forced labour in supply chains

Norway combats forced labour in supply chains through requirements that businesses conduct due diligence.  Norway has based its due diligence law on international standards, and international consensus, developed by the UN, the OECD, and the ILO, all of which recognise due diligence as an essential tool in preventing the use of forced labour in supply chains.  This consensus was built with the active participation from both Norway and the United States. 

In 2011, the UNHRC adopted the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UN Guiding Principles”),[21] which call upon business enterprises to respect human rights, including the prohibition against forced labour.[22]  The UN Guiding Principles provide that, to respect these rights, business enterprises should conduct due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their human rights impacts.  The UN Guiding Principles are accompanied by a detailed commentary, which elaborates on human rights due diligence.  Norway and the United States have worked together in the development of the UN Guiding Principles and the accompanying commentary.

The OECD MNE Guidelines, an even earlier instrument, calls on multinational enterprises to conduct due diligence to combat adverse impacts, inter alia, on human rights and the environment.^[23]  The OECD MNE Guidelines are aligned with the UN Guiding Principles with respect to human rights due diligence.  The OECD has also developed detailed accompanying guidance that elaborates on due diligence, both general and sectoral.[24]  Norway and the United States, as adherents to the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, have cooperated in the development of, and updates to, the OECD MNE Guidelines and related due diligence guidance.

In addition to the UN and OECD instruments, the ILO has developed “toolkits” for business to ensure that they comply with the ILO’s prohibition on forced labour.  These toolkits also rely on due diligence to root out forced labour in the supply chain, with explicit references to the UN Guiding Principles and the OECD MNE Guidelines.^[25]

There are sound reasons why the OECD, UN, and ILO all concur that due diligence is the most effective tool to combat forced labour in supply chains: when a good is purchased by a company, it is impossible for the company to discern from the good whether it was made using forced labour – forced labour is hidden deep within the operations of the company’s direct and indirect suppliers.[26] 

A company can, therefore, only assess the risk of forced labour in a purchased good through a thorough understanding of its supply chain and suppliers.  To ensure this understanding, the company must engage in a deliberate, structured, and continuing process to gather and assess information relating to the supply chain; and, if the company identifies a risk of (or actual) forced labour, it must take steps to prevent and mitigate the risks, wherever they arise in the supply chain.  This due diligence process also involves working with suppliers to educate them, and contractual commitments; these contractual commitments should be transmitted up the supply chain from the company’s direct suppliers to its indirect suppliers.  Due diligence also involves the company undertaking effective monitoring, supervision, and auditing of suppliers, including its indirect suppliers. 

These are quintessentially tasks that only a company can undertake with respect to its own supply chain.  Each company’s supply chain is unique, and larger companies often have thousands of direct and indirect suppliers in their supply chains.  A regulator in an importing country cannot possibly identify, assess, and prevent forced labour risks in the unique and extensive supply chains of every importer.  Instead, the role of the government is to ensure, through the adoption and enforcement of binding national rules, that companies within its territory themselves undertake effective due diligence to root out forced labour in their supply chains. 

To facilitate the task of governments, the UN Guiding Principles set forth a human rights due diligence framework, that has been further elaborated by the OECD through general and sector-specific guidance.  Norway was one of the first countries in the world to transform these international standards on due diligence into a binding national law – the Transparency Act – that requires Norwegian companies to carry out due diligence with respect to human rights and decent work, including with a view to preventing forced labour in supply chains.  In Section 4.b below, Norway provides further information on the Transparency Act. 

In the context of this Forced Labor Section 301 investigation, which covers 60 countries, it bears emphasising that, currently, very few countries in the world have taken mandatory steps, like those taken by Norway in the Transparency Act, to prevent forced labour in supply chains.

The United States is one such country.  According to the official guidance, implementation and enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act[27] and Section 307 of the Tariff Act[28] – the key U.S. legal frameworks that target forced labour in supply chains – rely on businesses conducting due diligence consistent with the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD MNE Guidelines and the ILO toolkits.[29]  Thus, in both Norway and the United States, due diligence serves as the foundation for combatting forced labour in supply chains.

b. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are aimed at eradicating forced labour in supply chains

i.  The Transparency Act makes human rights due diligence mandatory, including to prevent forced labour in supply chains

The Transparency Act entered into force on July 1, 2022.^[30]  It requires subject companies to conduct human rights and decent work due diligence, consistent with the OECD MNE Guidelines, including to prevent forced labour in the supply chain.  These due diligence requirements extend to the activities of the company itself, its subsidiaries, and its global supply chains.  In addition to conducting due diligence, companies covered by the law must publish an annual report on their due diligence, and the first reports were published in 2023.  Subject companies are required by law to respond to any requests from the public for information on how the company addresses actual and potential adverse impacts.[31]

The Transparency Act has a very broad impact within the Norwegian economy.  It currently applies directly, on the basis of financial criteria,[32] to approximately 9,500 Norwegian companies.[33]  The companies subject to these requirements are the largest in the Norwegian economy.  Statistics Norway estimates that these companies employ approximately 62 percent of the total number of employees for limited liability companies in the private sector in Norway[34] and account for approximately 62 percent of total imports into Norway.[35]  The Transparency Act, therefore, applies directly to a very large and significant share of the Norwegian economy and of Norway’s imports. 

The impact of the Transparency Act within the Norwegian economy is much broader still, because the Act requires due diligence with respect to the subject company’s subsidiaries and its global supply chains.  Hence, the companies are required to vet their subsidiaries and suppliers to combat forced labour.  This means that a large number of smaller Norwegian companies, not directly subject to the law, must take steps to address forced labour in their supply chains, including in respect of their imports.  

The Transparency Act, therefore, has a very broad impact in Norway in combating forced labour in supply chains. 

ii. The Transparency Act is effectively enforced and regularly evaluated

Norway takes active steps to ensure that the Transparency Act is properly applied by companies and effectively enforced by public authorities.  The Transparency Act is enforced by the Norwegian Consumer Authority (“NCA”), which monitors compliance and initiates actions for non-compliance.  The NCA is responsible for providing guidance[36] and engaging in dialogue with companies to ensure compliance.  The NCA is also empowered to issue orders and impose penalties for any failure to conduct due diligence, or any failure to provide annual reports on due diligence activities or respond to public requests for information.^[37]  In its annual budget allocation letter to the NCA, the Government has emphasised that the NCA must prioritise supervision of the Transparency Act.  

Each year, the NCA reviews due diligence compliance with a focus on companies operating in sectors with known risks.  The NCA can act on the basis of information shared by the public, including civil society organisations.  In total, more than 800 companies have been subject to controls, resulting in proceedings against over 120 companies.[38]  Following these proceedings, companies have been subject to ongoing monitoring, both to ensure sustained compliance and to enable the NCA to undertake prompt compliance action if needed. 

The NCA can issue an order in the case of non-compliance.  If the company fails to comply with the order, it can issue a penalty for non-compliance with the order.  In the case of repeated violations of the law, the NCA can also impose a penalty.[39] 

To that end, the NCA has recently found a number of annual due diligence reports to be deficient for failing to provide sufficiently detailed and specific information on due diligence assessments and the measures taken to address identified risks.  The NCA has guided companies to address these deficiencies, and will monitor compliance, including reviewing the due diligence assessments themselves.[40]

Two main factors motivate the system of remedies under the Transparency Act, which relies primarily on orders and penalties.  First, the subject company must bear the responsibility for its failure to comply with the law.  A penalty does not have any immediate repercussions for the actors in this company’s supply chain, the vast majority of whom are not tainted by any human rights issues in the supply chain and, therefore, should not be penalised. 

Second, with respect to any direct or indirect supplier where human rights issues arise, both the OECD MNE Guidelines and the UN Guiding Principles recognise that the immediate termination of the business relationship may not be appropriate because it could itself have adverse human rights impacts.[41]  Instead, a company should, wherever possible, work with the supplier to terminate and remediate the forced labour practices.  The Transparency Act is based on this approach and allows a company to maintain business relationships in order to secure improvements at a supplier, without, nevertheless, excluding the possibility of terminating the business relationship if the circumstances so dictate.

In 2024, Norway initiated an evaluation of the Transparency Act shortly after it entered into force.  This early evaluation illustrates Norway’s commitment to ensuring the law’s effect.  As part of the evaluation, Norway commissioned a report from the independent consulting company KPMG.^[42]  The report finds that, in a short period, the Transparency Act has significantly increased the awareness and prioritisation of human rights in the business community and led to enhanced competence related to human rights, both within enterprises and across their supply chains.  The Act has also contributed to improved procurement practices and a more systematic approach to due diligence. 

iii. Norway’s public procurement rules prevent forced labour in supply chains

The Public Procurement Act[43] requires public contracting authorities to have appropriate processes for promoting respect for fundamental human rights, including prohibition of forced labour, in public procurement where there is a risk of violations of such rights.  These processes have to feature in specific procurement exercises, and both the lack of a process, or a failure to follow the processes in a procurement can be enforced through judicial review.  The Norwegian Parliament has recently adopted amendments to the Public Procurement Act, which largely constitute a continuation of existing law. 

First, contracting authorities are now subject to a new obligation to adopt a procurement strategy to prevent violations of fundamental human rights, including forced labour.  Second, a new section encourages contracting authorities to set requirements or selection criteria, where there is a risk of violations of such rights.  These requirements and criteria can be enforced through legal remedies.  Both the existing and new provisions apply to all public procurements. 

The Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management (“DFØ”) prepares a high‑risk product list[44] that contracting authorities may use during the initial phase of public procurement to identify product categories with a risk of human rights violations[45] and provides example requirements and criteria for selecting suppliers.[46]  The DFØ prepares the list based on ILO reports and investigations and other relevant sources, such as those of the United States Department of Labor.[47]  The DFØ’s example requirements for suppliers include compliance with international conventions, including the ILO core conventions, not only in the tenderer’s own operations but also in its entire global supply chain. 

The DFØ’s example requirements also contain provisions on sanctions.  The contracting authority may require corrective action, impose a temporary suspension of a contract, replacement of subcontractors, or termination of the contract.  The DFØ’s high-risk list and example requirements and criteria provide the necessary guidance for contracting authorities to further promote fundamental human rights, including prevention of forced labour in public procurement. 

Under the Public Procurement Regulations,[48] the contracting authority has a duty to exclude suppliers convicted of, or having confessed to, the use of forced labour.[49]  Breaches committed by a subcontractor may be equated with breaches committed by the supplier itself.[50]  Together with the Public Procurement Act, the Procurement Regulations are designed to prevent forced labour products from entering the Norwegian market. 

The Government of Norway is currently conducting a study on strengthening human rights requirements in public procurement.[51]  This further shows Norway’s commitment to preventing forced labour in supply chains.  The study is to be submitted to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries by September 1, 2026. 

5. Norway will implement the EU’s Forced Labour Regulation that bans import and export of products made with forced labour 

The parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA Agreement”),^[52] including Norway, are currently working on the incorporation of the EU’s Forced Labour Regulation (“FLR”)^[53] into the EEA Agreement.^[54]  Following incorporation, the FLR, which prohibits imports, exports, and placing on the market of goods made with forced labour,^[55] will be implemented into Norwegian law.  This express prohibition will effectively complement Norway’s existing obligations to prevent the use of forced labour in supply chains, including by way of imports. 

The FLR prohibits economic operators from importing goods into, and exporting goods from, Norway, if they are made with forced labour.  The ban applies to all goods, regardless of their sector or origin, including components.  The ban also covers online/telephone sales that target Norwegian consumers.

In deciding on enforcement action, the FLR requires authorities to consider whether and how companies have conducted due diligence to identify and address forced labour in the supply chain.  If an authority determines that a product has been produced using forced labour, the product is prohibited from entering Norway and must be withdrawn from the market and disposed of.

6. Conclusion

Norway is firmly committed to combating forced labour in all its forms and has shown international leadership in taking and enforcing effective measures to eradicate forced labour in supply chains.  Norway’s acts, policies and practices demonstrate this firm commitment.  Norway remains open to dialogue with other countries, including the United States, in order to further strengthen global efforts to prevent forced labour.

Annex

Labour commitments in EFTA’s trade agreements

Agreement	A commitment to respect, promote, and realise the principles concerning ILO’s fundamental rights, including elimination of forced labour	An obligation to effectively implement and make efforts to ratify ILO conventions	Entry into force[56]
EFTA-Albania Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 35(1)	Article 35(3)	Yes
EFTA-Bosnia and Herzegovina Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 37(1)	Article 37(3)	Yes
EFTA-Ecuador Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 8.5(1)	Article 8.5(2)	Yes
EFTA-Central America Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 9.5(1)	Article 9.5(3)	Yes
EFTA-Chile Free Trade Agreement 2024 (not yet entered into force) (link)	Article 137(2)	Article 137(4)	Not yet entered into force
EFTA-Georgia Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 10.5(1)	Article 10.5(3)	Yes
EFTA-Hong Kong China Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 2(1) EFTA-Hong Kong China Agreement on Labour	Article 2(2) EFTA-Hong Kong China Agreement on Labour	Yes
EFTA-India Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (link)	Article 11.6(1)	Article 11.6(2)	Yes
EFTA-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 8.6(1)	Article 8.6(3)	Yes
EFTA-Kosovo Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 6.4(2)	Article 6.4(3)	Not yet entered into force
EFTA–Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (link)	Article 12.5(2)	Article 12.5(3)	Not yet entered into force
EFTA–MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 13.5(2)	Article 13.5(2)	Not yet entered into force
EFTA-Moldova Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 9.4(2)	Article 9.4(3)	Yes
EFTA-Montenegro Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 35(1)	Article 35(3)	Yes
EFTA-Philippines Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 11.5(1)	Article 11.5(3)	Yes
EFTA-Serbia Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 36(1)	Article 36(3)	Yes
EFTA-Thailand Free Trade Agreement (link)	Article 10.4(2)	Article 10.4(3)	Not yet entered into force
EFTA-Türkiye Free Trade Agreement 2018 (link)	Article 7.5(1)	Article 7.5(3)	Yes
EFTA-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement 2025 (link)	Article 9.6(2)	Article 9.6(3)	Not yet entered into force

 

[1] See Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, 91 Fed. Reg. 12884 (Dep’t of Commerce March 17, 2026) (“Initiation Notice”).

[2] The full list of ILO fundamental instruments and governance conventions is available at: https://www.ilo.org/international-labor-standards/conventions-protocols-and-recommendations.

[3] ILO Convention (No. 29) concerning forced or compulsory labour, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2039/volume-39-I-612-English.pdf.

[4] Protocol to the ILO Convention (No. 29) concerning forced or compulsory labour, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203175/volume-3175-A-612.pdf. 

[5] ILO Convention (No. 105) concerning the abolition of forced labour, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20320/volume-320-I-4648-English.pdf.

[6] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights.

[7] European Convention on Human Rights, available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG.

[8] European Social Charter, available at: https://rm.coe.int/168007cf93.

[9] OECD (2023), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, OECD Publishing, Paris, available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/06/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_a0b49990/81f92357-en.pdf.

[10] OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, available at: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0144.

[11] OECD, 2023 Ministerial Council Statement, Securing a Resilient Future: Shared Values and Global Partnerships, available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/about/2023-Ministerial-Council-Statement.pdf.

[12] An unofficial summary of the main updates in the OECD MNE Guidelines, based on the presentation of changes prepared by the OECD Secretariat, is available at: https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/M-O/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct-2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 

[13] Norway and the United States have also agreed a Memorandum of Cooperation on High-Standard, Market-Oriented Trade of Critical Minerals, which entails cooperation to promote internationally recognized labor rights in global critical mineral supply chains.  Paragraph III, Memorandum of Cooperation between the Government of Norway and the Government of the United States on High-Standard, Market-Oriented Trade of Critical Minerals, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7741695bf19749a0b0475245d30866d9/moc-signert-300924.pdf. 

[14] The full list of the relevant trade agreements is attached as an annex.

[15] Norwegian labor laws are, in general, subject to a high level of regulatory oversight and effective enforcement in practice: in 2025, the Norwegian Labour Inspectorate conducted approximately 14,380 inspections, issued nearly 19,450 “improvement orders” and imposed 574 administrative fines, alongside work stoppages and other sanctions in cases of serious non-compliance.  Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, Annual Report 2025: Analysis of the Labour Inspection Authority’s Activities, available at: https://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/globalassets/rapportar/arsrapport/arsrapport-2025/arbeidstilsynets-arsrapport-2025.pdf.  See also audit reports on labor compliance from the Norwegian Oceans Industry Authority, available at: https://www.havtil.no/en/supervision/audit-reports/.  

[16] Norway scores highly on employee protection indicators.  See, e.g., the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Dataset, available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-indicators-of-employment-protection.html.

[17] Article 93 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, unofficial English translation available at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17. 

[18] See Chapter 24 (e.g., Sections 251, 252, 254, 257, 258, 259, 260) of the Norwegian Penal Code, unofficial English translation available at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-05-20-28. 

[19] Section 15 of the Norwegian Penal Code.

[20] See, e.g., Chapter 4 of the Working Environment Act.  Act relating to the working environment, working hours and employment protection (Working Environment Act), unofficial English translation available at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-06-17-62. 

[21] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 

[22] Principle 15(b) of the UN Guiding Principles. 

[23] Chapter II (General Policies), para. A.11 of the OECD MNE Guidelines. 

[24] The OECD guidance is published together with the OECD MNE Guidelines, available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/06/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_a0b49990/81f92357-en.pdf.

[25] International Labor Organization and International Organization of Employers, Combating forced labour: A handbook for employers and businesses, Third (revised) edition, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025, available at: https://www.ilo.org/publications/combating-forced-labour-handbook-employers-and-business-1.

[26] Direct suppliers have a direct business relationship with the purchasing company, like a contract (i.e., they are so-called tier 1 suppliers); whereas indirect suppliers have no direct relationship with the supplier (i.e., they are suppliers in tiers 2, 3, 4 and so on).

[27] Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, Public Law 117-78, available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-117publ78. 

[28] Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307), available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1307. 

[29] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Operational Guidance for Importers, available at: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/uflpa-operational-guidance-importers.

[30] Act relating to enterprises’ transparency and work on fundamental human rights and decent working conditions (Transparency Act), unofficial English translation available at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2021-06-18-99.

[31] Section 6 of the Transparency Act.

[32] According to Section 3, letter a of the Transparency Act, “[f]or the purposes of this Act, “larger enterprises” means enterprises that are covered by Section 1-6 of the Accounting Act, or that on the date of financial statements exceed the threshold for two of the three conditions: (1) sales revenues of NOK 70 million [(USD 6,58 million)]; (2) balance sheet total of NOK 35 million [(USD 3,29 million)]; and/or (3) average number of employees in the financial year of 50 full-time equivalent.  Parent companies shall be considered larger enterprises if the conditions are met for the parent company and subsidiaries as a whole.”

[33] Estimated by Statistics Norway, based on reporting numbers from 2024 (the last year with complete data). 

[34] The total number of employees of limited liability companies in the private sector in Norway amounted to 2,066,320 in 2024.  The 9,500 companies employed 1,291,761 persons in total.  Estimated by Statistics Norway. 

[35] Total Norwegian goods imports amounted to NOK 1,088 billion in 2024.  The 9,500 companies accounted for imports of around NOK 672 billion.  Estimated by Statistics Norway. 

[36] Since early 2022, the NCA has responded to over 1,200 individual guidance requests.  The publicly available NCA guidance was most recently updated in late 2025, drawing on both the evaluation of the effects of the Act and insights gained through the NCA’s supervisory work.  NCA guidance is available in Norwegian at: https://www.forbrukertilsynet.no/vi-jobber-med/apenhetsloven/aktsomhetsvurderinger. 

[37] See Sections 11-14 of the Transparency Act for more information about orders and penalties. 

[38] Information provided by the Norwegian Consumer Authority. 

[39] See Sections 9 and 11-14 of the Transparency Act. 

[40] NCA, Financial sanctions following violations of the Transparency Act, available in Norwegian at: https://www.forbrukertilsynet.no/okonomiske-sanksjoner-etter-brudd-pa-apenhetsloven. 

[41] OECD MNE Guidelines, Commentary to Chapter IV (Human Rights), available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en.html; UN Guiding Principles, Commentary to Principle 19, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.

[42] KPMG (2024), Review of the Effects of the Norwegian Transparency Act, available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/01d712ab61f340bb9321b40ceeb80a36/endelig-rapport-utredning-apenhetsloven-engelsk-versjon.pdf. 

[43] Public Procurement Act (Procurement Act), available in Norwegian at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2016-06-17-73. 

[44] The DFØ’s high-risk product list is available in Norwegian at: https://www.anskaffelser.no/samfunnshensyn-i-offentlige-anskaffelser/menneskerettigheter/hoyrisikolisten. 

[45] As indicated on the DFØ’s high-risk product list webpage, “high-risk products” are products for which there is extensive documentation demonstrating that systematic violations occur in the supply chain with regard to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO core conventions (including on prohibition of forced labor), and national labor and Health, Safety and Environment (“HSE”) legislation in the product’s supply chain.

[46] Example requirements and criteria for various product categories can be found in the Criteria Guide, available in Norwegian at: https://kriterieveiviseren.anskaffelser.no/. 

[47] Information provided on the DFØ’s high-risk product list webpage.

[48] Public Procurement Regulations (Procurement Regulations), available in Norwegian at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2016-08-12-974. 

[49] Section 24-2, § 2, letter f of the Procurement Regulations. 

[50] Section 24-3, § 2, of the Procurement Regulations.

[51] This assignment follows the Proposal 147 L concerning amendments to the Public Procurement Act, available in Norwegian at: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/80e167b3a6cf49df82f84602c6231a4d/no/pdfs/prp202420250147000dddpdfs.pdf. 

[52] Agreement on the European Economic Area, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/european-economic-area-eea-agreement.

[53] Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labor on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj/eng. 

[54] The EEA Agreement extends the EU single market to the three of the four EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway).  The FLR is a “text with EEA relevance”, meaning it covers one of the four freedoms of the single market and applies to the EEA states.  As such, the FLR is to be incorporated into the EEA Agreement and transposed into the national laws of the EEA EFTA states, including Norway. 

[55] The FLR definition of “forced labor” is contained in Article 2(1) of the FLR and aligns with that established by the ILO.  See Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 29. 

[56] Some agreements are pending ratification.

The Government of Norway’s Post-Hearing Rebuttal Comments in the Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of Norway (“Norway”), we hereby submit these post-hearing rebuttal comments in the investigation initiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) into the acts, policies, and practices of various economies related to the suspected failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor (“Forced Labor Section 301 Investigation”).  This investigation was announced on March 12, 2026, pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.[1]

Table of Contents

1. Introduction. 4
2. Norway’s laws effectively address and penalise the use of forced labour in supply chains, including with respect to imports. 4
3. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are justifiable, reasonable, and non-discriminatory and do not burden U.S. commerce. 8
4. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are comparable in effectiveness to those of the United States, placing equivalent burdens on commerce. 9
5. Norway’s comments on general principles for potential actions that USTR may consider under Section 301. 13

 

1. Introduction

Norway recalls its long-standing and close relationship with the United States, which is grounded in common values, and a joint commitment to democratic values, the rule of law, upholding fundamental human rights and eliminating the use of forced labour in global supply chains. As Norway outlined in the Government of Norway’s Reply to the Request for Comments dated April 15, 2026 (“Comments”),[2] both countries have consistently and cooperatively engaged in international efforts to address forced labour.

Norway submits the following post-hearing comments in addition to the Comments previously submitted, to address comments by other participants and statements at the hearings held on April 28 and 29, 2026.  Section 2 outlines how Norway’s laws effectively address and penalise the use of forced labour in supply chains, including with respect to imports.  Section 3 explains further how Norway’s acts, policies and practices are justifiable, reasonable, and non-discriminatory and do not burden U.S. commerce.  Section 4 explains how Norway’s acts, policies and practices are comparable in effectiveness to those of the United States.  Finally, in Section 5, Norway offers comments on general principles for USTR to consider in relation to potential actions under Section 301.

2. Norway’s laws effectively address and penalise the use of forced labour in supply chains, including with respect to imports

As Norway elaborated in Section 4 of its Comments, it has pioneered laws to prevent forced labour in supply chains.[3]  Norway’s constitutional, labour and criminal law all prohibit forced labour.[4] Further, to tackle forced labour in the supply chain, Norway has adopted the Transparency Act, which follows international standards both as to what constitutes forced labour and how to address the use of forced labour in the supply chain.[5]

In July 2022, when the Transparency Act entered into force, Norway was one of the first countries to implement an effective law to tackle forced labour in the supply chain.  Norway remains one of the few countries worldwide to implement such a law.

The Transparency Act follows international law in defining what constitutes forced labour.  More specifically, under international law, forced labour is defined and prohibited under, among others, a series of International Labor Organisation (“ILO”) instruments - ILO Convention No. 29,[6] its 2014 Protocol,[7] and ILO Convention No. 105.[8]  In Norwegian law, the Transparency Act applies in respect of “fundamental human rights”, which are defined as “internationally recognised human rights that are enshrined, among other places, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the ILO’s core conventions on fundamental principles and rights at work.”[9]  The reference to the ILO conventions includes the prohibition in international law on forced labour.

The Transparency Act mandates the use of due diligence by companies as the means to identify and tackle forced labour in their supply chains.[10]  Several international organizations have found a “strong consensus” around the use of due diligence for these purposes.[11]   These same organizations have also found that all international instruments on responsible business conduct “establish due diligence as the framework for companies to address child labour, forced labour and human trafficking risks in their supply chains”.[12]   Specifically, the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD MNE Guidelines, and the ILO toolkits, all set forth that companies should identify and tackle forced labour in the supply chain using supply chain due diligence.[13]  The Transparency Act turns these international standards into a mandatory obligation for Norwegian companies to undertake due diligence. 

Through the Transparency Act, Norway is one of very few countries that has mandated its companies to undertake such due diligence.  Norway’s approach follows the same principles applied by the United States in its enforcement of Section 307 of the Tariff Act and the UFLPA.  Under both these laws, the U.S. government expects entities to conduct compliance through due diligence.[14]

In light of the hearing testimony and written comments regarding the different approaches to tackling forced labour, Norway finds it useful to recall the central tenets of supply chain due diligence pursuant to the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines, and the ILO toolkits.  These are most fully captured in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (“OECD Guidance”),[15] which serves as a commentary on implementation of the OECD MNE Guidelines.

The scope of due diligence, under the international standards and as mandated under the Transparency Act, covers the entire supply chain, from its earliest point, such as extraction or harvest, all the way through to a company’s immediate suppliers and its own operations.[16]  As part of mandatory due diligence under the Transparency Act, therefore, a company must ensure a thorough understanding of its entire supply chain, including direct and indirect suppliers, and identify any parts of the supply chain where there is a risk of forced labour.

With respect to any parts of the supply chain that are found to involve actual or potential forced labour, a company must take prompt action to cease, prevent and mitigate adverse impacts.[17]  The company must work with the offending direct or indirect supplier to terminate the supplier’s forced labour practices.[18]  The company must also work with its direct or indirect suppliers to minimize and eliminate any risk of forced labour.[19]  If necessary, when efforts to correct an offending supplier’s practices fail, the company should terminate such business relationships.[20]  The company must also track the effectiveness of its actions.[21]  The Norwegian Transparency Act expressly incorporates these steps into its obligation for companies to conduct supply chain due diligence.[22]

Norway also highlights that it has enforced, and continues to enforce, the Transparency Act effectively.  In the event of non-compliance, the Act empowers authorities to order compliance and impose fines.[23]  The Transparency Act is enforced by the Norwegian Consumer Authority (“NCA”).  The NCA reviews due diligence compliance with a focus on companies operating in sectors with known risks.  In total, more than 800 companies have been subject to controls, resulting in proceedings against over 120.[24]

3. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are justifiable, reasonable, and non-discriminatory and do not burden U.S. commerce

Under Section 301, the USTR seeks to establish whether the acts, policies, or practices of foreign countries are unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and burden U.S. commerce.

Norway’s acts, policies and practices regarding forced labour are justifiable, reasonable and non-discriminatory, and do not burden U.S. commerce.  As noted, Norway’s constitutional, labour and criminal law all prohibit forced labour under domestic law.[25]  Further, the Transparency Act mandates supply chain due diligence, following the international standards adopted by the UN, OECD and the ILO, with the cooperation of the United States, which establish due diligence as the most effective tool to tackle forced labour in the supply chain.  Norway’s actions in adopting and enforcing the Transparency Act are perfectly justifiable and reasonable; and they are applied without discrimination.  These actions also benefit U.S. commerce because, given the inevitable overlaps in global supply chains, the actions required of Norwegian companies will have knock-on benefits for U.S. companies sourcing inputs from the same foreign suppliers.

4. Norway’s acts, policies and practices are comparable in effectiveness to those of the United States, placing equivalent burdens on commerce

Given the complexities of forced labour in the supply chain, a nuanced approach to addressing forced labour in supply chains is required.  These nuances are not one-size-fits-all and do not support binary outcomes.  

To consider these nuances appropriately, USTR and the Section 301 Committee should assess the extent to which the acts, policies and practices of foreign governments are comparable or equivalent to those of the United States in effectively tackling forced labour in supply chains, thereby imposing comparable or equivalent burdens on the commerce of foreign countries.

In that respect, Norway notes that the United States adopts such an equivalence-based approach in other areas of U.S. law regarding imported products, including, for example, the Import Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)[26].  In particular, the United States evaluates whether foreign regulatory systems are “comparable in effectiveness” to those of the United States.  Thus, in tackling a complex regulatory issue, the United States does not expect a foreign country to adopt exactly the U.S. regulatory approach, provided the country has an equivalent approach of comparable effectiveness. 

This equivalence approach is consistent with the sovereign right of all countries to adopt their own regulatory approaches to tackle social and environmental objectives, through measures adapted to their own domestic situation.[27]

Norway’s regulatory approach in the Transparency Act is equivalent to that of the United States with respect to (1) the means for identifying forced labour in a supply chain, (2) the penalties for non-compliance, and (3) the burdens on commerce.

First, with respect to the means for identifying forced labour in a supply chain, Norway and the United States agree on what constitutes forced labour, as both countries rely on the same definitions in the relevant ILO conventions.  Further, Norway and the United States (and several other commenters) agree that companies should follow international standards relating to due diligence to identify and eliminate forced labour in the entire supply chain, covering both direct and indirect suppliers.[28]  In that respect, Norway’s Transparency Act mandates that companies use supply chain due diligence, whereas the United States includes due diligence merely as an expectation pursuant to guidance issued under U.S. law.[29]

Second, Norway and the United States both employ systems that create strong incentives for compliance.  While the United States uses an import ban that focuses on products, Norway enforces compliance under the Transparency Act with actions against companies in the form of orders to comply and financial penalties/fines (which can be ongoing or lump sum).[30]  Norway’s law sets forth the principle that companies cannot benefit from any non-compliance.[31]  The forms of action used in the two countries are both well recognised, justifiable and reasonable means of enforcement that create comparably strong and effective incentives for companies to comply.  In many areas of U.S. law, the United States itself enforces the law through fines/penalties on companies.[32]  In the case of the Transparency Act, financial penalties create a strong incentive for compliance and there is no evidence to suggest that Norway’s enforcement of the Transparency Act has not been effective.

Third, Norway’s acts, policies and practices result in burdens on Norwegian commerce that are comparable to those imposed on U.S. commerce under U.S. law.  In both countries, the primary compliance costs are the day-to-day costs of implementing due diligence across the entire supply chain to prevent forced labour.  As noted, in both countries, the scope of forced labour is the same; and, in both countries, supply chain due diligence consistent with the international standards is the required (Norway) or expected (United States) means of compliance, with comparably effective enforcement tools.  The costs of compliance for Norwegian and American business are, therefore, equivalent. 

Finally, as Norway has highlighted in its Comments, Norway will complement its current regulatory approach to forced labour, when it implements the EU’s Forced Labour Regulation (“FLR”).[33]  The FLR prohibits the importation, exportation, and placing on the market, of goods made with forced labour.  It is currently in the process of being formally incorporated into the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and is foreseen to be implemented into Norwegian legislation without delay as soon as the incorporation procedure is completed.[34]  The FLR has a broad scope, and indeed is broader in scope than U.S. law, because it applies to all imports, sales (including online sales), and exports.[35]  The FLR also includes several administrative tools that will support effective and coordinated action by European governments.  It establishes a Network Against Forced Labour Products, which is a platform for coordination and cooperation between EU and EEA Member States;[36] and it will create a centralised database of forced labour risk areas and products.[37]  The FLR also provides for a single information submission point, through which any person or entity can submit information that relates to an alleged violation of the ban on selling, importing or exporting goods made with forced labour.[38]

***

In sum, therefore, Norway takes justifiable, reasonable, and non-discriminatory actions to tackle forced labour in the supply chain, which has benefits for U.S. commerce.  Further, these actions are comparable in effectiveness to those taken by the United States, and entail similar regulatory burdens for Norwegian commerce as the regulatory burdens imposed on U.S. commerce.  Norway is also in the process of complementing its current regulatory approach to forced labour with the implementation of the FLR, which prohibitsthe importation, exportation, and placing on the market of products made with forced labour.  As a result, therefore, there is no basis for USTR to take trade-restrictive actions against imports from Norway pursuant to this Section 301 investigation.

5. Norway’s comments on general principles for potential actions that USTR may consider under Section 301

Although USTR has no basis to take trade-restrictive actions against imports from Norway, Norway echoes the views of other commenters on certain general principles that should inform any actions that USTR proposes to take pursuant to this investigation, including with respect to the country and product scope of such actions.[39]

First, as outlined above, USTR should determine the extent to which a country’s acts, policies and practices to tackle forced labour in the supply chain are comparable or equivalent to those of the United States in their effectiveness and in the burdens they place on commerce from the country.  Where they are comparable or equivalent, USTR should not take any trade-restrictive action against products from that country, because the acts, policies and practices of the country do not burden U.S. commerce.  As set out above, this is Norway’s case.  As a result, Norway considers that the remaining three general principles set out below are not relevant to Norway, and Norway includes these three principles simply for the sake of completeness.   

Second, to the extent a country’s acts, policies, and practices are not fully comparable or equivalent, USTR should tailor any measures it deems necessary to the degree of comparability or equivalence.  For example, a country with close to equivalent acts, policies, and practices should not be subject to the same level of action as a country that has little to no acts, policies, or practices that address forced labour in force.

Third, any action proposed by USTR must effectively target imported goods at risk of being made with forced labour.  The actions should be measured against the level of forced labour risk and should not be imposed on broadly defined sectors or product categories.  Actions that affect sectors and products that have little to no forced labour risks will not accomplish USTR’s intended goals in this investigation.  Indeed, such actions may undermine the goals by restricting U.S. market access from countries and companies in the global supply chain that take action to address forced labour and that, in turn, promote other market participants to meet those standards.

Fourth, USTR should recognize that any country that chooses to introduce forced labour legislation needs time to do so.  As both national and international efforts show, the objective of combatting forced labour is best served through cooperative engagement that gives concerned countries the time needed to implement effective legislation.

USTR and the Section 301 Committee (and in particular, the Department of Homeland Security) is well aware of the practical challenges of adopting and operationalizing legislation implementing forced labour legislation and developing the investigative and enforcement capacity.  The U.S. Government has seen so first-hand through the implementation of the Uighur Forced Labor Prevention Act.  Changes in legal regimes cannot be realised overnight.  Affording a transition period would allow countries the time to adjust their laws, and would ensure that regulatory changes are meaningfully applied, and will effectively combat the use of forced labour in global supply chains.[40]

Such an approach is aligned with recent U.S. actions in the space of forced labour.  Just two weeks before initiating this investigation, the United States and Indonesia agreed to a two year period for Indonesia to adopt and implement an import ban to address forced labour.[41]  In October 2025, the United States also agreed to the same timeline for Malaysia to adopt such a ban.[42]  To the extent that USTR proposes to take action against any countries pursuant to this investigation, it should afford those countries the same two year period on a non-discriminatory basis.

The United States affords similar (or longer) periods under other legal regimes when it requires foreign regulatory action, including under the Import Provisions of the MMPA.[43]  Under that legal framework, countries were invited to provide a progress report to the United States.  Further, in case of particular risk during this implementation period, the United States adopted an import ban.[44]  In the context of forced labour, the United States could adopt a similar approach. 

Finally, many commenters, including coalitions of U.S. businesses,[45] argue the burden of import tariffs will fall heavily on U.S. industrial users and end consumers of imported goods, who will face higher prices and reduced supplies.  Any tariffs imposed as a result of this investigation will likely have an inflationary effect that will burden the U.S. economy and U.S. commerce.  This adverse impact of any actions taken pursuant to this investigation should, therefore, be weighed against the burdens that the alleged forced labour practices may have on U.S. commerce.  A tailored approach to USTR’s actions, and affording countries time to adopt effective regulation, as set forth above, would limit the adverse impact on the U.S. economy and U.S. commerce.

Pursuant to the Initiation Notice, these rebuttal comments are due “Seven days after the last day of the public hearings.” As the hearings concluded on April 29, 2026, the deadline for rebuttal comments is May 6, 2026. Thus, this submission is timely filed.

[1]             See Initiation of Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure To Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced With Forced Labor, 91 Fed. Reg. 12884 (Dep’t of Commerce March 17, 2026) (“Initiation Notice”).

[2] Comments submitted to USTR from the Government of Norway, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127051 (April 15, 2026), pp. 5 - 8 (“Comments from Government of Norway”), available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=HX9PRHGQVG.

[3] Comments from Government of Norway, pp. 9-19.

[4] Comments from Government of Norway, p. 9.

[5] Sections 3(b) and 4 of the Act relating to enterprises’ transparency and work on fundamental human rights and decent working conditions (“Transparency Act”), unofficial English translation available here: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2021-06-18-99.

[6] ILO Convention (No. 29) concerning forced or compulsory labour, available here:

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2039/volume-39-I-612-English.pdf.

[7] Protocol to the ILO Convention (No. 29) concerning forced or compulsory labour, available here:

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203175/volume-3175-A-612.pdf.

[8] ILO Convention (No. 105) concerning the abolition of forced labour, available here:

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20320/volume-320-I-4648-English.pdf.

[9] Section 3(b) of the Transparency Act.

[10] Section 4 of the Transparency Act.

[11] International Labour Organization, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Organization for Migration and United Nations Children’s Fund, Ending child labour, forced labour and human trafficking in global supply chains, (2019), p. 59, available here: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_norm/%40ipec/documents/publication/wcms_716930.pdf.

[12] International Labour Organization, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Organization for Migration and United Nations Children’s Fund, Ending child labour, forced labour and human trafficking in global supply chains, (2019), p. 59, available here: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_norm/%40ipec/documents/publication/wcms_716930.pdf.

[13] See Comments from Government of Norway, pp. 9-11.

[14] See Comments from Government of Norway, pp. 12-13.

[15] OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (2018) (“OECD Guidance”), available here: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2018/02/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct_c669bd57/15f5f4b3-en.pdf.

[16] See Section 4(b) of the Transparency Act; OECD Guidance, p. 10.

[17] See OECD Guidance, p. 76.

[18] See OECD Guidance, p. 31.

[19] See OECD Guidance, p. 32.

[20] See OECD Guidance, p. 33.

[21] See OECD Guidance, p. 34.

[22] Section 4 of the Transparency Act.

[23] Sections 9-14 of the Transparency Act.

[24] Comments from Government of Norway, p. 15.

[25] Comments from Government of Norway, p. 9.

[26] Fish and Fish Product Import Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 2016, available here: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/08/15/2016-19158/fish-and-fish-product-import-provisions-of-the-marine-mammal-protection-act.

[27] See Comments submitted to USTR from the Australian Embassy to the United States of America, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127000 (April 15, 2026), p. 10, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=JPM8FVH4MW;  Comments submitted to USTR from the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126380 (April 15, 2026), pp. 6-7, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=XR2DKKQJGW.

[28] Comments submitted to USTR from the New Zealand Government, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126572 (April 15, 2026), p. 4, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=P82JPWXJXH; Comments submitted to USTR from the Australian Embassy to the United States of America, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127000 (April 15, 2026), p. 4, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=JPM8FVH4MW;  Comments submitted to USTR from the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126380 (April 15, 2026), pp. 19-20, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=XR2DKKQJGW; Comments submitted to USTR from the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Switzerland, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00125946 (April 15, 2026), p. 3, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=PBPDHDVX6K; Comments submitted to USTR from the Government of the Republic of Singapore, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126283 (April 15, 2026), p. 8, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=HMM9JMB4XH; Comments submitted to USTR from the Labor Advisory Committee, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126600 (April 15, 2026), p. 3, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=T2CH4TWHT2.

[29] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Operational Guidance for Importers, available here: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/uflpa-operational-guidance-importers.

[30] Sections 12-14 of the Transparency Act.  

[31] Section 13(2) of the Transparency Act.  

[32] See, for instance, The Securities Act of 1933, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

[33] Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made

with forced labor on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, (“FLR”), available here: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj/eng.

[34] Comments from Government of Norway, pp. 19 – 20.

[35] Article 3 of the FLR.

[36] Article 6 of the FLR.

[37] Article 8 of the FLR.

[38] Article 9 of the FLR.

[39] See Comments submitted to USTR from the Labor Advisory Committee, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126600 (April 15, 2026), p. 10, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=T2CH4TWHT2; Comments submitted to USTR from The Mississippi Business Alliance, North Carolina Manufacturers Alliance, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00125810 (April 15, 2026), p. 2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=R3DG7GHY6R; Comments submitted to USTR from the Forced Labor Working Group, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127483 (April 15, 2026), p. 8, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=9VF6MF3BRQ.

[40] Comments submitted to USTR from the Labor Advisory Committee, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126600 (April 15, 2026), p. 10, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=T2CH4TWHT2; Comments submitted to USTR from the Human Rights Law Centre, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00125894 (April 14, 2026), p. 1, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=MH3H7VJ4HJ; Comments submitted to USTR from the The Human Trafficking Legal Center, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127189 (April 15, 2026), p. 8, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=7TBDBR8TXB; Comments submitted to USTR from the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127523 (April 15, 2026), p. 8, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=JDQ6X7FHXT.

[41] Article 2.9, Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia on Reciprocal Trade (February, 2026), available here: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/02.19.26%20US-IDN%20ART%20Full%20Agreement%20-%20US%20Final%20for%20Website%20sanitized.pdf.

[42] Article 2.9, Agreement between the United States of America and Malaysia on Reciprocal Trade (October, 2025), available here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-malaysia-on-recipricol-trade/.

[43] Fish and Fish Product Import Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 2016, available here: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/08/15/2016-19158/fish-and-fish-product-import-provisions-of-the-marine-mammal-protection-act.

[44] NOAA, Petitions and Other Actions Regarding the Marine Mammal Protection Act Import Provisions for Vaquita and Maui Dolphins (2026), available here: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international-affairs/petitions-and-other-actions-regarding-marine-mammal-protection-act-import

[45] Comments submitted to USTR from The Mississippi Business Alliance, North Carolina Manufacturers Alliance, and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00125810 (April 15, 2026), p. 2, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=R3DG7GHY6R; Comments submitted to USTR from American Petroleum Institute, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00126940 (April 15, 2026), p. 3, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=J3XB6P6MD6; Comments submitted to USTR from the Forced Labor Working Group, Section 301 Investigation of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, Submission No. USTR-2026-0133-00127483 (April 15, 2026), p. 6, available here: https://comments.ustr.gov/s/commentdetails?rid=9VF6MF3BRQ.