The Prime Minister's speech at the Arctic Frontiers conference

Checked against delivery. Two slides (maps) were also shown

Why the Arctic is important for us and our allies

Good morning, Tromsø, it's good to be here! – Thank you, Arctic Frontiers; I think it was 2007 when it first happened. I say this – just as an introduction to the fact that for those of you who think that the Arctic is now ‘the new kid on the block’, well – it's been there for a while; we have been here for a while. We know a bit about the Arctic.

Tromsø

We also know that the only constant thing in history is that things change. And I think, in Arctic, when we see the formidable nature, as when I flew in to Tromsø yesterday, there were clear skies from Trondheim and northwards. You think about this as eternal land and the beauty of the nature. And the fact that Norway has seven times more sea and seabed than land, and that we have the world's second longest coastline after Canada. – Anybody from Canada here? You hold a prime position.

And then you think that this is eternal, it is stable, nothing is really changing, or? Of course, things are changing here also. From the natural point of view; nature is changing. And also, obviously, in politics, interests, strategic interests – these things are changing.

I will take this opportunity today, with a map behind me, to share with you some perspectives on how Norway is anchored in this region. And I’ll speak not as a ‘Tromsø person’ – although I feel Tromsø is my second hometown – but from the Government of Norway. And I think I can speak on behalf of governments that have been around for the last decades – to explain why we have developed policy and policies on the Arctic.

We are set to meet what lies ahead. We have skills, experience, we have partners, we have research, and we have Tromsø – which I think is the Arctic capital and with the Secretariat of the Arctic Council, also celebrating an anniversary this year under difficult circumstances, but still upholds its activity.

Geography

So, my first point, from a Norwegian perspective, is the fundamental thing in geopolitics: geography. We are blessed with geography, I believe. And what you see depends on where you stand. It has a fundamental bearing on your strategic outlook and what it means to be Norway.

So, the fact that we have the vast oceans, the large maritime sector, and our resources – that have been available to Norway – and why the international law of the sea matters to my country, the long traditions of shipping through centuries until this day, and the fact that Norway neighbors Russia. Not all countries, not all neighbors, not all allies do, but some of us do. Kaja Kallas’ Estonia borders Russia, Alex Stubb’s Finland borders Russia, and my country, we border Russia, which has a bearing.

We have been at peace with Russia for a thousand years. I think it holds true that Norway is the only neighboring country with Russia with whom they have not been at war. All that matters. When I became Foreign Minister in 2005, in the first Stoltenberg government, we defined the High North as the strategic priority of the Norwegian government. And I’ll go back to the analysis back then, because the interest in the Arctic was starting to speed up globally, for some obvious reasons.

One reason was that the climate was warming and the ice was melting. And I think, you know; what research found in the Arctic in the early years of 2000 had a major impact on the IPCC, sounding the alarm, because we know now that it is heating faster in the north than elsewhere. Those conclusions were a bit like the canary in the coal mine, reminding people in the world that something was really happening.

So, you could shorten sailing times from Rotterdam to Yokohama across the North Eastern Sea route, or the other way around, coming from Asia to Europe. So that was one major element of change. The other was obviously – resources. When sea lanes open up, access to resources increases. And then, the growing interest from around the world, from Arctic nations of course, but also beyond.

Russia

And the third factor was, I would say, Russia. – Because at that time, the question was, where was Russia heading? So, we had, after 1989, after the fall of the Soviet Union, we have the years of the 1990s, the thaw in relations. You know, at the border between Norway and Russia in 1990, there were around 5,000 border crossings a year. So, we were quite close to the border between North and South Korea in terms of contact. And then, during the 1990s and the first decade of our century, this was opening up. I experienced on my watch that we reached more than 300,000 border crossings.

In 2009, it was noted in the media that after my Swedish colleague – you know, a Norwegian foreign minister always has a lot of relations with a Swedish colleague – my Russian colleague was the one I saw most frequently. It's the same guy sitting there now, defending the war in Ukraine, Sergei Lavrov, and I'll come back to that. But we dealt with each other because this was, you know, a time when relations were developing. We had all the exchanges, people to people, businesses growing, all that was happening.

The first Arctic policy strategy

So, with that outlook for Norway, it was fundamental to say that this is a strategic priority because this is the where things change the most. If Norway looked south, we have relations with Europe, European Union, we have the European Economic Area Agreement. Looking west, we have, across the North Sea, the UK and then the US, and our NATO allies. And looking east, we have our Swedish friends, neighbors, Finland in the north. But Russia, where was Russia heading and landing? That was a big question at that time.

So, we defined an Arctic strategy in 2006. And the first European Union strategy on the Arctic came in 2008. Today, there are 30 to 40 countries that have Arctic strategies, which is quite interesting.

And the Arctic Council is celebrating its anniversary this year. In the beginning, people could hardly spell the Arctic Council. What is it? What is it doing? And after a few years, the challenge was that there was a lot of countries wanting to come on board.

In addition to the Arctic states, there were all the observers. I remember, in my time, that we agreed that at least there should be one meeting during Arctic Council meetings only for the Arctic States, because there were so many other countries around.

International law

The other thing that was key – in that area, at that time – and this is so relevant today; that was to stress the fact that this is not a legal vacuum. – Because when I talked to people – you see, I spoke about this in Beijing, I spoke about it in New York, I spoke about it all around the world – and the impression was that up there, ‘close to the North Pole’, there is ‘a legal vacuum’, a ‘terra nullius’, where no rules apply.

So, we stressed the fact that the Law of the Sea, the UNCLOS, applies in the North. Coastal states have both responsibilities and rights. And even though the U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS, they respect it. So, one major effort for us was simply to state that here there are boundaries and they apply, and they need to be respected.

This map of the Arctic (put on the screen behind me) was developed by the Defense Headquarters in Bodø. I think it was the first kind of ‘circumpolar map’ of the High North. I still have it in my office. So, the fact was that the Law of the Sea applies, boundaries apply, and in 2008, in Ilulissat in Greenland, the Arctic States came together and signed a declaration stating this – the U.S., Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, signed this.

And I stress this now because even today we need to remind people that this is the fact. According to the Law of the sea, the Arctic states are also obliged to define their boundaries, the extension of their continental shelves. And if there are overlapping claims, the message is: sit down and negotiate the boundary.

Norway had been in business with the Soviet Union on that since the mid-1970s. When I took office in 2005, we had come closer, but it was still the big unsettled issue. And we knew enough about Russia to say that to have a disputed border with Russia is not really where you want to be, you want to have your borders fixed. So, the major effort we had during those years was to settle that issue, in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Sea, going from our land border up towards the North Pole, where there is a dividing line – so, in April 2010 we settled the issue. 170,000 square kilometers disputed area was divided down to the square kilometer in two. And the line followed the most modern principles of international law. And let me share with you: I'm happy we have that settled now. It was settled at a time where we could settle it, and got it ratified by both parliaments, and it is there.

We deal with Russia when we manage the Norwegian Arctic cod, one of the world's most valuable fish stocks. And that same family of cod – my American and Canadian friends – was around the Newfoundland coast, some decades ago, until it was overfished and disappeared. So, we have to look after our cod stock and we have to manage it, in concert with Russia. And we've been able to do so, which I believe is taking responsibility for what is happening up north.

So, all this is the background for how we worked during those years, and how the Arctic came on the agenda for so many states. And we can say that basically most of the people living in the Arctic – and this is no discrimination of those not living here – but most of them live in these areas in Norway. I had an ex-prime minister of Canada as a guest in my house the other day, we know each other well, and I reminded him that if you take this map and look at the 60th parallel – you can almost see it here, it goes from Helsinki to Stockholm, Oslo, Bergen and around the globe, the 60th parallel – then there are more people living in Tromsø than North of the 60th parallel in Canada. Canada has a huge area north of the 60th parallel, but not many people are living there.

Changes

So, this is a story leading up to where we are today. So where are we today? We know a lot more about Russia, unfortunately. Especially during that decade; we made progress in our bilateral relations, but at the same time we saw more and more authoritarian rule, more civil society organizations connecting with Norwegian partners being stopped, arrested, put in prison, and a country moving into more of a totalitarian kind of regime.

Then, 2014, Crimea, and then on to where we are today, with a full-scale war in Europe, looking like a different century. It is a profound change. And it is, from our perspective, the same people with whom we dealt with in the early part of this century – opening up, moving forward – they are governing this country today, waging war on another country, where they wake up every morning, the attacks on civilians, bombs, drones, missiles, a terrible story. It is an historic event of profound implications which will be lasting.

So, how will we approach all this from this outlook? We don't see, the government, when we consult our military and our intelligence, that there is an imminent threat against Norway. And for the time being, there is less of that because they are consumed by Ukraine. Fewer people and less equipment. But – obviously – a country that is re-establishing the Leningrad military district, is a country we have to watch out for. We have 200 kilometers common border. My Finnish colleagues have 1,300 kilometers common border. So, any government being neighbor to Russia in this setting has to make some profound decisions.

Defense

And here are the ones we have taken. Two major documents: We have agreed, the whole Norwegian parliament on a defense plan (LTP) for the next ten years. We will come back to the parliament in a few weeks with some kind of ‘reshaping’ of that plan, on where I think our focus should be towards 2030, the next five years. It's basically about taking part in more European responsibility for our own security, which for us will mean to invest significantly in our naval capacities, as in the Coast Guard, or other kinds of vessels that can secure presence in these vast areas. And, basically, in all branches of our defense sector, we will have to strengthen, recruit and adapt.

Our ‘mantra’ is still to maintain ‘High North, low tension’. And we believe that keeping low tension is of mutual interest among the Arctic states. We can never rule out the fact of our geography, our ‘map’, which I also brought with me to the American President when I met him in April in his office. And some of you have heard me say this before: I put the map in front of him, a bit more precise map than the one you see now, and then I said that; ‘Mr. President, 100 kilometers from my border is the world's largest nuclear arsenal, the submarines – the strategic capacity of Russia. And it is not directed against me, but probably against you. But we should be pleased, both of us, that we collaborate on monitoring all this very closely’.

We are ‘the eyes and ears of NATO’ in the north. We work together with the U.S. on this. It matters for U.S.’ homeland security. And let me be direct about this: I heard President Trump in Davos two weeks ago, where he said something like this: ‘We have given everything to NATO. NATO has given us nothing back’. And I'm a diplomat, so I will say now; ‘Mr. President, that is wrong’. I have a few other words in my head, but I think this is a sober way of saying it. Because this is collective security. The US presence in our defense capabilities is critical. But so is what we can do together in the north also for US’ security. This is where Russia is testing their weaponry. This is where the submarines sail. And we know a lot about that. So, this is a mutual thing.

National Security Strategy

So, the first thing is to have the long-term defense plan (LTP) working. Secondly, we developed last year, for the first time, a National Security Strategy. As most countries have. This is the first time we have one. And it has three major parts:

The first one is to get our defense up to shape, to where it should be. We will reach our obligations in NATO; 3.5% and 5% investments (of GDP) during the years to come, which is a major collective decision by our society; saying that when security matters, this is where we have to invest. So that's the first point.

The second point is perhaps the more complicated one; it is to raise resilience in society. Resilience for unforeseen situations – it may not be a security crisis, but it may be extreme weather, it may be breakdown of data, it may be absence of electricity. All of that has to be trained for – in municipalities, in businesses, in families, in my own life. What do I have in my kitchen if – all of a sudden – things break down for some days?

And the third priority in the National Security Strategy is economic security. How do we play into the fact that Norway is providing one third of the European Union's gas, almost 40% of UK’s gas, and critically important to Poland's independence of gas from Russia? How do we maintain that line? How do we preserve the fact that we are part of the value chain of the European economy in so many areas? And in new areas emerging; countries in the north will be important for space industry, we will be important for critical raw materials, and all of this has strategic implications.

So, these two strategies are critical for the way we also work on our Arctic perspectives, being present with this up here now. During these 20 years, we have developed the infrastructure, strengthened educational institutions, and last year we launched the biggest polar research program in modern times, in collaboration between research institutions and the industry and other key players, supported by government.

We have what we called the Barents Watch system, monitoring the maritime areas for fisheries, for transport, and so on and so forth. We have to be clear about this maritime dimension, especially when we have the Russian shadow fleet sailing up and down our coast with non-insured vessels heading for their markets.

Again, change is the only constant thing happening here. So, for us, having our own defense in shape, having our bilateral relationship with the United States linked to these specific security challenges in the north, and implementing – with our NATO allies – the Arctic strategy, which has been developed over years.

Greenland

There is an impression now in the media that ‘all of a sudden’ NATO has to look at what is happening in the Arctic. But we've done so for many years. I feel that in our parts of the Arctic we have the regional plans of NATO, adopted at the two recent summits. All five Nordic countries, now with Sweden and Finland, in NATO, we are part of the same command, with the UK, in Norfolk, Virginia. So, this is nothing new. It is operating and I would say it is very updated.

And then two words on Greenland: Speaking on behalf of Norway, making it very clear – and this is a reference to what I said in my introduction. The Law of the Sea and the legal principles apply in the Arctic.

This is not some kind of ‘a semi-legal region’. Greenland is an integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and the future of Greenland will be discussed between people in Greenland and people in Denmark. All Nordic countries are behind that, and all European countries and the bulk of NATO allies. – And again, in the last years, because the Arctic is now mattering more, the Arctic states in NATO have been working on how will we – as NATO allies – deal with the broader Arctic perspective in the future?

And here's my conclusion on that issue: In our part of the Arctic, which I believe is the most serious and concentrated region of the Arctic, bordering Russia, connecting the Barents Sea with the Baltic Sea, this is where we have to have our main focus. But we will also have to have our focus spread to other parts of the Arctic, because NATO must be relevant to all territories of the member states.

So, we respect and support that the Kingdom of Denmark is dealing – in their diplomatic relations – with these themes now, in a dialogue with the United States, and we will be adamant about these legal principles.

And the other track is that NATO will have to look at: What is the relevant presence of NATO in these areas, in and around Greenland? We don't see on any maps that there are ships from China and Russia circulating around Greenland, and we have good monitoring of what happens up there. But there should be an appropriate NATO presence and attention also to that part of the Arctic, but – again – in a measured way which is matching the facts.

Northern Nordics

Now, this is another way of showing maps (new map shown). There are many centers in the world. I don't say that the Arctic is the center in the world, but when turning the map upside-down, then you see the geography and the globe in a different way. You also see the depths of the seas: It is harder to follow Russian submarines when they are in those dark blue (deep) areas than when they are in the light blue areas, as an example.

And you see that the land mass of Norway, Sweden and Finland make some kind of a unitary impression in the north. So, in our High North Strategy now, after the relations with Russia changed, as they did, we put major emphasis on what we call the North of the Nordic region. We integrate with Sweden and Finland in a way which we have never done before. We had cooperation on defense and security with Sweden and Finland when outside of NATO, but it is – of course – significantly different when we can do all that with inter-operability.

Norway, Sweden and Finland have 250 fighter jets. If you separate them in three, it means something. If you unite them in one potential force, it means quite something different.

And then, my conclusion on this: We increase our cooperation with our European partners on security. And we welcome that our European partners are showing more interest in the Arctic with more presence. They sail alongside our ships, they come and visit.

In March there will be 25,000 troops exercising in northern Norway and northern Finland, from 13 different countries. I think the two biggest delegations are from France and the United States. And those 4,500 US troops, we really welcome them because they get valuable training. It is highly appreciated that we can exercise, having this transatlantic relationship. But I think – again, as I said – it is a mutual benefit in this. And this is the principle of having collective security.

So, congratulations to the Arctic Frontiers. Next year there will be an anniversary to celebrate. But we've been around in the Arctic for many more years, and we've been building policy and stability and continuity. And that I think is the challenge of policy up here: It looks like everything is ‘eternal’, but it is changing. And our policies have to change as well. And I hope I've illustrated to you how we have been trying to match it by policies with allies and by keeping High North, low tension.

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The PM’s answer to a question after the speech:

We have to hope and expect that we get back to some kind of normal in Europe. And I'm in the circle of Prime Ministers saying that one day this war in Ukraine has to end. Russia will still be there. It will be an Arctic state. It will be our geography. We have to think about what this will look like in the future. I think the fact that Arctic Council is existing, it is sustaining, I mean – there is activity. That's a good point. And perhaps this is an area where one can resume contacts again when the situation allows. But, in the meantime, we – who are here – operating as allies, as partners, have to deal with each other and deal with current issues.

You know, this is also an area with indigenous people. We have obligations. They have rights. They should be respected. They are being affected by the changing climate. This is something we have to deal with now – and not say that we will postpone it to some future time.

There is also growing interest, you know, in these rare minerals, which we have more of in the Arctic. But it is not an easy avenue to get access to them in a way which is responsible.

And then, I think, again, let us deal with this from the perspective of what is true and what is real. That's why I try to say to people who are saying that legal principles don't apply in the Arctic. – No, they do. So, when some people come with that, we have to be very clear. And when some say, you know, there is a security threat here and we have to deal with that imminently. – Well, let's see, what is it? Is it a threat? And how do we respond to it?

You know, when Norway is buying frigates from the United Kingdom, it means that there will be an integration between our two navies, which will be there for the future. When we buy our submarines from Germany, there will be an integration between our two countries. When we deepen cooperation with Denmark, Sweden and Finland on defense, it will be a more integrated Northern European region. And that is, I think, something we have to hold on to in the years to come, to show that we who live here, we take this responsibility.

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The speeches at Arctic Frontiers 2026:

• Arctic Frontiers Conference