5 Professionalisation

Norway’s peace efforts in conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s had a visible value and promoted Norwegian interests in several ways. This created a need to strengthen, professionalise and systematise the work. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a separate section for peace and reconciliation in 2003. The goal was to gather a significant part of the operational work, the expertise created in the processes, the responsibility for grant schemes, and competence building. This has been important for Norway’s ability to learn from experience, ensure a high quality of work, and further develop efforts in the face of an ever increasing array of new situations.

The work of systematising and professionalising the efforts is continuous. According to the report A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014 (the so-called ‘Godal Report’) from 2016, Norwegian peace and conflict diplomacy in Afghanistan was important for professionalising the effort.1

An important aspect of the work is the political commitment. In Norway, the effort is rooted at the political leadership level, while much of the day-to-day work takes place at the official level. Smooth interaction and a clear division of roles between the political leadership and the civil service make Norway’s diplomatic engagement effective and flexible, and have been key factors in achieving results. Decisions can be made quickly when needed. Political leadership contributes to processes, uses networks and contacts in relevant capitals, meets conflict parties, and undertakes visits on the ground.

Earmarked aid funds are a key part of the work for peace and conflict resolution. Grant funds for conflict resolution are channelled through Norwegian and international partners and local organisations at the country level. Grants also cover operational expenses for meetings and negotiations in which Norway is engaged, including security measures, meeting rooms and transport. Funding for the implementation of peace agreements is also important. This may include support for reforms, measures to strengthen human rights, the inclusion of women and vulnerable groups, demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, judicial settlements, ombudsman functions and truth commissions.

A number of countries have recently wished to strengthen their involvement in peace processes and wish to learn from Norwegian experiences. Some seek to strengthen or build up an internal apparatus for peace diplomacy. Countries we are in contact with about this include Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, China, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, South Africa, Turkey, and Uruguay.

Several countries are investing considerable resources in conflict resolution, and strategic decisions are often made at the highest level. The increased interest among these countries shows a broad recognition that peace and conflict diplomacy is an area of foreign policy that is important for safeguarding national interests and that provides political capital.

Figure 5.1 Several of the FARC’s delegates were flown by helicopter to take part in negotiations during the Colombian peace process. Here, a delegation is seen boarding an International Committee of the Red Cross helicopter in 2012.

Figure 5.1 Several of the FARC’s delegates were flown by helicopter to take part in negotiations during the Colombian peace process. Here, a delegation is seen boarding an International Committee of the Red Cross helicopter in 2012.

Photo: Dag Nylander

Textbox 5.1 The importance of good logistics

The importance of a well-prepared meeting cannot be underestimated. Logistics is often a large and important part of the work on conflict resolution. Peace processes can break down almost before they have begun, if the practical aspects go wrong. The following description is from a secret meeting in Norway between the parties to the war in Libya in 2011. It shows several of the dilemmas when arranging secret meetings, such as complying with the parties’ need for secrecy, avoiding a bad start, and treating the parties equally and with the respect they expect:

The delegations had to arrive separately. If they were left idle together in the hallway outside, there was a risk that the opening would go wrong. Besides, we had to decide who should go first. And where they should be placed. Those who came in and sat down first were, in a way, the room’s owners. If you are placed closest to the door, the feeling of being a visitor grows. Both can seem biased and be seen an expression that we as hosts have taken a stand. When two sovereign, independent states meet, this can be solved by placing a table crosswise with the short side facing the door. For us, it was more complicated. Gaddafi was still the ruler of a state, while the TNC was a rebel group in enemy territory. At the same time, Jalil and TNC were already recognised by France and Qatar, among others. In the end [… it was decided that we should] base ourselves on the formal status of the parties. Zidan knew that Norway did not regard his group as Libya’s new ruler. Gaddafi’s people should therefore sit down first, and the table could stand with the long side facing the door. We spent hours on similar details. The size and shape of the table, for example. And the meeting room. Intimate and small or grand and official? The decision was made to find a small room, preferably hidden deep inside a hotel, to create security. Then we had to track down a table that was short but wide enough to create sufficient distance. On the outside of the room, we needed two more meeting rooms. One for “B” and one for “T”, for clothes and phones, and for breaks in the meeting if the atmosphere became heated.1

1 Thune, H. (2023). Thune, H. (2023). Strengt fortrolig: Norges hemmelige forsøk på å stanse krigen i Libya. Kagge Forlag AS, side 162. (Strictly confidential: Norway’s secret attempt to stop the war in Libya’. Kagge Forlag AS, page 162. in Norwegian only.)

Figure 5.2 The first meeting of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was held in 1996. The commission was important for the country’s peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy.

Figure 5.2 The first meeting of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was held in 1996. The commission was important for the country’s peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy.

Photo: Mike Hutchings/AP

Textbox 5.2 Cooperation with South Africa

Norway has a long-standing cooperation with South Africa in the field of peace and reconciliation. South Africa has valuable experience from its own history of a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy and is a major diplomatic power on the African continent. Norway’s commitment to counter racial segregation in South Africa became strong throughout the 1960s. Together with the Nordic countries, Norway provided political and financial support to the liberation movement, including the largest party, the African National Congress, and to refugees in neighbouring countries. Norwegian solidarity and aid organisations participated actively. Among other things, Norwegian Church Aid and the Inter-Church Council were part of a Christian network that worked strategically to combat the policy of racial segregation. The apartheid regime came to an end through several major and minor negotiations between political parties in the period 1990–1993. Norway actively supported these processes. After the first free elections in 1994, and before the country got a new constitution in 1996, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established. This was a pioneer in international reconciliation work and was led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984.

Bilateral cooperation in this field currently has a particular focus on skills development and the inclusion of women in peace mediation and conflict resolution on the African continent.

Footnotes

1

NOU 2016: 8 A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2016-8/id2503028/