1 Purpose and background

1.1 Introduction

Norway is a liberal, open democracy characterised by an egalitarian society and robust welfare provisions. Citizens, authorities and other societal institutions enjoy a high level of mutual trust. The country has a good public education system and a highly educated population, robust protections for freedom of expression, and pluralistic editorial media.

These values and characteristics underpin a Norwegian society defined by security, stability and strong democratic institutions, and they make us resilient to disinformation.

However, authoritarian forces are on the rise in many countries around the world. There are fewer democracies now than 35 years ago. Among those that remain, several are introducing policies and laws that restrict freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in democracy.1

Authoritarian states also attempt to sway public opinion and policy decisions in other countries to serve their own interests, including through the propagation of disinformation.

This strategy provides an overview of the Norwegian Government’s efforts to prevent disinformation by maintaining and strengthening resilience. The outlined policy instruments and measures aim to safeguard open and enlightened public discourse, not limit the right to speak publicly or eliminate all false claims from the public discourse.

1.2 Background for the strategy

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression examined the frameworks for freedom of expression in contemporary Norwegian society.2 It concluded that conditions in Norway currently provide a favourable environment for public discourse. Over the past two decades, technological advances have increased opportunities for citizens to express themselves. The population now has access to an almost limitless array of information, and the barriers to participating in public discourse have been lowered. Freedom of the press and freedom of expression remain strong, but trust in institutions and politicians is declining.3

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression was also tasked with examining disinformation in a Norwegian context. It concluded that the extent of disinformation observed in several other countries gives cause for concern and requires vigilance, including in Norway, and highlighted the need to consider strengthening emergency preparedness and coordinated efforts.

The security situation is becoming more acute, compounded by the extensive technological change taking place. Even before the proliferation of generative artificial intelligence (AI) towards the end of 2022, Norway was undergoing a digital transformation.

Social media and other online platforms have simplified access to information, but they are also attractive channels for exerting influence. Hate speech, misinformation and disinformation generate engagement and spread rapidly on social media, not only because people comment on, like and share content, but also because platform algorithms further propagate it.4 Recommendation algorithms can also reduce the distribution of editorial content and other forms of credible information.5 Generative AI has made it even easier, cheaper and more effective to spread disinformation via social media and other online channels.

The infrastructure requirement in Article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution places a broad responsibility on the authorities to facilitate open and enlightened public discourse. This entails a duty to facilitate channels and institutions where people can express themselves and access relevant information. A key challenge is that social media – now central to public expression and information – are still subject to minimal regulation and limited democratic oversight.

In combination, the security situation, the use of disinformation by authoritarian states, technological advances and changing media habits among the population have dramatically altered the landscape of challenges. The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission concluded that this development requires Norway to prepare for a long-term situation of increasing exposure to influence attempts and the spread of disinformation.6 The gravity of the situation makes it imperative to strengthen Norwegian resilience, including in the civilian sector.

Although disinformation and other forms of information influence present a societal challenge, it is neither possible nor desirable to prohibit falsehoods. Nor can resilience be legislated. Addressing this requires concerted efforts and cooperation between the public, the business sector, the third sector, local and county authorities, and national government bodies.

1.3 The security situation

In May 2025, the Norwegian Government presented the National Security Strategy7 aimed at the joint effort to keep Norway secure and safe.

Norway’s fundamental security interests form the basis for this strategy:

1. A free and independent Norway
2. A robust democracy
3. A safe society with a high level of trust
4. An open and adaptable economy
5. Allied solidarity and cohesion in Europe
6. A world guided by international law in seeking solutions

All of these interests are vulnerable to disinformation and other information threats, either directly or indirectly.

The security strategy also provides a more detailed account of the security situation and describes how Norway is facing its most serious security situation since World War II. In a short period of time, the world has become more dangerous and less predictable. War is raging in Europe, superpower rivalries are intensifying, and transatlantic relations are marked by considerable uncertainty.

Intelligence activity is extensive, foreign actors are seeking to influence Norway, and the threat of sabotage is serious. Economic activity representing a threat to security has become more widespread, and state actors are deliberately using migration as a means of pressure. Norway must be prepared for these activities to escalate and become more aggressive in the future. These developments affect all areas of society.

Another worrying development is that state actors are funding radicalised groups and criminal networks and using them to carry out actions on their behalf. Serious acts of violence and disinformation are used to create fear and division. Finnmark, and particularly East Finnmark, is in a unique situation due to its geographic and strategic location at the border with Russia. Those living closest to the border are most directly affected by negative developments in Russia, and the region will remain a key focus in the ongoing monitoring of the strategy’s priority areas.

1.3.1 Threat assessments

In its threat assessment, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) writes that Russian intelligence and security services use AI and the Internet to propagate anti-Western narratives and incite extremist actors, including in connection with controversial media reports.8 The aim is to exert influence and create unrest in Western countries.

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) states in its threat assessment that it expects authoritarian states to conduct influence operations in Norway in 2025.9 Amid rising geopolitical tensions, covert influence operations and disinformation have emerged as key tools for certain states seeking to sway decisions and change public attitudes in their favour.

The Norwegian population is a target for Russian influence attempts, including actions aimed at weakening our support for Ukraine. China is also increasingly demonstrating both the capability and will to carry out influence operations directly targeting citizens in Western states and our security interests. PST expects the quality of Chinese disinformation to improve and the scale of digital influence campaigns to grow in the coming years. In 2023, the first digital Chinese influence campaign directed at a Norwegian audience was uncovered. Viking United News, which presented itself as a Norwegian online newspaper, was part of a larger international campaign in which a commercial Chinese company created over a hundred fake websites, embedding Chinese propaganda within a stream of news articles stolen from legitimate news sources.

The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) notes that generative AI is increasingly being used to support influence operations.10 It is employed to generate large volumes of false information, to create fake social media profiles and to orchestrate interactions between these profiles, thereby helping to spread disinformation or create the impression that a particular view is widely held.

1.4 What is disinformation?

Disinformation can take many forms and can originate from a variety of actors with differing motives. It could, for example, form part of a broader foreign-state influence operation, or be disseminated by authorities seeking to legitimise their own policies. It could also be propagated by groups or individuals for profit or other personal or political gain. In some countries, government authorities pay individuals to propagate disinformation.

Regardless of who spreads it, disinformation can displace other types of information and erode public trust in news media, politicians and institutions. It can undermine political debate and hinder opposition, threaten electoral processes, exacerbate polarisation and weaken alliance cohesion. Collectively, disinformation can erode many of the values and the resilience of Norwegian democracy.

In addition to disinformation, there are numerous other forms of information influence. These often share the aim of misleading, creating unrest, or shaping the views of the recipient. This information can then be propagated by individuals who believe the information they have received.

1.5 Scope and structure of the strategy

A comprehensive effort to counter disinformation can be divided into four phases: (1) prevention, (2) identification, (3) management and (4) evaluation.

1. Preventing disinformation involves strengthening resilience. We must reinforce the factors that hinder both the spread of disinformation and its effects on society. This includes pluralistic editorial media, an informed, discerning and critical public, and the regulation of algorithm-driven disinformation on social media.
2. Identifying disinformation requires authorities to assess individual cases in their broader context and determine whether they constitute a deliberate attempt to exert influence. This can be extremely challenging, as those seeking to propagate disinformation often attempt to conceal their motives.
3. Managing disinformation involves minimising its potential harmful effects, either proactively in anticipation of an attempted influence operation or once an attempt at dissemination has been identified. Measures can include informing the public about a specific influence operation, disseminating accurate information and, where appropriate, revealing those responsible. This requires a coordinated approach to public communication and can entail security assessments and responses.
4. Evaluating disinformation involves learning from previous instances of disinformation and from any countermeasures taken. The purpose is to improve our ability to prevent, identify and manage disinformation in the future.

This strategy is primarily focused on the first phase: prevention.

However, the phases are interlinked, and the capacity of authorities to identify, manage and evaluate disinformation will also help strengthen resilience and prevention.

In practice, it is difficult to identify disinformation and distinguish it from other forms of information influence and misinformation. Preventive measures will largely aim to strengthen public discourse and counter polarisation, thereby tackling issues that go well beyond disinformation. The strategy therefore includes policy instruments and measures across a wide range of areas, which together, and in various ways, also help reinforce resilience to disinformation.

Disproportionate measures to counter disinformation or other information threats could inadvertently suppress freedom of expression, thereby undermining the values we seek to protect. All measures to counter disinformation must therefore be carefully weighed against their potential impact on freedom of expression. Up-to-date, evidence-based knowledge on the Norwegian context is crucial for identifying the most appropriate measures and striking the right balance between freedom of expression, freedom of information and civil protection.

Building resilience to disinformation requires focus, coordinated efforts and measures across a wide range of areas. To illustrate the breadth of the Government’s work, the strategy includes both existing and new initiatives that support the objectives in different ways.

The landscape of challenges is changing rapidly, but strengthening resilience takes time. This strategy will remain in effect until 2030.

The strategy is divided into five priority areas, each of which starts with an overview of the background and the challenges involved, followed by a review of the relevant policy instruments and measures.

Priority area 1: Strengthen the public’s critical media literacy

Help strengthen the public’s critical media literacy, enabling them to assess for themselves the trustworthiness of information, images and videos.

Priority area 2: Hold social media to account

Ensure robust oversight of social media and other online platforms, as well as their impact on public discourse.

Priority area 3: Strengthen editorial media

Further develop media policy to help ensure that the media can continue to fulfil their societal mission in the future.

Priority area 4: Strengthen the knowledge base

Help generate knowledge about how disinformation is propagated in Norway, and the potential implications for public discourse.

Priority area 5: Strengthen government efforts and coordination between agencies