6 Strengthen government efforts and coordination between agencies

6.1 Introduction

Effective prevention requires shared situational awareness, risk assessment, information sharing and coordination. Preventing disinformation and other forms of information influence is challenging, as it can be hard to identify. It can also be difficult to distinguish it from legitimate expression, and it could unfold over long periods with widespread impact.

Numerous public actors are working to strengthen resilience to disinformation in different ways. The Norwegian Government’s total preparedness report outlines’ authorities efforts to strengthen the overall preparedness, clarify roles and responsibilities, and coordinate efforts to counter influence operations.109

A key strength is that many different actors are working towards a common goal from different perspectives and using various approaches and policy instruments. Addressing such a complex challenge requires multifaceted solutions, underpinned by clear responsibilities and effective knowledge sharing and collaboration where appropriate.

The principle of responsibility in public administration means that managing disinformation and influence operations primarily rests with each individual agency and sector. Certain ministries and agencies, however, have specific responsibilities that are central to the efforts to counter disinformation and influence operations.

Local and county authorities are responsible at the local level for protecting the population and preventing unwanted incidents.110 Local authorities’ remit in terms of preparedness is set out in the Civil Protection Act. In addition, local and county authorities play key roles in civil protection and emergency preparedness, covering areas such as elections, transport, business development, transport preparedness and upper secondary education. Although local and county authorities do not have specific responsibilities for countering influence operations or disinformation, they play a crucial role in ensuring that the public receive accurate information and in maintaining effective local preparedness.

In addition to public authorities, numerous actors in the business sector and third sector contribute, directly or indirectly, to strengthening resilience to disinformation. Private companies can, for example, be targets of disinformation as well as unwitting channels for its dissemination. They can also play important roles as employers or as owners and operators of platforms where disinformation circulates. The business sector can enhance resilience through measures such as information sharing, proprietary algorithms, ethical guidelines, responsible marketing and skills development. Both the business sector and the third sector can help build public trust and disseminate reliable information.

This chapter outlines the challenges and presents measures to strengthen and coordinate preventive efforts, as well as proposals for how authorities can further support open and enlightened public discourse.

6.2 Challenges

6.2.1 Need to strengthen preventive efforts

No single measure alone can strengthen resilience to disinformation. A range of actors across multiple disciplines possess complementary tools and capabilities that, collectively, can have a preventive effect. There is a need to reinforce these preventive efforts and to facilitate a shared understanding of the situation and the risks posed by disinformation targeting Norway and Norwegian interests.

6.2.2 Need to share information between relevant public actors and the business sector

The Norwegian Defence Commission highlighted a need to improve shared situational awareness and to better equip authorities to translate threat and risk assessments into specific policy measures.111

The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission stressed the need for information to be shared across sectors and at local, regional and national levels. This includes general information on the intentions of foreign states in Norway and information on disinformation methods and specific events that require scrutiny.112

Using coordinated measures has society-wide effects, making it essential to facilitate effective information sharing, coordination and shared situational awareness across sectors and all levels of government, as well as the business sector.

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security follows up and coordinates the Government’s work on hybrid threats, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. Inter-ministerial coordination forums have also been established to strengthen situational and threat awareness, including with respect to disinformation.

However, developments in the threat landscape indicate that more sectors and levels of government need to take a more proactive approach and establish channels for sharing information and experience.

To improve shared situational awareness, greater information sharing may be needed between civilian actors and the Norwegian intelligence, surveillance and security services (EOS services). While EOS services have extensive insight into various information threats against Norway, civilian actors could provide valuable expertise in their own domains, such as how information propagates on social media.

International cooperation with neighbouring countries and multilateral organisations is also essential to learn from the experiences of other countries and international organisations.

6.3 Policy instruments

Several of the policy instruments available to authorities to strengthen resilience to disinformation are discussed in earlier chapters. These include measures to safeguard public debate, pluralistic editorial media, teaching source evaluation in schools, and robust monitoring of social media. Below, we outline measures that directly target the specific challenges related to disinformation.

6.3.1 Intelligence and security services

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) (EOS services) contribute in various ways to resilience to disinformation, including by providing decision-making support to the authorities and through annual threat and risk assessments, which enhance public situational awareness. PST is responsible for identifying, assessing and managing threats from foreign influence operations. Since 2024, it has been a criminal offence to participate in such operations on behalf of foreign intelligence services where this may harm major societal interests. PST also has the authority to collect, systematise and analyse publicly available information for intelligence purposes, enabling it to produce analyses and assessments to support decision-making in situations where influence operations could pose a threat to Norway’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic governance or other national security interests.

The EOS services, together with the wider police force, work together to strengthen Norway’s capacity to detect and understand hybrid threats, assess vulnerabilities and provide effective decision-making support to the authorities, including through the National Intelligence and Security Centre (NESS) for hybrid threats.

6.3.2 Guidance on self-preparedness

During a crisis, misinformation and disinformation can spread quickly, either because the crisis itself causes confusion and misunderstandings or because actors seek to destabilise society. It is therefore essential to verify information sources and consider carefully what information should be shared. In 2024, DSB revised the guidance on self-preparedness among the public, following consultations with the NMA. The updated guidelines now include advice on source evaluation and how to identify disinformation.

6.3.3 Special measures to counter election interference

Prior to the last parliamentary, Sámi, local and county council elections, the Norwegian Government appointed a working group to strengthen resilience to election interference. Headed by the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, the group has included representatives from relevant ministries and agencies, including the intelligence and security services and the Norwegian Electoral Directorate. Since 2019, it has prepared an action plan for each election, detailing measures to strengthen Norway’s resilience to influence attempts.

These measures have targeted political parties and candidates, government authorities, the media and the general public, among others. They have included information campaigns relating to fake news and disinformation, research projects on foreign electoral interference, and brochures for candidates on personal security. The group has also served as an important network linking actors involved in elections, which has helped improve the coordination of efforts.

In June 2024, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development appointed a rapid-response expert group to examine the implications of generative AI for secure and democratic elections. The group reviewed experiences from elections held in other countries in 2024 and submitted its report in February 2025.113

The report emphasises that Norwegian society is well placed to withstand democratic threats, and highlights the importance of building on and reinforcing these strengths. It also notes that the information landscape has been transformed by algorithm-driven systems and that AI primarily amplifies existing threats. The expert group proposed a series of recommendations to reduce the risk of AI negatively affecting elections and democracy. These recommendations are aimed at multiple sectors, with the aforementioned inter-ministerial working group playing a key role in their implementation.

6.3.4 Hybrid network

In 2024, the Norwegian Government established a hybrid network comprising representatives from all ministries. Its purpose is to strengthen the coordination and understanding of hybrid policy instruments and threats, including disinformation, within the ministries and across the broader public administration.

6.3.5 International sanctions

Norway has endorsed the EU’s sanctions against Russia, with certain national adaptations. Norway has agreed to place individuals and entities involved in propaganda on sanctions lists, subjecting them to financial restrictions, including a prohibition on providing them with funds or other resources. Travel restrictions also apply to these individuals.

6.4 Measures

6.4.1 Expand the mandate of the NMA

The Norwegian Government intends to expand the mandate of the NMA in order to strengthen resilience to disinformation. The NMA currently contributes to the efforts to achieve societal objectives related to freedom of expression, legal certainty and a vibrant democracy. Its key priorities include facilitating a diverse media landscape and critical media literacy among the population.

The NMA is well positioned to assess the impact of disinformation in relation to potential countermeasures, both due to its expertise in freedom of expression and its responsibility for safeguarding media diversity.

Under the expanded mandate, the NMA will serve as a competent authority in accordance with the DSA, with responsibility for provisions relating to content and expression, as outlined in Chapter 3, Hold Social Media to Account. A central part of this role will be to analyse and document compliance by social media and other content platforms, and to ensure that any breaches are addressed, in coordination with the European Commission and other EU regulatory bodies.

In 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Equality commissioned the NMA to explore a methodology for assessing how online platforms influence public discourse in Norway. The aim is to establish a knowledge base on the scope and propagation of disinformation on these platforms and on how the platforms moderate such content.

The NMA will initially develop a methodology for analysing how platform algorithms impact on the reach of editorial content as well as misinformation or disinformation, and the extent to which platforms enforce their own terms of service regarding misinformation, disinformation and inauthentic behaviour.

With an expanded mandate and increased resources, the NMA will be equipped to carry out this task alongside other responsibilities related to strengthening resilience to disinformation. This will involve producing, gathering and disseminating knowledge about the propagation of disinformation and its impact on society, with particular emphasis on social media. The mandate should be viewed in conjunction with the NMA’s existing work on media diversity and freedom of expression.

The following sections provide further details of several of the new tasks the Government proposes for the NMA.

6.4.2 Establish a new council structure for preparedness planning and status assessments

In its total preparedness report,118 the Norwegian Government announced the establishment of a new council structure at the ministerial level for preparedness planning and status assessments. This represents an important step in countering hybrid threats, including disinformation. Systematic reporting on status and vulnerabilities across sectors will provide a more robust and comprehensive foundation for improved situational awareness within the Government. The new council structure will also facilitate more comprehensive and coordinated input to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in its role as the lead and coordinating ministry for the prevention and management of hybrid threats.

6.4.3 Make the inter-ministerial working group for resilience to election interference permanent

The work of the inter-ministerial group for resilience to election interference has yielded positive results.

The Norwegian Government aims to make the group a permanent body, eliminating the need to re-establish it before each election. This will help ensure that efforts in election security and building resilience to election interference are coordinated across sectors. Maintaining continuous activity within the group will also allow for a more long-term approach than was previously possible.

6.4.4 Strengthen public discourse

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression, the Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission and the Norwegian Defence Commission have all emphasised that the most important measure against hybrid threats, influence operations and disinformation is a resilient society. Trust and open and enlightened public discourse are central to achieving this.

The Norwegian Commission for Freedom of Expression concluded that the current status of public discourse and freedom of expression in Norway is good. Against this backdrop, and given current security challenges, the authorities’ priority should be to monitor developments and continue supporting and strengthening measures that have proven successful.

To guide this effort, which must be carried out across all sectors, the Norwegian Government will present a strategy for ensuring open and enlightened public discourse.

6.4.5 Update the Government’s communication policy

Part of the aim of the Norwegian Government’s communication policy is to ensure that it effectively communicates accurate and relevant information about rights, duties and opportunities to the entire population. While the policy does not directly address disinformation, its objectives, underlying assumptions and policy instruments are crucial for enabling the Government to provide timely information.

The current policy, adopted in 2009, needs to be reviewed and updated to align with today’s population and media landscape.

6.4.6 Raise public awareness of the threat posed by disinformation in Norway

The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) have a large body of knowledge on specific instances of disinformation and the threats such activities can pose to society.

Every year, these services publish their unclassified risk and threat assessments, which form an important basis for shared situational awareness among the authorities, the private sector and the public. Sharing this information more widely helps the public better understand the threats posed by disinformation. Enhanced situational awareness can lead to a more resilient society, where the public is better equipped to recognise disinformation and other influence attempts.

The authorities need to clearly convey the threats we face in order to strengthen awareness throughout society.

6.4.7 Promote transparency in public administration

An open and transparent system of public administration is an important tool for preventing and countering the spread of conspiracy theories and disinformation. Clear communication from the authorities about their decision-making processes helps to reduce uncertainty and mistrust, conditions in which misinformation and speculation can be rife.

Norway aims to be a driving force and take a leading role in promoting transparency in public administration. To achieve this, and to ensure credibility and legitimacy, the Norwegian Government is working continuously to identify and address the challenges associated with maintaining transparency.

Since 2010, Norway has been an active participant in the international Open Government Partnership (OGP). Through the OGP, Norway undertakes to strengthen transparency in public administration through extensive cooperation between the administration and civil society. Norway’s engagement in the OGP reflects the Government’s ambition to promote transparency as a core principle of Norwegian public governance. Norway also plays an active role in the OECD Working Party on Open Government.

A study commissioned by the Ministry of Digitalisation and Public Governance gathered insight into transparency in Norwegian public administration. The work drew on contributions from public administration, research communities, civil society and other key actors in the area. Its purpose is to build a clearer picture of the current situation, identify challenges and knowledge gaps, and provide recommendations for the Government’s further work within the framework of the OGP.

The work provides a starting point for further discussion on the Government’s efforts to enhance transparency in Norwegian public administration, and the recommendations will be given consideration in Norway’s engagement with the OGP and in the development of future action plans.

6.4.8 Protect national security interests in the information environment

The use of disinformation and other forms of misleading information is a key feature of today’s threat landscape. Such subversive activity can destabilise liberal democracies, the rules-based international order and the fundamental security interests on which our freedom and prosperity depend. Our national security interests in the information environment must, within the framework of democratic values, international law and individual rights, be protected from systematic interference and attacks.

Strategic communication entails coordinating objectives and resources to protect and promote fundamental national security interests. The Norwegian Government will strengthen the framework for more coordinated communication in order to protect national security interests within the information environment.

6.4.9 Initiate efforts to ensure a more comprehensive approach to managing disinformation and other information threats

The Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission recommended establishing a national function to monitor and analyse influence attempts, independent of the intelligence and security services. The Norwegian Government does not consider it appropriate to create a new agency dedicated to countering disinformation, but acknowledges the need for more comprehensive efforts to manage disinformation and other information threats.

These efforts must protect the interests of the public, the business sector and public authorities across sectors, and strengthen resilience, situational awareness, evaluation and international cooperation. This includes devising more systematic methods for identifying concerning developments, understanding individual incidents as part of a broader campaign, and ensuring that this information is shared with other relevant actors and the public.

This work must be carried out with full regard for freedom of expression and other rights. The objective cannot be to limit lawful expression, but it may include measures to inform the public about coordinated attempts at information influence that obstruct the free formation of opinion.

The Government will initiate cross-sectoral efforts to ensure a comprehensive approach that balances security policy considerations with the protection of individual rights.

6.4.10 Host the Internet Governance Forum in Norway

The Internet is now one of the world’s most critical infrastructures and a fundamental resource for the free flow of information in society. Protecting freedom of expression and countering disinformation therefore depend on the responsible governance of the Internet. The UN’s Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is the leading global platform for broad and inclusive dialogue among all relevant actors on Internet governance and global digital development. As the host country and organiser of IGF 2025, Norway will help safeguard the existing model for governing the resources and structure of the global Internet.

Norway will also work to ensure that this multistakeholder governance model will be continued in the future. The model is founded on the principle that governance is carried out collectively, with government authorities, the business sector, civil society, academia and technical communities jointly establishing the framework. The aim is to secure a sustainable global Internet that strikes the right balance between transparency, security, robustness and freedom. Achieving this requires active engagement from liberal democracies in the work of the IGF.

IGF 2025 will be the largest UN meeting ever held in Norway, with 4000–5000 participants attending in person each day and a comparable number participating via digital platforms.

6.4.11 Strengthen Norwegian representation in internation cooperation

There are numerous regional and international initiatives aimed at coordinating and sharing knowledge and experience on the propagation of disinformation, as well as on how countries can strengthen their resilience. Although countries have different starting points and cultural approaches to these challenges, sharing experience and knowledge and identifying common solutions is of considerable value.

The Norwegian Government recognises that such initiatives are becoming increasingly important and will therefore strengthen Norway’s engagement in relevant international forums and initiatives. This will include increasing support for cooperation with international organisations such as the Council of Europe to identify and counter online hate speech, and strengthening the cooperation with the OECD to promote robust governance at all levels, including with respect to information integrity.

The Government will also actively support NATO’s efforts to prevent and manage information threats, and will seek dialogue and cooperation with the EU on relevant measures and initiatives in this area.

The Norwegian Government will

• expand the NMA’s mandate in order to strengthen resilience to disinformation
• establish a new council structure for preparedness planning and status assessments
• continue the inter-ministerial working group on resilience to election interference and make it a permanent body
• consider the expert group’s recommendations on the implications of AI for elections
• present a strategy to promote open and enlightened public discourse
• raise public awareness of the threat posed by disinformation in Norway
• update the Government’s communication policy
• strengthen efforts to promote transparency in public administration nationally, in cooperation with civil society, the business sector and academia
• serve as a driving force for transparency internationally, through active engagement in forums such as the OGP and the OECD
• protect national security interests relating to the information environment
• initiate efforts to ensure a more comprehensive approach to managing disinformation and other information threats
• host the Internet Governance Forum in Norway in 2025
• strengthen Norwegian representation in relevant internation forums in order to share knowledge and experiences
• actively support NATO’s work to counter disinformation and information threats
• seek dialogue and cooperation with the EU on relevant measures and initiatives to counter disinformation