Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk

Proposal for a peace plan for Kosovo

Briefing to the Storting on the situation in Kosovo and the rest of the region, 7 June 1999

During the weekend, military experts from NATO met with Yugoslav officers, with observers present from Russia and Finland, to follow up on the principles for a peace settlement that were approved by the Yugoslav authorities last Thursday. The purpose was to draw up a plan for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the subsequent deployment of an international security force in Kosovo - KFOR. The parties have not, however, managed to agree on conditions for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces. It appears that the Yugsolav authorities have gone back on their agreement as regards these principles. This is extremely regrettable and may jeopardize the progress that has been made.

Even though Yugoslavia has approved the peace plan, whether or not this will be followed up by action remains to be seen. One of the decisive factors will be whether all the elements of the agreement can be verified. Previous experience with the Yugoslav authorities, for example in Bosnia, has unfortunately shown that it cannot be taken for granted that they will fulfil their promises until they have actually done so. NATO will therefore continue the air campaign until it is clear that the Yugoslav authorities are meeting the commitments they have undertaken.

Despite the problems that have now arisen, however, the efforts to find a political solution to the Kosovo conflict have moved onto a new, more positive track. On 3 June the Serb parliament voted 136 to 74 to approve the ten principles of a peace settlement that had been presented to President Milosevic the day before by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and the Russian envoy to the Balkans, Victor Chernomyrdin. Only the Serbian Radical Party voted against accepting the principles, which are in keeping with the demands put forward by NATO, the G-8 and the UN Secretary-General. The breakthrough was a result of persistent, concerted international pressure and NATO's air campaign.

The agreement that has been reached shows the importance of drawing Russia into efforts to persuade Yugoslavia to accept a peaceful settlement. The fact that President Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin were able to present a proposal endorsed by both Russia and the West has clearly made an impression on the Yugoslav authorities. The efforts made by these two men and by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on behalf of the EU, Russia and the USA, respectively, are highly commendable.

There is however still some uncertainty as regards Russia's role because of domestic disagreement in Russia on the plan approved by the Yugoslav authorities. Although Russia was represented in the negotiations by Victor Chernomyrdin. who is President Yeltsin's envoy, other Russian politicians and military leaders are of the view that he went too far in accepting the principles that were agreed upon.

The basis for a political settlement to the Kosovo conflict is contingent on an immediate halt to the fighting and the withdrawal of Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces and police from Kosovo. An international security force and an international civilian presence will be established in Kosovo, based on a mandate from the UN Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Yugoslav authorities have accepted that the international security presence will include a considerable NATO component and be under a unified control and command. An interim international administration for Kosovo will be established as part of the civilian presence.

After the withdrawal, a limited number of Serb troops, a few hundred according to the plan, will be permitted to return to Kosovo in order to secure Yugoslavia's borders and Serb religious and cultural monuments. These troops will also mark and clear minefields. All refugees will have the right to unimpeded and safe return under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

A political process will be implemented with a view to reaching agreement on a provisional political framework based on the Rambouillet Agreement, including respect for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). This is not, however, to delay the efforts to build up an interim administration in Kosovo.

In order to provide for the rapid, safe repatriation of refugees and to lay the groundwork for deployment of the civilian presence, it will be necessary to ensure that the international security force is put in place quickly. An internationally led police force in Kosovo must also be established as soon as possible.

In the future it will be especially important to maintain close contact with Kosovar Albanian political leaders. Yesterday evening I had a meeting with the head of the Kosovar Albanian interim coalition government and the UCK political leader, Hashim Thaçi, who welcomes the agreement reached on the G-8 principles, despite the fact that he strongly doubts that President Milosevic will comply with them.

Mr. Thaçi made no secret of the fact that the demilitarization of the UCK is a difficult issue, but confirmed that the UCK will respect the principles set out in the Rambouillet Agreement. He pointed out, however, that this must be done in close cooperation with the international community and that it will inevitably take some time. One of the conditions necessary to realize this is that NATO forces are present in Kosovo. Although independence remains the UCK's ultimate goal, they have accepted that this must be temporarily set aside in the interests of what can actually be accomplished at the present time.

If the peace plan is to be successful, it is vital that the various political factions among the Kosovar Albanians join forces so that an effective interim administration can be established. This will lay the groundwork for democracy in Kosovo in the future. Mr. Thaçi also says that he is open for cooperation with Ibrahim Rugova and other political leaders.

When implementing the principles of the Kosovo peace plan, it will be important to continue our support to the democratization process in the rest of Yugoslavia. President Milosevic and his supporters have accused the leaders of the democratic opposition of treason because of their criticism of the government. There are examples where opposition politicians, human rights activists and journalists have been threatened, and in one case killed.

President Milosevic could respond to a solution to the Kosovo conflict by tightening his grip on the Serb opposition. This must be prevented. The Milosevic regime is still trying to undermine and remove Montenegro's lawfully elected, Western-oriented president, Milo Djukanovic. And the constitutional conflict in Yugoslavia between Serbia and Montenegro continues. Moreover, there is still heavy pressure on the ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia.

Together with the four other major representatives of the Yugoslav authorities, President Milosevic was indicted on 27 May for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the UN International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the Court issued an arrest warrant, which is binding on all member states and Switzerland. President Milosevic's formal position as head of state is not, however, affected by this.

2. NATO operations and the military implementation of the peace plan

All the NATO member states support the Alliance's campaign. The results that have been achieved indicate that international pressure seems to have been effective, and confirms that NATO has had the right strategy. This has taken time, but the use of military force has been necessary in order to arrive at the political solution that is now on the table.

It is extremely important that KFOR is in place as soon as possible. This may be based on a resolution by the UN Security Council which gives the force a mandate in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The G-8 countries are currently involved in deliberations on the wording of such a resolution. If the process of adopting a Security Council resolution should prove to be protracted, it is entirely possible that the force may be deployed on the basis of an agreement with the Yugoslav authorities. A power vacuum must be avoided. The force's important tasks will include preventing new clashes between the parties to the conflict, enforcing the ceasefire, monitoring the demilitarization of the UCK guerilla forces and the withdrawal of Serb forces, and creating a safe environment so that the refugees can return to their homes.

In order to avoid unintended incidents, KFOR will not enter any part of Kosovo until the Yugoslav forces have been withdrawn. However, as I mentioned previously, it is essential that the international security force is prepared to fill the vacuum left by the Yugoslav forces quickly. This will prevent the Kosovar Albanians from exploiting the situation and taking control on the ground, or from provoking the Serb forces as they withdraw. The demilitarization of the UCK will be a test of the Kosovar Albanians' desire for peace.

The Alliance will be one of the principal components of KFOR, which will be under a unified control and command structure with the North Atlantic Council as the highest political authority. The plan is that the force will comprise approximately 50,000 troops. Ensuring the safety of the troops will be an important part of the planning. The participation of Russian troops will have to be clarified by means of separate agreements. The force will probably be organized in four or five areas of responsibility headed by the various contributing countries, as is the case with SFOR in Bosnia. The details of how these areas are to be defined have not yet been fully clarified. However, the deployment of various forces in areas of responsibility must not be a step towards dividing the province.

NATO will continue the air campaign until it has been verified that the withdrawal of Serb forces has begun as agreed. The Alliance is united in the view that it is still important to maintain military pressure on President Milosevic until it is absolutely clear that he will honour his commitments this time. NATO has reduced the scale of the air strikes, both in order to signalize a willingness to find a solution and to demonstrate that the Serb population would quickly feel the positive effects. The campaign has been intensified once more because of the problems connected with a military implementation agreement. The North Atlantic Council is prepared to adopt the operation plan for KFOR and issue activation orders for the deployment of troops.

Norway has assumed its share of the responsibility in the Alliance's efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Balkans. In the view of the Government, it is important that Norway continues to show solidarity with our Allies in the current, decisive phase.

Given the recruitment situation in Norway as regards serving in international peace operations, we will not be able to maintain our involvement in SFOR in Bosnia at the current level and at the same time contribute substantially to KFOR in Kosovo. A careful assessment will therefore be made, in cooperation with the NATO military authorities, of where a Norwegian contribution would be most valuable. It is generally agreed that it is important to ensure that the peace process in Bosnia is not impaired. In the course of the next few days, the Government will have a better idea of how many troops Norway will contribute to KFOR. This will, of course, be discussed with the appropriate bodies of the Storting.

3. The civilian tasks set out in the peace agreement

The Kosovo crisis has caused tremendous human suffering. The international community has responsibility for continuing efforts to allieviate this suffering. Implementation of the parts of the peace agreement concerning civilians will also involve a wide range of tasks and will require enormous resources from the international community. In reality the political and administrative functions in Kosovo will have to be totally rebuilt, as will much of the housing and other infrastructure. Reconstruction in the rest of Yugoslavia and the region will also be a demanding task.

The organization of the implementation of the civilian parts of the peace plan has not yet been decided. The questions concerning which organization is to have the main responsibility for implementation and how the various tasks are to be distributed are currently being discussed by the G-8 countries. In any event, it is clear that there will be more than enough to do for all the international organizations involved. The UN, the OSCE, the EU and the international financial institutions will all be assigned major roles. It will be important to ensure a clear division of responsibility and close and effective coordination between the various actors.

As Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, I have, of course, been concerned about the tasks that should be addressed by the OSCE and have taken the initiative for drawing up a comprehensive plan for the OSCE's role in the implementation of the civilian provisions of the peace plan. The OSCE is working on a comprehensive plan for rebuilding the political and administrative institutions in Kosovo, for democratization, for monitoring the observance of human rights and for preparing for and holding elections. The OSCE has also drawn up detailed plans for establishing an international police force in Kosovo, and will be able to assume responsibility for this if so decided by the G-8 countries. Such an operation will be extremely complex and will demand considerable resources. According to the OSCE plans, the police force would comprise 1,500 international police officers and 2,500 local police officers. Norway is prepared to take part in this force. I have informed the G-8 countries of the responsibilities that the OSCE would be able to undertake.

As soon as security and stability have been restored, we can turn our attention to the enormous tasks of reconstruction. In order to deal with these tasks, an interim international administration for Kosovo must be established for a transitional period. There are no longer any functioning political or administrative structures that can be kept up either in villages and towns in Kosovo or in the capital of the province, Pristina, although certain fragments are still to be found. We must therefore work simultaneously at local and central levels to restore the necessary interplay between the local and central authorities.

After an initial transitional period, elections must be held under international supervision. However, before this can happen, the census must be restored. This in itself is a considerable task, since all of the refugees have been deprived of their identification papers, and the population registers in Kosovo are said to have been partly destroyed.

Thus, there are a number of tasks that must be resolved. Health and social institutions must be re-equipped; the educational system must be revised; telecommunications, roads and railways must be improved; and water and energy supplies must be restored. These are only a few of the tasks we are facing. We must support local politicians and the local administration from the very beginning so that they are drawn into the process and take responsibility for their own future.

The EU, in cooperation with the World Bank, would be the logical choice to take charge of the comprehensive rehabilitation and rebuilding of housing and other infrastructure, and other tasks that require substantial funding. The process of considering how this can best be coordinated is already under way.

The Government is prepared to make a considerable contribution to the implementation of the part of the peace plan concerning civilians, in terms of both personnel and financial support. In this connection I would refer you to Proposition No. 88 (1998-99) to the Storting, which was submitted last Friday.

4. The refugee question and humanitarian tasks

As I have already mentioned, the humanitarian situation is still very serious. According to UNHCR estimates, there are some 780,000 refugees outside Kosovo's borders. They have a need for protection and humanitarian assistance where they are now. When the refugees return to their homes, they will also need immediate assistance in rebuilding homes, agriculture, infrastructure and a number of basic services. In addition, the UN emergency relief coordinator, who headed the first UN mission to Kosovo, estimates that there are more than half a million internally displaced persons who are in acute need of food, medical assistance and clean water.

Above all, the return of the refugees to their homes will depend on the security situation in Kosovo. The task of the international community will be to facilitate their rapid return. We cannot disregard the possibility that their return from neighbouring areas may be at least as difficult to handle as the flow of refugees from Kosovo.

In order to facilitate the refugees' rapid and unimpeded return, there will be an immediate need to establish interim political and administrative structures, an effective judicial system, and a large, internationally led police force to ensure safe and stable conditions for the population. This will call for close cooperation with the international security force.

The UNHCR is responsible for organizing the repatriation of refugees, and is now stepping up its plans for the return schedule. At the same time, there are still plans for continuing humanitarian programmes in countries of asylum. It is now clear that there will be a need for traditional emergency relief for quite some time. The UN is working on a plan to prepare for the winter, and on an appeal to meet the need for humanitarian assistance during the remainder of the year. The Government will assist in these efforts.

We do not yet have a clear idea of the humanitarian needs inside Kosovo, but priority will be given to the rapid delivery of relief supplies to all those in need. Norwegian NGOs that were established in Kosovo before March this year are prepared to return, and assistance will be channelled both via these NGOs and via the UN and the Red Cross. The UNHCR will be in charge of coordinating the humanitarian relief efforts.

In order to pave the way for return and rehabilitation, it will be necessary at an early stage to chart the extent of anti-personnel mines, booby-traps and undetonated bombs and to remove them. Mine clearance is among the humanitarian relief measures that must be implemented quickly. Norway has considerable expertise to offer in this area.

The NOK 225 million already allocated by the Storting for humanitarian assistance in the area has mainly been channelled through the UN and Norwegian NGOs. In Proposition No. 88 (1998-99) to the Storting on humanitarian assistance in connection with the Kosovo crisis, it is proposed that an additional NOK 350 million be allocated, which will bring the Norwegian contribution up to NOK 575 million. This does not include the expenses for the 6,000 refugees who are in Norway. The Government stresses the importance of allocating funds for humanitarian measures that not only meet immediate needs, but that also have a long-term perspective.

Once a peace settlement is in place, we must consider the humanitarian needs not only of Kosovo and its neighbours, but of the rest of Yugoslavia as well. It is obvious that there will be a great need for reconstruction, but there is reason to presume that there will also be considerable short-term humanitarian needs that have to be met. Throughout the conflict Norway has also provided humanitarian assistance to the Serb population, and to the Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, via the Yugoslav Red Cross. We will continue to do so, both through the Red Cross and through other relief organizations. It is important that the Serb population, too, sees that the proposed peace plan yields concrete, positive results.

5. The regional situation

Even after a political solution to the Kosovo conflict has been found, the threat to regional stability will remain. It will therefore be necessary to implement long-term measures to promote stability in order to counteract the negative regional effects of the Kosovo crisis. With this objective in mind, the German EU Presidency has taken the initiative for what is known as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.

In addition to the countries of the region, the USA, Russia, all the EU countries, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Council of Europe will participate in the Stability Pact. The intention is that Yugoslavia will be able to participate when the country has met the international community's demands. Norway has pointed out that it is no longer possible to achieve long-term security and stability in the Balkans unless Yugoslavia, too, is involved in a broad political, economic and social process.

The aim of the Pact is to promote close ties between the countries of the region by means of a network of agreements on good neighbourly relations. Through the Pact, a regional forum for cooperation will be established in which the participants will discuss measures for supporting the countries of southeastern Europe in their efforts to promote peace, democracy, respect for human rights, economic growth and enhanced security and stability.

The OSCE will serve as the political superstructure for the Pact, while the EU, in cooperation with the OSCE, will play a leading role as regards the practical implementation. The Pact is expected to be signed at a meeting of foreign ministers in Cologne on 10 June.

Norway, the EU and the international financial institutions have provided financial support to the countries of the region. Norway has given budget support to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, partly through the World Bank and partly on a direct basis. There will be a need for additional contributions in connection with the first regional donor conference, which is scheduled to take place as soon as possible after the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe has been adopted.

NATO, too, is working on measures designed to prevent the destabilization of the region. At the NATO summit meeting in Washington, there was full agreement on the need to initiate broader, more long-term cooperation with Yugoslavia's neighbouring countries. It was therefore proposed that a consultation forum should be established, based on arrangements NATO already has with other partner countries. This NATO initiative needs to be specified more clearly and must be viewed in conjunction with other regional stabilization measures.

6. Conclusion

Agreement has not yet been reached on a plan for the withdrawal of Serb forces. There is, however, hope that peace may soon be achieved in Kosovo. Then the refugees will soon be able to return home and begin the reconstruction process. They deserve our full support. We have seen that the unity demonstrated by the international community in its dealings with the Yugoslav authorities has brought results, and it now seems that the latter are beginning to realize that a political solution to the Kosovo conflict is the only option open to them.

We must not lose sight of the fact that formidable challenges still lie ahead. There is a great deal of uncertainty connected with the implementation of the agreed principles. This has been fully confirmed by the difficulties encountered in reaching agreement on the conditions for a Yugoslav withdrawal. At this point it is important to ensure that the agreement on the basic principles can be maintained.

I am in close contact with my colleagues from the G-8 countries on these issues, and will be travelling to New York tomorrow to discuss the situation with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.