Ladies and gentlemen.

It was with great pleasure I accepted the invitation by our Finnish hosts to address such a distinguished group of colleagues and friends. Not at least since the topic I was asked to elaborate on, both is one very close to my own heart, as well as a highly prioritized area of concern to my government.

You are probably all well aware of the increased focus the Norwegian government is giving the UN, both in terms of the ongoing UN reforms, and in terms of increased military participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations. While Norway at present has approximately 500 soldiers in international operations, only about 70 of these are directly participating in UN missions. This is indeed a strange contradiction to the fact that the UN currently is running an “all-time high” number of peacekeeping operations, counting close to 80 000 troops and more than 10 000 civilians.

Unfortunately, this kind of mismatch is not unique for Norway, but rather the rule for most western countries. At the same time, most of us share the view that the reforms suggested in the Brahimi report are essential to avoid future operational failures like the one we witnessed in the early 90s. I am of course thinking of the inexcusable tragedies like the ones in Rwanda in ‘94 and Srebrenica in ‘95. I think we can agree that the reforms suggested were well substantiated and necessary, and the report received as you all know massive support when delivered.

Very much as a result of both the lessons learned in the early 90s, and the Brahimi report, we today see a much more proactive and far-seeing UN than only five years ago. With an increased focus on a holistic approach, UN peacekeeping has scored strategic successes over the last few years; a free and independent East Timor, consolidation of the peace in Sierra Leone, and the first peaceful transition in Burundi’s history. Likewise, UN and NATO have overseen the installation of a democratic government and the ratification of a constitution in Afghanistan after two decades of war and autocracy. In Liberia a successful election has been held, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo the UN forces have gained great respect through robust offensive operations against rebel groups.

However, there is still work to be done regarding the reform process, and in some areas the progress has been rather slow. The Norwegian government therefore believes that increased military participation and burden-sharing in peace operations is a prerequisite in order to influence on both the pace and the results of the ongoing reform process.

But the prospect of influence is of course not the only motivation for my governments increased interest in the UN. We also firmly believe that our own national interests are best served by a word order based on human rights, international law, and social and economical development. As we see it, the UN, commanding the whole range of necessary means, is the only actor able to ensure such world order. In addition, the UN has more or less the monopoly to legitimize use of force, and Security Council resolutions in general receives broad international acceptance.

But, ladies and gentlemen, let me now turn to the main topic of my presentation; “from peacekeeping to peacebuilding”.

The objectives of peacekeeping operations have evolved from often just maintaining a status quo, to a far more ambitious approach. A peacekeeping force is no longer the solitary or even autocratic actor in the field, but rather one actor of a wide range of organisations providing humanitarian aid, reconstruction, reforms, institution building and so on. All these actors are increasingly dependent on each other. Hence, the UN is seeking involvement in the whole spectre of enterprises linked to crisis management and nation building.

Other organisations like the EU, AU and NATO are also broadening their approach to peacebuilding, with NATOs operation in Afghanistan as one of the best examples with its “Provincial Reconstruction Team”, or PRT-concept. Afghanistan was, after decades of war and misrule, a typical example of a failed state. Military force alone is only part of the solution to re-build such a state, and has to be integrated into a larger, comprehensive setting. The PRT concept consists of a range of closely orchestrated military and civil elements, and is as such an effective instrument for the support of local authorities. Although it is important to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian and military activities, it is vital that we improve our ability to coordinate these activities in complex peace operations.

In this respect UN is still a rather unique organisation, which unlike most others actually has access to the whole range of crisis management tools. Multifunctional UN operations reach from stabilisation and protection, to humanitarian aid, organising elections, security sector reforms, economical support, and so on. In other words; all measures necessary to build a state and ensure lasting peace.

This evolution is necessary, and reflects the typical crisis scenarios of our time. Previous conflicts and crisis were usually the result of armed conflict or war between states. Today however, stabilising and rebuilding failed states, or states in distress, has become one of the major challenges, if not ‘the challenge’, to the international community. These states are often recognised by the total lack of social and security institutions, internal conflicts, and very often deliberate violence against the civilian population. As a result, the international community no longer only faces a military conflict, but a whole range of challenges, often including humanitarian crisis beyond imagination. It has become evident that military means and traditional “blue helmets” only provides part of the solution, and that something more than “keeping the peace” has to be done to help conflict resolution.

Building lasting peace is a very challenging task and at times even more demanding than winning wars. The success of a typical contemporary mission of rebuilding failed states therefore depends on the success of the overall efforts of all parties involved. Because the UN traditionally has been the leading organisation in peacekeeping, and also possesses a range of different means, it has done a lot to get in pace with the evolution.

A series of measures have been taken, started of with the Secretary-General report “Reviewing the UN – a program for reform” of 1997. In this report the Secretary-General for the first time expressed the need for an overall authority over all UN entities in field operations. Such measures have later been echoed in several reports, like the already mentioned Brahimi report, and again in last years Secretary-General report “In larger freedom”. While the SG report of ‘97 expressed the need of an overall authority, the Brahimi report did not refer to integration as such, but stressed the importance of integrated planning. The SG report of last year emphasised that system-wide integration should remain a key objective in the field of planning and execution of UN operations.

The report also expressed the interdependence of security and development, by stating: “Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other. … While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to ‘cause’ civil war, terrorism or organised crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence.” This security-development nexus, linking the lack of development and human rights with the lack of security, further underlines the need for a comprehensive approach. Inevitably, it also forces us to re-think how we maintain our national security.

In my view, the initiatives called for in the three reports mentioned, are indeed necessary to meet the challenges of failed states, where building lasting peace should be the overall goal. Such challenges can only be met with a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach is also an absolute prerequisite to cover the three key functions of what we might call peacebuilding; to establish stability and security, to protect and help civilians, and to build a foundation for long term development and democracy.

These three key functions make up a triangular relationship, each depending on the others. It is difficult, or sometimes even impossible, for the “soft” parts of an operation to gain access to civilians with their humanitarian assistance without the “hard” parts providing security. On the other hand, military force alone does not feed, heal or educate civilians, as humanitarian aid alone does not provide security or build democracies.

I saw this quite clear in my resent visit to Sudan. In south Sudan there is a growing dissatisfaction among the population, since their expectations for rapid social and economic development obviously not has been met by the presence of UN peacekeepers alone. A peacekeeping force is of course very visible, and tends to raise the expectations of the population to an unrealistic level. It therefore needs to be backed by the necessary civilian agencies. On the other hand, in Darfur, UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs are not able to reach all in need of help because of the lack of security.

But this triangular relationship in peacebuilding is also one of the challenges, or even dilemmas, of integrated missions – reconciling “partiality” with “impartiality”. On the security and nation building side one often has to be politically and militarily partial, while on the humanitarian side there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian actors form that of the military or political.

Another dilemma of a comprehensive approach is the one of local ownership. Especially when dealing with failed states, there is a challenge in engaging host governments effectively, and at the same time pushing for positive changes. The lack of capacity in national government ministries often make international actors work independently, and over time undermining the transition process more than supporting it. Overcoming this problem calls for patience and a long-term approach.

To meet these challenges, there is a need for a holistic approach both in the planning and the execution of peacebuilding missions. Close cooperation and coordination by all agencies involved should be guided by a common long term strategic vision that both describes the desired End State and defines the actions necessary to achieve this. Plans must ensure that all recourses and activities are brought together and applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors. The challenge in this respect will be to define the “Centre of Gravity”, or the decisive parameters that must be influenced to make all other efforts work.

Strategic visions and centres of gravity have to be mission-specific, as one mission may have to concentrate on assisting the formation of a new government, while another may have to concentrate on the implementation of a peace agreement. Therefore, there is no fixed model for integrated or comprehensive operations, and the form of a mission should follow the functions that are needed to influence the Centre of Gravity and reach the defined End State.

As I have already mentioned a great deal has been done to reform and strengthen the UN over the last years, and to make the organisation ready and able to meet the security challenges of our century. However, work has still to be done, and one of the most important initiatives set forth by Secretary-General is still to come. Just before Christmas last year, the General Assembly and the Security Council approved the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to be supported by a new Peacebuilding Support Office set up in the Secretariat. Unfortunately, the election process for members to the commission has become rather lengthy, and the commission is not yet operational. With the final elections held this month, the 31 members of the Organisational committee may have their first meeting already next month. (Still to be confirmed)

As I have great expectations to the Peacebuilding Commission, I am of course especially happy that Norway will be one of the members for the first two years. With the Peacebuilding Commission the UN finally will have an intergovernmental body responsible for the overall coordination of post-conflict and peacebuilding activities. The Commission will not only provide a forum for internal coordination of planning and execution of peace operations, but also a forum for coordination of the activities of donors, troop contributors, and other international organisations and institutions.

Likewise, with the Peacebuilding Support Office the Secretariat of the UN will finally have a body dedicated to the overarching strategic thinking in the planning process and overall coordination inside and outside of the UN.

As I mentioned, one of the purposes with the Peacebuilding Commission will be to coordinate the activities of all actors at the international peacebuilding scene. It goes without saying that a comprehensive approach can not be limited to the UN alone. It also has to include the successful integration of all other actors, like other international institutions, regional organisations, donor nations, NGOs, local authorities, and so on. The list of actors in the business of peace, security and humanitarian aid is extensive, and probably growing.

Regional organisations like NATO, EU and AU are all adapting to the new security environment and challenges in a similar way as the UN. UNs “Integrated missions” and NATOs “Concerted planning and action” are both part of the attempts to respond to the challenges of peacebuilding. Also the EU is aiming at a broader approach and lager responsibility for peace and security, both in Europe and globally. With its broad spectre of economic, political and military assets, the EU are well suited to take on all the challenges of peacebuilding.

The establishment of EU Battle Groups, with one of the ambitions to help increase UNs crisis management capability, has also to be mentioned as a part the development of peacebuilding. I think the increased number of crises, humanitarian disasters and states in distress, eventually will increase the demand for ‘hybrid operations’ – operations mandated by the UN but executed by regional organisation. To succeed, such operations need a comprehensive approach, coordinated and planned not in solitary, but in close cooperation between the parties involved. In this respect I firmly believe the Peacebuilding Commission, when established, will be able to play a vital and important role.

Let me conclude by saying that I think the challenges of this century, and hence our new approach to security thinking, calls for multidimensional, global and long-term commitments – commitments that have to be coordinated and tailor-made to fit each situation. If we succeed in addressing these challenges, I think what we might call “peacebuilding operations” will be the rule, rather than the exception.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.